Drug Epidemic Not War
SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy
Title: Drug Epidemic Not War
Author: Major William L. Burnham, United States Army
Thesis: The Drug war is not a war as we know it; it is a human
tragedy based on greed, vice and poverty that is not open to
military solution. The ever-increasing pressure for the military
to do more in the drug war is a recipe for disaster.
Background: The drug problem continues to be an emotional
and political issue, but not a true first priority for this
administration. In spite of this, the pressures for increased
direct military involvement are growing. In frustration the
military may get thrown headlong into the problem, yet the nature
of the drug problem does not lend itself to a military solution.
On the contrary, the military can only provide a limited
supporting role in any realistic solution to the drug epidemic.
The current strategy has emphasized supply reduction, and it has
failed. The global economic nature of drug production ensures
that, short of world mobilization against drug production, supply
reduction strategy is doomed to continued failure. An
overwhelming number of countries are in desperate need of capital
to feed and house their people. These countries are searching for
any way to make money. This creates overwhelming geographic and
operational security problems for any military solution.
Conclusion: The military can be successful in selected in selected supporting
roles. This will only be possible after the required emphasis is
given to the problem by the current Administration.
Drug Epidemic Not War
The problem is the "Drug War" is not a war as we know it; it is a
human tragedy based on greed, vice and poverty that is not open to
I. Global complex economic based problem
A. Basis for majority of violent crime
B. Profit ideology
C. World economies are desperate
II. Global production base expansion
A. Trade barriers and open markets
B. International consortium
III. Corrupt or ineffective bureaucratic governments
IV. Doomed military strategy
A. Operational security
b. Untargetable features
C. Nonmilitary nature
D. Supply and demand
Drug Epidemic Not War
by Major William L. Burnham, United States Army
"The first, the greatest and most critical decision upon
which the Statesman and the General have to exercise their
judgment is to determine the nature of the war, to be sure they do
not mistake it for something nor seek to make of it something
which from its inherent conditions it can never be."
-General Carl Von Clausewitz
The "Drug War" is a misnomer that could be a self-fulfilling
prophecy. The current Administration and Congress are continuing
to increase their rhetoric on military solutions to a nonmilitary
problem. Everyone wants the military to do more in the "Drug
War." The problem is the "Drug War" is not a war as we know it;
it is a human tragedy based on greed, vice and poverty that is not
open to military solution. As the quotation from Clausewitz
points out, the most important question that must be answered,
before settling on military solutions, is what is the nature of
the conflict? Clausewitz's warning is clear: do not attempt to
impose a military solution on a nonmilitary problem! This is still
a current and valid caution, as our experience in Vietnam showed.
The Administration's frustration, and a political need to show
progress in the drug war, is again putting pressure on the
military to get involved in an arena that is clearly beyond its
It is understandable why there is so much pressure to find
anything that will help with the drug problem. Depending on which
set of statistics we care to use, seventy-five to eighty-five
percent of violent crime in the United States is either directly
or indirectly related to drugs. Gangs are on the rise and
directly tied to the drug trade. According to The Congressional
Quarterly, only ten U.S. cities had serious gang problems a decade
ago, but gangs now operate in 125 cities. The crime, violence and
human suffering associated with drugs is appalling. There is good
reason to be concerned about drugs as a National Security Issue;
however, that doesn't mean incremental increases of everything is
a good idea.
The very fact that the drug problem is such an emotional
issue is cause for caution. The frustration and fear created by
the drug problem produce pressures to strike back in whatever
manner we can. We must, however, carefully consider the effects
of U.S. Military involvement both at home and abroad before we
act. The drug problem is not like any war we have been involved
in. The drug problem is not a conflict of state against state,
communist ideology, or classical insurgency. The drug problem is
a problem of crime, and crime is not a problem that can be dealt
with adequately, or even substantially, by a conventional
The drug cartels do not profess an ideology per se, let alone
one that is vulnerable to military operations. If there is an
ideology, it is one of pure profit. The Cartel's success is
driven by greed, corruption, addiction and survival. The amount
of money involved is staggering. The low estimates for the world
drug trade is $500 billion dollars a year. That is substantially
more than the GNP of most nation states. In 1989 the total gross
national product for Colombia was only $40 Billion dollars, and
Colombia is one of the wealthiest countries in all of Central and
South America. This is a good indication of the type of political
power and influence the Cartel can wield. This kind of criminal
activity is not militarily vulnerable, especially when it injects
wealth into a poverty ridden country.
What we are talking about is a criminal enterprise that,
provides the only means of survival for a whole section of the
globe that is living in absolute poverty. What chance do we have
to influence a campesino who cannot make enough from growing a
legal crop to feed his family? The situation is not getting
better. Major portions of the globe are in economic dispair.
In Peru wages have dropped by over 60% since 1987. Inflation
has been running 7,500%. 80% of the population is underemployed
and 22 million people are living in absolute poverty.(22) The
Peruvian Government--even with American aid--has been unable to
come up with any viable crop substitution plan for tens of
thousands of peasant growers, currently growing coca in the Upper
Huallaga Valley. Counter drug operations have been so
unsuccessful that coca cultivation is expanding into the Apurimac
and Ene River Valleys, despite all the rhetoric about counter-drug
Venezuela has been one of Latin America's most stable and
wealthy countries; however, its government has just been subjected
to a rash of Coup attempts. There has been a 100% rise in food
prices and the inflation rate is running at 89%. Compared with
Peru, Venezuela is an icon of economic stability, but by US
standards it is in serious trouble. Several of Venezuela's more
prominent leaders are under investigation for corruption and
possible links to the Drug Cartel. The Cartel appears to be
taking advantage of the deteriorating situation by expanding its
operations into Venezuela. (6) As the quality of life drops to the
point of a survival issue, it is not hard to find willing
participants for any enterprise that will put food on the table or
buy medicine for a sick child.
In Colombia the unemployment rate in some areas is 60%, and
there is no prospect on the horizon for any improvement. In areas
like Medellin, daily life is a true struggle for survival of the
fittest and most ruthless. Medellin, a modern-looking city with a
population of 1.8 million, experiences an average of 23 murders a
day, more than 7,500 a year.(7) That is an average of 416
homicides per 100,000. The US average is 12 homicides per 100,000
population. The Washington, D.C., (Murder Capital of the U.S.)
homicide rate averages 80 per 100,000 for a total of 483 homicides
last year.(11) When we compare the two, Medellin makes
Washington, D.C., look like Mayberry RFD.
The normal life situation of the average citizen in the less
developed countries of the world--which are the majority of the
countries of the world--is difficult for the average US citizen to
comprehend. The majority of the U.S. population is not in a
survival situation and we have social support mechanisms, limited
as they are, for those who are. This is not the ease for the
average citizen of the more prominent drug-producing countries.
Most barely survive day to day. They have few options and less
hope. Add to this situation the fact that the Cali Cartel is
estimated to send $50,000,000 dollars a month home to Colombia,
from its dealings in New York City alone, and it is not hard to
understand why there are no shortage of volunteers for the ranks
of the Cartel, regardless of how dangerous it gets.(14) As long
as there is a demand, and a profit can be made, there will be
recruits, because there is no alternate employer. Even if we
could apply enough pressure in one area, the process would just
move to the next impoverished area.
Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, and
Bolivia are just a few of the prominent drug producing countries
in Central and South America. The list is as long and
distinguished from Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The
probable trouble spots are anywhere the economy is in trouble and
the standard of living is dropping. That pretty much covers the
Globe, and there is no evidence the drug sphere of influence is
getting any smaller.
Revelations disclosed during the Manual Noriega trail point
to a huge worldwide organized drug consortium of cartels that may
be the biggest crime organization in history. The trial has
brought to light links between the Drug Cartel and $10,000,000
payments to Nicaragua; deals with Raul Castro, Cuban Defense
Minister and brother of Fidel, to allow shipments through Cuba;
the use of Costa Rican ranchers and ranches to ship drugs, and on
and on.(17) When we add to this thriving international drug
market the current economic pressures to expand legal markets, the
situation can only get worse.
The pressure the U.S. Government is exerting on Latin
American Nations to open up their markets is only one example.
Colombian officials are saying that their compliance with the US
request to open up their commercial markets has made it easier for
the Drug Cartel to internationalize and bring their profits home
to Colombia.(10). The opening of the legal barriers to trade has
made it easier for the Cartel to react to pressure and shift its
efforts to other areas of Colombia or to other South American
According to "Washington Post" articles, the Drug Cartel is
currently making inroads in Suriname (GNP 200 million) and
Venezuela (GNP 62 Billion). The articles indicate that there has
been no slowing of the Cartel by international antidrug efforts.
In fact, it appears the Cartel is currently expanding
internationally into the heroin trade, and members are
also receiving training from British and Israeli mercenaries. (9)
The international expansion appears to be taking place in every
market. In June 1991, 1285 pounds of high grade "China White"
heroin was seized in California. It was being smuggled by a
"legitimate" corporation owned by Tiawanese nationals. This has
prompted a wave of new concerns about a large Chinese heroin trade
The sheer magnitude of the environment that drug
production can flourish in should make a military solution
suspect. We cannot occupy every Latin American, Asian, Middle
Eastern or African Country. We certainly cannot solve their
economic problems, considering the difficulty we have with our
own. It is unrealistic to expect the U.S. Military to cope with
such a monetarily driven global problem. Even if the problem
could somehow be isolated into a reasonable size, the foreign
bureaucracies that would be involved in combined operations would
make success doubtful.
Military operations overseas, unless the U.S. is willing to
act unilaterally (highly unlikely with today's politics), require
the complete coordination and cooperation of the host nation. In
the case of Latin American Governments, most are very rigid,
extremely territorial and much more bureaucratic than our own.
Graft is often an accepted way of life. This makes it virtually
impossible to guarantee operational security. The U.S. press is
never short of articles about U.S. Law Enforcement Officials who
are under investigation for corruption in drug-related cases. If
we cannot guarantee our own officials' honesty, what chance do we
have in monitoring foreign officials in their own country?
As was pointed out earlier, the amount of money the cartel
can wield, the limited options available to most people for
legitimate wealth, and the chaotic international environment for
criminal investigation make a powerful force for corruption. This
is an extremely dangerous environment for military operations that
require operational security as a paramount ingredient for
survival and success. It is impossible to be sure who or what
we are dealing with. There are no shortage of cases which
illuminate the danger.
Tn Suriname, Lt. Col. Deis Bouterse, a former sergeant until
he seized power during a coup in 1980, is reportedly allowing his
country to become a major narcotics center. He appears to be
allowing large-scale permanent cocaine laboratories to be
established in Suriname. He is also reportedly providing safe
haven and army protection for Cartel members.(8) In Peru, during
September 1991, Peruvian Government Soldiers, supposedly
protecting drug traffickers, fired on DEA helicopters in the Upper
Huallaga Valley. (21)
On 7 November, 1991, at an airstrip in Vera Cruz Mexico,
Mexican Army Soldiers shot dead seven Mexican Counter Narcotics
Agents, but allowed the drug traffickers the agents were following
to escape. The smugglers had landed a few minutes before the plane
carrying the Agents. The drug smugglers escaped without being
fired upon even though the army reported it had been waiting in
ambush for airplanes to land. The airplanes landed at
approximately 6:50 a.m. with the Agents being taken under fire
shortly thereafter. The gents reportedly weren't killed until
after General Alfredo Moran arrived on the scene, at approximately
8:30 a.m., and ordered his men to sweep the area. The General
reportedly ordered this sweep after he had been notified--three
times by the Mexican Attorney General's Office--he was engaging
Mexican Drug Agents. The General is reportedly under
investgation by Mexican Authorities. (3)
Don Pedro Orozco, a very well-to-do Mexican businessman and
rancher, was gunned down by men firing M-60 machine guns near his
horse ranch. Don Orozco was a prominent figure, well known for
making frequent political contributions. He numbered among his
friends the Governor, Mayor, State Police Chiefk and leaders of
the Institutional Revolutionary Party. It turns out that after
his death, Orozco was identified as Manuel Salcido Uzueta, known
as El Cochiloco (The Mad Pig), one of the most notorious Mexican
kingpins in the Mexican drug trade. (3)
Dancleny Munoy was arrested in the U.S. for carrying false
immigration paperwork. In Colombia he is believed to be the top
hit-man for Pablo Escobar. He is reportedly responsible for the
assassination of over 40 Colombian Police Officers and two
bombings. One of the bombs destroyed an Avionca Jet and killed
107 people, the other was a car bomb that killed 65 people. He
has escaped from Colombian jails twice. He escaped once by using
a helicopter, and the other time by bribing his guards with a
reported $800,000 (U.S.) dollars. Even though the U.S. Government
is able to hold him only on minor immigration charges, the
Colombians reprotedly don't want him back--they say they can't
hold him! (13)
The President of Colombia himself, Cesar Gavirea, is coming
under pressure for failure to launch an investigation into charges
that the drug barons are bribing members of the Colombian
Congress. Gavirea has reportedly been in possession, for quite
some time, of a video that shows a lawyer for Pablo Escobar
bribing a Congressman to vote to ban the Extradition of drug
barons to the U.S. He has taken no action to date; however, and
this has cast suspicion over the President and the Congressional
Assembly. It also calls into serious question the reasons behind
the Assembly calling for General Elections three years ahead of
schedule. In the meantime the Assembly took advantage of this
period to re-write the Colombian Constitution to ban the
extradition of drug barons to the U.S., among other things. (5)
Jose Cabrera, a jailed leader of the Medellin Cartel,
testified during the Noriega case that the Cartel contributes
heavily to the Colombian Presidential Campaigns and to Colombian
Congressional leaders. (5) Carlos Lehder, another jailed Cartel
member, also testified that the Cartel had not trouble getting
detailed information on DEA agents and counter-drug operations.
The most notable supplier of this information was Noriega himself,
who reportedly supplied the Cartel with the names and pictures of
all the DEA agents working in Panama. (18)
These episodes are just the tip of the iceberg, but they are
enough to form a clear picture. They point to the almost
impossible job of providing operational security for combined
counter-drug operations. It is apparent that the nature of the
drug problem is enormous and complex. The factors affecting the
drug trade would seem to not lend themselves to a military
solution, even if we could all agree to pursue one. The drug
problem is simply not a militarily solvable conflict. There is no
sovereignty dispute to act on. There are no overt military forces
taking the field of battle. The main enemy force wears business
suits and lives in the major cities. It is impossible to identify
a "narco-soldier" from a friendly citizen without someone pointing
him out and, as previously discussed, we would do well to evaluate
the motives of the person doing the pointing.
The drug problem also does not fit the normal framework of an
insurgency. The drug lords do not seek to overthrow the civil
government; they seek to control it. The drug lords buy the
influence they need. They use their money to support candidates,
bribe officials and lobby to change constitutional laws to their
advantage. The Drug Lords purposely refrain from any overt threat
to the sovereignty of the host nation. Their method is insidious
and, therefore, not vulnerable to military counter measures.
It is obvious that drugs are a world problem and any
successful effort must take a multidimensional, coordinated world
view. Unfortunately, that is not the way things are proceeding.
So far, most of the effort has been directed at counter-supply
operations. For the most part, it appears to be uncoordinated at
the strategic and operational level. Most agencies are pretty
much independent in their planning and operational execution.
Even the Commanders In Chief (CINCs) of the Unified and Specified
Commands are coming up with their own Counter Drug Campaign
Plans."(23) Since there is no overall strategy, these campaigns
will amount to tactical engagements at best. There is a definite
need for a single "Department," at the National Security Counsel
level, to take "command" of the total strategy. Although the
"Drug Czar" position was created to do this, it has proven
The "Drug Czar" concept has proven to be lacking in both
domestic and international expertise and the political clout to
deal with the drug problem. The resignation of the first "Drug
Czar," and the latest statistics showing an increase in US drug
use, demonstrate this failure. The Drug Abuse Warning Network
(DAWN) shows a 15% increase in cocaine-related incidents and a 13%
increase in heroin-related incidents. In the beginning, when the
figures were favorable, the Administration used to proudly point
to the DAWN statistics as a measure of success. However, now
that the statistics have turned around, showing an anti-drug
policy failure, no one in the Administration is citing them.(19)
A State Department report, cited in the Washington Post,
reports that Opium Production is up by eight%. The same report
reveals that our successful poppy eradication effort in Mexico has
pushed poppy production into Guatemala were it has doubled. The
article also quotes Mark Kleiman, Harvard University, John F.
Kennedy School of Government, as saying, "So much in so many
places makes crop control irrelevant." (20) This same State
Department report indicates that there has been no noticeable
difference in the volume of money laundering or drug
trans-shipments in Panama since the Noriega Government was
replaced over a year ago. It further cites this as proof that the
Drug Cartel is well financed and able to adapt to whatever
pressures we manage to produce.
Another "Washington Post" article quotes Stanley E. Morris,
1989-1991 Deputy Director Supply Reduction, White House Office of
National Drug Control Policy as saying,"There is no indication
that there is less cocaine coming out of South America. Indeed
there is such a surplus that they are pursuing new markets in
Europe because they have saturated the U.S. market . . . We have only
managed to push the market around a little." The increase in
production is attributed to the Cartel's ability to adapt and move
facilities into Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and Central America.
White House estimates put cocaine production last year at 900
metric tons. That is twice the 1988 estimate. A European
estimate due out from the European Community puts the estimate at
1100 metric tons. (12)
Another reason cited for the production increase is the
advances in high technology that the Cartel has made. The
Cartel has developed the technology to eliminate a step in the
process of making cocaine: it is no longer necessary to turn the
coca leaf into a gooey paste before converting it into coca base,
This has eliminated the need for large labs. The Cartel has also
developed a technique to store the coca base as a liquid solution,
known as "agua rica," making it much easier to hide and extending
its shelf life to two years. Unfortunately, along with the
increased efficiency, this also makes the job of interdiction much
All this is pointing at the failure of the current policy and
the premise that the current policy was built on. That premise is
that both supply and demand reduction could be effective. I think
it is clear that supply reduction is an insurmountable task. As
long as there are so many poor and exploitable countries, and the
demand remains, there will be more than ample drug production.
This would appear to make "demand reduction" the only logical
solution, however, demand reduction has gotten none of the
emphasis it deserves. The current Director of National Drug
Control Policy (Drug Czar) has very little statutory authority to
ensure support of the Drug Strategy. (23)
What is needed is a Drug War "CINC" who has the power to
direct the domestic reforms associated with demand reduction as
well as all the national elements of power associated with supply
reduction. We need a commander capable of directing and
coordinating the full spectrum of resources from behavioral
science to domestic and international economics.
The CINC for the Drug War needs to be a politically powerful
cabinet level member of the National Security Council. This is
the minimum power level at which the political, economic,
psychological, law enforcement and military elements of power can
be orchestrated. All these elements of power are required to wage
a domestic and international anti-drug campaign. The strategy and
the campaign plan must emphasize the behavioral and
environmental modifications required to change the personal mores
of the drug consumer. This is the only sure way to stop the
demand cycle, and I believe it is clear, the demand cycle is the
center of gravity of the Drug War.
As long as there is a demand for drugs it is unrealistic to
assume the production of drugs can be stopped. The majority of
the world is underdeveloped and impoverished, which provides
fertile ground for illicit drug production. There is no realistic
possibility that we can stop the production of drugs across such a
vast area of the globe. Consequently, the only answer is to stop
the demand at home.
To stop the demand requires us to change the values, social
mores and life conditions of the user. This is a tall order. As
the Soviets can attest, the only way to permanently change a
person's behavior through the application of military power is to
either maintain a constant military force in the streets or
permanently eliminate the offender. Neither of these options
would be acceptable to the American public. Our own experience
with prohibition leads to the same conclusion on forced human
morals. Lethal force is the only way the military can permanently
change a drug-user's mores. Clearly, education, social services,
human development, and economic forces must take the lead.
In light of the complex and immense nature of the
drug problem, the first step this country must take is to get
serious about solving the problem. Nothing short of making the
drug problem the number-one priority will even come close to
making the required assets available. The next step is to pick
the correct man to lead. As stated before, he must be able to
mobilize the country. He must be able to manage and direct all
the required elements of national power. In addition, he must
have the appropriate stature and authority to direct compliance
with the National Strategy.
Given the stature required and the nation-building nature of
both the domestic and international problem, our only chance for
success rests with the President himself. He is the only one with
the required statutory power to direct the vast organizations
required to do the job. He is the only one who can direct all the
required agencies to support one strategy in detail. As in Desert
Shield/Desert Storm, he is the only individual in our system who
can energize the country and direct a unified strategy.
Until the President is willing to personally take the reins
and make the drug problem a true priority, we will continue with
disjointed, ineffective measures. Like Desert Shield/Storm, the
President doesn't need to personally run the organizations
involved; that would be a mistake. He does, however, need to
captain the ship of state toward the drug problem with the same
vigor and intensity he showed during the Gulf War. If he would do
that, the other elements/agencies of power could then be
coordinated and directed by an appropriate level of command.
The majority of the military's supporting role could be most
effective, and least controversial, in noncombative U.S.-based
functions. With the proper legislative changes, the military
could provide increased intelligence support, US Border
surveillance/control and customs inspection support.
Currently, over 50% of all illegal drugs come through the
2,000-mile U.S. Southern Border. (22) At current manning levels,
we have approximately the same number of New York City police
riding the subway at any given time as we do covering this 2,000-
mile border area. Currently Customs Agents can only inspect about
14% of the containers entering this country from cocaine-source
countries, and a U.S. Customs Officer only has about seven seconds
to decide whether or not to search a vehicle at a border
crossing. (23) With legislative changes, the military could
certainly be of assistance in these areas, as well as in
If we are truly serious about a solution, the military could
also help alleviate the overcrowding of jails. The services can
provide trained personnel to set up and run confinement facilities
for drug offenders. The CINCs could also provide tactical level
military operations, as needed, in support of the overall
nonmilitary strategic and operational - level campaign plans.
These may seem like drastic and unusually serious steps
toward a solution, but the point is, drugs are a drastic and
unusually dangerous problem. If a solution is truly sought, this
country must be willing to address it as such and take the
appropriate harsh steps. Until the President is willing to make
it a true number-one agenda item, instead of a "political" agenda,
there is little the military can do. Unless the country is
mobilized for a true drug war, military involvement will send us
down the familiar and dangerous road of unclear goals and
incrementalism. If we have learned anything from Vietnam, it
should be that misidentifing the nature of a conflict, coupled
with unclear national goals and military incrementaiism is a
formula for disaster. The oft repeated, but seldom heeded, words
are still true, "those who will not learn from history are
destined to repeat it.."
1. Brown, Dale E Maj. "Drugs on the Border," Parameters, U.S.
Army War College Quarterly, XXI No. 4(Winter 1991-92), 50-59.
2. Cody, Edward. "Mexican Army Blamed For Drug Agents' Death,"
The Washington Post, December 7, 1991, Section A., p. 22.
3. Cody, Edward. "Mexican's Violent Death Exposes Double Life,"
The Washington Post, November 6, 1991, Section A., p. 33.
4. Dewar, Helen. "Crime Bill Bogged Down Amid Partisan
Bickering," The Washington Post, October 6, 1991,Section A., p. 1.
5. Farah, Douglas. "Colombian Political Campaign Focuses on Drug
Cartels," The Washington Post, October 26, 1991, Section A., p.18.
6. Farah, Douglas. "Austerity Plan, Economic Woes Spark Violent
Protests in Venezuela, "The Washington Post, November 30,
1991,Section A., p.20.
7. Farah, Douglas. "Vigilantes Retake Slums of Medellin," The
Washington Post, December 7, 1991, Section A., p.17.
8. Farah, Douglas. "Drug Traffic Shifting to Suriname," The
Washington Post," November 4, 1991, Section A., p. 1.
9. Farah, Douglas. "Rival Colombian Groups Battle Over Heroin
Trade," The Washington Post," January 18, 1992, Section A., p. 14.
10. Farah, Douglas. "U.S. and Colombia Target Drug Traffickers'
Finances, " The Washington Post," December 31, 1991, Section A., p.1.
11. Farah, Douglas. "Violence in a District in Colombia," The
Washington Post, December 9, 1991, Section A., p. 14.
12. Farah, Douglas. "Drug Summit To Convene as Supply Surges,"
The Washington Post, February 25, 1992, Section A. p. 1.
13. Goodstein, Laurie. "Reputed Colombian Hitman Convicted on
Lesser Charges, " The Washington Post, November 27, 1991, Section A.,
14. Isikoff, Michael. "Drug Raid Nets a U.S. Leader of Cali
Cartel," The Washington Post, December 7, 1991, Section A., p. 22.
15. Isikoff, Michael. "Noriega Trial Witness Says Cartel Met With
Raul Castro," The Washjngtnn Post, November 27, 1991, Section A.,
18. Isikoff, Michael. "Justice Dept. Subpoenas Unaired NBC Tapes
of Drug Seizure," The Washington Post, January 18, 1991, Section
A. p. 3.
17. Isikoff, Michael. "Drug Cartel Gave Contras $10 Million," The
Washington Post, November 26, 1991, Section A., p. 1.
18. Isikoff, Michael. "Government Gambled in Turning to Cartel
Figure in Noriega Case," The Washington Post, November 24, 1991,
Section A., p. 23.
19. Isikoff, Michael. "Reversing Course, Cocaine Use Indicator Is
Rising," The Washington Post, October 15, 1991, Section A., p. 22.
20. Isikoff, Michael. "International Opium Production Up 8% Last
Year," The Washington Post, March 1, 1992, Section A., p. 4.
21. Robinson, Eugene. "U.S. Drug Fighting Program in Peru
Enormously Delayed," The Washington Post, November 24, 1991,
Section A., p. 28.
22. Robinson, Eugene. "Peru's Guerrillas Pose New Threat," The
Washington Post, February 16, 1992, Section A. p. 51.
23. U.S. Army. Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College.
"Campaign Planning and the Drug War." Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, February 1991.
24. U.S. Army. Center For Lessons Learned. "Counterdrug
Operations. "Newsletter No. 91-4, November 1991.
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