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Express It:  Privatization Of Airlift
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues
Title:   EXPRESS IT:  Privatization of Airlift
Author:  Major Dale L. DeKinder, United States Air Force
Thesis:  Would our nation be better served if all airlift
capabilities are consolidated in the private sector of
Background:   Some people perceive that military airlift is
nothing more than civil aviation in uniform.  Exploring past
important airlift occurrences and a previous historic
airlift debate over the role and missions of military
airlift clears up incorrect perceptions.  A comparative
analysis of privatization, placing all our nation's airlift
capability into private industry, appears to be a viable
option.  Then a military perspective of this analysis explains
the flaws and concerns for the nation.  In summation, an answer
to the thesis is offered.
Recommendation:  Military and civilian airlift, as a
partnership, provides our nation with a vital tool for
supporting national objectives.  Based on historic successes
such as the Berlin Airlift and Desert Shield/Desert Storm
operations, this cooperative capability will continue to be a
source of national strength well into the Twenty-First
                     EXPRESS IT:  Privatization of Airlift
Thesis:  Would our nation be better served if all airlift
         capabilites are consolidated in the private sector
         of industry?
  I.  	Airlift as a worldwide mission
      	A. 	Lend-Lease Act
      	B. 	Civil carriers contracted
      	C. 	Post-war military and civilian relationships
      	D. 	Finletter Commission
  II. 	Airlift system crucial debate
      	A. 	Cost effectiveness versus responsiveness and flexibility
      	B. 	Respected airlift experts viewpoints
      	C. 	Partnership and responsibilities initiated
III.  	Comparative analysis for privatization
      	A. 	Military reductions supported
      	B. 	Current mobility operations are supportable
      	C. 	Efficiency realized
      	D. 	Domino effect of privatization
      	E. 	DoD safety oversight
IV.   	Flaws of privatization comparative analysis
      	A. 	Partnership provides strength
      	B. 	Peculiar requirements of military airlift aircraft
		C.	Domino effect is irrelevant
		D. 	Military's responsiveness and flexibility proven
      	E. 	Desert Shield/ Desert Storm civilian airlift risks
      	F. 	Privatization political concerns
      	G. 	Military airlift provides unique services to nation
      	H. 	Additional airlift requirement is not satisfied
                     EXPRESS IT: Privatization of Airlift
      	Some service members believe that U.S. military airlift
is little more than an airline.  One USMC Major remarked,
"Like the Berlin Airlift, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
(DS) was little more than Federal Express or UPS operations."
This perception toward such successful airlift operations
requires an introspective look at our nation's airlift power
in supporting national objectives.  More succinctly phrased,
would our nation be better served if all airlift capabilities
are consolidated in the private sector of industry?  To answer
this important question requires a glimpse into the previous
debate about military and civilian airlift, followed by a
comparative analysis of the current advantages and
disadvantages of privatization, and an assessment of the
      	Only months prior to the U.S. entry into World War II,
the Lend-Lease Act passed congress which gave the military a
modest mission of flying aircraft across the Atlantic.
Eventually, however, the mission became global when President
Roosevelt authorized the military to deliver planes "to such
other places and in such manner as may be necessary to carry
out the Lend-Lease program." (1:12) Although the military
airlift establishment had authority to operate a worldwide air
transportation system, it lacked the necessary resources and
proposed augmenting the military with civilian contracted
assets.  Atlantic Airways, Ltd., a Pan American Airways
subsidiary, agreed to flight-ferry missions to Africa via the
South Atlantic. (1:17) This arrangement tapped Pan American's
rich experience gained during the previous twelve years of
operations in Latin America and inextricably linked military
airlift to civilian airlines.  Eventually, every major U.S.
airline provided some type of contract service worldwide.
      	Although the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) had envisioned a
fully militarized organization as ideal, the use of contract
services continued until the end of the war.  The original
agreements allowed the government to purchase the airlines'
aircraft and equipment and then operate them using civilian
pilots and support personnel.  These contracts often called
for specific services such as scheduled passenger and cargo
service between San Francisco and Hawaii by Trans World
Airways and Pan American was directed in its contract to make
runway improvements and to construct housing at airfields
along the routes under its jurisdiction.  So, the War
Department gradually adopted an "on-call" contract strategy in
1943.  This type of contracting bound the airlines to render
any service to the government within the general limits of the
carrier's capabilities.
      	However, by the end of 1944, a completely militarized
domestic system greatly improved airlift's flexibility and
responsiveness.  For example, it allowed aircraft and
personnel to be allocated as needed, enabled the establishment
of an integrated communications system, and standardized
aircraft types which enhanced training, scheduling, and
maintenance operations.  Also, General Hap Arnold believed
that "the AAF had to provide transport operations run by
military personnel, rather than by civilians under contract,
on routes that enter combat areas or are likely to become
combat areas." (1:19) The military's use of the civil carriers
had been one of necessity, but now they became bonded.
      	On the civilian side, post World War II airlines hired
large numbers of people, ordered new airplanes and extended
their routes--in short, they overextended.  By the end of
June, 1947, the US carriers were showing an operating loss of
$22 million for the year.  Their viability to respond and
augment the military was questionable. In 1947, President
Harry Truman established a temporary Air Policy Commission "to
make an objective inquiry into national aviation policies and
problems," and to assist in formulating an integrated national
aviation policy. (1:64) Known as the Finletter Commission, it
extensively interviewed airlift experts.
      	The post-war AAF fortunately had some highly-placed
advocates who ensured that military airlift was not completely
disbanded.  When General Hap Arnold was preparing to pass
command of the Army Air Forces to General Carl Spaatz, he
asked American Airlines executive and founder, Cyrus R. Smith,
for advice on the structure. (1:57) Smith's opinion was
valued, based on his civilian and military experience, since
he had entered as a colonel and eventually assumed the rank of
Major General.  He said:
     "[Military airlift] should be the preeminent air line
     operators in the world, better than any other
     military establishment and better than any air line
     organization.  This is possible, on account of lack
     of civil restrictions [upon the military],
     availability of equipment and the military necessity
     of always being ready on a highly skilled basis."
     	General Arnold strongly favored a well equipped
transcontinental military airway, worldwide missions, and
emphasized that civil air transport was an integral part of the
United States' air power.  Arnold wrote a "Dear Tooey" letter
to his successor and urged Spaatz to preserve essential airlift
capability for future crises, since it appeared that the
nation's forces would be pulling back from overseas locations.
Without airlift, Arnold reasoned, the nation could find itself
in serious trouble in future confrontations. (1:59)  Above all,
General Arnold realized that without a rapid deployment
capability, the deterring forces of the AAF were hollow.  He
stressed planning for emergency overseas deployment and told
Spaatz, "It would appear reasonable to assume that civil air
carriers should provide a large share of the required lift."
      	The Finletter Commission revealed that the nation's
airlift would be unable to meet wartime needs and stated, "We
must increase our commercial fleet." (1:65) The report also
disclosed that the military planned to "take over, as they did
in World War Il, as much of the civilian lines, domestic and
international, as circumstances permit" and suggested the
preparation of prior agreements to specify what equipment and
services the airlines would furnish. (1:68) The final report,
submitted in December, 1947, stated, "As potential military
auxiliary, the airlines must be kept strong and healthy."  The
Finletter Commission added, "They are not in such a condition
at the present time." (1:81)
      	Three years after the Finletter commission, a wartime
airlift requirement study called the Douglas Commission
recommended establishing a three-tiered reserve of four-engine
transports in the civilian airlines.  The Douglas Commission
admitted that the required military modifications, making the
aircraft heavier, would increase the operating expense of
airlines.  The commission suggested that the military should
pay the calculated difference.  This report in 1951 became the
basis for organizing the commercial carriers to augment the
military airlift system--the birth of CRAF.  When fully
mobilized, CRAF participants would be expected to airlift 95%
of the passengers and 33%  of the cargo required by overseas
theatres.  While CRAF was never activated until Desert
Shield/Desert Storm (DS), the airlines previously had always
volunteered aircraft when national crises and military
contingency operations required more airlift.
      	As the airlift missions of the Korean operations wound
down and the Cold War continued, the military found itself
embroiled in a crucial debate with segments of the commercial
aviation industry and members of Congress over the role of
military air transport in peace and in war.  To many critics,
the military's airlift system simply appeared more appropriate
for private enterprise, especially when military pilots flew
the same routes used by the commercial carriers.  Intense
competition in the uncertain airline market had brought the
issue to a climax.  Moreover, the timing was favorable for the
airline industry, since there was great public interest in
reducing the size, as well as the expenditures, of the federal
government.  Initially, the debates were driven by the desire
to achieve sound management practices and were consistently
focused on cost-effectiveness.
      	Nevertheless, during these disputes Air Transport
Association (ATA) President Stuart Tipton presented a plan for
a national airlift program.  He advocated a force of military
and civil aircraft capable of satisfying war requirements.  His
plan essentially limited the military to specialized transport
for outsize, or exceptionally heavy cargo, unusual security
measures, or direct support of tactical combat units.
      	Defense Department rebuttals were centered on flexible,
responsive airlift.  Military air transport forces had to
achieve a high state of trained readiness as well as to
maintain peacetime operations to ensure an instant response
capability.  These forces required the means to expand
operations to meet the projected wartime utilization rate.
Furthermore, the military airlift system desired to reduce its
peacetime airlift costs.  This system viewed civil air
transport resources as augmentative and planned to use them in
peacetime to the maximum practical extent, as long as this
policy was consistent with airlift requirements and the
efficient cost effective employment of military resources.  Air
Force Deputy Chief of Staff Curtis Lemay candidly told
Congress, "The military has core airlift needs of crucial
importance at the outset of emergencies that reliance for
anything but a seasoned, properly equipped, disciplined
military force is a folly....Where the security of the free
world is suddenly threatened, we cannot wait for the
acquisition of commercial airlift.", (1:97)
      	Each side's argument on the debate had some validity;
civil carriers were motivated by profit making and the military
was building an airlift empire.  Congressman Holifield advised
the House Defense Appropriations subcommittee to make
recommendations on the basis of what would best serve national
defense.  These recommendations laid the groundwork for the
military to concentrate on the outsize or unusual missions or
"hard-core" requirements, while leaving the passenger and
conventional cargo business to the commercial carrier. (1:96)
The great national debate, tape for continuing, caused the
military and commercial carriers to regard each other as
essential for national defense.
      	But, recent world events have the U.S. contemplating the
largest recent redistribution of economic, political, and
military power.  Also the time may have come to determine if
privatization, tne transfer of military airlift to private
industry, would be best for the nation.  Hypothetically,
privatization of airlift could work much like the Air Force's
contracting of other services and at a cost savings to the
nation.  Commercial aviation would competitively bid for
providing unique airlift capable aircraft as well as current
contract airlift for cargo and passenger movement.  Perhaps
private industry might even purchase existing military aircraft
and infrastructure to support this large shift of capability.
This hypothetical discussion is possible since the general and
specific contracts for airlift were proven during World War II
and currently $700 million per year is already spent on
commercial augmentation, (2:23) not counting DS.   Also, our
nation is reducing the military, and the privatization of
airlift maybe a viable option.
      	Current reductions call for cuts of about 25%, or about
300,000 personnel, by 1995 and discussions continue on larger
future cuts.  For the Air Force, these cuts mean a 56,200
person reduction by 1995.  Comparatively, the Military Airlift
Command's (MAC) personnel strength as of April, 1991, was
70,547 with about 55,000 as direct support to the airlift
operation. (11:50) Privatization of MAC, the single manager
operating agency for military airlift, would avoid the
burgeoning of the unemployment numbers unlike the privatization
of any other Air Force line skill.  Moreover, the transfer of
airlift personnel to the private sector transitions
experienced, skilled, and motivated military personnel into job
opportunities and, in the process, may generate more jobs.
      	In addition, civil carriers demonstrated the ability to
move personnel and equipment for DS.  Since no threat to the
parity of U.S. military power exists, "our focus now is on
regional crises and contingencies," SecDef Cheney told a Senate
Panel.  (11:52) Also, the Bush administration states sufficient
warning exists for future conflicts.  Therefore, commercial
requisition can be used to fly personnel and equipment to
marry-up with more cost effective and bulk outsize movement on
sealift.  A precedent was established during DS, "The majority
of the Army's heavy equipment was moved by sealift," General H.
T. Johnson, current C1NCUSTRANSCOM, explained, "as the first
ships began to arrive in the [Persian] Gulf, we had to ensure
the troops arrived in time by air to complete the marry-up was essential to our success." (6:13) The
combination of airlift and sealift will be vital to future
successes, particularly if military material is prepositioned
in the few existing tension regions of the world.  General
Johnson said that he "expects the Pentagon to call for
increases in sealift and prepositioning as well as airlift."
(2: 24) Any urgently needed outsize and oversize cargo can be
airlifted on C-5's and C-141's that have been auctioned to
civil carriers.
      	Integral to privatization would be competition between the
carriers that would provide the lowest cost modern aircraft to
meet the specific requirements of the military.  McDonnell
Douglas is planning the commercial sale of the C-17. (10:23) The
military's versatile C-130, commercially the L-100, is in use
today and Lockheed is currently modernizing its L-100 version.
In addition, the French are possibly participating in the
European Future Large Airlifter (FLA) program or procurement of
several McDonnell Douglas C-17s. (5:57) In any event, commercial
special type airlift aircraft are readily available.
      	In addition, Public Law 97-86 authorizes the CRAF
Enhancement Program (CEP), which includes subsidies for
"modifications including reinforced floors, side cargo doors,
and rollers and rails to accommodate palletized military cargo"
in their aircraft. (7:24) CEP paves the way for privatization
of airlift to work, especially when coupled to crew ratio.
Civilian carriers already maintain a crew ratio of 7:1 or
greater while currently the MAC ratio is around 3:1--a less
efficient wartime surge profile.  Carriers awarded the
contracts could increase their CEP aircraft and crew ratio, if
necessary.  This situation would reduce the number of pilots in
the Air Force, ease a current personnel reduction problem and
address pilot retention difficulties.  Since the Air Force
would require fewer pilots, the undergraduate pilot training
costs would be greatly reduced and the associated costs at C-5,
C-141, and C-130 training schools would be eliminated.  A
domino effect could occur from privatization.
      	Privatization dominoes into the possible acquisition or
closing of Altus and Little Rock AFBs, since each base's
primary mission is C-5, C-141, (soon the C-17), and the C-13O
training schools, respectively.  Plus, military bases such as
Travis, McChord, McGuire, and Dover AFBs, used for the home
station of airlift aircraft could be targeted for closure.
Dual commercial and military capable airports, such as
Charleston, could serve as outsize cargo aerial ports of
debarkation.  Also, the C-17 will bed-down first at Charleston
AFB, so private industry could acquire those C-17 facilities.
	Civilian acquisition of all these capabilities and
facilities would economically strengthen a sagging civil
aviation industry, boost the U.S. economy in general, and
reduce military presence.  Massive humanitarian contract
airlift for overseas operations could produce revenue and
existing overseas military airlift infrastructure could be
expanded- even into the former Soviet Union, for revenue.
      	Economically, MAC has grown to, be a $5.2 billion per year
operation, possessing $33 billion worth of equipment working at
287 locations in twenty-five nations worldwide. (11:54) In many
countries, such as Korea, where the U.S. desires a less
noticeable military presence, this change to civil carriers
fulfills this desire.  Also, most carriers that currently
accept contracts to large trading countries like Korea justify
those missions by delivering the contracted military cargo and
then returning with higher revenue-producing goods.  Civil
carriers could maximize their cost efficiency more with control
of all the assets.  Additionally, the U.S. benefits from
support for national objectives with safe airlift.
      	For safety oversight and efficient civil compliance, the
DoD already has the Air Carrier Survey and Analysis Directorate
to detect safe and sound business practices of all contracted
carriers, no matter how large or small.  This office, working
in close coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA), identifies any contracted air carrier using poor safety
practices or entering weak financial operating solvency. Such
identification can result in a recommendation for suspension of
the air carrier's military contracted operations.  Each such
recommendation is presented to the military Civil Air Review
Board (CARB).  The CARB is an executive level review board
headed by a MAC Major General.  Those civil carriers placed on
suspension by this process usually receive similar scrutiny
from the FAA, until released from the suspension.
      	Nevertheless, the present time is unique for the nation to
formulate and redirect national policy.  Military threats seem
to be low, economic threats seem to be great, and citizens are
caught somewhere between.  With the current competitiveness
between civil carriers and efficiency in operations due to
deregulation, the time is ripe for the privatization of
airlift. (8:71)
      	While almost any type of contract can be negotiated,
militarily unusual environments, locations, and requirements
make the cost effectiveness of contracting doubtful.  Many of
MAC's 278 operating locations are probably not on revenue-
producing routes that interest civilian carriers.  Those routes
that are in use by commercial carriers are usually contracted
by the military.  Commercial air carriers provide a necessary
augmentation buffer to active core airlift aircraft that
efficiently and routinely use the Air Reserves and Air National
Guard in the worldwide infrastructure.  This military mobility
system of airlift works well with the civilian air carriers'
partnership and provides about $700 million worth of contract
incentive.  The airlift system also saves an equal amount, if
not more, each year using the military portion.
      	Since the partnership is strong, the competition ofmilitary and civilian airlift is a source of national strength.
Airlift leaders strive to efficiently operate this system while
meeting customer requirements in support of national
objectives.  Current world threats have been reduced, but there
remains much and high volatility.  This situation makes quick
response to anywhere, anytime, and likely transporting outsize
loads, a stark possibility.  These facts make contracts
(particularly long-term) for commercial augmentation difficult,
if not impractical, for a profit-motivated civilian carrier.
      	Also, there are no known civilian companies wanting to
purchase the military's airlift infrastructure or aircraft to
transport specialized cargo requiring special military material
handling equipment (MHE).  National defense features for CEP
aircraft require extensive aircraft modifications and make
those aircraft less economical to operate.  Military organic
aircraft, unlike civilian aircraft, have little civilian
application since they have peculiar military requirements:
straight-in loading for combat throughput, self sufficiency for
austere operations, box-like shapes for outsize and oversize
cargo, stressing and corrosion resilience for military loads,
in-flight refueling capabilities, and strengthened weight
bearing landing gear and wing structure for stressful military
flying.  To complement this type operation requires unique,
quickly deployed MHE for military operations in any
environment.  Commercial wide-body carriers require wide-body
loaders that must be moved on outsize-capable military aircraft
while organic military aircraft do not require them at all.
Furthermore, commercial carriers are limited on hazardous cargo
they can carry.
      In regards to the domino effect on military facilities, a
close look at the total economic impact (TEI) and secondary
jobs created (SJC) at those locations negates the idea:  Altus,
Little Rock, Travis, McChord, McGuire, and Dover create $144.7;
$466.2; $946.8; $547.3; $1,095.7; $513.9 million TEI and 860;
3,481; 8,190; 4,291; 9,474; and 3,994 SJC, respectively.  This
totals $3,714.6 million and 30,290 jobs worth of public concern
in this matter. (9:73) Therefore, a more important concern is
national defense responsiveness rather than cost differentials.
      	During DS, military airlift responsiveness was
demonstrated by "supply-pull" operations due to the dramatic
daily, often hourly, change in requested airlift by USCENTC0M--
especially in the first few weeks.  During DS, to satisfy
customer requirements, an express airlift operation for the
most critical necessities was developed for daily guaranteed
delivery.  C-141's flying from Charleston to Dahran via a
premium airlift system were used for 17-hour guaranteed
delivery, as stated by General H.T. Johnson speaking to this
years MCC&SC.  The commercial carriers that could have operated
this mission work on a Monday through Friday basis.  Also,
military airlift is the reason Patriot missile systems arrived
in Israel in just 11 hours to perform counter-SCUD operations
at a critical time.  This further demonstrates the
responsiveness of military aircraft in the operational flow,
unlike commercial carriers.  Commercial carriers must rely on
volunteer pilots to fly into combat zones, as they did for
Vietnam and in DS.  But, regardless of the profit, commercial
aviation might not risk diverting enroute aircraft or sitting
alert for take-off to some obscure, possibly hostile location.
      	Another risk for contract carriers are the multi-million
dollar aircraft without indemnification when flying into war
zones.  "According to the ATA, the principal air-carrier lesson
learned from the Persian Gulf War was the need to strengthen
war-risk insurance." (7:28) If airlines purchase coverage, the
significant cost would negate the profit.  Also, with the
fragmentation of world threats and the higher probability of
low intensity conflict, some operations may become unpopular as
compared to DS.  When contracted missions were scrutinized by
the public, nonperformance on contracts would be likely.
      	Politically, many nations find hope and resolve in U.S.
commitments by seeing U.S. military aircraft on their ramps
with the American flag on display.  But, in those nations that
are adversaries, this presence may invite terrorist acts
against civilian carriers or civilian missions, not knowing or
caring if the target supports a military contracted mission.
Military aircraft are also in the process of acquiring self-
defense capabilities for military operations that further
complicate a commercial airlift operation.
      	The military airlift system provides many unique services:
tactical and special assignment airlift, aeromedical evacuation
by converting an inbound cargo loaded compartment to return as
an aeromedical configured aircraft, some special operations,
movement of all nuclear assets for the U.S., smaller than C-130
airlift by C-27's in South America and Central America, rescue
missions responding in hours to downed airmen or even life-
saving missions for civilians in the middle of the Pacific
ocean, flying into hostilities, and transporting injured
civilians and cargo on humanitarian missions.  These are
military capabilities to consider before inistituting
      	In analyzing the privatization question, historical
arguments pro and con can be asserted.  But, an important
detractor is the unhealthy status of U.S. sealift as compared
to the strong civilian and military partnership of airlift.
General Duane Cassidy, previous CINCUSTRANSCOM said, "At this
point, defining the exact number of ships sufficient to do the
job is not as critical as recognizing the continuing downward
trend in ships available."  He told congress that the state of
the maritime industry is "the most disturbing situation I have
encountered since assuming command of USTRANSCOM." (3:41) The
current CINCUSTRANSCOM, General Johnson, lauded sealift but
mentioned deficiencies in the sealift capability for DS.  As an
example, the operators' ages and lack of crews and stevedores
signified a problem.  For instance, one seaman in DS service
was 82 years-old and the usual age was in the late 50-to-60-
year-old range.
      	Finally, transfer of airlift to the private sector does
not satisfy our nation's need for additional airlift; it only
transfers the capability and may eventually erode what the
historical partnership has built.  The April 1981
Congressionally Mandated Mobility Study cited a large airlift
shortfall.  Our military was directed to modernize its fleet
and build to a fiscally constrained 66 million-ton-mile per day
capability.  To date, even with the gradual introduction of 120
modernizing C-17's, the best level of capability expected is 54
-million-ton-miles per day.  Every congressional sponsored
mobility study, including the most recent one authorized by the
National Defense Authorization Act, released 23 Jan 92,
recommends increasing our nation's responsive lift assets.
Furthermore, it asserts that the need for airlift will increase
as the number of prepositioned ships increases in order to
match and round out the units. (4:32)
      	The airlift lesson learned during World War II, and
confirmed during Korean and DS operations was that the nation
could not maintain enough airlift capability in its military to
respond to wartime requirements.  This shortcoming provided the
catalyst for and establishment of, the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
(CRAF), a partnership between military and civilian airlift.
Presently, the military and civilian partnership provides a
valuable national power--airlift.  Each partner, regardless of
the perception, adds an important dimension to U.S. airlift
capability.  While the previous hypothetical discussion may
appear attractive initially, it is blatantly flawed.
Therefore, a person committed to the best interest of our
nation should answer the privatization question one way:  "No,
it is not in our nation's best interest to place all airlift in
private industry."  Throughout the Twenty-First century,
military airlift must continue to provide maximum flexibility
and responsiveness with a civilian backup.
1.  	Anything, Anywhere, Anytime. An Illustrated History of the
Military Airlift Command, 1941-1991. May 1991.
2.  	Bond, David P. "MAC Faces widening Gap in Peacetime, Crisis Needs.
"Aviation Week & Space Technology,  September 20, 91 23-25.
3.  	Correll, John T. "The Power Projection Shortfall." Air Force Magazine.
August 88 38-42
4.  	D'Agostino, Janet. "DoD Study Finds C-17 Essential In Post-Cold War
Era." Air Force Times. March 23, 92 32.
5.  	Inset "French  Airlifters  Support  Gulf  War."  Interavia Aerospace
Review. March 91 57.
6.  	Johnson, Mark E. "Civilian Airlines: Partners In Defense Airlift." Airman.
June 91 13-16.
7.  	Logistics Management Institute. Report PLO23R2. Review of Strategic Mobility
Programs. Volume 2: Civil Reserve Air Fleet. May 1991.
8.  	Mackenzie, Richard. "More Stormy Weather for the Airlines." Air Force Magazine.
March 92 70-73.
9.  	Military Airlift Command, Command Data Book. April 91 73.
10. 	Oliveri, Frank. "Aerospace World." Air Force Magazine. January 92 17-23.
11. 	Powell, Stewart M. "They Deliver." Air Force Magazine. August 91 50-55.

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