Marine Corps C2 Systems Integration: Considerations For The Future
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA C4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: Marine Corps C2 Systems Integration: Considerations For The
Future
Author: Major Robert A. Gearhart Jr., United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The Marine Corps' ability to effectively integrate
multiple C2 systems on future battlefields requires a Corps-wide
C4I2 concept implementation, appreciation of C2 system
complexities, knowledge of key organizational relationships,
educational reform, alteration of traditional MOS progression
paths, and efficient manpower utilization.
Background: Success on the modern battlefield depends greatly upon
the responsiveness of various C2 systems and their timely
interpretation, presentation, and dissemination of critical
information to operational commanders. The importance of this
issue is magnified by the fact that the Marine Corps continues to
develop and field a significant number of C2 systems which
intersect all battlefield functional areas. C2 systems
interoperability is critical within an integrated environment that
shares information both horizontally and vertically. Significant
corrective costs, as well as degraded operational capabilities
result from poorly planned or incorrect C2 systems integration.
Such results will be unacceptable in the constrained fiscal
environments of the future. A basic C4I2 concept has been
published in CMC White Letter 1-91. The Marine Corps
organizational structure is currently struggling to implement this
concept throughout the Fleet Marine Force, and the Supporting
Establishment. The diversity of MAGTF employment options also
raises concern for C2 systems integration within a joint or
combined environment. Additionally, current professional military
education, traditional MOS progression paths, and manpower
utilization do not maximize C2 system integration efforts within
the Marine Corps.
Recommendations: The Marine Corps can streamline C2 systems
integration by employing the C4I2 concept, improving professional
military education, removing M0S progression path impediments, and
using a more logical manpower to billet assignment process.
MARINE CORPS C2 SYSTEMS INTEGRATION:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: The Marine Corps' ability to effectively
integrate multiple C2 systems on future battlefields requires a
Corps-wide C4I2 concept implementation, appreciation of C2 system
complexities, knowledge of key organizational relationships,
educational reform, altering traditional MOS progression paths, and
efficient manpower utilization.
I. Background
A. State of Technology Today
B. C4I2 Concept
C. Marine Corps C4I2 Reorganization Issues
II. MAGTF C2 Systems
A. Tactical Versus Supporting Establishment C2 Systems
B. Intelligence Systems
1. Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS)
2. Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS)
3. Intelligence Analysis System (IAS)
C. Operations/Fire Support C2 Systems
1. Tactical Combat Operations (TCO)
2. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
(AFATDS)
D. Combat Service Support C2 Systems
1. Marine Integrated Logistics System (MILOGS)
2. MAGTF Il/Logistics Automated Information Systems
(MAGTF II/LOG AIS)
III. Organizations Impacting C2 Systems Integration
A. Commandant of the Marine Corps (C4I2 Department)
B. Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)
C. Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM)
IV. Current Impediments To C2 Systems Integration
A. Professional Military Education
B. MOS Progression Paths
C. Manpower Utilization
MARINE CORPS C2 SYSTEMS INTEGRATION:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Given the complexity of current and emerging command and
control (C2) systems, the sheer number and speed of technological
advances applicable to warfighting are almost incomprehensible.
Innocently enough, the intent of this movement is to simplify
things in an increasingly complex combat environment. However, by
making things easier, technology has also made things more
difficult.
Nowhere is this more evident than within the realm of C2 for
operational forces. Indeed, success on the modern battlefield
depends greatly upon the responsiveness of various C2 systems and
their timely interpretation, presentation, and dissemination of
critical information to decision makers. Within the past several
years, literally hundreds of C2 systems supporting various combat
functional areas such as intelligence, fire support, air
operations, maneuver, logistics, and communications have been
fielded. This literal flood of state-of-the-art information
systems demonstrates the complexities which technology brings to
the battlefield.
To further complicate matters, Marine Corps C2 systems will be
required to accept information from and provide information to a
myriad of allied, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
Department of Defense (DoD), Joint Staff, Army, Navy, and Air Force
C2 systems when conducting ioint or combined operations. Without
proper employment or understanding, these well-intentioned C2
systems will quickly overload the very operational commander they
were designed to assist. Currently, the Marine Corps does not
properly train or utilize officers to employ multiple C2 systems in
an integrated environment. Over time, the lack of focus in these
areas actually works against efforts to provide meaningful C2
systems integration within the Marine Corps.
Such neglect could prove detrimental, if not fatal, in the
increasingly complex battlefield environment facing Marine forces
in the future. Additionally, degraded operational capabilities, as
well as significant corrective costs, result from poorly planned or
incorrect C2 systems integration. The Marine Corps' ability to
effectively integrate multiple C2 systems on future battlefields
requires a Corps-wide C4I2 concept implementation, appreciation of
C2 system complexities, knowledge of key organizational
relationships, educational reform, alteration of traditional
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) progression paths, and
efficient manpower utilization. If the Marine Corps continues to
ignore addressing these issues, the development and operation of
multiple C2 systems in an integrated environment will be fragmented
and degraded.
In order to meaningfully integrate C2 systems throughout the
Marine Corps, there must first exist a basic philosophy and
understanding of the "C4I2 concept". General Gray described the
essence of this concept in White Letter 1-91, and charged
commanders to "...instill the C4I2 concept into your Marines until
it becomes the only way of thinking with regard to the effective
integration of all command and control assets to support the
commander".(1)
Although the Marine Corps is currently moving in the right
direction, not everyone is fully on board yet. To be effective, C2
systems integration requires the understanding and efforts of all
involved, or we will fall short of the goal - supporting the
operational commander. Once fully accepted, this philosophy will
permeate doctrine and subsequently provide a common roadmap for C2
systems integration within the realms of policy, requirements,
acquisition, operations, and life cycle support. As both resources
and personnel shrink in the coming budgets, the criticality of
doing C2 systems integration right (the first time), should be
clearly evident.
The C4I2 concept presented in CMC White Letter 1-91 is
relatively simple:
- Positive command and control are critical to success in war
- A commanders ability to receive, process, disseminate, and
display all information required to support decision making and
effective control of forces are keys to success on the modern
battlefield
- Command and control systems include personnel, equipment,
facilities, communications, procedures and information. Together
as a whole these assist the commander in planning, directing,
coordinating, and controlling operations of assigned forces.
- Interoperability links the C4I2 concept
- Command and control systems must support how we organize and
fight as MAGTFs, either independently or in concert with joint and
combined commands.(2)
Recently, several reorganizations have taken place to support
introduction of the C4I2 concept within the Marine Corps. At the
Headquarters Marine Corps level, the C4I2 Department has combined
the functions of communications, automated information processing,
intelligence, and systems interoperability under a single policy
sponsor. In the Fleet Marine Force, the Surveillance
Reconnaissance Intelligence Groups support the operational
commanders by communicating, fusing, and disseminating a myriad of
information throughout the battlefield. Finally, the Communication
Electronics Officer (CEO) and Information Systems Management
Officer (ISMO) functions have been combined to form the G-6 at the
general staff level.(3)
However, as takes place during any reorganization that also
implements a new operating philosophy, a certain degree of
misunderstanding and resentment have occurred. At some levels,
both personal opinions and political "ricebowl" issues still
prevent a Corps-wide "sensor-to-shooter" C4I2 concept
implementation. The crux of this problem lies in the fact that C2
systems can still be acquired without coordination by many
organizations within the Marine Corps. While normally well-
intentioned, C2 systems purchased from a local commanders
discretionary funds, often add to, rather than solve the problem.
Functional managers of Automated Information Systems (AIS's) within
the Supporting Establishment (SE) often procure first and ask MAGTF
interconnection questions second. Today, C2 systems integration
crosses all functional areas. Tactical systems are required to
interface with administrative systems on a daily basis to support
commanders. Supporting Establishment (garrison) systems are taken
to the field and plugged into tactical systems. There exists
almost no distinction between the two anymore in this age of
information transportation. Both sides still remain separated,
albeit moving begrudgingly toward some sort of eventual agreement.
However, in the present environment of rapid technological
developments, the movement is not fast enough. The key players
cannot even agree upon who should establish standards for the
Marine Corps. This particular issue has prevented updating the
Marine Corps C2 Systems Interoperability Order (MCO 3093.1C) for
over two years. Publishing the new version would be a major step
in the right direction. Such action would provide clear policy
guidance throughout the Marine Corps concerning "total" C2 systems
integration in consonance with the spirit and intent of the C4I2
concept. This should be a top priority, and provide a working
cornerstone, thus allowing everyone within the Marine Corps
involved with C2 systems integration to work from the same sheet of
music.
Existent within the Marine Corps today are literally hundreds
of C2 systems, some of which were developed and fielded over two
decades ago. The challenge facing the Marine Corps is one of
integrating these C2 systems developed in an age of "functional
stovepiping" with modern C2 systems employing a "horizontal vice
vertical" philosophy to exchanging information. Indeed, Marines
have painfully come to realize that it is more efficient and
accurate for functional area C2 systems to share information rather
than to operate in an independent environment. This approach,
while preferred, is extremely difficult for acquisition program
managers to implement and coordinate. The various C2 systems with
which their product must integrate are at various life cycle
stages. Some may have been fielded for years, and now require
retrofit, while others in development may require expensive changes
or upgrades. One can quickly surmise that without some overall
coordination mechanism, things could quickly fall apart. The
Marine Corps as an entity needs to understand and appreciate the
challenges of fielding MAGTF/SE systems compatible with existing
USMC/Joint C2 systems. Additionally, within the parameters of
increased fiscal constraints, these systems must be capable of
expanding to meet future required operational capabilities. This
is no small task considering the multiple aspects involved such as:
joint fielding schedules, initial operational capability deadlines,
data communications protocols, data elements, software languages,
message formats, waveforms, frequency hopping parameters, baud
rates, etc., which require detailed coordination and addressal.
The following section is included to provide a synopsis of the
scope and variety of C2 systems currently under development within
various MAGTF functional areas. It should in no way be construed
as even closely approximating all the C2 systems currently being
addressed throughout the Marine Corps.
The intelligence community currently has multiple C2 systems
in various phases of development and fielding. The Advanced
Tactical Air Reconnaissance System (ATARS) is being procured to
provide MAGTF commanders with near real-time tactical intelligence.
The ATARS suite will be employed on the F/A-18D and Remotely
Piloted Vehicle (RPV) platforms. A data link communications
capability will allow ATARS to feed raw imagery into intelligence
systems, which in turn will provide targeting and other information
to multiple MAGTF C2 systems.(4)
The Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS), scheduled
for FY-93 procurement, will be the ground-processing facility
capable of receiving soft copy data link images from systems such
as ATARS, as well as both national and theater sources.
Information provided by JSIPS will then feed other MAGTF C2
systems. Thus, JSIPS will allow the Marine Corps to exploit near-
real-time soft copy digital imagery provided by various organic,
theater, and national systems.(5)
Several systems are combined to form the Intelligence Analysis
System (IAS). This fusion center will process all-source
information on the enemy, weather, and terrain provided via
communication links with other systems such as: JSIPS, the
Technical Control and Analysis Center (TCAC), and the Tactical
Electronic Reconnaissance Processing and Evaluation System
(TERPES).( 6)
The Tactical Combat Operations (TCO) system continues to evolve
as the centerpiece of MAGTF C2. This automated system will
receive, display, fuse, and disseminate input provided from C2
systems in other MAGTF functional areas via Local and Wide Area
Networks (LANs/WANs). TCO capabilities include, display of current
enemy and friendly tactical situations, automated message handling,
and dissemination of operation orders/overlays. TCO is being
acquired for use within the MAGTF command element and at all levels
in the GCE, ACE, and CSSE.(7)
Providing automated fire support coordination and tactical fire
direction functions within the MAGTF, the Multi-service Advanced
Field Artillery Tactical Data System (MAFATDS) will enhance the
employment and coordination of surface and air delivered fires.
Additionally, MAFATDS system interfaces include the Position
Location Reporting System (PLRS), and the Army's Advanced Field
Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS).(8)
Within the Combat Service Support arena, the Marine Integrated
Logistics System (MILOGS) is designed to provide the MAGTF
commander with near-real-time, automated logistics data. MILOGS
serves to enhance the visibility of logistics assets and interfaces
with TCO and the MAGTF II/Logistics Automated Information Systems
(MAGTF II/LOG AIS). Eight mutually supporting automated systems
form the basis of MAGTF II/LOG AIS. Component systems include the
following: MAGTF II War Planning Model, the Transportation
Coordinator's Automated Information for Movements System, a
Computer-Aided Embarkation Management System, (CAEMS), a Computer
Aided Load Manifesting (CALM) system, a Terminal Operations
Management System/Cargo Management Subsystem, the Landing Force
Asset Distribution system, MAGTF Deployment Supporting System II,
and a MAGTF Data Library. Together, these logistics systems
support both deliberate and time-sensitive planning, and operations
from initiation of mobilization/deployment through employment in an
assigned area of responsibility.(9)
Within the functional area of aviation, the Advanced Tactical
Air Command Central (ATACC), scheduled for FY-93 procurement,
incorporates state-of-the-art technology to command and coordinate
tactical air operations, conduct automated mission planning, and
provide Air Tasking Order (ATO) generation and processing. The
ATACC will provide the MAGTF commander with the capability to
direct and coordinate organic aviation assets, as well as aviation
assets from other services and/or nations. Current ATACC
interfaces include the TCO system, and the Improved Direct Air
Support Center (IDASC).(10)
All the previously mentioned C2 systems are being
interconnected under a concept named the Marine Tactical Command
and Control System (MTACCS). Thus, the myriad of component systems
comprising MTACCS are being integrated to provide the MAGTF
commander an ability to receive, process, filter, and display data
in a usable format for tactical decision making. A comprehensive
automated tactical system, MTACCS combines disparate battlefield
functional areas by employing common hardware, standard operating
systems, and software developed to common standards. Connectivity
via a digital communications "backbone" links MTACCS throughout the
MAGTF.(11)
This relatively short review of emerging MAGTF C2 systems
merely scratches the surface at best, and does not even address C2
systems present within the garrison (supporting establishment)
environment. Literally hundreds of other existing systems are in
place throughout the Marine Corps. The complexity of developing,
acquiring, fielding, maintaining, and integrating modern C2 systems
cannot be overemphasized. If properly understood, planned, and
coordinated, the integration of multiple C2 systems can provide the
MAGTF commander with a formidable combat multiplier. Conversely,
a less than total approach to C2 systems integration merely invites
disaster.
Present organizational relationships within the Marine Corps,
if exercised correctly, are properly structured to support C2
systems integration. The Marine Corps Interoperability Program has
been instituted to ensure continuity and coordination of the C2
system integration effort. This interoperability program, which
supports a "cradle-to-grave" C2 system integration approach,
derives its mission from several Department of Defense (DoD) and
Joint Staff policy memorandums. Specifically, DoD Directive 4630.5
requires all DoD C3I systems to be compatible and interoperable.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Memorandum of Policy (MOP) - 160 tasks
services and agencies to possess the compatibility and
interoperability necessary to ensure success in Joint and Combined
operations, and to regularly test/verify the interoperability of C2
system interfaces. Internal to the Marine Corps, MCO 3O93.1C
establishes the policy and management procedures that govern
interoperability parameters of C2 systems integration.
Within the Marine Corps, several organizations are responsible
for ensuring successful C2 systems integration. Every step of the
process including policy, requirement identification, research,
development, acquisition, fielding, operation, and post deployment
support is being monitored by a responsible office. Principle
"players" include the Assistant Chief of Staff for Command,
Control, Communication and Computer, Intelligence and
Interoperability (CMC-C4I2); the Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (MCCDC); and the Marine Corps Systems Command
(MARCORSYSCOM). A quick review of the responsibilities of
principle organizations impacting C2 systems integration in the
Marine Corps is vital to understand and appreciate this complex
process.
CMC (C4I2) establishes overall Marine Corps C2 systems
integration policy, publishes and maintains the Interoperability
Management Plan (IMP), and chairs the Interoperability Policy Board
(IPB). The IMP provides the Marine Corps with detailed C2 systems
interoperability program guidance, to include Joint/Combined
interface efforts. The IPB serves as a resolution forum that
addresses various interoperability issues within the Marine Corps.
Additionally, CMC (C4I2) reviews and certifies that C2 system
interoperability requirements have been met at each program
decision milestone.
MCCDC is responsible for validating Marine Corps C2 system
operational interoperability requirements and standards. The C3I
Proponency section publishes and maintains the MAGTF
Interoperability Requirements Concepts (MIRC) document which is a
compendium of interoperability requirements, based on doctrine,
that contains information exchange requirements for Marine Corps,
Joint, Agency, and National C2 facilities. Additionally, MCCDC
assures that new C2 system interface requirements are evaluated for
integration with fielded C2 systems. Finally, MCCDC is the
"keeper" of C2 systems integration doctrine. It should be noted
that MCCDC is the proponent for only the FMF, and not the
supporting establishment.
MARCORSYSCOM, specifies technical standards which drive the
interoperability of C2 systems. MARCORSYSCOM program managers
oversee the research, development and acquisition of Marine Corps
C2 systems identified as requirements by MCCDC. Espousing a
"cradle-to-grave" philosophy, MARCORSYSCOM is also responsible for
continuing to support systems after fielding. In reality this
effort is delegated to Marine Corps Logistics Base (MCLB)
Barstow/Albany or the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support
Activity (MCTSSA). To aid the C2 systems integration effort,
MARCORSYSCOM maintains the Marine Tactical Systems Technical
Interface Design Plan (MTS-TIDP), which serves as a repository of
approved Marine Corps data element, message, and communications
protocol standards. Additionally, MARCORSYSCOM produces the Marine
Corps Tactical Communications Architecture (MCTCA) which is an
architectural baseline that integrates interoperability
requirements, standards, and C2 systems. Finally, MARCORSYSCOM
coordinates required annual Joint and Combined interoperability
testing of Marine Corps C2 systems.
Organizational support for C2 systems integration within the
Marine Corps is both complex and comprehensive. Along the "cradle-
to-grave" path many things must be accomplished by many different
offices and people to ensure success. The basic management
hierarchy is in place for C2 systems integration to work. Strict
adherence to the C4I2 concept, in accordance with MCO 3O93.IC, is
required to force local commanders, the SE, and MARCORSYSCOM to
properly coordinate C2 system integration throughout the Marine
Corps. However, properly educated and qualified Marines are still
required within key billets of these various organizations to make
it happen.
A deficiency exists today concerning C2 systems integration,
concepts, and capabilities within the framework of the current
Marine Corps educational system. Presently, most basic Military
Occupational Specialty (MOS)-producing schools, intermediate-level
schools, and top-level schools only pay "lip service" toward
increasing awareness of the complexities surrounding C2 systems
integration. To impart an appreciation of the importance of
interacting with C2 systems to all Marine officers, regardless of
MOS, the educational system must actively address C2 system
integration within each respective curriculum. Such an approach
would create a healthy basic awareness among C2 system "users" in
the Marine Corps officer community, ultimately making the job of
those performing C2 systems integration that much easier. The
requirement for this cross-training should be identified to the
Marine Air Ground Training and Education Command (MAGTEC) so that
current programs of instruction could be modified.
Current Marine Corps manpower policies regarding progression
paths within the communications, data systems, and air command and
control MOS's hinder rather than help the effort to provide
officers capable of performing C2 systems integration. These
progression paths routinely switch officers between MOS-related
assignments (both within the Fleet Marine Force and the Supporting
Establishment) and assignments outside a particular MOS, such as
recruiting duty or other "B-billets". The goal of this policy is
to produce a "well-rounded" officer. However, this policy produces
an atrophy of skills in technical MOS's, and takes officers "out of
circulation" for significant amounts of time. Given the rapid pace
of technological development today, this "out of the saddle"
syndrome negates the considerable costs and time invested by the
Marine Corps in training these officers.
The irony concerning this situation is particularly unsettling:
if these officers were allowed to remain in their respective
specialties and become proficient at conducting C2 systems
integration, they would be considered unpromotable. Therefore, the
Marine Corps promotion system must recognize and make necessary
adjustments for officers in specialties performing C2 systems
integration. These adjustments must include provisions allowing
designated communication, data system, and aviation C2 officers to
remain in assignments or billets that positively affect increased
MAGTF C2 systems integration, without adversely impacting their
promotion opportunities. This approach will serve to stabilize the
C2 systems integration efforts within the Marine Corps, prevent
atrophy of technical skills, and allow Marine Corps C2 systems to
keep pace with current state-of-the-art technological developments.
To further complicate matters, certain Table of Organization (T/O)
billets exist within the communication, data systems, and aviation
C2 specialties which require the ability to conduct C2 systems
integration. Neither these billets nor the officers possessing C2
systems integration expertise are flagged in any manner by the
current manpower system. Therefore, no mechanism exists to ensure
that officers capable of performing C2 systems integration are
properly placed by the manpower system in billets requiring such a
skill.
The situation in this area requires teamwork and cooperation
between the communications, data system, aviation C2 specialties
and the Marine Corps Manpower system. First, the military
occupational specialty fields must identify T/O billets throughout
the FMF and Supporting Establishment structure which require C2
systems integration experience and knowledge. Next, the Manpower
system must identify officers, who either have formal or on-the-job
C2 systems integration training. This could be done via an
additional MOS designation or other discriminator. Once
accomplished, monitors could then assign qualified personnel to
billets which actually require C2 systems integration experience.
The benefits are immediately obvious. By matching known abilities
to specific billets, this approach offers a high probability of
allowing the Marine Corps to unlock and best utilize the combat
multiplier potential of effective C2 systems integration.
Indeed, the effectiveness of warfighters is degraded by C2
systems that are not interoperable, or flexible, or do not provide
appropriate information to commanders in a timely manner. Degraded
operational capabilities, as well as significant corrective costs,
result from incorrect C2 systems integration. Integration of C2
systems within the Marine Corps and across Joint/Combined
interfaces is not an easy task. However, the solutions could be
enacted with relatively minimal turbulence given a cooperative
approach by Marines from the respective educational, manpower, and
occupational field communities. Thus, through improved
understanding, education, relaxing of MOS progression path
impediments, and more logical manpower to billet utilization, the
Marine Corps can drastically improve C2 systems integration
efforts. Without properly qualified officers to occupy key billets
within Marine Corps command structures that affect policy,
requirements, doctrine, acquisition, and post-deployment software
support of C2 systems, the inability to effectively perform C2
systems integration will continue to haunt the Marine Corps.
ENDNOTES
1. Commandant of the Marine Corps, White Letter No. 01-91,
26 Jun 1991.
2. CMC White Letter, No. 01-91.
3. CMC White Letter, No. 01-91.
4. United States Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues, Ninth Edition,
1991, p.3-13.
5. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-23.
6. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-19.
7. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-18.
8. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-18.
9. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-19.
10. USMC, Concepts and Issues, pg.3-22.
11. USMC, Concepts and Issues, p.3-18.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Boros, LtCol. Louis L., "Automated Command and Control for the
MAGTF: Can It Be Done?", Marine Corps Gazette, Vol 74, No.12,
Dec 90.
2. Burkett, LtCol. Jack, "Command and Control: The Key To
Winning", Military Review, Vol.7O, No.7, Jul 90.
3. Coates, Maj Robert A., "Automated Support for Command and
Control", Marine Corps Gazette, Vol 74, No.12, Dec 90.
4. Commandant of the Marine Corps, "C4I2 Concept", White Letter,
No. 01-91, Jun 91.
5. Gray, Gen. Alfred M., "Marines Streamline C3I, Merge
Interoperability", Signal, Vol 44, Nov 89.
6. Marine Corps Order 3093.1C, "Intraoperability and
Interoperability of Marine Corps Tactical C4I Systems", Jun 89.
7. Parker, Jay P., "C2 for the Cutting Edge", United States Naval
Institute Proceedings, Vol 114/10/1028, Oct 88.
8. Tuttle, VADM Jerry O, "Command is the Name of the Game",
Signal, Vol 43, Jun 89.
9. United States Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues, Ninth Edition,
1991.
10. Van Crevald, Martin, Command In War, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985.
11. Wickham, Gen. John A. Jr., "C3I as a Force Multiplier", Signal,
Vol 42, Apr 88.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
