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The Need For A Greater Expeditionary Capability In The United States Air Force

The Need For A Greater Expeditionary Capability In The United States Air Force

 

CSC 1992

 

SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy

 

 

 

 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

Title: The need for a Greater Expeditionary Capability in the

United States Air Force

 

Author: Major Richard A. Fryer Jr., USAF

 

Thesis: The changing world scene implies the USAF must be an

expeditionary force to be able to project significant power in

all contingencies.

 

Background: The Chief of Staff of the Air Forces sees a major

challenge for the USAF as the need to move toward a more

expeditionary Air Force. An expeditionary capability requires

the right organizations, logistics network, and, perhaps most

importantly in the near term, hardware. World events bear this

out as the U.S. either voluntarily or involuntarily falls back

from its overseas basing network; a network the USAF is heavily

dependent upon to project significant combat overseas. But, what

constitutes an expeditionary air force is not clear. The author

presents his view of the "ideal" expeditionary capabilities of an

air force which include low reliance on developed basing

structure, various necessary support organizations, and the

logistically infrastructure which best supports expeditionary

operations. When this "ideal" is compared to present USAF

capabilities the most glaring limitation to Air Force expeditionary

operations would appear to be the operational limitations of its

primary fighter aircraft. More specifically, the.lack of

capability of present USAF aircraft to operate from the austere

bases. Follow-on aircraft such as the ATF, and perhaps the

A-X, appear to be capable of overcoming this limitation. In the

meantime, the USAF should consider means of overcoming these

limitations.

 

Recommendation: The USAF should study means of overcoming the

limitations of its present fighter aircraft to operate from

austere airfields.

 

 

THE NEED FOR A GREATER EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY

IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

 

Outline

 

Thesis: The changing world scene implies the USAF must be an

expeditionary force to be able to project significant

power in all contingencies.

 

I. World political scene is changing

 

A. Gone is the major conventional/nuclear war threat

 

B. Political pressures to pull back from overseas bases

 

C. Not restricted to Europe, Pacific as well

 

II. Impact of world changes upon the USAF

 

A. USAF is dependent upon oveseas basing to project

significant comabt power

 

B. Coalition warfare provides attractive solution

 

C. Coalition warfare does not cover all eventualities

 

D. U.S. must be prepared to go it alone

 

III.        Capabilities of an ideal expeditionary air force

 

A. In a scenario where we have no regional allies

 

1. USAF can not fight until bases available

 

2. But basing choices limited by USAF aircraft needs

 

B. Ideal expeditionary Air Force:

 

1. Has aerial refueling and airlift capabilities

 

2. Can use just about any available airfield

 

3. Viable support organizations

 

4. Pre-packaged contingency sets

 

C. These same capabilities enhance coalition warfare and

low intensity conflict

 

IV. Expeditionary characteristics the USAF possesses today

 

A. Airlift and aerial refueling

 

B. Largely viable support organizations

 

C. Pre-packaged contingency sets

 

V. The critical limitation to an expeditionary USAF

 

A. Aircraft limitations

 

1. Most fighter aircraft are not austere capable

 

2. Future aircraft (ATF and A-X) should be austere capable

 

B. Air Force must address this limitation to be a truely expeditionary force

 

 

THE NEED FOR A GREATER EXPEDITIONARY CAPABILITY

 

IN THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

 

by

 

Major Richard A. Fryer Jr.

 

INTRODUCTION

 

The world political scene is in transition; this is not

 

new news. Nor is it new that no one can predict the future

 

world political steady-state with absolute certainty

 

(assuming such a "steady-state world" lies in store for us).

 

In this paper, I will not discuss possible outcomes of this

 

transition, but instead will discuss a major implication of

 

this "new world order" for the United States Air Force (USAF).

 

This implication is what General Merrill A. McPeak,

 

Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, sees as one of

 

two larger challenges facing the Air Force. One involves a

 

blurring of the distinction between tactical and strategic

 

"air forces" resulting in the need for what he calls

 

"composite structures." The other challenge is. the need to

 

move toward a more expeditionary Air Force, one "that moves

 

quickly from a CONUS [continental United States] location to

 

a forward position and is ready to fight immediately when it

 

gets there."(7:4) The former challenge is presently being

 

addressed in a major, USAF-wide re-organization. However, it

 

is the latter, more difficult challenge the USAF must

 

overcome if it is to remain the premiere air force of the

 

United States and, consequently, the world. An expeditionary

 

capability requires the right organizations, logistics net-

 

work, and, most importantly in the near term, aircraft.

 

It is this latter challenge to which I turn my attention

 

in this paper. The intent of this paper is to examine in

 

broad terms the capabilities the USAF needs to be expedition-

 

ary. Specifically, I intend to discuss the changing global

 

political scene and how it implies the need for a more

 

expeditionary Air Force. Then, I will present the capabil-

 

ities of an "ideal" expeditionary Air Force and determine

 

which expeditionary capabilities the USAF presently

 

possesses. Finally, I will discuss what I see as the critical

 

limiting factor the Air Force must overcome to fulfill

 

General McPeak's challenge, the limits of our aircraft.

 

 

WORLD POLITICAL SCENE IS CHANGING

 

The world political scene is in transition. The

 

Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs

 

of Staff, Lieutenant General George Butler, put it this way,

 

[T]he global arena in which these aims [fundamental U.S.

security objectives] find their context is undergoing

such a profound transformation that virtually all of the

givens that have shaped our national strategy for four

decades have been called into question.(3:1)

 

However, this is not to say that this new "context" means an

 

end to threats to U.S. security. "These changes do not

 

promise a tranquil world nor an end to threats to American

 

interests around the globe."(11:2) Yet, the apparent death

 

of the Soviet Union with the resultant lessening of tensions

 

for a major conventional/nuclear conflict fought on the

 

European continent has brought questions about national

 

defense postures in European countries as well as in the

 

United States. Cut-backs are planned in most NATO (North

 

Atlantic Treaty Organization) countries and are already

 

underway in the United States. Politicians, both at home and

 

in Europe, are questioning the need for a continued U.S.

 

presence overseas. (9)

 

The same questioning of U.S. presence is on-going in the

 

Pacific despite the continued existence of major regional

 

threats such as North Korea. In one area, the pull-out has

 

begun as we depart from major, long-held installations in the

 

Phillipines. In another area, the Republic of Korea (ROK),

 

the U.S. has unilaterally removed its nuclear weapons.

 

Moreover, slight reductions of U.S. forces in the ROK have

 

been proposed. However, these reductions could conceivably

 

mirror that of the Phillipines should further reconciliation

 

occur between North" and South Korea. Additionally, with

 

increased trade tension between the United States and Japan,

 

it is not inconceivable that Japan could limit our presence

 

or operations at any point in the future in retaliation for

 

trade disagreements.

 

 

IMPACT OF WORLD CHANGES ON THE USAF

 

The overarching effect of these world events upon the

 

USAF is the potential loss of overseas bases critically

 

needed to carry out its missions. An inescapable fact of

 

airpower is that it must to come back to the surface for

 

refueling, maintenance, rearming, crew-changing, and

 

redirecting. Effectively, an air force is tethered to the

 

airbases from which it is launched, whether they be land-

 

based or sea-based.

 

The USAF is especially vulnerable in this regards due to

 

its need for in-theater bases with long, well-paved surfaces

 

for its fighter aircraft. As the Secretary of the Air Force

 

put it, "typically, land-based fighter forces require forward

 

basing to sustain power projection options."(10:9) The Air

 

Force does the nation a disservice if it cannot "get" to a

 

war due to an inability to use existing, austere in-theater

 

bases. To be an effective force capable of what the

 

Secretary of the Air Force calls "global reach/global power,"

 

the USAF must have this capability.

 

Additionally, the USAF needs expeditionary capabilities

 

to free itself from being a "hostage" of overseas basing

 

agreements. I refer to the ability of other nations to

 

deny or constrain our operations overseas. A fairly recent

 

example of this dependency was demonstrated during Operation

 

El Dorado Canyon (the 1986 Libyan Air Raid) when striking F-

 

111s were required to fly a long, indirect route from the

 

United Kingdom to Libya because Spain denied basing and

 

France denied overflight.

 

An answer to this dilemma, put forth by some, would

 

seemingly be that the United States will not fight further

 

regional conflicts without partners (i.e. coalition warfare

 

such as we saw in Desert Storm).(8) Clearly, under such a

 

philosophy, the U.S. would always expect to have access to

 

regional basing rights in any theater of operations where we

 

would fight. In other words, "when the interests of our

 

allies are threatened, basing will normally be made avail-

 

able."(10:9) Indeed, some prominent leaders in America

 

believe the U.S. will not go to war again without partners.

 

Yet, there are potentialities unaccounted for in the

 

answer presented above. Specifically, it ignores circum-

 

stances where only our vital interests are threatened and

 

where, consequently, others would have no national self-

 

interest in assisting us. Additionally, it ignores circum-

 

stances where others may have a self-interest, or where

 

others are threatened as "well, but they choose to deny us

 

bases and access for reasons of fear, for cultural reasons,

 

or for some other reason valid to that government.

 

In the National Security Strategy of the the United

 

States, President Bush delineates the nation's strategy for

 

regional conflicts as one that always seeks allied support,

 

while still retaining a credible U.S. capability for global

 

reach and power projection (hence, the ability to "go it

 

alone" if necessary).(2) Clearly, the armed forces of the

 

U.S., including the USAF, must be prepared to respond to any

 

eventuality. As stated in Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the

 

US Armed Forces,

 

The strategic context confronting the United States is

unique, and our friends, allies, and interests are

worldwide. Accordingly, the arena of our potential

operations is the entire planet.(6:2)

 

The U.S. must be prepared to go it alone, anywhere on

 

the globe to defend our vital interests. For the USAF, this

 

means being able to project airpower beyond our shrinking

 

overseas basing ring. To do this, the USAF must have the

 

capability for expeditionary operations.

 

 

CAPABILITIES OF AN IDEAL EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE

 

At this point, I will examine the operations, and

 

necessary capabilities, of an ideal expeditionary Air Force.

 

To do this, I will present what I believe to be the worst

 

case scenario for employment of the Air Force: a conflict in

 

a remote part of the world without in-theater friends or

 

allies (and thus without basing). Then, I will present what

 

1 believe are the capabilities the USAF requires to operate

 

ideally in such unfavorable circumstances. Finally, I will

 

review these expeditionary capabilities and their possible

 

effect in other types of conflicts including a coalition air

 

effort similar to that of Desert Storm.

 

The scenario I present involves the need to conduct

 

combat in an area remote from the United States and its

 

overseas bases. To add to this, the scenario will assume no

 

regional country will allow our forces to operate from or

 

through their territory. In sum, these are the worst case

 

conditions for a conventional war from the USAF viewpoint.

 

Admittedly, it is possible to apply some USAF combat airpower

 

independently in the form of unescorted bomber strikes

 

launched from the U.S. or U.S. territories. However, over-

 

whelming combat airpower can not be brought to bear until

 

aircraft can be brought into the theater and operate out of

 

seized territory.

 

Clearly, the first step to Air Force operations in such

 

a scenario would involve the seizing of territory containing

 

airfields by ground troops. Then, support forces would be

 

introduced to secure the base (security police), repair and

 

expand critical airfield surfaces to the minimum necessary

 

for preliminary operations (engineers), and establish the

 

initial logistics infrastructure (logisticians). Next,

 

fighter forces would be introduced into thee seized territory

 

with an initially constrained tempo of operations due to

 

logistics and support limitations. Delivery and build-up of

 

logistics and the development of the infrastructure necessary

 

for sustained high-level operations would be an on-going

 

priority operation, heavily dependent upon available sea- and

 

air-lift reception facilities (ports and airfields). Initial

 

flight operations would likely center on combat air patrol

 

(CAP) and limited offensive counter-air missions as these

 

require the least mass of munitions (although fuel require-

 

ments are still sizable). As the logistical infrastructure

 

grows, operations could shift to a full-scale air superiority

 

campaign to include CAP and offensive counter-air operations

 

against enemy airfields, command and control, air defenses,

 

and communications. Once most forces were in place, full

 

logistics support available, and the air superiority campaign

 

essentially won; air operations could shift priority of

 

effort to "strategic" targets, air interdiction, battlefield

 

isolation, and/or close air support at the choice of the

 

joint task force (JTF) commander. Clearly, all this hinges

 

on that first step, seizing ground somewhere in theater for

 

the introduction of Air Force airpower.

 

But, to make this task practical, there must be air-

 

field(s) suitable for the introduction of the Air Force.

 

That is to say the Air Force hardware must be expeditionary

 

itself to a certain degree or there would be no place

 

available in-theater for ground forces to secure capable of

 

sustaining USAF air operations. For instance, if all USAF

 

aircraft could only operate from 7,000 foot runways and only

 

3,000 foot runways existed in theater, the USAF would be

 

unable to contribute its airpower to the conflict until

 

adequate airfields were constructed (which takes considerable

 

time and resources). However, the problem would still not be

 

solved even if there were one or two airfields with the

 

necessary facilities. An opponent would know our needs and

 

would, accordingly, concentrate his defensive and denial

 

efforts on those particular airfields. Clearly, the more

 

expeditionary the capabilities of the USAF, the greater

 

flexibility ground forces have in securing adequate

 

facilities. Moreover, the chance of success will be greater

 

due to the enemy's greatly increased defensive problem.

 

I believe the "ideal" expeditionary Air Force is

 

one that could deploy from the United States, fly to any

 

point on the globe and conduct combat operations out of a

 

small pocket of captured enemy territory. Obviously, the

 

first capability needed is aerial refueling; both long-range

 

aircraft with the capability to refuel and others with the

 

capability to be refueled. Next, the expeditionary Air Force

 

operating out of hostile territory must be flexible in its

 

basing needs to allow for operations off of any available,

 

long, straight strip of pavement (to interject a note of

 

practicality, say longer than 2,000 feet). Thus, either the

 

Air Force's aircraft must be capable of operating unassisted

 

off such a surface or systems must be provided to assist them

 

in doing so (such as barriers and catapults). Additionally,

 

the expeditionary Air Force needs its own organic maintenance

 

and support organizations capable of supporting it in any

 

environment and requiring the minimum of people, equipment,

 

and supplies. Amongst the support organizations must be

 

security, services, logistics, and engineering. The latter

 

must be capable of infrastructure development to include

 

runway and parking repair and expansion as well as facility

 

and utility repair and expansion. In that line, the expedi-

 

tionary Air Force should require minimal facilities beyond

 

pavements and packaged airbase kits. These kits containing

 

personnel shelters, generators, field kitchens, and such

 

equipment could be transported with other bulky items such as

 

equipment, spares, fuel, and munitions. However, adequate

 

airlift would unlikely be available to bring in anything but

 

the most urgently needed bulk items. Thus, the ideal

 

expeditionary Air Force would use pre-packed maritime pre-

 

positioning to save time transporting bulk requirements.

 

Having identified what I see as ideal capabilities of

 

the expeditionary Air Force, a review of these capabilities

 

as applied in other types of conflicts indicates no incompat-

 

ibility. In a coalition theater war such as Desert Storm,

 

all the capabilities above would only serve to enhance the

 

Air Force's effectiveness. For instance, systems that allow

 

for operations off of austere airfields would allow for

 

greater basing flexibility and enhance force protection by

 

allowing greater dispersion. Additionally, maritime pre-

 

positioning enhances rapid build-up of bulk logistics and

 

equipment, thereby, enabling sustained, high-tempo combat

 

operations earlier. These capabilities are-not limited to

 

enhancing just maid- and high-intensity conflict.

 

Low-intensity conflict can occur in remote locations

 

with no secure rear area. With adequate security forces and

 

the ability to operate out of austere facilities, the

 

flexibility is available to choose the most secure option (if

 

that is the important factor) from a wider variety of

 

options. Moreover, the flexibility inherent in expeditionary

 

engineering and medical forces can provide added "forces" to

 

fight a low-intensity conflict through civic action.

 

 

EXPEDITIONARY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE USAF POSSESSES TODAY

 

The USAF has made great strides preparing for high tempo

 

combat, improving its supportability, and, to a certain

 

extent, improving its expeditionary capabilities. An example

 

of the first is provided by the close integration of assets

 

we have achieved to fight and survive in today's more

 

sophisticated combat environment. Airborne warning and con-

 

trol, fighter escort, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance

 

are routinely orchestrated and synchronized in conjunction

 

with air strikes.

 

Moreover, the USAF has championed airlift and aerial

 

refueling to provide all U.S. forces with the mobility to

 

reach any area on the globe.(5) The Air Force has not

 

ignored the need to update its strategic lift as exemplified

 

by its commitment of resources and focus to the replacement

 

for the C-141. This aircraft, the C-17, will incorporate

 

expeditionary features such as "survivability, ability to

 

operate from short, unimproved airfields, agility and

 

enhanced maneuverability in the air and on the ground, and

 

the ability to employ various methods of airdrop."(5:2l-22)

 

Additionally, the USAF has spearheaded the development

 

and fielding of better munitions; better in terms of accur-

 

acy, lethality, and range. Aircraft range, endurance, and

 

all-weather operating abilities have also been extended.

 

Maintenance has been greatly improved resulting in more

 

aircraft in service, requiring a smaller logistics train, and

 

(important for support and sustainment considerations) less

 

maintenance personnel.(12) For example, "the F-16C

 

requires, in terms of dollar value, only one sixth the spares

 

needed to support the F-111, and less than half that of the

 

F-15C. "(12:2)

 

The Air Force has also learned lessons from past

 

conflicts and recognized some of its vulnerabilities and

 

shortcoming. In response, it has developed, structured, and

 

improved organizations for airbase security (using relatively

 

heavily-armed, air-transportable security police squadrons),

 

combat "services" support (specifically food, laundry,

 

billeting, and mortuary support provided by mobile services

 

teams), and engineering support.

 

This last organization factors heavily upon the expedi-

 

tionary capabilities of the USAF. The Air Force, by Depart-

 

ment of Defense directive, is required to rely upon U.S. Army

 

support for airbase construction. However, in recognition of

 

the failure to receive that support in the Korean and Vietnam

 

wars, the USAF developed and still maintain its own organic

 

engineering capability. These engineers are structured to be

 

able to repair and develop existing in-theater bases. Two

 

types of engineering organizations exist to provide the

 

necessary expedient base development capability.

 

The first, Prime BEEF (Primary Base Emergency

 

Engineering Force), is resident in the base civil engineering

 

squadron at every active Air Force base. Prime BEEF teams,

 

consisting of trained military engineers, are linked to the

 

wing's flying squadrons and, ideally, deploy in advance of

 

the aircraft to prepare receiving base facilities for flying

 

operations. However, they rely heavily on either pre-

 

positioned kits, host nation support, or equipment and

 

supplies flown or shipped to the base.

 

The other, RED HORSE (Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy

 

Operations and Repair Squadron, Engineer), are Major Command-

 

owned squadrons designed to accomplish major repair and

 

development of airbases. Similar to a small Army construc-

 

tion battalion ore a Navy "SeaBee" battalion, they possess a

 

large amount of heavy construction equipment that requires

 

sealift or a great many airlift sorties to transport. While

 

a great capability, USAF engineers require a friendly port or

 

significant airfield in-theater in order to receive their

 

necessary equipment and supplies.

 

Additionally, the USAF has recognized to some degree its

 

reliance of bases and has developed and pre-positioned

 

airbase kits at strategic points around the globe. One type

 

of kit, Harvest Bare, is designed to provide all the

 

facilities and equipment needed for a 4,000 man airbase.

 

Another kit, Harvest Eagle, provides the same for a 1,000 man

 

force, which could operate at a co-located operating base or

 

augment a main operating base. However, use of both kits is

 

predicated upon an existing runway and parking area and water

 

source suitable for combat operations.(4) Moreover, use of

 

these kits requires a great deal of transportation.

 

Finally, the USAF has used maritime pre-positioning to

 

store necessary bulk supplies such as munitions. These

 

assets were tapped during Desert Storm to supply- deploying

 

combat forces. Reconfiguration, and possibly expansion, of

 

maritime pre-positioned supplies, as a result of Desert Storm

 

lessons, is likely.

 

 

THE CRITICAL LIMITATION TO AN EXPEDITIONARY USAF

 

As presented above, the USAF has, or is, acquiring many

 

of the capabilities necessary to be an expeditionary Air

 

Force. However, the above discussion should have made it

 

clear the greatest single factor Influencing further develop-

 

ment of an expeditionary capability is the hardware

 

(specifically, the fighter aircraft) the USAF owns.

 

The great majority of the Air Force's present combat

 

aircraft are the multiple-purpose fighter, F-16 (over 1,000

 

as of 30 September 1989), and the air superiority and ground

 

attack fighter, F-15 (over 700). (1:52) These are very

 

capable aircraft with good range and a good maintenance

 

history, but with poor austere-field operating capability.

 

One aspect of this manifests itself as minimum runway length

 

(MRL); the design length and clearance pilots require to

 

"recover safely from emergencies."(4:4-2) For the F-15 and

 

F-16, this design distance is 6,000 feet at forward operating

 

locations and 8,000 feet in rear areas. This is high

 

compared to the MRL for a more austere capable aircraft such

 

as the C-130 (MRL of 3,500 feet for forward locations and

 

6,000 in rear areas).(4:4-2)

 

Another aspect of austere field capability is the rough

 

field operability of an aircraft. This generally measured by

 

the capabilities of an aircraft's landing gear and airframe

 

to absorb the shock of "bumps" in airfield pavements

 

(referred to as sink rate of landing gear struts). Both the

 

F-15 and F-16 are poor in this regards compared to other

 

"tougher" aircraft such as the A-7 or A-10. Additionally,

 

the F-16, because of its low engine inlet, requires pavements

 

completely free of debris to forestall foreign object damage

 

(FOD) to the engine. Thus, spalling airfield pavements

 

(where runway surfaces are breaking up), found in many third

 

world countries, are unacceptable for F-16 operations without

 

repair.

 

However, aircraft presently under development for the

 

USAF will have far better austere capabilities. While exact

 

figures are classified, minimum runway length and rough field

 

operability for the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) will be

 

significantly improved over present fighters. Additionally,

 

the ATF will self-contain much of what is presently needed

 

for ground support equipment and provide easy access for

 

maintenance crews.

 

Also, the Air Force's next generation ground attack

 

aircraft may well be the A-X, the Navy's attack aircraft

 

under consideration. By its very nature as a carrier

 

aircraft subject to great stress from catapults for take-off

 

and barriers for landing, the A-X should be capable of

 

operating under rough conditions in austere environments.

 

Unfortunately, we will be into the next century before both

 

aircraft become fully operational.

 

However, given the aircraft the USAF presently owns and

 

operates and the likely period before they are replaced with

 

aircraft more favorable to expeditionary operations, the Air

 

Force must come up with solutions to cover the difficulties

 

I have outlined herein. An answer to one aspect of this

 

problem, that of landing aircraft on austere bases, may

 

already be found in modifications to the barrier systems the

 

USAF uses to catch aircraft with brake problems or other

 

emergencies. While these are not presently designed for

 

continuous engagements, modifications may allow them this

 

capability. Perhaps a solution to the take-off portion of

 

the problem may be expeditionary catapults or cheap, dispos-

 

able rockets designed to provide the extra thrust necessary

 

to take-off in shorter distances.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

The Air Force has many of the capabilities necessary to

 

be an expeditionary air force. However, one critical factor

 

limits the ability of the Air Force to deploy in strength,

 

fly, and then fight in any region on the globe. This is the

 

inability of the majority of its fighters to operate from

 

austere airfields. A long-term solution appears already

 

available with the next generation of fighter aircraft under

 

dvelopment. But, in order for the Air Force to have an

 

expeditionary capability soner as senior leadership feels is

 

necessary, a near-term solution to this problem must be

 

found.

 

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10. Rice, Donald B. The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach-Global Power. Washington DC: Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, June 1990.

 

11. Rice, Donald B. FY 92 Air Force Posture Statement. Presented to the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee. Washington DC: Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, 26 February 1991.

 

12. Viccellio, Henry, Jr., Lt. Gen, USAF. "Tactical Air Warfare: Planning in a Changing World." Remarks to the Air Force Association Annual National Symposium, Orlando, FL, 1 February 1991. Aerospace Speech 91-3. Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Public Affairs, Washington DC, 1991.



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