A NEO Is More Than A Maneuver
CSC 1992
SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Title:
A NEO is More Than A Maneuver
Author:
Major S. L. Bumgardner, USMC
Thesis:
The Department of Defense needs to create joint doctrine for the conduct
of
noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) which
recognizes the significant political
consequences of the operation.
Background:
The United States has been concerned with rescuing and evacuating its
citizens from foreign countries since Lieutenant
Prestley O'Bannon attacked in
Tripoli. With instability spreading in the
world, it is likely that more NEO operations
will be occurring. Because a NEO is requested
by the Department of State and
supported by the Department of Defense, joint
military doctrine should recognize the
foreseeable consequences that occur when NEOs
are conducted. During Operation
Sharp Edge, the noncombatant evacuation
operation conducted in Liberia in June,
1990-January 1991, dramatic and expensive
political changes occurred in conjunction
with the execution of this mission.
Recommendation: Develop joint military NEO doctrine that shares terms and goals
with the Department of State.
A NEO IS MORE THAN A MANEUVER
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: To better conduct future noncombatant evacuation operations
(NEOs) the Department of Defense needs to
create joint doctrine that emphasizes the
significant political consequences of these
operations.
I. NEO defined.
A. Historical legal basis
B. Modern legal basis
II. Relationship of State Department and
Department of Defense in NEOs
A. State Department Role
1. Responsibilities
2. Emergency Handbook
B. Department of Defense Role
1. Responsibilities
2. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
III. Operation Sharp Edge
A. Situation
B. Political considerations
C. Consequences
A NEO IS MORE THAN A MANEUVER
In
1805 United States Marines first planted an American flag on a foreign
shore as part of a rescue mission. Led by
Lieutenant Presley Neville O'Bannon, a
combined force of seven enlisted Marines and
more than 500 Greek, Arab, and
expatriate European mercenaries supported by
Bedouin cavalry captured the city of
Derma to force the Barbary pirates to free 307
American sailors held captive in
Tripoli. Despite manifest bravery, O'Bannon's
campaign against the beys, deys and
bashaws of the Tripolitian Arabs failed to
achieve its stated goal. In large part this
failure occurred because of contrary
diplomatic negotiations undertaken by the U.S.
Consul General to Algeria Tobias Lear, the
former personal secretary for President
Washington.1
This inauspicious beginning marked the start of the U.S. challenge to
effectively coordinate diplomatic initiatives,
combined forces, and military action
when conducting rescue missions. With regional
instability rising in the aftermath of
the Cold War, the need to execute military
rescue missions -specifically
noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs)-
will increase.2 To better conduct
future
NEOs the Department of Defense needs to create
joint doctrine that emphasizes the
significant Political consequences of these
operations.
The U.S. military conducts noncombatant emergency evacuations at the
request of the State Department to rapidly
remove U.S. citizens and a few specified
others from the threat of harm in a foreign
country. The need for a NEO occurs
when, as a consequence of natural disaster,
internal unrest, or armed conflict with
another country, a host country can or will
not provide protection to U.S. citizens
within its borders. Current Marine Corps
doctrine describes NEOs as similar to
amphibious raids because both involve
"swift incursion into or temporary occupancy
of an objective followed by a planned
withdrawal."3 This description distinguishes a
NEO from an amphibious raid because different
rule of engagement are followed. In
a NEO, force may be used only for self-defense
or defense of others, such as the
evacuees.
The international law basis for NEOs has become better settled in the
years
since the end of World War II. Before 26 June
1945, when the United Nations
Charter had not yet superseded customary
international law, two humanitarian
purposes permitted intrusion by one State into
the sovereign territory of another.4
The rare justification for foreign incursion
occurred when a country committed
atrocities upon its own people on a scale that
fell below the standards of civilized
societies ---an extremely flexible standard.
The more frequent basis for foreign
intervention occurred when a State's citizens
living abroad faced imminent danger to
lives and property.5
With the passage of the U.N. Charter, world governments reexamined the
legal theories of intervention. Initially many
believed the U.N. Charter barred any
threat or use of force between States
regardless of the intentions or goals of the
intervening State. The U.N. Charter grants
only two exceptions to this absolute
prohibition:
self-defense or participation in U.N. enforcement actions to restore
international peace. However, in the years
following World War II, idealism and the
U.N. could not establish an effective
international peace force to conduct evacuation
missions world-wide.
Lacking an active international force, the U.S. has adopted an
interpretation of
self-defense which rests upon customary
international law. This interpretation accepts
the ideas of self-defense put forth by the
U.N. Charter. However, it permits a nation
to help its own people when the U.N. is unable
to effectively act. When harm to
citizens abroad is imminent, the U.S.
government can take appropriate action to
prevent injury or harm. These actions can
include intervention into another country
provided the intervention is limited to
protecting the citizens being evacuated.6
Current regulation, agreement, and plan place the responsibility for
protecting
U.S. citizens abroad on the Secretary of
State.7 Under the scheme of Executive Order
12656, the Secretary of State eyes the world
to minimize the number of U.S. citizens
who are subject to the risk of death, injury,
and capture as hostage. To carry out this
responsibility, the Secretary of State names
offices within the Department of State that
are responsible for evacuation planning and
implementation. The cognizant on-scene
official who oversees the preparation and
implementation of these plans for each
country is the U.S. ambassador.
As
instability grows, the Ambassador is charged to review the Emergency
Action Plan (EAP)contained in the Embassy's 12
Foreign Affairs Handbook-1
Emergency Planning Handbook.8 This plan is
composed of completed checklists from
the 16 chapters and seven annexes of the 12
FAH-1 Emergency Handbook. Started as
a Department-wide program after the report of
the 1985 Inman Commission which
examined the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in
Beirut and other disasters, these
checklists assist the Ambassador and the
Embassy Country Team in anticipating
potential emergencies.
In
the EAP, chapters are devoted to natural disasters, bombings, civil strife,
massive refugee requests, reduction of
personnel, and evacuation. The EAP plans
responses to these various emergencies which
range from standing-fast, leaving the
country by commercial means, evacuation, and
post closing. When complete and
updated, an Embassy EAP contains extensive
maps, pictures of landing zones and
beach sites, a transportation plan, a
logistics plan, and a communication plan. Copies
of the EAP, which become a classified document
when filled out, are returned to the
Emergency Plans Office of the State Department
in Washington, D.C., which then
sends 44 copies to the Pentagon for retention
and use.9
Along with reviewing crisis response plans, the Ambassador is also
tasked
with coordinating with the Secretary of
Defense to maximize timely use of military
transportation assets and to insure military
evacuation plans can be integrated into the
Department of State plans.10 If military
assistance may be required for an evacuation
operation, the Ambassador makes the request to
the Secretary of State who then
informs the President. The Ambassador's
message to the Secretary of State requesting
this action normally informs the area
Commander in Chief of Unified and Specified
Commands (CinC) so that military planning of
the evacuation may begin.11
Each CinC is tasked with preparing and maintaining plans for assisting
the
Department of State in the protection and
evacuation of U.S. noncombatants
abroad.12 Matters considered when drawing up
these plans include courses of action,
forces, assembly area operations, evacuation
site operations, embassy security,
medical support and host nation support -the
same matters also considered in Chapter
15 of 12 FAH-1 Emergency Handbook.13 As the
CinCs and their staffs work on
concepts of operation for the evacuations in
their region, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Force Management and Personnel,
the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Washington Liaison
Group--a joint monitoring body established and
chaired by the Department of State
with Department of Defense representation--all
oversee, and provide coordination for
the implementation of the non-combatant
emergency evacuation plan.14 In their final
form, these military evacuation plans are
included as part of the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP) which gives the CinCs
guidance for the accomplishment of
their military tasks over a two year cycle.15
Two opportunities presented themselves in 1990 and 1991 to test the
multi-
layered planning now involved when conducting
NEOs. Both occurred in littoral
countries of Africa as Desert Shield built
into Desert Storm. The first, Operation
Sharp Edge in Monrovia, Liberia, started as a
evacuation rescue mission and evolved
into a seven month embassy sustainment
mission. The second, Operation Eastern Exit
in Mogadishu, Somalia, began as an emergency
evacuation and lived up to its billing.
Of the two operations, Operation Sharp Edge
differs most from the normal
"amphibious raid" model of a NEO and
for that reason perhaps had more influence
on the political situation of the host
country.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) started Operation
Sharp-Edge
on 25 May 1990 by ordering the United States
Europe Command (EURCOM) to
deploy Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group
(MARG) 2-90 off the western coast
of Africa near Monrovia, Liberia. The 22nd
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special
Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]) embarked aboard
four amphibious ships gave
MARG 2-90 its ground combat element. This
MEU(SOC) consisted of a Marine
medium helicopter squadron, a rifle battalion,
and a combat services support group.
upon receipt of the JCS order, MARG 2-90 began
planning the potential tasks of a
NEO. These included reinforcement of the
United States Embassy in Monrovia,
protection of communication sites in Liberia,
and possible extraction of key United
States Embassy personnel.16
The circumstances which started the NEO begin in December of 1989. On
Christmas eve, 1989, Charles Taylor, the U.S.
educated former head of the Liberian
Government Services Agency (GSA) and a member
of the Gio tribe, started a revolt
against the then president, Samuel K. Doe, a
member of the Bakwe tribe. Doe had
accused Taylor of corruption in 1987 and
forced him to flee the country.17 Upon his
return in 1989, Taylor starte his insurrection
with a small organization, the National
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Fueled by
tribal rivalries, the NPFL spread civil
dissent while growing quickly during the early
months of 1990. Working inland from
the coastal town of Buchanan, Taylor followed
Maoist doctrine by advancing slowly
while he gained the support of the people.
In
May the NPFL threatened the only international airport in Liberia, Roberts
International Airport. Around this airport in
the outskirts of Monrovia, the members
of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), who
remained loyal to President Doe, and the
NPFL, engaged in bloody battles with neither
obtaining much success. Observing the
mayhem, the American Embassy in Monrovia
issued situation reports which "painted
a picture similar to the 'Fall of the Roman
Empire' for the rest of the world to read
in message traffic."18 By 25 May the
severity of these reports caused the JCS to
send MARG 2-90 from Toulon, France, to Mamba
Station, a navigational point off
the coast of Liberia.
To
plan for the missions assigned in Operation Sharp-Edge, MARG 2-90 sent
an advance party comprised of the executive
officer of the 22nd MEU(SOC), the
executive officer of the Marine rifle
battalion ahead of the MARG to Monrovia. The
platoon commander of the Navy Sea, Air, Land
(SEAL) team, an air/naval gunfire
liaison team (ANGLICO), and two radio
operators joined them en route in Barcelona,
Spain. Together these individuals formed the
Forward Command Element (FCE) of
MARG 2-90.
Prepared for immediate action, the FCE arrived in Monrovia on 29 May.
Their baggage included food, batteries,
satellite communications gear, smoke
grenades, weapons, and ammunition. Because
they believed either the 22nd
MEU(SOC) would soon land or the crisis would
end shortly, the FCE brought
supplies for only ten days.19
The tasks the FCE conducted when it reached Liberia expressly concerned
the
technical Marine Corps aspects of a NEO: finding and evaluating possible helicopter
landing zones, finding and evaluating
potential beach landing sites and assembly sites
for the evacuees, and drafting a reenforcement
plan for the American Embassy. As
planned, MARG 2-90 reached Liberia on 5 June.
By diplomatic decision, it sat
offshore for sixty days.20
The Embassy personnel had several good reasons to resist the NEO. First,
as
diplomats, the State Department officials in
Liberia wanted to pursue negotiations for
as long as possible. Problems in the revolt
caused circumstances to not be as dire as
broadcast.
In
late May, Charles Taylor lost two of his top lieutenants. One, Elmer
Johnson, was killed. The other, Prince
Johnson, a professional soldier who had
trained with the U.S. Army at Fort Jackson,
South Carolina, broke away to form a
splinter group called the Independent National
patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL).21
Hampered by these command problems and
logistics difficulties, Taylor's advance on
Monrovia slowed. This delay, and the entry of
the INPFL into the melee, provided an
opportunity for a diplomatic solution to the
crisis.
Second, the U.S. had a great deal of prestige and money tied to the
government of Liberia. Because good relations
existed between the two countries for
a long time a surprising number of valuable
U.S. assets are within its borders. The
U.S. abolitionist societies in 1822 began to
send free slaves to Monrovia for
settlement of the country. By 1892 more than
16,000 freed U.S. slaves had returned
to Africa. They became the ruling elite,
formed a republic, and became the model of
independent rule in Africa. Samuel Doe
brutally crushed these leaders and the
traditions of their government when he came to
power by insurrection and
assassination 1980.22
From 1980 until 1987 Liberia received the largest per capita share of
U.S. aid
to the sub-Saharan Africa, a figure close to
$500 million.23 North of the town of
Careysburg, a place too small for most maps,
Voice of America maintains its largest
transmission center in the world. Broadcasting
with six 250 kW and two 50 kW
transmitters, coverage is provided for the
entire African continent, the Middle East,
and southwestern Russia.24 Looking towards the
sea from Monrovia, the U.S. keeps
an Omega communications and navigation relay
station to transmit and guide
submarines in the Atlantic.25 Firestone runs
the largest rubber plantation in the world
outside of Monrovia, complete with a 200 bed
medical facility.26 Recalling these
facts, it is understandable why, although
President Doe seemed to be losing his grip
on the country during the summer of 1990, the
U.S. did not wish to under take any
action which would hasten his overthrow.
From 29 May until 4 August, the FCE closely worked with the State
Department and bided its time while the MARG
sat over the horizon. On 29 July
President Doe met privately with the American
Ambassador Peter de Vos and refused
an offer to depart the country under U.S.
protection. On this date over 7,000
Liberians had taken shelter on grounds
adjoining the U.S. Embassy with 12,000 more
taking refuge at the Voice of America
transmitters and another 18,000 crowded on the
grounds of the telecommunication facility near
Brewerville.27 Then, on the evening
of 30 July, Armed Forces of Liberia soldiers
massacred 200 hundred of civilians in
an Lutheran church in Monrovia and wounded
many more. 28 Five days after the
slaughter, on 4 August, Prince Johnson
demanded humanitarian intervention by the
U.S. to settle the bloody three-way civil war.
To back up his demand, Johnson and
the INPFL, threatened to arrest U.S. citizens
for the sole purpose of forcing foreign
involvement. This threat forced the Ambassador
to finally initiate the NEO.
Based upon the extensive time for in-country planning by the FCE and the
opportunity for face-to-face coordination with
the Embassy staff, the execution phase
of the non-combatant evacuation proceeded
superbly. At dawn on 5 August more than
200 Marines aboard 11 CH-46E and CH-53D
transport helicopters escorted by four
AH-1T gunships flew into the U.S. compound in
Monrovia. Ten AV-8B Harriers
assigned to the Saipan took turn flying air
cover. During the next few weeks more
than 2,400 people, including 226 Americans,
were evacuated and no weapons had to
be fired by Marines.29
The primary evacuation effort continued until 20 August when MARG 3-90
arrived with the 26th MEU(SOC) aboard and
conducted an in-place relief. Rifle
companies from 26th MEU(SOC) then took up the
mission of remaining ashore in the
U.S. embassy compound to reinforce the Marine
Security Guard Detachment and the
State Department security forces directed by
the Embassy's Regional Security Officer.
This duty continued until 9 January 1991.30
With the landing of the first helicopters on 5 August, the tempo of the
insurgency increased. Within 33 days, on 9
September, the President Samuel Doe's
rule ended when Prince Johnson trapped and
then assassinated him, recording the
whole gruesome event with a video camera.31
During all of the time the Marines
were ashore in Liberia daily fighting between
among the three factions of the
population continued.
At
Nigeria's urging, five of Liberia's adjoining Africa states formed a 6,000
solider multi-national force to help put a
cease-fire into effect among the three
factions. Although these forces entered the
country in late August, by November the
U.S. State Department recognized these
regional troops would not soon establish
order.32 At the last count in November of
1990, 20,000 Liberians in a population of
2,639,809 had died either from fighting or
starvation.33 In July of 1991, U.S. State
Department estimated that 750,000 Liberians
had become refugees. To assist in this
increasingly chaotic situation the U.S.
provided $130 million to the Liberian relief
effort, $2.8 million to ECOWAS and an
additional $3.75 million grant in fiscal year
1991 directly to the five ECOWAS countries
whose troops maintained the regional
peace keeping coalition in Liberia.34
The principle conclusion which may be drawn from this brief overview of
NEO procedures and Operation Sharp Edge is
that a NEO is more than a maneuver.
Joint doctrine which recognizes the dramatic
political consequences of noncombatant
evacuation operations must be developed. The
constant warfare, the large number of
casualties which occurred to Liberians during
the operation, and the political
involvement at the highest levels in
supervising these events suggests that permanently
including NEOs as part of Low Intensity
Conflict is confusing.35
President Samuel Doe lost his legitimacy on 5 August when the first
helicopter
touched. Analogizing this seven month
operation to an amphibious raid brushes away
too many complications. The turbulent manner
in which his government ended caused
the U.S. to lose some ability to influence
events in West Africa. To regain this
influence, to date, has cost $136 million.
ENDNOTES
1.A. B. C. Whipple, To the Shores of Tripoli (New
York: William Morrow and
Company, Inc., 1991), p. 244. See also, Robert
Debs Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea
(Annapolis, Maryland: 1962), p. 45, which
calls the expedition, "a fool's errand."
2.U.S., President, National Security Strategy
of the United States (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1991), George
Bush, August 1991, p. 7. See also Fleet Marine
Force Manual 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps
in the National Defense, 21 June 1991,
chapter 3, "Marine Corps'
Responsibilities and Relationships," para. 3006.h; U.S.,
Department of Defense, Annual Report of the
Secretary of Defense to the President and the
Congress, February 1992, (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p.
12-13.
3. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 1-02, DOD
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
1 June 1987, s.v. "amphibious raid";
U.S. Marine Corps Manual FMFM 8-1, Special
Operations, Superintendent of Document, U.S.
Government Printing Office, (Washington,
D.C. 1 June 1987), Chapter 7, "Special Operations,"
para. 7102.
4. Charter of the United Nations With the
Statute of the International Court of Justice
Annexed Thereto Signed at San Francisco, 26
June 1945; entered into force 24 October 1945.
59 Stat. 1301, TS 993, 3 Bevans 1153.
5. Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, "Forcible
Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights:
Recent Views from the United Nations,"
Richard B. Lillich ed., Humanitarian Intervention
and the United Nations, (Charlottesville,
Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1973), p.
198.
6. Steven F. Day, "Legal Consideration in
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations" (Naval
Justice School, 1991), p. 10. (Mimeographed);
W. Hays Parks, "Evacuation by Military
Force," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 62,
No. 9, (September 1978), p. 25.
7. Executive Order 12656, "Assignment of
Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities," 18
November 1988, section 1301(2)(f), 3 Code of
Federal Regulations 585-610, (1988
compilation). See also: "State-Defense
Statement on Protection and Evacuation of US
Citizens and Certain Designated Aliens Abroad
("Joint Statement")," A-1395, 18 July 1980;
and Department of Defense Directive No.
3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of U. S.
Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas
Abroad (Short Title: Noncombatant
Evacuation Operations) (5 November 1990).
8. U.S. Department of State, 12 Foreign
Affairs Handbook-1 Emergency Planning
Handbook, 1 September 1988.
9. Stephen Burnett, Plans Officer, U.S. State
Department. Personal interview about
emergency actions plans. Washington, D.C., 16
March 1992.
10. "Memorandum of Understanding Between
Departments of State and Defense on the
Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and
Designated Aliens Abroad," Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense For Force
Management and Personnel. (Advance copy: 19
November 1990).
11. J. P. Terry, "Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations: Operational Issues, Legal
Issues,
and Rules of Engagement," lecture given
at Naval Justice School, Newport, Rhode Island,
1991.
12. DoD Dir. 3025.14, para. E.9.(a). See also
12-FAH-1 Emergency Planning Handbook,
para. 1531.
13. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine For Joint
Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, Joint
Test Pub 3-07 (Washington, D.C. 1990), p. V-6.
14. Ibid.
15. Armed Forces Staff College, The Joint
Staff Officer's Guide 1991, AFSC Pub 1,
Norfolk, Virginia: (National Defense
University 1991), p. 5-15.
16. Glen R. Sachtleben, "Operation SHARP
EDGE: The Corps' MEU(SOC) Program in
Action," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 75,
No. 11 (November 1991), p.78.
17. Tunji Lardner, Jr., "An African
Tragedy", Africa Report, Vol. 35, No. 7, (November-
December 1990), 13-16. See also, Mark Huband,
"Liberia, The Scars of War," Africa
Report, Vol. 36, No. 2, (March-April 1991),
p.48; Michael Chege, "Remembering Africa,"
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1, (1991/92), p.
159.
18. "Intelligence Gathering and Analysis
Prior to and During MARG 2-90 Insertion,"
Marine Corps Lessons Learned System Long
Report, 28 September 1990.
19. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen
J. Labadie, USMC, Executive Officer, 22nd
Marine Expeditionary Unit by Marine Corps Oral
History Program at Camp Lejuene, 25
October 1990.
20. Ibid.
21. Mark Huband, "Doe's Last Stand,"
Africa Report, Vol 35, No. 5, (July-August), p.47-
49.
22. "U.S. and Africa,--Two New
Worlds," US Department of State Dispatch, Vol. 12, No.
8, (25 February 1991), pp. 136-137. See also,
Baffour Agyeman-Duah, "Military Coups,
Regime Change and Interstate Conflicts in West
Africa," Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 16,
No. 4 (Summer 1990) pp. 547-570.
23. Tunji Lardner, Jr., "An African
Tragedy," Africa Report, Vol. 35, No. 7, (November-
December 1990), p. 15.
24. U.S. Department of Defense Electromagnetic
Compatibility Analysis Center,
"Electromagnetic Compatibility Aspects of
the Radio Spectrum in the Republic of Liberia,"
(Annapolis, Maryland: 1986), p. 1-11.
25. "UpDate: Liberia After Doe: The Bloody Struggle For Power, " Africa
Report, Vol. 35, No. 4, (September-October 1990), p. 6.
26. "Medical Intelligence Report,"
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Rockville,
Maryland, 26 March 1992, p. LI-2.
27. U.S. State Department,
"Representative State Department Statements on the Civil War
in Liberia," Foreign Policy Bulletin,
(September/October 1990), p. 29.
28. Ibid.
29. Glen R. Sachtleben, "Operation Sharp
Edge: The Corps' MEU(SOC) Program in
Action, "Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 75,
No. 11 (November 1991), pp. 85-86. See also,
"Marines Continue Liberia Airlift,"
The New York Times, 18 August 1990, pp. A-18: 4-5;
Eric Schmitt, "Marines Evacuate 21 More
in Liberia," The New York Times, 8 August 1990,
pp. A3: 1-3.
30. Glen R. Sachtleben, "Operation SHARP
EDGE: The Corps MEU(SOC) Program in
Action. " Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 75,
No. 11, (November 1991), p. 86. See also,
Captain James K. Shannon, USMC, Commanding
Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit,
Interview by Marine Corps Oral History Program
at Camp Lejuene on 15 April 1991.
31. Archives, Marine Corps Museum, Washington
Navy Yard, Washington,D.C. See also
Tunji Lardner Jr., "Liberia, An African
Tragedy," Africa Report, Vol. 35, No. 7,
(November-December 1990), p. 14.
32. U.S. Congress, Senate, "Statement
before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,"
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs, 27 November 1990.
33. "Settlement and Reconstruction Still
Evade Liberia," Strategic Policy, (November
1990) p. 32.
34. "Liberia, Assistance to Regional
Peace-keeping Efforts," U.S. Department of State
Dispatch, 30 September 1991 p. 731.
35. The place to begin this work is with the
dictionaries. The term "NEO," and the words
"noncombatant," or
"noncombatant evacuation." are not defined in JCS Pub. 1, ,
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 1986, JCS Pub. 3-02.1 (Test), OH
1-100 Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations, 1989, Joint Test Pub 3-07
Doctrine For Joint Operation In Low Intensity Conflict, 1990, and JCS Test Pub
3-0 Doctrine For Unified and Joint Operations, 1990. Lacking a shared
definition of the terms quickly leads to differing courses of action. In
Operation Sharp Edge these different understanding were most apparent when the
Forward Command Element (FCE) reported to the Embassy in Monrovia expecting the
NEO to be over in 10 days!
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9.
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