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Grenada:  Hindsight
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA History
TITLE:   GRENADA: HINDSIGHT
     	On the morning of 25 October 1983, United States armed forces
invaded the small Caribbean island of Grenada.  This account of
Operation Urgent Fury is to provide a historical analysis of the
high-level political and military decision-making process that
directed the conduct of the operation.
     	Almost ten years later, much of the data about the invasion
of Grenada continues to be controversial.  While many Americans
now have some idea of the operation, tight security and the media
restriction clouded much information on the military side of the
Grenada mission.  Critics challenge whether Operation Urgent Fury
should have been performed at all.  This paper does not purport to
tell the "whole" story.  Rather, the objective has been to make an
attempt to answer questions and settle some of the controversy.
     	The political decision to launch Operation Urgent Fury was
proven by events to be a sound one.  The Grenada campaign reflects
the operational level of war, in which the results of individual
tactical actions by the military were combined to fulfill the
needs of national strategy.  If the primacy of the political over
the military is beyond question, the application of the
relationship in the real world poses problems of terrible
complexity.  Political motives and the military methods and
procedures to realize them are seldom clear-cut and in balance at
any given moment.  They are anything but easy to synchronize.
     	The United States forces did achieve victory but no military
operation ever has been, or ever will be, flawless.  The dearth of
intelligence, which resulted in units going into the island blind;
serious planning errors; an absence of strategic or tactical
surprise; the failure to achieve concentration at decisive points;
continuous communication snarl-ups; and the lack of interservice
coordination or overall ground commander all helped to fuel
protests heard around the world.  American armed forces were
unprepared to respond to a crisis as a coherent joint force with
all the inherent complexities.
     	An ad hoc joint headquarters was required to plan and
coordinate the operation.  Inevitably constraints led to a task
force composed of units and staffs that did not know each other,
had never trained together, often did not understand each other's
procedures, and were forced to plan in isolation and ignorance of
what others were doing.  We must fight bureaucracy's perception
that the only way secrecy can be maintained is to exclude from the
decision-making process all those who are theoretically charged
with carrying out the decision.
     	The lackluster success of Operation Urgent Fury points to the
necessity for a blending of military capabilities into a joint
force.
                              GRENADA: HINDSIGHT
                                    OUTLINE
THESIS:  An analysis of Operation Urgent Fury can provide valuable
lessons learned that can prevent future operational planning
pitfalls and contribute to overall combat readiness of the Marine
Corps.
I.   	Background
II.  	Situation
     	A.  	The People's Revolutionary Government
     	B.  	Caribbean Reaction
     	C.  	United States Interests
III. 	Response
     	A.  	Intelligence Shortcomings
     	B.  	Operational Planning Pitfalls
     	C.  	Task Force Selection
IV.  	Evaluation
     	A.  	High-level Military Decisions
     	B.  	Information Flow\Operational Security
     	C.  	Joint Warfighting
                             GRENADA: HINDSIGHT
    	Why did the United States invade the sovereign state of Grenada
in October 1983, risking world condemnation and the possible
escalation of violence outside the borders of the tiny Caribbean
island?  Throughout the twentieth century, U.S. policy toward the
Caribbean has been the sum of the answers to a set of recurring
questions, how to (1) ensure stability, (2) discourage foreign
penetration, (3) promote economic development, human rights, and
democracy, (4) gain respect for U.S. investment, the American
flag, and U.S. citizens, (5) maintain good relations. (5:15)
Alfred T. Mahan educated the political leaders of his and
succeeding generations about the strategic implications of the
Caribbean for U.S. interests.  The United States has been
motivated not so much to control the region but to keep things
from veering out of control where they could be exploited by
others. (5:16)  Thus a direct and active concern with the Caribbean
basin is a demonstrable facet of U.S. foreign policy and has given
rise to a corresponding image of the region in the consciousness
of U.S. decision-makers.
                                   SITUATION
    	In 1973 the new JEWEL Movement (NJM) was formed after the
merger of the Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and
Liberation (JEWEL) and the Movement for the Assemblies
of the People (MAP) led by two young lawyers, Maurice Bishop and
Kendrick Radix. (7:7)  On 13 March 1979, under the leadership of
Bishop and immensely successful and widely welcomed coup seized
power.  After the coup the NJM formed the People's Revolutionary
Government (PRG) , with Maurice Bishop as the Prime Minister.  The
new government suspended the 1974 constitution; however, Grenada
remained a monarchy, with the British Queen as head of state
represented in Grenada by the Governor General Sir Paul Scoon.
    	During its almost five-year rule, the PRG substantially
fulfilled the promise made or 13 March 1979.   The social
economic, and political life of Grenada was transformed (10:34)
Cuba and Grenada established diplomatic relations.  Cuba also
became the first country which Bishop visited after the
revolution, and Cuba remained Grenada's principal ally until the
American invasion.  Grenada also established close relations with
Nicaragua after the Sandinistas  seized power on 23 June 1979.
Grenada signed three agreements for free military assistance from
the Soviet Union covering the supply of infantry weapons and
equipment. (8:21)
    	Cuban aid to the Grenadian government covered a wide range of
activities.  Assistance included the construction of a new
international airport at Point Salines, health care, culture,
housing, sports facilities, advisors on planning, agricultural
industries and development of the island's electricity
network. (l2:38)  The majority of the Cubans were alleged to be
engaged in constructing the new airport.  They were housed in
barracks near the airport.  All Cuban conscripts undergo military
training and these "construction workers" did have small arms
(rifles and machine guns) with about 300 rounds per weapon for
self defense. (12:66)  According to an official Cuban communique,
784 Cubans were on Grenada on October 25. (12:38)  The Cubans had
been instructed by Fidel Castro to "fight to death."  The Cuban's
helped organize the militia and the People's Revolutionary Army
(PRA).
    	The Peoples Revolutionary Army (PRA) was approaching 600
soldiers supplemented by the People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM)
estimated at between 2,500 and 2,800 members. (5:163)  Although its
forces already dwarfed those of its neighbors, Grenada was
planning to field an 18-battalion force consisting of between
7,000 and 10,000 men and women under arms. (7:20)  For weapons the
PRA had a wide variety of small arms.  The weapons of significance
were six ZU-23-2 (range 2500 meters) Soviet-made anti-aircraft
guns, which were distributed between the two airports at Point
Salines and Pearls, and the capital, St. George's. The PRA also
had twelve 12.7mm guns, six BTR 50 P Wheeled APCs, two BDRM Scout
Cars, six 85mm guns, and twenty-four 8lmm mortars. (7:22)  In
proportion to population, this would have given Grenada one of the
largest military forces of any country in the world.
    	Grenada's relations with other countries in the Caribbean were
not as close as those with Cuba; however, Jamaica, Barbados,
Trinidad  and Guyana did recognize the PRG. (12:39)  The smaller
island states of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) were disturbed by the NJM's reformist surge and were
uniformly antagonistic to the Grenadian revolution.  The OECS gave
the PRG neither support nor recognition.  On 19 October 1983,
Bishop was executed by a hardliner Leninist faction in the NJM led
by Bernard Coard and General Hudson Austin.  On 23 October the
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) decided to cancel trade agreements
with Grenada and to expel it from the community. (12:55)
    	The OECS feared democracy would eventually be at risk
throughout the region and had already decided some sort of
military action was necessary.  Exploratory talks with the
British, Canadian, and U.S. ambassadors were held.  U.S.
policymakers were already aware of the gravity of the
request for assistance and the criticism the administration was
likely to face if they obliged. (2:101)  The choice made shows the
interest and influence of outside groups on policy and decisions.
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) specifically
had authority in this matter in accordance with its charter and
had requested the assistance of the United States.  Additionally,
the Grenadian Governor-General, Sir-Paul Scoon requested
assistance which provided a "nice legal justification" for
American action. (6:64)
    	"Vital" security and economic interests provided a tangible
basis for distinctive United States' policies within the region.
Ever since the U.S. became a global power at the close of the
Second World War, the persistent purpose of the U.S. has been to
maintain global preeminence.  Several transformations have
occurred  as various administrations have reacted with higher
or lower policy profiles toward the region according to the
nature of the "threat" perceived.  The Reagan administration' s
stark Cold War view of the world as a battle between the forces of
"good" (the United States) and "evil" (the Soviet Union) set the
stage. The administration felt that the principal problems in the
Caribbean basin had stemmed from an erosion of order, which had
been subverted by Soviet/Cuban expansion in the area and resulted
in the decline of U.S. power in the region. The solution follows
the diagnosis:  re-establish that order at whatever cost is
required. (10:54)
   	U.S. confrontations, whether protracted or brief, covert or
overt, by proxy or otherwise, have been impelled and guided by the
doctrine of Containment. (12:5)  The Soviet Union and its governing
ideology, Communism, is no longer the chief threat to the global
preeminence of the United States.  If the national policy of
Containment had been outdated in 1983, would the U.S. have invaded
Grenada?  According to a draft National Security Decision
Directive, the American operation would seek to ensure the safety
of American citizens.  However, the invasion of Grenada was as
much to "roll back" the allegedly Marxist regime and in the
process to give signals of our resolve to Cuba, the USSR, and
others as it was to "rescue" the American students. (12:62)
    	The U.S. was anxious to prevent a repeat of the Iran experience
with hostages taken and the U.S. publicly held helpless by a group
of fanatics. (2:103)  The Caribbean leaders told Ambassador Francis
J. McNeil the Americans on Grenada appeared genuinely vulnerable,
especially the medical students.  Moreover, they submitted,
resistance on the island was growing and a bloody civil war seemed
likely. (2:101)  Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, seven of his
colleagues, and scores or Grenadian citizens had already been
brutally murdered.  The American Government could not assure the
safety of foreign residents due to the chaotic internal situation
on the island.
    	U.S. citizens, most of whom were medical students, were
subjected to round-the-clock, shoot-on-sight curfew imposed by
Revolutionary Military Council.  This faction had decided that
they would use force if necessary to impose their will.  Moreover,
the RMC seemed to view the American citizens on the island as
pawns.  By itself, concern for the safety of U.S. citizens on
Grenada would probably have been sufficient to prompt a limited
rescue operation by the United States.  It is far easier to
prevent a hostage situation than to deal with one .  The
make-or-bread factor to mobilize the American people -- to invoke
the national will --  was the student.  (9:174)
    	The Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) " government of
terrorists"  repeatedly assured the American government about the
safety of the Americans on the  island, and allowed those who
wished to 1eave to do so without hindrance. (12: 63)  The school
authorities  were convinced, in spite of urging from the State
Department to the contrary, there was no danger and said so
publicly.  Moreover, 500 parents of the students and the school
authorities sent a telegram to the U.S. State Department imploring
it not to take any precipitous or provocative action. "(3:76)
    	Clausewitz said, "War is simply the continuation of policy by
other means. "(4:605)  Although in the course of deliberations over
the scope of contemplated American action, policy opponents urged
the use of the political element of power; the decision to use the
military element of power best served America's national
interests.   The United States' aim was to achieve our will by
defeating their fighting forces to a degree consistent with our
national objectives.
                                  RESPONSE
   	The United States had invaded a foreign country; it was likened
to the Soviet's attack on Afghanistan -- international law had
been degraded.  Nonetheless, the political decision to launch
Operation Urgent Fury was proven by event  to be a sound one.  The
Grenada campaign reflects the operational level of war, in which
the results of individual tactical actions by the military were
combined to fulfill the needs of national strategy.  In line with
the Weinberger Doctrine which stated the U.S. will not commit
armed forces unless the U.S. intends to win, Urgent Fury was over
in a few days.
    	The U.S. forces did achieve victory but no military operation
ever has been, or ever will be, flawless.  Campaigns are planned
and battles are fought by people, and people err.  After Urgent
Fury, the U.S. military became sensitive to criticism, some ill
informed, about how the operation had been conducted.  However,
the uninformed allegations had gone uncomfortable near the mark.
Although the campaign succeeded, the dearth of intelligence, which
resulted in units going into the island blind; serious planning
errors; an absence of strategic or tactical surprise; the failure
to achieve concentration at decisive points; continuous
communication snarl-ups; and the lack of interservice coordination
or overall ground commander all helped to fuel protests heard
around the world.  American armed forces were unprepared to
respond to a crisis as a coherent joint force with all the
inherent complexities.
   	Very little was known about Grenada. After all the fuss about
the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG), the National Security
Council's Special Situations Group was shocked to hear that there
was no Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent on the island, that
nothing was known about the military situation and that no aerial
photographs has been taken of Point Salines for more than five
months.(1:118)  Strenuous efforts needed to be made to rectify
these omissions; however, Vice President George Bush endorsed an
overriding necessity for secrecy.  For the most part, the
reluctance to inform even the participants was due to the need to
maintain security. (1:122)  The effort to prevent leaks was
understandable but in reality ineffective.  The movement of ships,
aircraft, and Caribbean troops had been seen and reported. Within
the Caribbean, Urgent Fury had been expected and achieved no
strategic surprise. (1:122)
    	The planners had one need above all others -- information!
Intelligence of the Cuban presence on the island, the Cuban's and
Soviets' likely reactions to attack, the People's Revolutionary
Army (PRA) strengths, armaments, deployment, intentions, and
morale were essential elements to be considered.  Defenses at the
airfields and the locations of the PRA headquarters,
communications centers, supply depots, and antiaircraft positions
were also necessary details.  Because a main objective was the
safety of foreign citizens, there was a need to know where such
persons were living, whether the people were guarded, whether the
people were at one location or several, and how many were at each.
Facts on the geography of Grenada:  the suitability of beaches for
landing, the type of terrain, the road system, the hills,
the layout of St. George's, and the details of approaches to
selected targets were all critical knowledge for tactical
planning.
     	U.S. planners had started to focus on Grenada on October 13,
almost two weeks before Urgent Fury took place.  On October 14
Atlantic Command (CINCLANT) at Norfolk, Virginia, had been alerted
to start planning for possible noncombatant evacuation operations.
As far back as October 18, the military crisis action team at
Norfolk started putting together various courses of action. (2:94)
Nevertheless, the killing of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop six
days before the intervention lit the fuse making military
involvement inevitable.  The Joint Chiefs of staff (JCS) provided
Langhorne Motley, assistant secretary of state for inter-American
affairs, with a list of the military resources immediately
available.  A warning order was sent to CINCLANT confirming that
evacuation plans were required at once.
   	There was a contingency plan gathering dust in the Pentagon,
number 2360, which was supposed to provide for a Grenada
intervention. (1:131)  This document specified that the overall
command of such an operation would be given to the commander of
U.S. Forces Caribbean at Key West, Florida, with the on-scene
commander being the commander of XVIII Airborne Corps.  An air
assault or airborne division from this corps, with one additional
brigade on call, a carrier battle group, and a marine amphibious
unit (MAU), were earmarked as the forces available.  Likely
objectives noted in this plan were Pearls and Salines airports,
St. George's harbor, the supposed naval facility under development
at Calivigny, and the radio transmitting station at Beausejour,
north of St. George's.  To the surprise of many, this plan was not
activated; indeed, it was not discussed at the CINCLANT planning
conference. (l.132)
   	At very short notice, CINCLANT, rather than the U.S. Forces
Caribbean Command, became responsible for planning what was mainly
a ground forces operation.  The operation would involve techniques
and tactics bearing no resemblance to maneuvering naval battle
groups, convoy protection, or antisubmarine warfare, the normal
day-to-day activities of the staff at CINCLANT.(1:126)
   	On October 22, the JCS issued their Execute Order for Urgent
Fury to Admiral W. L. McDonald, CINCLANTCOM.  He was to "conduct
military operations to protect and evacuate U.S. and designated
foreign nationals from Grenada, neutralize Grenadian forces,
stabilize the internal situation, and maintain the peace.  In
conjunction with OECS/friendly government participants assist in
the restoration of a democratic government on Grenada. "(1:126)
   	Once invasion became an option, the JCS had to put together an
operation involving the Navy and Air Force--at the very least for
transportation and logistic support--with Marines, and possibly
the Army, for ground combat.  Because the operation demanded speed
and surprise, with the possibility of hostages being seized or the
need to rescue U.S. citizens, there was a role for Special
Operations Forces as well. (1:131)
   	CINCLANT had the major planning responsibility; nevertheless,
It also had to accept any constraints imposed by the Pentagon.
CINCLANT had to accept the decision that it was not going to be a
Navy-Marine Corps operation but that all services and Special
Forces had to have part of the action.(1:131)  The planning was
further complicated by the requirement to include small units from
Caribbean countries in a peacekeeping role.  Additionally the
final plan had to incorporate the involvement of both State
Department and CIA.  Urgent Fury would increase the prestige or
the armed force, so none of them could afford to miss out.  Urgent
Fury was unusually complex.
    	Inevitably constraints led to a task force composed of units
and staffs that did not know each other, had never trained
together, often did not properly understand each other's
procedures, and were forced to plan in isolation and ignorance of
what others were doing.  In fact there was no combined
U.S./Caribbean planning, and the role of the Caribbean contingents
was not clear to commanders.  On October 25, when Caribbean troops
started landing at Salines, at least one Ranger battalion
commander knew nothing of their participation in the operation;
for a brief moment, he thought the peacekeeping Caribbean troops
were the troublesome PRA.(l:131)
    	CINCLANT could not cope unassisted.  The headquarters at
Norfolk lacked the intelligence and communications capability to
handle the situation.  Neither did the staff have the planning
expertise for a large-scale ground operation.  To assist CINCLANT,
the commanders of Readiness Command (REDCOM-Army), Military
Airlift Command (MAC-Air Force), and Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC-Army) were designated as supporting commands. (1:127)
   	An ad hoc joint headquarters was required to plan and
coordinate the operation.  An on-scene commander was needed.  The
operation would require a Joint Task Force (JTF) , under a task
force commander.  For Urgent Fury the task force was designated
JTF 120, with its commander being Vice-Admiral J. Metcalf
III. (11:5)  To supplement Metcalf's naval team, a seventeen-man
joint "fly away" staff was assembled.  This group would fly out
with the commander of JTF 120 to establish an operational
headquarters on the U.S.S. Guam, the amphibious assault ship (LPH)
leading ARG 1-84.
    	It was all very rushed, with most officers never having worked
together before. (1:127) The short time frame also limited the Army
and Air Force representation on Metcalf's staff.  Lack of a staff
who understood how to plan and coordinate joint fire support
programs for ground forces on the island, by aircraft or naval
gunfire, was an omission later much regretted.  At the initial
main CINCLANT joint planning conference on October 22, the MAC
representative did not make the meeting, hindering the airborne
planning because MAC was to provide all the transport aircraft to
get everyone, except the amphibious task force, to Grenada.
Similarly there was no senior Marine Corps participant as the
amphibious task force was at sea; the Special Forces
representation was only a lieutenant colonel and three junior
officers.  Effective cooperation was to prove virtually impossible
to achieve below the rank of general. The Navy dominated
proceedings.  Logistical problems were never considered at all.
This exclusion was made in the name of security. (1:132)
   	The decision made to divert toward Grenada the amphibious task
force (ARG 1-84) that had sailed for Lebanon on October 18,
resembled the original contingency plan.  On board was the 22d MAU
with some 1,900 marines comprised of Battalion Landing Team 2/8,
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 261 (REIN), and MAU Service
Support Group 22. (11:2)  No reason was given when the task force
received the orders to divert .  If further word had not arrived by
midnight of October 23 the amphibious task force could resume the
transit to Lebanon.  The force immediately assumed an emissions
control (EMCON  condition  under which messages could be received
but not sent  (radar and other electronics equipment did not
transmit under EMCON) .  Colonel J. P. Faulkner (MAUCO) and his
staff believed that if the MAU were committed to Grenada its
mission would be to evacuate non-combatants.  At this point, the
task force had no information on the location or precise numbers
of American citizens to be evacuated, but planning proceeded on
the assumption that such information soon would be provided.
                                  EVALUATION
   	In the future during deliberations over the scope of a
contemplated American action, military advisors must provide sound
insight to the national, leadership with regard to the selection of
the best prepared task force composed of units and staffs that
have trained together.
   Activation of the existing contingency plan would have allowed
FORCARICOM to execute a plan prepared by that command minimizing
the devastating effect imposed by the short time available for
pre-invasion planning. The result achieved by using the plan was a
task force composed of units and staffs that knew each other, had
trained together, and properly understood each other's
procedures.   Moltke ("The Elder") said. "No plan survives contact
with the enemy. "(13)  But that does not mean that you disregard
the plan beforehand.  By activating the established plan much of
the friction, which Clausewitz described as "the force that makes
the apparently easy so difficult," would have been
prevented. (4:119)
    	To the amazement and consternation of all who wanted
information, none was available.  From a military point of view,
the lack of accurate intelligence was to be the most serious
failure of the operations. Perhaps the most serious handicap,
aside from the conspicuous lack of good intelligence on all
aspects of the operation, was that nobody had a map. (1:131) To
plan a military operation without reference to a map is a sure way
of making participants unclear and confused about their
objectives.
    	To prevent the undersupply of information in the future the
CINC and his staff must anticipate the problems in information
dissemination to the task force.  A map planning package or a
contingency plan request to the CINC -- critical to the operation
-- should be transmitted prior to EMCON being set.  If this
request is not received, then the CINC must cue on that omission
and transmit the necessary information out to subordinate units.
   	We must fight the bureaucracy's perception that the only way
secrecy can be maintained is to exclude from the decision-making
process all those who are theoretically charged with carrying out
the decision. (5:59)  Through military competence and operational
security we can dissolve the overriding concern for secrecy that
hampers vital information flow. A better balance between
operational security and disclosure of critical information
necessary for planning can be achieved by revising emissions
control (EMCON) procedures, updating communications equipment, and
using a little common sense.
   	Parallel and concurrent planning favors the assembly of
commanders and staffs of corresponding echelons in the same
locality.  If such an arrangement is not practicable, the exchange
of liaison officers qualified to perform essential planning is
necessary.  An exchange of liaison officers must be accomplished
as early in the planning process as possible.  The liaison
officers are to ensure such things  as link-up frequencies and
call signs are distributed and joint fire support measures are in
use.
    	Intelligence staffs were caught badly off-balance. (1:129)  The
CIA should be tasked to provide a Joint Intelligence Liaison
Element (JILE). The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) should be
tasked to provide a National Military Intelligence Support Team
(NMIST).  JILE and NMIST can provide advanced communications
capabilities and intelligence on an enemy's armaments, intentions,
morale and other essential elements of information, to operational
commanders in crisis situations.
    	For U. S. military operations to succeed today and in the
foreseeable future given the often divergent nature of service
interests to succeed in war utilization of "joint" methods,
structures, and relationships is required. Interoperabi1ity of
communications equipment between all services ought to be pursued
in the acquisition cycle and jointly coordinated by each service
component.  Intrenched and institutionalized interservice
rivalries that afflict the defense establishment must be set aside
for the common good.   The lackluster success of Operation Urgent
Fury points to the necessity for a blending of military
capabilities into a joint force to achieve military objectives
that will support our national objectives.  Despite
service-specific problems, joint warfighting concepts, processes,
and doctrine must be adopted and taught to all operating forces to
include all supporting agencies.
                                 BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.  	Adkin, Major Mark. Urgent Fury. Massachusetts: Lexington 
Books, 1989.
2.  	Beck, Robert J. The "McNeil Mission" and the Decision to Invade
Grenada. Newport: Naval War Review, Spring 1991.
3.  	Burrowes, Reynold A. Revolution and Rescue in Grenada. New York:
Greenwood Press, 1988.
4.  	Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret.
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984.
5.  	Dunn, Peter M. and Watson, Bruce W. American Intervention In 
Grenada. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
6.  	Gilmore, William C. The Grenada Intervention. New York: Facts
on File,  1984.
7.  	Grenada: A Preliminary Report. Washington,D.C.: U.S. Department
of State and Department of Defense, December 1983.
8.  	Lessons of Grenada. Washington,D.C. : U.S. Department of State, 
February 1986.
9.  	McNeil, Frank. War and Peace in Central America:Reality and 
Illusion. New York: Scribner's,1988.
10. 	Payne, Anthony, Sutton, Paul and Thorndike, Tony. Grenada: 
Revolution and Invasion. New York: ST. Martin's Press, 1984.
11. 	Spector, Lieutenant Colonel Ronald H. U.S. Marines in Grenada 
1983. Washington,D.C. : History and Museums Division Headquarters, USMC,
1987.
12. 	Tiwathia, Major Vijay. The Grenada War. New Delhi: Lancer 
International, 1987.
13. 	Attributed.



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