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DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM OBSERVATIONS

 

a compilation of observations collected from multiple sources for your review, action or tracking; these observations will eventually make their way into our Engr Lessons Learned Data base and the Army Lessons Learned Management Information System for all activities to access.

  Source: Directory of evaluation and Standardisation US (June 1991)

 

Table of Contents:

A. Mobility page 9

B. Countermobility page 27

C. Survivability page 28

D. Sustainment engineering page 32

E. Topographic engineering/intel page 40

F. Unexploded ordnance (UXO) page 50

G. Engr logistics page 52

H. Engr personnel page 56

I. Engr training page 58

F. Command, Control & Comm (C3) page 60

 

A. MOBILITY

1. Heavy force requirement for counter mobility vehicle

2. Mf line clearing charge (MICLIC) training

3. Overall mf breaching and clearing capability

4. USMC breaching experiences

5. Flame obstacle systems breaching

6. Scatterable mf self breaching capability

7. Need for lightweight mf breaching eqpt

8. Breached mf lane marking system

9. Lack of organic HET assets

10. Tank mounted mine plough effectiveness

11. Ineffectiveness of breaching mfs by bombing

12. Heavy force requirements for a comparable CEV/AVLB chassis

13. Mechanised engr requirement for M 113A3

14. M9 ACE effectiveness in spt of cbt ops

15. Need to improve mine warfare training and eqpt

16. Reliability of trailer mounted MICLIC

17. Mechanised engr coy cdr's need for an M 113A3

18. Inability of M 548 ammo carrier to stay with manoeuvre force

 

B. COUNTERMOBILITY

1. Scatterable mines

2. Modernisation of US Army's conventional mine stocks

3. Need for improved demolitions eqpt and training

 

C. SURVIVABILITY

1. Camouflage and concealment

2. Fighting position construction (constr) standards

3. Vulnerability of eqpt to indirect fire

 

D. SUSTAINMENT ENGINEERING

1. Armour protection kits for D7 series dozers

2. DOD contract constr agent

3. Expedited mil constr approvals

4. Strategic stockpile of engr facility material for contingency ops

5. Essential eqpt for spt of cbt ops

6. Sustainment engr spt exceeding doctrinal requirements

7. Prime power spt in the theatre of ops

8. Facility leasing authorities for the theatre of ops

9. Development of comprehensive facility requirements

10. Installation infrastructure to spt deployments

11. Infrastructure management shortfalls

 

E. TOPOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING/INTELLIGENCE

1. Intel preparation of the battlefield

2. Access to threat/intel issues

3. Tactical recce

4. Quick response multicolour printer (QMRP) capability

5. Space based technology

6. Exploitation of digital terrain data

7. Theatre topographic bn

8. Theatre topographic planning and control team (P&C Team)

9. Topographic customer requirements/taskers

10. Topographic map distribution

11. Topographic survey requirements

12. Army TENCAP imagery priority

13. Terrabase issue to all engr units

14. Corps topographic coy lack of material to spt corps map requirements

15. Obstacle intel not consolidated and analysed

16. Topo capability at special ops command (SOCOM)

17. Topographic hardware requirements

 

F. UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO)

1. Improper handling of UXO

2. Large numbers of duds from dual purpose munitions and cluster bombs

 

G. ENGINEER LOGISTICS

1. Class IV supply priority

2. Sandbags

3. Scatterable mines and delivery system availability

4. Class IV and V materials pushed as standard LOGPACs

5. Force modernisation during preparation for cbt

6. Hardened ambulance for mechanised engr casualty evacuation

 

H. ENGINEER PERSONNEL

1. Engr personnel management

 

I. ENGINEER TRAINING

1. Lack of realistic mine warfare training aids

2. Engr refresher training

3. Hands-on live fire training on engr systems

4. Cbt lifesaver for each squad and crew

5. Combined arms battle drills

 

J. COMMAND, CONTROL & COMMUNICATIONS (C3)

1. Engr restructure initiative (ERI)

2. Requirements for having an ENCOM

3. Engr representation at field army and corps levels

4. Need for a GPS or LORANS system in all engr units

5. Need for a manoeuvre control system for bde engrs

6. 1SG must have a dedicated vehicle

7. Need for engr units to have compatible comm with the manoeuvre units they spt.

 

MOBILITY OBSERVATIONS

1. Observation: The Heavy Force needs the Cbt Mobility Vehicle (CMV) to provide a survivable, mobile vehicle, capable of breaching a variety of obstacles

  Discussion: The CEV with mine rake and the track width mine plough had inherent limitations in cbt ops. The CEV was unable to keep up with the manoeuvre force, thus rendering the mine rake of little value. The track width mine plough was a capable mf breacher, but was limited to clearing only pressure-fused mines in front of its tracks. The M1A1 chassis proved to be fully capable of ploughing, in desert soils at rates of 30 k/h. This chassis, combined with a full width plough, will provide a full width breaching capability that will be able clear all known mines and still be able to manoeuvre with the heavy force. The plough should be fitted with a wire cutter and be capable of ploughing at variable depths. The blade should be actuated in the centre to allow the blade to be used for digging in constr of cbt roads and trails and survivability positions. While this would not be its primary mission, it would enhance the capabilities of the engr force. The system needs crew of at least 2 soldiers to conduct 24-h ops and be fitted with a weapons system for self-protection

  Recommendation: Replace the CEV with the CMV and increase the quantity in a coy so that each breached lane has at least two vehicles (a minimum of 4 per coy)

 

 2. Observation: Mf Line Clearing Charge (MICLIC) Training

  Discussion: Most US Army engr units deployed to the Persian Gulf were unfamiliar with the MICLIC. The STRAC allocation for MICLIC did not allow engr units to achieve training proficiency in MICLIC use. The magnitude of the problems with the eqpt was not revealed until repeated firings were attempted in theatre. Operators and cdrs were unfamiliar with its use, characteristics and remedial measures necessary to achieve an acceptable initiation rate. Misfires were the norm rather than the exception. Firing circuits continually malfunctioned. The US Marine Corps had less trouble with the MICLIC, primarily due to the pro-active training that occurred in their units prior to the Gulf crisis.

  Recommendation: Combined arms units, including engrs, must train regularly with live and training MICLICs to ensure proficiency and familiarity. STRAC training requirements must be revised to reflect increased live MICLIC firings in the future. Training areas in CONUS and overseas must be identified that will accommodate live fire training

 

3. Observation: Overall mf breaching & clearing capability

  Discussion: Op Desert Storm showed that our World War II vintage US Army mf breaching and clearing capability, coupled with the lack of demolition expertise resulted in an inability to technically or tactically breach the modern mfs that we faced. Modern mines were found with magnetic, double impulse and seismic fuses, anti-disturbance devices, and contained little or no metal. Hand held mine detectors, grappling hooks, bangalore torpedoes, and mine probes made breaching very hazardous at best. Current mechanical means such as ploughs, rakes, rollers and explosives provided a slightly faster, but ad hoc capability than other methods.

  Recommendation: As inefficient as the bangalore, grappling hook, hand held mine detector, and mine probes are, they represent the "bottom line" in our current breaching capability. The MICLIC needs to be improved and made more survivable. All armour bns must receive their full complement of countermine sets. They all need to be replaced by devices that can be remotely emplaced and more effective than the current systems. A standoff mf detection system needs to be developed along with a full width mine plough mechanical capability.

 

4. Observation: US Marine Corps breaching experience

  Discussion:

a. General. The US Marine Corps adopted the US Army breaching doctrine in FM 90-13-1 and found it worked exceedingly well. The Marines encountered mfs that had no set pattern, were 80-100 meters deep and 1-2 k wide. Density was 3 mines per square meter with some mines as close as 6" inches between mines. No magnetic, tilt-rod, single impulse or mines with anti-handling devices were encountered. The majority of mines encountered were British Bar mines. Mfs were breached by employing the MICLIC first, followed by a mine plough or mine rake, then the mine roller. The MICLICs worked well; they blew mines out of the breached lanes and also cleared all wire obstacles encountered. The mine ploughs and mine rakes worked well, but the mine rollers did not. The rollers got stuck and most of the mines encountered were 'roller proof' due to the design of the fuse. One tank was lost due to a mine that did not detonate after being proofed by the mine roller. The Anti-Personnel Obstacle Breaching System (APOBS) was used a minimum of three times and worked well. No berms, other than those found in Saudi, or fire trenches were encountered. The thirty M9 ACEs temporarily loaned from the US Army were effectively used in a variety of ways and played a key role in enhancing the mobility and survivability of all cbt systems. Flippers were fielded but not used. AVLBS, Towed Assault Bridges (TAB) and fabricated pipe fascines were effectively used to gap anti-tank ditches.

b The Second Marine Div Experience: The div fired 44 MICLICs. Of the 44 fired, 3 did not function properly and were detonated with explosives and one was launched over a high-tension wire. All MICLICs used were the older M58A1 models.

Mines encountered included:

L-8/L-9 Bar AT Mine (British) 11 kg

VS-1.6 AT (Italian) Scatterable 3 kg

VS-2.2 AT (Italian) 3.5 kg

Valmara 69 AP (Italian) Bounding 3.2 kg

c. The First Marine Div Experience. The div fired at least 22 MICLICs. Of the 22 fired, 3 required detonation by explosives and one was an airburst.

Mines encountered included:

VS-1.6 AT (Italian) Scatterable 3 kg

VS-2.2 AT (Italian) 3.5 kg

VS-Mk 2 AP (Italian) Scatterable 135 g

Recommendation: US Army continue to work closely with the US Marine Corps in the development of mechanical breaching systems. Knowledge of threat mines needs to be continually updated, disseminated & trained. Marine training & employment techniques with MICLIC need to be studied and adopted by US Forces

 

5. Observation: Flame Obstacle Systems Breaching

  Discussion: Iraq constructed trenches and pits filled with crude oil that were to be ignited as part of their complex obstacle system. This theatre unique use of flame obstacles focused attention on developing breaching methods. The Engr School recommended eliminating the fuel source, igniting the fuel and waiting until the obstacle burned out. The added time involved in this method was balanced against adding a complicated, eqpt and manpower intensive drill to an already difficult complex obstacle breach. AMC attempted to field an armoured fire fighting vehicle until it was dropped 20 Feb 91. The Egyptian Army successfully infiltrated Special Forces into Iraq prior to their ground assault and turned off the crude oil supply valves at the trenches that were to be crossed. Other trenches were ignited, but did not effect the Egyptian assault

  Recommendation: Doctrine for breaching complex obstacles is contained in FM 90-13-1, The theatre unique use of flame obstacles does not change the validity of the doctrine. The technique suggested for dealing with the Iraq flame obstacles (removes fuel, ignite, and burn out) was effective. Procurement of theatre specific, special armoured fire vehicles for this purpose is not required

 

 6. Observation: Scatterable Mf Self Breaching Capability

  Discussion: allied forces and US did not actually encounter threat scatter-able mfs. However, encounters with unexploded ordnance (UXO) from friendly artillery and Air Force bombing were treated like scatterable mfs. Unexploded cluster bombs blew off vehicle tires and killed or wounded dismounted soldiers and civilians. Engrs were required to plough lanes and clear areas in Iraq and Kuwait for all forces, due to lack of a self-extraction capability. There is no system fielded or planned for near-term fielding which will allow units to continue their missions without experiencing significant losses when forced to cross a scatterable mf

  Recommendation: Fielding of small ploughs and other types of systems on artillery and cbt spt/cbt service spt vehicles will greatly increase unit survivability in scatterable mfs and UXO environments

 

7. Observation: Need for a lightweight mf breaching eqpt set

  Discussion: A lightweight sapper squad set containing several non-developmental items (NDI) including: small bolt cutters, mine probes, mine bonnets, and a foam compound all in a gym bag has been developed. 500 sets were sent to the Persian Gulf. Some units never received them. This sapper squad set meets an urgent need for light force engrs

  Recommendation: Initial assessment is that complete fielding of this set will provide engr units the necessary eqpt for hand breaching ops. This set should be a standard TO&E item

 

8. Observation: Breached Mf Lane Marking Systems

  Discussion: There were no standard marking systems identified throughout the theatre. The 1st Infantry Div developed an extensive system using plywood panels, pickets, airfield landing lights and chemlight fluid. Extensive rehearsals were conducted with divisional forces and follow on British forces. The USMC used plastic barrels and bottles filled with chemlight fluid. The Cleared Lane Marking System (CLAMS) and Hand Emplaced Mf Marking System (HEMMS) proved ineffective by most units in training and were not used. Road graders were used to cut ditches as marking lines through some lanes, due to drivers getting lost during rehearsals. Return lanes were provided to allow quick return of casualties

  Recommendation: Assault breach marking systems should be standardised at the div level. Follow on marking systems should be standardised at the corps level. Easily seen assault marking systems, that do not expose personnel to enemy fire must be developed quickly. Whatever system is adopted, it must be trained and rehearsed with all combined arms team members under buttoned up conditions so that no soldiers are exposed to direct small arms and indirect fires

 

9. Observation: Engr units must be 100% mobile. They must have the organic capability to move over great distances

  Discussion: Cbt Heavy Bns, and Cbt Spt Eqpt Coys (CSE), operated over distances of several hundred kilometres maintaining MSR that stretched the length of the theatre. This required HET spt to transport wheeled constr eqpt. With a shortage of HETs in theatre, this drained an already overtaxed transportation system. To illustrate this point, one engr bn took a week to change task organisations from one corps to another due to a lack of HETs. Since the engr's mission is to enhance mobility, not impede it, it is necessary for engrs to have sufficient organic HETs to provide 100% mobility and not drain an already scarce resource

  Recommendation: That all Engr Organisations be provided sufficient heavy eqpt transporters to be 100% mobile

 

10. Observation: Tank mounted mine ploughs were very successful in breaching mfs

  Discussion: Track width mine ploughs fielded as a part of the Bn Counter-mine Set proved very successful against pressure fused anti-tank mines and allowed the M1A1 main battle tank to breach mf with little loss of momentum. In lose sand, the ploughs could operate at a rate of 30 k/h. When ploughing the plough produces a windrow of soil that is filled with mines. In one case a magnetically fused mine slipped down this windrow and detonated into the side of an Ml producing a mobility kill. Units found that this windrow must be reduced using a mine rake or by laying a MICLIC along side the windrow and detonating it. Units also discovered that the plough was useful in pushing up berms, clearing trench-lines, and delineating counter-attack routes and lager sites.

There is apparently little need to mark a ploughed lane for the passage of the breach, assault and spt forces. The signature created by the plough is very distinctive. The CLAMS system was not used in this regard. When operating the plough during the breach, the vehicle driver would be buttoned up, with the vehicle cdr in the open protected position. It is uncertain what impact this would have had on vehicle cdrs had anti-tank mines been encountered on a large scale. This deserves a second look. Units also provided their own local security during ploughing ops by positioning the vehicle main gun offset to the right or left to cover the other ploughing tank. In this way they had mutually supporting fields of fire. All the units in one div consolidated their ploughs and rollers in selected plts. This served to ease C2, maintenance, and training. Units felt that this was the method of choice for the M1 coy. This plt then became the designated "Breach" force for the conduct of instride breaching ops. These plts could then be further consolidated at task force level to effect a "Deliberate" breach.

The following problems were encountered, and modifications applied to the use of the plough. The nylon-lifting strap on the plough wears quickly in the desert and needs to be replaced with a more robust alternative. One plt replaced straps 7-8 times. Units encountered problems clearing concertina wire from the ploughs, which had to be removed by hand using bolt cutters, or by constructing ad hoc wire cutters from angle iron. The plough requires a modification in order to install a built-in wire cutter. The Israeli anti-magnetic fuse drum was mounted on selected ploughs and used in cbt. One unit had trouble with the drum riding up on the front glucose of the tank during ploughing. This was due to the unit not receiving the proper mounting hardware for the dog bone and chain. Another problem with the Israeli drum is that it requires that the M1 travel at 10 mph in order to work. The operator's manual for the plough however, prescribes 8 mph as the operating speed, even though it can go much faster. This must be corrected. Some drums were seriously damaged during mine detonations. It is unclear whether this was due to magnetic mines or mines detonating against the plough. Units also constructed a magnetic fuse-clearing device using locally procured items. A 5'x 3' plywood box was constructed which mounted on the shoes of the plough. In it were placed 80 turns of 6-gage wire (1200'). Information regarding the electrical properties of wire was obtained from FM 5-36. The resulting device was then tested against British magnetic fuses and found to be effective. It was able to detonate mines 3'- 4' in front of the vehicle. Ploughs were also found to be effective in clearing DPICM and CBU duds for the movement of essential wheeled vehicles. Four ploughs in an echelon formation can clear a lane 19' 4" wide. However, the Mine Rake was the device of choice in this role when available. The plough also has problems with the depth adjustment bolts shearing off under normal use. One plt replaced the bolts after every use. M88 centre guide bolts appeared to be very effective. Units also did not receive parts (PLL) or parts manuals with the ploughs and no parts were available in theatre (they may have been available, but the entire theatre had problems with CL IX re-supply)

  Recommendation: Continue to field this system with the modification necessary to cut wire, a more robust lifting strap and stronger depth adjustment bolts. Field the STAMIDS anti-magnetic fuse system, in order to overcome the deficiencies associated with the Israeli drum. Cdrs were unanimous in their praise of the plough performance

 

11. Observation: Bombing of mfs proved ineffective in breaching ops

  Discussion: Bombing of mfs in order to aid the breaching op proved ineffective. The bombing pattern did not provide a straight lane, which in turn made proofing by ploughs, or rollers ineffective and difficult. Bombing also hampered the clearing process by littering the ground with metal fragments which interfered with mine detection. In addition, there were bomb duds (UX0s) which were often a greater hazard than the mines

  Recommendation: Bombing of mfs in order to clear a lane is ineffective and a waste of resources

 

12. Observation: The Cbt Engr Vehicle (CEV) and Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridge (AVLB) need to be on a compatible chassis with the heavy force

  Discussion: The CEV and AVLB proved unable to manoeuvre with the heavy force due to the inability of the M60 chassis and power train to keep pace with the MIA1. They also had difficulties associated with maintaining an obsolete, low-density piece of eqpt. Many manoeuvre units simply left this eqpt behind rather than slow their manoeuvre. Such was the case with the AVLM (Armoured Vehicle Launched MICLIC), a AVLB chassis modified with two MICLIC launchers on the rear deck, and the Mine Rake, mounted on the CEV. Cdrs planned for their use as a part of the deliberate breaching op, but left them behind once they began the pursuit and exploitation phase of the op. Cdrs were unanimous in their opinion that the engr force needs M1 chassis' for heavy breaching and gap crossing eqpt

  Recommendation: Replace the CEV and AVLB with modernised systems mounted on a logistically sustainable common chassis capable of supporting manoeuvre ops. An M1 based AVLB and CMV would fix this problem

 

13. Observation: The mechanised engr force needs to be mounted in the M113A3, Armoured Personnel Carrier

  Discussion: The requirement to keep pace with the manoeuvre force and survive on the battlefield while in close cbt with the enemy, make the M113A3 an essential replacement for the current fleet of armoured personnel carriers in the engr force. The M113A3 needs to be modified to include a cupola for the vehicle cdr to provide better protection during cbt ops. Units built bustle racks for the sides of their current M113A2s in order to carry the necessary eqpt to conduct breaching, clearing, and marking ops. The current trailer, which is towed behind the squad APC, was unable to keep pace with mobility requirements. Something akin to the caterpillar tracked trailer may meet this requirement.

The APC also needs a GPS; a vehicle mounted compass for navigation, and 4 night vision devices (one for the TC, driver, squad leader, and M60 gunner). Additionally, the driver needs a thermal viewer for navigation during periods of low visibility.

The squad APC needs 2 radios one to dismount with the squad and one to communicate with the dismounted squad in order to provide suppressive fires and communicate with the spt unit. Likewise, the plt leader's track needs two VRC 46 radios to allow for greater range and, to communicate with parent and spt unit. The coy cdr's track needs two VRC 46s and an auxiliary receiver, all with secure capabilities, in order to communicate on the coy, and task force nets, and to monitor the engr bn net. The plt and coy cdr's vehicles also need a fast erecting, vehicle mounted OE-254 antenna for use on a fluid battlefield.

One bn got smoke grenades for their launchers for the first time when they arrived in theatre. When they rehearsed with them they experienced a significant failure rate. This highlights the need to train as you fight

 

Recommendation: Replace the current fleet of M113s with M113A3s in the mechanised engr force. Equip the M113A3 with the necessary trailers or bustle racks, crew protection, night vision devices, antennas and radios, to better perform their cbt mission. Resource training ammunition to include smoke grenades for vehicle launchers. Insure they can be used in home station training

 

14. Observation: The M9 Armoured Cbt Earthmover (ACE) performed exceptionally well in spt of cbt ops

  Discussion: The ACE proved to be a successful combination of armoured vehicle and cbt earthmover that was capable of keeping pace with the manoeuvre units, while providing crew survivability. While not as efficient as the D7 Dozer in earth moving, its ability to move with manoeuvre forces over several hundred kilometres of desert allowed it to successfully perform a wide variety of missions such as constr of cbt roads and trails, survivability positions and berms. It is however, a fallacy that the ACE can move as fast as an M1 or M2. The vehicle is governed to prevent this. The M916 tractors towing D7 Dozers were never able to keep pace with manoeuvre units. The training of ACE operators appears to he inadequate. Operators were unfamiliar with the techniques associated with dozing, scraping, cut and fill ops, and grading. The ACE is a versatile piece of engr eqpt. The operator should be trained as a 62E first, and as a 12E second.

The ACE experienced trouble in reducing the berms associated with Iraqi tank ditches (berm on enemy side). Due to the location of the driver in relation to the vehicle blade, he cannot see the blade or determine when he is about to tip over. The ACE needs a front mounted telescope or a side mounted periscope to overcome this deficiency. The ACE led the way in breaching the border berm between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and in reducing trench-lines during the assault breach. In both instances the ACE performed extremely well. Problems were encountered, however, due to the ACE's shortcomings. One bde cdr referred to the ACE operator as "Alone, Unarmed, and Unafraid". This highlights the ACE's major shortcomings as a piece of mobility eqpt used during direct fire engagements. ACE operators, usually 19 year old PFC's, led the 7th Corps breach into hostile country, alone, unarmed and unafraid. Fortunately, they met with very light resistance. Otherwise, mortality among ACE operators would have been very high. The ACE is a single operator vehicle, without the moral and physical advantages of a crew with an NCO in charge, and without the advantage of a weapon for local suppression. Habitually, manoeuvre task forces provided two Bradley Fighting Vehicles to protect the ACE during breaching ops. While this is a high price to pay for protection of one vehicle, cdrs deemed it necessary for the success of their ops. Cdrs felt that the ACE needs an additional crewman and a protective weapon such as the .50 calibre's machinegun, or the Mark 19 automatic grenade launcher

  Recommendation: Continue to field the M-9 ACE to Cbt Engr Units, and make the appropriate changes to crew training and eqpt modifications. A "block II" ACE concept needs to be developed focusing on weapon stationing, blade design, engine, and 2 man crew

 

15. Observation: Mine warfare training and eqpt needs improvement

  Discussion: Units were poorly trained, equipped and lack confidence in mine warfare tactics techniques and procedures. The requirement to hand clear mfs highlighted a general lack of modern eqpt, realistic training, and a lack of confidence in our ability to conduct breaching and clearing ops by hand. Mine detectors were poorly maintained and lacked batteries. Operators were unfamiliar with basic techniques and were not adept at detecting modern plastic mines. Units need threat mines to train on. Current eqpt, such as the counter mine kit, was unavailable. Units had not anticipated the need to conduct mf recce in order to determine type and composition of threat mfs. Units also lacked knowledge concerning threat mines & clearing methods.

Mine probes need to be issued to every soldier as part of a Sappers kit. Design grappling hooks so that mines can be lifted from a distance in order to determine the presence of anti-handling devices. A grappling device also needs to be developed that can be remotely fired from an APC into a mf

The mf marking tape in the HEMMS kit is too small to be easily seen. A universal tape, stripped in red and white, 3 inches in height and made of durable plastic, needs to be adopted as the means of marking hazardous areas. There are currently too many different systems, and not enough resources. A lightweight plastic pole also needs to be developed to compliment this system. In many cases GATOR mfs and large areas which contained DPICM and CBU duds, were left unmarked due to the lack of a fast and simple method for marking hazardous areas. This caused numerous fatalities.

Units placed an over reliance on the MICLIC as the answer to all their breaching problems. This was due to ignorance of threat mine capabilities, poor MICLIC training at home station, and the general lack of an effective training device or training strategy. Procedures were written for firing the MICLIC without regard for tactical requirements. Subsequent training in theatre improved the ability of units to employ the system effectively. However, it also highlighted the system's shortcomings and eventually relegated it to a back-up system which was not used for breaching

  Recommendation: Mine warfare eqpt and training needs improvement. The Army should field a modern mine detection system which uses standard batteries ("D" or "C" Cell), and which is capable of discriminating between modern mine systems. Units need a threat mine data base from which to draw info about potential enemy capabilities and on which they can base a training strategy. Threat mines must be procured for training based on potential areas of employment. Eqpt such as the mine probe needs to be issued to each sapper. The grappling hook must be modified to be able to turn mines and be capable of being fired from an armoured vehicle or projected from a rifle. Field the mine effects simulator. Live mine training must be emphasized

 

16. Observation: The trailer mounted Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC) was an unreliable system with limited utility given the system configuration and nature of modern mines

  Discussion: The MICLIC system suffered from several serious shortcomings. During test firings the system suffered a 50% failure rates requiring each MICLIC to be dismantled and checked before firing. This forced units to train crewman to dismount and initiate the line charge with a non-electric charge in cases of misfires. One div fired 48 MICLICs in training in order to become familiar with the system and to overcome system failures. Units also had to overcome the 5 minutes firing time proscribed in the technical manual. Units eventually narrowed the firing time down to 30-45 seconds. The trailer-mounted system towed by an armoured vehicle has little mobility or survivability. Units mounted all their MICLICs, on AVLB chassis' (AVLM). Fortunately, bridges were not needed in this theatre. Blast resistant mines encountered in most mfs rendered the MICLIC ineffective. The 100-m length of the MICLIC also limits its use. The Corps calculated initially, that it needed 400 MICLICs to meet its breaching needs. This far exceeded their allocation. Fortunately, breaching ops were virtually unopposed and enemy obstacles were very few. The AVLM, while an improvement over the trailer mounted system, has several serious shortcomings. First, it is mounted on an AVLB chassis, limiting its ability to keep up with the M1 tank. Second, the MICLIC is exposed to enemy fire, which may render the system useless or at worst, kill the crew. This system needs a modification package to enhance its survivability.

The fix which one bn settled on involved insuring arming and electrical wires are not fouled within the sock, and tying a prussic knot using the firing wire, around the arresting cable. The knot is then taped. This insures the firing wire does not break as the arresting cable stretches during firing. The USMC solution, threading the firing wire through the arresting cable, was found to be ineffective

  Recommendation: Harden and mount the MICLIC system on a tracked vehicle. Have its length and explosive weight increased to defeat the current generation of mines. Also, modified to prevent misfires. MICLIC training needs to be fixed in STRAC and CATS

 

17. Observation: Every engr coy in the heavy force needs an M113A3 to replace the HMMWV

 Discussion: The coy cdr in a mechanised cbt engr coy needs the mobility to manoeuvre with the heavy force and the survivability to C2 breaching and mobility ops while in close cbt. The HMMWV is incapable of performing this task. The M113A3 will provide a mobile and survivable vehicle, common to the squad vehicle in the mechanised cbt engr coy, capable of supporting the engr cdr. It should be noted that this requirement is in addition to the M577 Command Post Carrier, and not a replacement for it. These two vehicles perform separate functions, which cannot be combined. Nor can the M577 be replaced by a thin skinned, wheeled vehicle. It too must be armoured and tracked

  Recommendation: Replace the cdr's HUMMWV with the M113A-l or authorise it as an addition

 

18. Observation: The M548 Tracked ammunition Carrier is unable to keep pace with the manoeuvre force

  Discussion: The M548, Tracked Ammunition Carrier, proved itself unable to keep pace with the manoeuvre force. Its slow speed and inability to carry heavy loads, while maintaining the march speeds necessary on the mechanised battlefield relegated this piece of eqpt to the cbt trains. The Volcano system (or the current GEMSS) should have a vehicle such as the FAASV, used by the artillery, as its prime mover. This provides enhanced mobility and survivability

  Recommendation: Replace the M548 with a more mobile and survivable vehicle

 

COUNTERMOBILITY OBSERVATIONS

 1. Observation: Scatterable Mines

  Discussion: USAREUR engr bns brought Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering Systems (GEMSS) with them to the Persian Gulf. Units trained with inert mines and uploaded two loads of mines for the attack into Iraq and Kuwait. No GEMSS mfs were emplaced. The GEMSS proved cumbersome to move around. Two US Air Force GATOR mfs were emplaced, but not recorded. Artillery scatterable mfs were planned but not emplaced

  Recommendation: Future contingency ops need to continue to plan for use of quickly emplaced scatterable mine systems to protect flanks and close gaps. The VOLCANO mine dispenser needs to be fielded to replace the GEMSS

 

2. Observation: The Army needs to modernise its stocks of conventional mines

  Discussion: Experience with Italian anti-tank and anti-personnel mines during this op highlighted the complexity and versatility of the current generation of foreign mines, unfortunately, it also highlighted the obsolescence of our current stock of conventional mines. The enemy would have had a far easier time breaching our obstacles than we did his. Overpressure protection, advanced fusing, and anti-handling features; make Italian mines an attractive alternative to our current stock of conventional mines. The current conventional stock of mines needs a common fuse, capable of being placed on any current mine, with the flexibility to perform any of the current mine functions, as well as being remotely turned on/off or destroyed

  Recommendation: Replace or augment our current stock of conventional mines with state of the art conventional mines and update our current fusing. We need to go to scatterable, dynamic mines with C2 as centrepiece for the future. We need to sell the old inventory

 

3. Observation: The Army needs to improve demolition eqpt and training

  Discussion: Engr eqpt and training for demolitions, denial and booby trap ops needs improvement. The engr force needs a universal destruction device, much like a hand grenade, with a pull pin delay fuse, and a high explosive charge, capable of denying eqpt, destroying duds, and performing missions such as initiating demolitions chains. The fast pace of modern battle and (he large volume of work placed on engrs, made time fuse and blasting caps to cumbersome. One engr bn destroyed 61 tanks, 47 APCS, 305 trucks, 15 artillery pieces, 51 ADA guns, and 2,514,000 LBS of munitions. AVLM crews, who are not trained to handle MICLIC misfires, were forced to place explosives on the MICLIC in the case of a misfire. A simple destruction device would have performed this mission without the need to rig a block of C-4. The satchel charge is another example. It still requires that blasting caps and time fuse be rigged. This World War II technology does not meet current requirements. One unit found both British and Russian blasting machines superior to ours. Each squad needs a ram gun with plastic devices to affix charges to concrete. Each squad also needs an assault ladder similar to the German pole ladder with quick release.

Training also needs improvement. The presence of duds on a large scale, and the vast amount of eqpt and munitions that had to be destroyed, highlighted the need for NC0s and officers who understand more than rules of thumb with regard to demolitions. Our senior NC0s and officers need to be experts in the theory and application of demolitions.

Units were generally poorly trained and lacked confidence in using of demolitions. STRAC requirements and range limitations have cut the heart out of demolition training. Artillery men can fire 40 LB steel projectiles filled with high explosive, but engrs are prohibited from "blowing anything up" on most USAREUR and Conus based training areas. The MICLIC is a prime example. If safety is the concern, and then we need to build safer ranges, not limit training. Anything too dangerous to do in training is too dangerous to do in cbt. Train as you fight! One bn had not seen a satchel charge until they arrived in theatre

  Recommendation: Improve demolition eqpt and training Army wide. Develop an Army policy for the conduct of demolitions training (similar to the mine training strategy). Give units and training areas the resources, and training devices and ammunition necessary to conduct safe, realistic training through STRAC and CATS

 

SURVIVABILITY OBSERVATIONS

 1. Observation: Camouflage and Concealment

  Discussion: Limited deliberate camouflage actions of US forces occurred during the op. Woodland pattern camouflage nets were used to conceal command posts and other facilities. They did not blend well into the desert and only hid the activity. Limited desert camouflage nets were used for individual fighting positions. Dispersion of units and vehicles were the norm due to lack of hiding places. Most tactical vehicles were painted in desert brown, but were not further camouflaged to eliminate shadows or glare. Contracted civilian vehicles and eqpt were not normally camouflaged. Night ops occurred with good noise and light discipline. US forces seemed complacent in camouflage discipline due to the limited threat from the air, space and line of sight observation

  Recommendations: Camouflage discipline is a command responsibility. Camouflage actions must be practised and become SOP. Future develop-ment of desert and other camouflage systems for US forces is needed against future air, space and direct observation threats

 

2. Observation: Fighting Position Constr Standards

  Discussion: During Op Desert Shield, coalition forces (principally Egyptian and Syrian) provided fighting positions and revetment kits to their soldiers to keep the sides and roofs of their positions from collapsing. US forces relied on using sandbags and other products i.a.w. FM 5-103, Survivability, to construct fighting and protective positions. Availability of FM 5-103 to the individual soldier during the op is unknown. When units failed to adhere to those standards, and terrain became saturated with rainwater, several US positions caved in due to increased dead-loads of sandbags and materials placed on top of plywood and stringer roofing, killing and injuring soldiers, In addition, heavy rains, high winds and extremely fine grade sand required constant effort be placed on maintaining these positions. Excessive eqpt and man-hours were dedicated to this process. Assigned M9 ACEs and SEEs cannot vertically or horizontally displace enough soil in a short time to provide the required protection for units. During Op Desert Storm, the only reported survivability type actions being conducted in Iraq and Kuwait were the constr of sand berms around unit positions. These sand berms were built to provide traffic control in and out of the positions, avoiding numerous areas of unexploded ordnance. The need for rear area survivability was highlighted when SCUD missile fragments hit a US barracks facility

  Recommendations: The US Army has not trained in the need to "survive", because we are "mobile". We don't dig in or improve positions. The basics of survivability found in FM 5-103 are well stated, but not practised during FTXS. Force protection needs to be an integral part of how we fight. We need to train to standard on survivability, including CTC training. The needs for a lightweight, low volume overhead cover system remains. We have nothing on the drawing board in this area. AMC IMED should also conduct a foreign market survey of available foreign revetment and fighting position kits. After the results are collected, AMC can conduct analysis and recommend adoption. For static defence ops the need for a high-speed excavator exists, to reduce the period of vulnerability to cbt and spt units

 

3. Observation: Vulnerability of eqpt

  Discussion: During Op Desert Shield, engineering and other vulnerable eqpt was protected from Iraqi indirect fires by positioning, camouflage and sand berms. Their exposure/risk profile remained high during this long period. Long and vulnerable columns of cargo and fuel vehicles were constantly moving forward to resupply cbt elements. These vehicles and their cargo were also exposed to destruction from indirect fire fragments. During Op Desert Storm, unexploded cluster bombs did more damage to vehicles and fuel tanks than did direct or indirect fires

  Recommendation: Procure ballistic protective blankets to protect engines and cargo. A more determined or sophisticated threat might not have missed the opportunity to exploit these vulnerabilities. The risk of destruction from fragments can be significantly reduced using of these blankets. Vehicle also need a type of KEVLAR protection underneath to protect against unexploded ordnance

 

SUSTAINMENT ENGINEERING OBSERVATIONS

 1. Observation: Need for a Mine Clearing/Armour Protection Kit for the T-9 (D7G) Dozer

 Discussion: Op Desert Storm demonstrated the urgent need to provide engr corps cbt bns additional means to reduce complex obstacles. These units are responsible for widening breach lanes and clearing mfs and unexploded ordnance areas. The best solution at this time is to equip currently fielded D70 dozers in these units with mine clearing rakes and armour protection kits

  Recommendation: Continue procurement of the T-9 Mine Clearing /Armour Protection Kit. Ensure that they are stockpiled for contingency ops around the world. They should not be issued to units unless deployed

 

2. Observation: DOD Contract Constr Agent (CCA)

  Discussion: Early deployment of DOD CCA assets were critical to the successful arrival and initial sustainment of forces in the Persian Gulf. Contingency ops first require lodgement areas for the reception of deploying forces, their eqpt, and supporting supplies. Ops and spt bases are required to quickly position forces and clear the reception areas. Even though cbt forces and their supplies to spt them precede their requisite sustainment force, facilities must be available upon arrival. The DOD CCA is organised to obtain the facilities directly from the host nation, through private sector leasing, and through contract constr. The CCA must be an integral part of both opal planning and execution

  Recommendation: Sufficient CCA personnel must be deployed early in contingency ops to meet facility needs of the developing theatre

 

3. Observation: Expedited Mil Constr Approvals

  Discussion: Current peacetime procedures on use of Contingency Mil Constr Authority were not responsive to the CINC in the build up of forces phase during Op Desert Shield. Currently there are four basic legislative authorities that can be use, used to expedite the release of MILCON funds during contingencies. They are title 10 USA 2803, 2804, 2805, and 28084. The CINC needs immediate MILCON funding authority in a fast building and changing theatre of ops. USC 2805 would have been responsive in the pre-hostility environment if the funding threshold was increased to an adequate level. USC 2808 authority, if delegated to the CINC, would have given the necessary authority if requirements had been significant

  Recommendation: Increase the authority under USC 2805 during contingency ops, for use by a MACOM Cdr from $200K per project to $1M per project and delegate the combatant CINC up to $250M of MILCON authority under USC 2808

4. Observation: Strategic stockpile of engr facility material for contingency Ops

  Discussion: There were serious facility shortfalls (i.e. troop beddown, maintenance, storage), coupled with heavy contracting and leasing requirements during Op Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Most of these facility materials were located in CONUS and not easily shipped or in short supply in theatre

  Recommendation: Identify, procure and stockpile expeditionary relocatable facilities and related material. Configure in unit type sets for contingency force immediate deployment needs for the various theatres of op. Incorporate this listing into approved HQDA opal project (i.e. BADEP), and establish this action as a high priority effort to spt the Army of the 90s as a strategic force

 

5. Observation: The SEE (Small Eqpt Excavator), D7 Dozer, and Road Grader proved to be essential items of eqpt for spt of cbt ops

  Discussion. The austere nature of this theatre, and the need for heavy eqpt to perform a wide variety of mobility, survivability and sustainment tasks, made the SEE, Dozer and Grader key and essential pieces of eqpt.

The SEE performed a wide variety of missions associated with survivability and sustainment. Divs, bdes and bns found the SEE to be essential in establishing their hq. The requirements of AirLand Ops make quickly establishing a hq essential. The SEE proved equal to this task. Its mobility enabled it to move with the HQs and provide the necessary "beddown" spt. Cdrs were universal in their praise of the SEE and desired to have it as a part of their hq TO&E.

The D7 Dozer proved essential in performing the heavy tasks the ACE could not perform. The nature of the soil found in this theatre limited the usefulness of lighter earthmovers. The D7 Dozer with a ripper proved essential in MSR constr, berm constr and removal. Engrs discovered that rippers were essential for all dozers. Winches are of little value. Because the marl bedrock is close to the surface in this environment, local constr companies used D8 & D9 dozers with large single tooth rippers. Had cut and fill ops been required, the D7 may have proven too lightweight to perform this task.

The requirement in this theatre to construct a vast road network of MSRs to spt cbt ops made the Road Grader the key piece of engr constr eqpt. MSRs were constructed by placing graders in echelon and windrowing a 12" lift of sand in order to permit wheeled traffic. The lack of cutting edges in theatre made crowning of roads impossible. Unfortunately, this techniques rendered the roads virtually impassable during periods of rain. They also required constant maintenance. One div constructed 800 kilometres of MSR with one cbt heavy bn. The maintenance requirements of this MSR far exceeded their capacity

  Recommendation: The SEE and heavy eqpt such as dozer and grader were essential to cbt ops in this theatre. Divs relied on these, pieces of eqpt to provide them the mobility, survivability and sustainment necessary to conduct cbt ops. Cdrs were universal in their opinion that the div must retain this eqpt as part of the Engr Restructure Initiative (ERI) force structure

 

6. Observation: The scope of sustainment engineering spt far exceeds current doctrinal requirements

  Discussion: Sustainment engineering ops extended from the bde rear area to the corps spt area, a distance of 160 kilometres. Typically, this area was covered by 2 engr gps with a cbt heavy bn each, supporting 4 divs and an ACR and an engr bde which contained one engr gp with 1 cbt heavy bn and two cbt spt eqpt companies. Active corps cbt engr battalions, that would normally provide sustainment engineering spt in the corps areas, were pushed forward to spt bde ops. Reserve corps cbt bns were not activated and deployed, leaving a sustainment void that had to be filled from theatre assets. This was insufficient to meet sustainment requirements in this austere theatre.

  Recommendation: Insure future plans and force structure reflects the needs of sustainment ops in spt of contingency ops in an austere theatre. The structure and numbers of corps cbt bns, cbt heavy bns and cbt spt eqpt companies to handle these missions needs to be identified. The remaining question will be how many gets TPFDD'd and where?

 

7. Observation: Prime power spt in the theatre of ops. The non-standard configuration of active component prime power teams made off-line planning, organising and executing the norm during deployment ops

  Discussion: The US Army Prime Power Program and its organic prime power teams evolved from the Army's nuclear power program. The evolution from nuclear to generator power created non-standard Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) teams vice Table of Organisation and Eqpt (TOE) detachments. This results in the teams not being authorised tactical vehicles, mil radios, individual and unit Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) eqpt and weapons. Additionally, direct data input into the Joint Opal Planning and Execution System (JOPES) was not possible. Deployment actions became off-line manual exercises. The Prime Power Program provides unique, dedicated precise electrical power generation capability above those levels available from tactical generators. Teams are trained and equipped to power US facilities using host nation commercial power distribution systems and/or large non- tactical generators in the theatre of ops. All aspects of the program, including hands-on soldier execution, were used during Op DESERT SHIELD/ /STORM. Deployment of the non-standard TDA teams to Southwest Asia required off-line, one-of-a-kind manual actions outside of the normal JOPES

  Recommendation: Organise prime power teams as TOE detachments

 

8. Observation: Facility leasing authorities for the theatre of ops. Contract leasing threshold expeditiously increased, and contract approval above threshold completed at HQDA in less than 24 hours

  Discussion: Normal contracting approval authority for a combatant Cdr-in-Chief (CINC) is normally $250k per contract lease. The threshold was increased to $2M per contract lease quickly after recognition of need. The approval process for contracts exceeding $2M resided at HQDA, however, the approval process was responsive as evidenced by less than 24-hour turn-around

  Recommendation: Increase CINC contract leasing approval threshold to $2M per contract immediately after request. HQDA approval process for contracts exceeding threshold is responsive to the CINC's needs

 

9. Observation: Development of comprehensive facility requirements. The capability to develop facility requirements was not immediately available during the build-up of forces

  Discussion: Upon execution or Op DESERT SHIELD, Central Command (CENTCOM) was developing an OPLAN for a regional contingency similar to the scenario encountered in Southwest Asia. The Civil Engr Spt Plan (CESP) portion of the OPLAN was being written by the 416th Engr Command, a Reserve Component unit with an habitual focus on Southwest Asia, who upon activation would be the Theatre Engr Command (ENCOM). The CESP data is intended to provide the necessary OPLAN oriented input to spt development of a Base Development Plan. During the early build-up, beddown requirements were met by host nation facilities contracted/leased through the efforts of the Middle East Africa Project Office (MEAPO) which were fortuitously already located in theatre. The Army component of CENTCOM (ARCENT) had no capability for detailed long range bases development planning to spt the surge of arriving forces. The 416th ENCOM finally arrived in theatre mid-December 1990, providing the necessary planning and contracting/real estate expertise to spt Echelon above Corps (EAC) engineering tasks. Early deployment of an engineering planning and design HQs, with real estate and contracting officer personnel, is essential for generation of base development plans and rapid acquisition of land and facilities

  Recommendation: Deploy an appropriate theatre-level engr HQ early on in future ops to provide EAC engr spt

 

10. Observation: Inadequate installation infrastructure to spt deployments. The CONUS installation transportation infrastructure hindered rapid deployment to Southwest Asia

  Discussion: Effective and efficient mobilisation of CONUS forces hinges on the adequacy of installation transportation facilities (i.e., airfields and railway trackage) and effectiveness of co-ordination between Mil Traffic Management Command (MTMC) and FORSCOM. Many installations (e.g., Ft Stewart and Ft Campbell) have not been sufficiently funded to maintain these vital spt facilities. Consequently, long road marches were necessary and airfield ops were restricted due to poor facilities. Seaport facilities also needed work (e.g. Sunny Point needed maintenance dredging that slowed ammunition ship loading). In reaction to facilities problems from installation to port; MTMC made unilateral deployment decisions which put FORSCOM in the reactive mode, creating hardships for deploying units and their supporting installations. Large-scale mil deployments are hindered by insufficiently maintained CONUS installation transportation infrastructure and poor co-ordination between Major Commands (MACOMs)

  Recommendation: Re-evaluate mobilisation spt facilities and develop programs to maintain those facilities. Develop a program to foster improved co-ordination between MACOMs to ensure efficient deployment of US forces during a contingency; not from a single agency, but from a CINC perspective

 

11. Observation: Infrastructure management shortfalls. Engr personnel to manage real property maintenance activities (RPMA) in a theatre of ops were insufficient and late in deploying

  Discussion: To properly spt the deployed force, a large amount of infrastructure is necessary. These range from contracted/leased real property to newly constructed logistics bases and complexes. Any facility has a requirement for a dedicated staff to supervise the real property maintenance, which normally comes from the staff of the unit in charge of the base or complex. The staffing for an Area Spt Gp (ASG) appears lacking in sufficient engr personnel as requests for engr personnel augmentees were generated late in the deployment. Since the doctrinal engr gp supporting the ASG's RPMA mission was not deployed, the theatre ENCOM assisted using volunteers front its TDA DEH detachments to create ad hoc arrangements

  Recommendation: Infrastructure management engr personnel are required to be on-hand as bases and complexes are developed. Activation and deployment of supporting engr gps must coincide with deployment of ASGS. Re-evaluate the engr staffing inherent in ASG hq

 

TOPOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING/INTELLIGENCE OBSERVATIONS

 1. Observation: Engr S-2 capability to provide input to the Intel Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process

  Observation: During several mobile training team visits to deploying engr bns, it became evident that the S-2s were unsure of how they were to perform their tactical intel functions. Many S-2s were only familiar with their unit security duty requirements. Many were lieutenants or captains in a holding pattern on the bn staff. They were unsure of how to obtain and use engr intel as part of the combined arms team in the intel estimate process

  Recommendation: The resident Engr Officer Basic and Advanced Courses must deal with the IPB and engr intel process in some detail. The engr battlefield assessment process must be well under-stood. The Engr Pre-command Course must stress the real-life intel duties, which S-2s must be proficient at. S-2s and their NC0s cannot be focused only on peacetime security matters at home station, they must train continually in the IPB process and understand the world-wide threat

 

2. Observation: Access to Threat/Intel Issues

  Discussion: During several mobile training team visits to deploying engr bns, it became obvious that most engr units were not receiving adequate intel information through their peacetime chains of command. Many posts and div staffs were also far behind on the latest intel information from the Gulf. The Engr School had direct access to all of the primary national intel gathering agencies and was able to keep an excellent and current threat picture. There was good expertise available in the school threat office and with the tactics instructors. This ensured that the intel was evaluated in the most competent manner possible. The filtering of the information at various posts and hq was eliminated by the school capability

  Recommendation: The Engr School actively assists engr units in threat analysis and presentations during future contingency ops

 

3. Observation: Tactical Recce

  Discussion: During several mobile training team visits to deploying engr bns, knowledge of engr participation in tactical recce ops was determined to be "weak". Initial reports from Op Desert Storm indicate that engrs did participate in combined arms recce efforts to identify obstacle locations and bypasses. During Op Desert Shield, recce was not allowed prior to G day

  Recommendation: Continue emphasis of engr participation in tactical recce during resident instruction at the Engr School and in updates of engr manuals

 

4. Observation: Quick Response Multicolour Printer (ORMP) Capability

  Discussion: One QRMP prototype (Canon) was deployed, with the 30th Engr Bn (Topo). It apparently worked well. The QRMP capability will be required down to the terrain analysis team and topographic coy level

  Recommendation: Continue development of QRMP and field prototypes, as they become available

 

5. Observation: Space Based Technology

  Discussion: The ability of Spaced Based Technology to provide critical spt in the tactical environment was proven a success during Op Desert Storm and Desert Shield. Problems did surface, but were primarily the result of integration of systems, their doctrine, and their force structure. An example is the GPS. Soldiers used this system successfully. Some GPS confusion existed when reporting locations either by longitude and latitude or by grid co-ordinate

Recommendation: Continue to be aggressive in the evaluation and control of Space Based Technology for terrain applications

 

6. Observation: Exploitation of Digital Terrain Data

  Discussion: The initial lack of adequate topographic products to spt Op Desert Shield and Desert Storm emphasized the need to have the capability to exploit alternative sources of topographic information. These sources may consist of digital data (i.e. feature, elevation, and photography). This data was not easily accessed due to lack of eqpt and slow responsiveness through comm links that handle digital data. The ability to use these sources provides real time terrain information, which is needed, for successful tactical ops. A prototype Digital Topographic Spt System (DTSS) was deployed to the Persian Gulf, but not effectively used due to lack of digital data in a usable data base

  Recommendation: Emphasise aggressive development and procurement of improved comm eqpt that provides a digital data downlink from source to system and a connection between systems located at different locations (i.e. corps, div, bde, bn). Digital databases also need to be built to operate with DTSS in the future. The Intel community needs to be made aware of real time terrain data capabilities provided by these sources. Joint imagery ops will use these capabilities in the future

 

7. Observation: Theatre Topographic Bn

  Discussion: The 30th Engr Bn (Topographic) is a theatre topographic bn that is assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps at Ft Brags in peacetime. This assignment seriously detracted from the units' ability to train, as it should spt in war. The unit has many detractors that range from commanding non topographic units such as bridge coys, cbt spt eqpt companies and engr teams to having an excessive number of non-topographic qualified officers in the bn. Additionally the bn routinely trains and conducts its daily functions in a corps environment, not theatre. These detractors resulted in the unit not being prepared to fully spt the Persian Gulf theatre with adequate topographic spt. The unit needed special train-up in "routine" ops such as film development, press ops and maintenance

  Recommendation: The theatre topographic bn needs to train in peacetime what they will do in war. Real world topographic missions similar to intel units should be tasked by an Army topographic planning and control team. This would provide needed topographic material before a conflict arises and maintains current topographic databases for spt units to use. If this bn continues to be assigned to a corps, then these missions and spt arrangements must be worked out using FM 25-101 and its METL training philosophy.

Or reassign the bn to an Army hq on redeployment to CONUS and establish training and spt relationships with all CONUS Corps and divs. The real world missions described before would happen automatically

 

8. Observation: Theatre Topographic Planning and Control Team (P&C Team)

  Discussion: During Op Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the normally associated P&C Team from 416th ENCOM did not deploy a full team to the theatre. At the beginning of Op Desert Shield, the P&C Team had no direct role as topographic ops were controlled by the 30th Engr Bn (Topo), a theatre topographic bn, supporting a corps mission. As the op matured into a full theatre, the need for a co-ordinating unit was made apparent. Because the deployed P&C Team was not full up, it did not have the ability to act as the doctrinal topographic planning and controlling unit in the theatre for the ENCOM, leaving most of the P&C function with the theatre topographic bn

  Recommendation: Theatre topographic P&C teams should not be attached to Corps units in peacetime. Doctrine should be followed and units train as they are to fight. P&C teams must be deployed in total

 

9. Observation: Topographic Customer Requirements/Taskers

  Discussion: During Op Desert Storm and Desert Shield, it is unclear how customer requirements for topographic products were generated and received. In some instances, topographic units were producing what they "believed" the customer wanted with little regard for actual customer needs. ARCENT Engr staff indicated lack of co-ordination between customers at all levels and the appropriate topographic staffs and units. Topographic doctrine found in FM 5-105 identifying doctrinal responsibilities for topographic tasking is not clear to the engr and intel community.

Initial theatre map size requirements were to be 1:50,000 scale. Deploying units soon found that 1:100,00 scale maps were more appropriate for the flat terrain encountered. Units were force fed the on hand 1:50,000 maps because of the initial decision and were not able to get them changed to 1:100,000 in a timely manner

  Recommendation: The theatre topographic planning and control team from the ENCOM is responsible for consolidating and tasking topographic requirements at EAC. Corps missions, aside from direct spt to the G2, are the responsibility of the Corps staff engr office. Divisional requirements are prioritised by the div G2, with staff advice from the assistant div engr staff on those requirements outside the G2 area. This doctrine needs to be reinforced during all future training exercises and contingency ops. Map size requirements must be identified early for each level of command and theatre

 

10. Observation: Topographic Map Distribution

  Discussion: Topographic map distribution problems existed at all echelons from div to CENTCOM. At div level, map distribution is a logistics function. In at least one Army div, the div terrain detachment spent the majority of their time attempting to locate, collate, and disseminate the div's nap load. This prevented the unit from providing timely terrain information to the div. Another div's map supply sat in port warehouse facilities up to G-day, due to logistics and transportation problems. At corps level and above, the responsibility for map distribution presently belongs to the engrs. In 1984, the US Army Quartermaster Corps was directed by Cdr TRADOC to assure this mission. At this point in time, a concept for mission transfer exists, but no TOE window has been identified. Reports from the Persian Gulf indicate that engr units in at least one corps were not responsive to the needs of subordinate divs and tended not to place any sense of urgency on proper allocation and distribution of maps. This may have been due to a lack of training (current structure consists of quartermaster enlisted personnel functioning as part of a topographic engr unit; the enlisted personnel receiving little training on map distribution and the engr lieutenant receiving little training on logistics procedures). At theatre level, map distribution was handled by a joint agency with Army reserve personnel manning the depot for distribution ops. The Army reserve map depot unit was mobilised late, causing the theatre topographic bn to handle some of these functions until the theatre matured. Current peacetime staffing for this map depot unit is adequate, but wartime requirements in theatre overwhelmed the unit.

At all levels there was no organic unit transportation capability for map distribution, resulting in dependence on standard transportation systems and haul priority

  Recommendation: The topographic map distribution system must be handled by the same skilled personnel at all levels. In accordance with the 1984 TRADOC decision, maps are just another class of supply and needs to be handled as such. Transfer of function from engr to quartermaster must be expedited. Contingency corps map depots must be staffed with active duty personnel. The theatre mission should be handled as a joint activity with reserve units being used to supplement an existing active component/civilian cadre structure. Current map depot Toe's need to be revised to reflect increased wartime manning requirements. Standard topographic map products are not an integral part of the Army supply system. Maps do not have a National Stock Number (NSN) or a priority system (FAD) for distribution. Expedite assignment of bar code NSNs to topographic map products and insert them into the supply priority system

 

11. Observation: Topographic Survey Requirements

  Discussion: Op Desert Shield and Desert Storm demonstrated the need for new and updated topographic survey capability. A requirement for survey control to spt Corps artillery was established early. Existing control points were of questionable accuracy as they were on local datums or established by unknown procedures. Topographic survey teams deployed with GPS receivers and established a control point network to spt corps artillery. Some Automated Integrated Survey Instruments (AISI) were successfully fielded in the Persian Gulf, providing a total station survey capability

  Recommendation: Retain topographic survey capability in the force structure to be able to chart and update future contingency areas of op

 

12. Observation: Army TENCAP Imagery Priority

  Discussion: TENCAP (Tentage Capacity) imagery is used by topographic field units to rapidly produce spt products (terrain factor overlays, movement rates, etc) to keep up with the tempo of modern cbt. Op Desert Shield and Desert Storm topographic priority was low since it bad to compete with targeting priorities. Army users therefore had to use dated commercial multi-spectral imagery, which slowed production of needed terrain products

  Recommendation: Expand the use of manned and unmanned aerial plat-forms, to acquire needed imagery in a timely manner. Ensure topographic requirements are stated early and properly to garner higher platform priority

 

 13. Observation: Terrabase needs to be issued to all engr units

  Discussion: Terrabase needs to be issued to all engr units along with the terrain data necessary to perform terrain analysis in spt of cbt ops. In one instance, 600 vehicles got hung up on an escarpment because the maps available did not show this terrain feature. Terrabase could have generated the necessary terrain information to update the existing map and produced a new one

  Recommendation: Issue terrabase to all engr units. Provide units access to terrain data for all parts of the world. Make this system compatible with the Zenith Lap-Top computer

 

14. Observation: The Corps Topographic Coy lacks the material necessary to spt corps map requirements

 Discussion: The corps topographic coy is not resourced with the tentage, material handling eqpt, or shelving necessary to handle the Corps map requirements. The austere nature of this theatre rendered the use of an existing covered hardstand facility impossible. The unit possessed none of the rough terrain forklifts, tentage, or shelving necessary to create a map depot from scratch. These problems resulted in both Corps consolidating their depots in one location. Also, the lack of dedicated haul assets made map distribution very difficult

 Recommendation: Add the necessary eqpt to the Corps Topographic Coys TO&E for establishing a map depot in an austere theatre. We need to get away from large paper inventory! We need digital data and production at user level!

 

15. Observation: Obstacle Intel (OBSTINTEL) was not consolidated and analysed at any level

  Discussion: Seven different sources provided obstacle intel to the corps staff. This information often proved to be redundant, contradictory, or erroneous. There was no deliberate attempt at any level to consolidate and analyse obstacle intel. This produced reluctance on the part of the staffs to trust the intel they were receiving

  Recommendation: Continue to use terrain analysts. OBSTINTEL should be IPB that the corps engr or div engr provides to the spt force

 

16. Observation: Topographic capability at Special Ops Command (SOCOM)

  Discussion: SOCOM ops, by their very nature, require detailed rapid response topographic products to spt mission planning. At present, SOCOM is dependent on outside units or agencies to analyse topographic information and produce special products. This process incurs substantial risk of mission compromise and the possibility of unresponsive spt, which could be overcome by a specially tailored SOCOM topographic capability

Recommendation: Field a dedicated topographic capability within SOCOM

 

17. Observation: Topographic Hardware Development. Need exists for down-sized rapid map production capability to spt the tactical cdr

  Discussion: The tactical cdr has a requirement for tailored naps produced in theatre, in addition to those produced and shipped from the Defence Mapping Agency (DMA). A limited rapid production capability presently exists for ground farces using Non-Developmental Item (NDI) eqpt. It is not tactically deployable, requiring special handling and power requirements. A compact, ruggedized system similar to a down sized Digital Topographic Spt System (DTSS) with associated printing capability mounted on a HMMWV would better spt the tactical cdr

  Recommendation: Accelerate development of a compact, ruggedized map production capability preferably mounted on a HMMWV

 

UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE (UXO) OBSERVATIONS

 1. Observation: Improper Handling of UXO

  Discussion: During Op Desert Storm, Iraq and Kuwait were covered by large areas of UXO. Most of this ordnance included cluster bombs (CBU) that failed to detonate on impact. None of them had any self-destruct capability. Some bombs were easily seen by their yellow markings. Engr units clearing/handling UXO (BLU-97) did not follow explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, common sense, or guidance from local EOD units. This led to several casualties when units were acting "macho" around UXO. The large amount of UXO caught all land force personnel by surprise. Very little identification training or warning posters was available

  Recommendation: The magnitude of the UXO problem on the modern battle-field means that EOD teams may not be available in the number needed to handle the load. Engrs may be required to supplement EOD units. Doctrine needs to be reviewed to determine what types of UXO could be destroyed by engrs and the level of EOD advice/expertise required. Training programs need to he examined to possibly allow special identification of EOD trained engrs in units. The basics of UXO handling remain:

a. Don't touch or pick it up

b. Mark its location and report it to higher HQs

c. If it needs to be destroyed, place a demolition charge beside the UXO, not on top

Bomblets need to be painted in a bright colour for easy identification

  

2. Observation: Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM) and Cluster Bomb Units (CBU) produce a large number of dangerous duds

  Discussion: The large scale use of DPICM and CBUs resulted in units manoeuvring over areas where large numbers of these duds existed. One unit reported that MLRS appeared to have a 2% dud rate. This resulted in casualties and eqpt damage on a scale not previously encountered. This problem was beyond the capabilities of EOD detachments to deal with. Engrs were forced to remove these duds, particularly when they were encountered during breaching ops and establishing MSRs. The method used was to blow the dud in place. Unfortunately, engrs are not trained to perform this function. Additionally, the location of these dud munitions were hard to identify unless units drove over them

  Recommendation: The responsibility for clearing specific duds such as DPICM and Cubs needs to be clarified to meet opal requirements. If engrs are to perform this function, they must be properly trained to do so. There is also an opal requirement to mark, record, and report dud areas as hazardous areas. This requires additional doctrine co-ordinated with the artillery school and contained in a STANAG. Engrs should have role and mission to clear UXO on the battlefield. We need to fix!

 

 ENGINEER LOGISTICS OBSERVATIONS

 1. Observation: Class IV Supplies

  Discussion: During Op Desert Shield, Class IV received the lowest priority of all classes of supplies. The Persian Gulf region lacked procurable Class IV materials to provide force protection. Units deployed with little or no Class IV for self-protection. At the start of Op Desert Storm, less than 40% of requisitioned Class IV material had been delivered to the theatre. This stress on the system was caused by existing physical requirements for several types of Class IV supplies needed to construct fighting or protective positions. Several manoeuvre cdrs requested information during Op Desert Shield for single NSN items they could order to provide protection for their soldiers

  Recommendation: Develop simple packaged, easily transportable survivability materials to reduce the tremendous logistics burden placed on contingency ops supply systems. A short term solution is to create single NSN "push packages" that contain all required Class IV materials for a single line coy to construct all needed fighting and protective positions. AMC IMED should also conduct a foreign market survey of available foreign revetment and fighting position kits

2. Observation: Sandbags

  Discussion: During Op Desert Shield, more than 95 million sandbags were ordered from multiple sources to provide protection to units and facilities. Current sandbags have an ultraviolet light protective coating that resists a minimum of 400 hours of direct sunlight. During Desert Shield, for expediency purposes, this requirement was dropped

  Recommendation: Mil specifications for sandbags should be reviewed and a long-term world-deployable bag specification he adopted. In addition, purchase several sandbag-manufacturing machines for various theatres

 

3. Observation: Scatterable Mine Supplies

  Discussion: Theatre requirements for scatterable mines were unable to be fulfilled. USAREUR engr bns were the only units with Ground Emplaced Mine Scattering Systems (GEMSS) eqpt. Each system carried two loads, one in the dispenser and one on a 5-ton truck towing the dispenser. Artillery delivered scatterable mines (ADAM and RAAMS) were produced in insufficient quantities to fulfil antipersonnel mine requirements. USMC requirements exacerbated the availability. The only scatterable mfs actually emplaced were two GATOR missions flown by the Air Force. Overall scatterable mine requirements threatened world-wide availability

  Recommendation: There is a continuing requirement for scatterable mines and delivery systems. The VOLCANO mine dispensing system must be fielded. Production should be increased and inventory of ADAM and RAAMS levels raised for future contingency ops

  

4. Observation: Class IV and Class V materials should be pushed forward to Engr units as a standard LOGPACs without having to requisition supplies

  Discussion: Units deploying to a contingency theatre will be constrain on the amount of Class IV & V materials that they will be allowed to carry into theatre. Other classes of supply will invariably receive higher priority from the cdr. These stocks will not always be managed well at the theatre level. In this case, units could depleted the stocks of concertina for use in area security and EPW holding areas, leaving little for use as contingency stock for defensive ops. Attempts to identify stocks of materials exclusively for use by engr units were unsuccessful. Deploying units will also be ignorant of Class IV & V requirements for the theatre they are deploying to and it is difficult to acquire these stock in the short time prior to deployment. Once in theatre, requisitions for supplies take too long to process and fill. One div, which had 5 engr bns, had only 5,000 mines. Subsequently, no mines were shipped to theatre, and the theatre cdr eventually placed a prohibition on the emplacement of mines

  Recommendation: The theatre engr staff planners must focus on sup-porting manoeuvre ops. They need to establish estimates of unit requirements for Class IV & V materials and develop plans for stocking those supplies in theatre and pushing those supplies forward to units automatically. We need a "push" supply system in a contingency theatre. Army logistics planning manuals such as FM 101-10-1/1 and 1/2 need to be updated to reflect Class IV & V material requirements by theatre, type unit, and level of conflict. The Army also needs to identify Required Supply Rates (RSR) for Engr Class V materials. Engr units deployed with one basic load of ammunition, which was based on a separate theatre's requirements. Manoeuvre cdrs and staff planners also need to understand the capabilities and C2 procedures for employing conventional and scatterable mines

 

5. Observation: The Corps engr was forced to do force modernisation during preparation for cbt

  Discussion: The fielding of CEV rakes, ACES, bn counter-mines sets, fascines, AVLMs, armour plating on dozers, and MICLIC modifications proved to be distracters during preparations for cbt. The Corps force modernisation office proved unable to handle this additional load of new system. This required that the Assistant Corps Engr (ACE) handle these items

  Recommendation: While it is understood that the Army needs to field modernised systems into a contingency theatre, the fielding of these systems should not distract from the many other essential tasks that the ACE staff needs to perform. If large numbers of systems should be fielded again under these conditions, then personnel need to be provided to augment either the ACE's staff, or the Force Modernisation Office's staff

 

6. Observation: Engrs need a hardened ambulance for casualty evacuation on the battlefield

  Discussion: Engr companies must have an armoured, tracked ambulance in order to evacuate casualties from the battlefield. Area evacuation does not work due to the size of the battlefield and number of casualties. Manoeuvre units were forced to give up their own M113 ambulances in order to provide engr supporting breaching ops the capability to evacuate their casualties

  Recommendation: Include a M113A3 ambulance in each mechanised coy TO&E

 

ENGINEER PERSONNEL OBSERVATIONS

 1. Observation: Engr Personnel Management

  Discussion: Engr personnel management did not follow procedures established for mobilisation in response to contingency ops. This resulted in a fractured assignment system that was unable to manage the force. To date an actual figure of engr personnel by specialty code or MOS serving or has served in the Persian Gulf is nearly impossible to develop. For example, units deployed at artificially high strength figures, due to installations unilaterally attaching or assigning personnel without co-ordination with PERSCOM. As a result, subsequent taskers for assignment actions often found the soldier was deployed while PERSCOM was still carrying the soldier at a CONUS duty station. In-theatre personnel requirements were not co-ordinated. Three requisitioning agencies (PERSCOM Engr Branch for TOE/MACOM requirements, PM SANG advisor requirements through a Ft Brags office, and USACE mil personnel office) were submitting tasking for engr personnel without a central co-ordinating point (PERSCOM). The result was a haphazard tasking flow which, at the installation level, appeared like double-booking engr requirements. Another problem was allowing personnel management tasking and decisions to occur outside PERSCOM channels such as the CINC requesting deployment of 33 engr squads from TRADOC, FORSCOM and USAREUR. Some MACOMs only deployed skill level one-squad members, some formed squads with an NCO leadership cadre, others formed full TOE plts complete with officers. However once in-country, almost all of the arriving squads were broken up and used as individual fillers, while the leadership cadre became an unrequested benefit to the theatre. This resulted in an uncoordinated and confused response to an individual replacement theatre requirement. Similarly, the selection, activation, and use of IRRs and RT12s were a management problem. A large percentage of RT12s were clearly unfit to be recalled, placing an unnecessary burden on the reception stations. RT12s were activated without clear requirements. Over 1000 cbt engrs arrived at Ft Leonard Wood without PERSCOM direction or ultimate assignment instructions. An example was the deployment of RT12 squads to Fort Drum, New York, where the command also received a tasker to deploy soldiers to SWA. Rather than use recently arrived RT12 squads, the command directed that permanent soldiers fill Desert Storm requirements, leaving the RT12s on the installation. Their reason was that if DA wanted RT12s to fill Desert Storm requirements, then they would have tasked the training base to do so. The result of this was that div soldiers just returning from the Sinai were immediately deployed to the Persian Gulf

  Recommendation: All personnel actions be centrally controlled at PERSCOM. Tasking to MACOMS, USARPAC, or installations be co-ordinated with assignment branches. Deployment of individuals be conducted i.a.w. Mobilisation doctrine, or change mobilisation procedures. The issue of individual replacement versus unit replacement in future contingency ops must be raised and reviewed

 

ENGINEER TRAINING OBSERVATIONS

 1. Observation: Lack of Realistic Mine Warfare Training Aids

  Discussion: At the outbreak of hostilities, there was insufficient quantities of training aids for the types of mines, mine mechanisms and booby traps likely to be encountered in the Persian Gulf

  Recommendation: The US Army Engr School procure and maintain an adequate Stockage of mine warfare training aids which reflect modern mines and mechanisms available throughout the world

 

2. Observation: Engr Refresher Training

  Discussion: The deployment of engr forces to the Persian Gulf quickly revealed a desire and real need for comprehensive unit refresher training prior to deployment. Because units were clearly focusing on the actions of deployment, there was a clear benefit of having an external agency prepare, co-ordinate, and provide relevant briefings and training on current doctrine to units and HQs prior to deployment. The Engr School provided this training and proved invaluable in refreshing cdrs in tactics, techniques and procedures which then facilitated their focusing on the engr estimate process and essential actions on arrival in the Persian Gulf

  Recommendation: Future contingency ops will require engr unit refresher training prior to deployment when time is available. The Engr School must play a large role in this

 

3. Observation: The Army needs to emphasise hands-on live fire training for all engr systems

  Discussion: The problems associated with the MICLIC highlights the need for constant training using live munitions. If the system is unreliable or unsafe during training, then it will be unreliable and unsafe to use during war. The reluctance of units to use such systems such as FASCAM in peacetime manoeuvres resulted in severe restrictions on their use during this conflict. Cdrs were afraid to employ conventional and scatterable mines because of their potential for fratricide. Likewise, cdrs were afraid to conduct recce of mfs because of the risk this exposed to soldiers. This mind set is directly attributable to a lack of confidence produced by unrealistic training

  Recommendation: Incorporate live munitions training into individual and collective training plans and into the Cbt Training Canters. Resource units to conduct this training. Develop guidelines for safe live fire training. Emphasis needs to be placed on developing training systems and devices which accurately replicate our mine and counter-mine systems. STRAC and CATS need updating in these areas

 

4. Observation: Each squad and crew vehicle needs a cbt lifesaver

  Discussion: Each squad tracked vehicle, crew vehicle, and section needs a cbt lifesaver in order to stabilise wounded soldiers until they can be treated and evacuated by medical personnel. They must also be trained to understand that in cbt their mission comes before the treatment of wounded

  Recommendation: Insure units train personnel to perform this function and provide them the appropriate eqpt. We need to put it in BNCOC or somewhere to make it happen. It can be done by unit certification working with local medical units

 

5. Observation: Combined Arms Battle Drills are essential to successful cbt ops

  Discussion: Success in cbt is directly attributable to well rehearsed battle drills that are standardised throughout the div. TRADOC's definition for battle drills is too restrictive. The div had battle drills for div and bde movements. At all levels the talk-through/walk-through technique followed by full scale rehearsals involving all elements of the combined arms team, were key to success

  Recommendation: Continue to emphasise in training the value of rehearsals and drills

 

COMMAND, CONTROL & COMMUNICATIONS OBSERVATIONS

 1. Observation: Implement the Engr Restructure Initiative (ERI) with modernised eqpt

  Discussion: The requirements for mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability on the modern battlefield requires an engr force robust enough to meet manoeuvre unit requirements. This op proved that a manoeuvre task force requires a minimum of an engr coy for sup-port. This force must possess the ability to provide mobility to the heavy force. This in turn requires mobility eqpt that can survive under direct and indirect fire, yet move at the same pace as the manoeuvre force. The M60 chassis currently used for the CEV and AVLB must be replaced. The full width mine rake was a winner, but needs to be on another chassis (CMV). Likewise, the AVLM was a success, but requires another chassis. The ACE and mine plough were also very successful.

The requirements for sustainment-engineering tasks in spt of the manoeuvre div was greater than expected. The engr regiment requires a CSE type coy that habitually trains with the div to perform these missions. This coy may be less heavily equipped than the current CSE, but capable of performing the tasks of providing mobility, countermobility, survivability, and sustainment tasks that were essential to div ops in this theatre. Cdrs deemed it essential that a coy with three plts, equipped with dozers, graders and SEEs, be available to spt the div. They also felt that the trimmed down sapper bn (450 man) would be too to perform the essential functions necessary on the battlefield. Both manoeuvre and engr cdrs wanted to keep the current divisional bn strength, and expand the regiment to include three of these bns

  Recommendation: Per approval of CSA on 5 Mar 91, implement the ERI with the necessary adjustment in manpower and eqpt. Continue to modernise cbt engr systems to be compatible with and capable of supporting manoeuvre force needs. Ensure that METT-T and TPFDD provide for adequate horizontal constr capability in the div

 

2. Observation: A contingency theatre without a TAACOM or more than one subordinate EAC engr bde, does not require an ENCOM

  Discussion: With only 2 engr bns (cbt heavy) and one composite engr bn at echelons above corps (EAC), a theatre army engr bde was sufficient to C2 this size force. While an engr gp is usually sufficient for this size force, it lacks the C2, and staff to perform the functions of the sole EAC engr organisation for a contingency theatre. An engr bde is therefore necessary, and serves the traditional role of an ENCOM. A full ENCOM, however, would be redundant in this role

  Recommendation: This is an METT-T issue. Should be structured based on size of deployed force, length of deployment (expected) and availability of infrastructure. Spt to a deployed army in an immature theatre that lacks a TAACOM, or several engr bdes, could be limited to one EAC engr bde tailored with augmentation for contracting and topographic planning and control

 

3. Observation: Engrs are poorly represented on staffs at the Field Army and Corps level

  Discussion: Planning was often conducted by G-3 and G-4 staffs without engr integration. Engrs are needed in the G-3 and G-4 plans section on a dedicated basis to properly integrate engr planning. Like-wise, engrs are needed in the Deep Battle Cell and Battlefield Co-ordination Element (BCE). The use of GATOR mines by the Air Force illustrates this point well. Army planners released use of scatterable mines to the component services without specifying the appropriate control measures as per doctrine. CENTCOM Air Force (CENTAF) flew over 35 GATOR missions (the exact number is not known), without reporting, or recording the missions. The BCE, which is, responsible for co-ordination between the ARCENT and CENTAF staffs, was ignorant of GATOR employment doctrine, self-destruct times, or recording and reporting procedures. During the ground offensive, units found themselves manoeuvring in GATOR mfs without any knowledge of their existence. In order to fix this problem, engr officers need to be assigned to the army or corps engr staff, with duty at the separate staff elements in order to insure continuity of effort and to focus on critical engr issues

  Recommendation: Amend force structure to provide engrs for the G-3 Plans, G-4 Plans, Deep Battle Cell, and BCE, at army and corps level

 

4. Observation: All Engr units need a GPS or Lorans system for position indication and survey

  Discussion: The nature of this theatre made the use of the GPS, Lorans, or some variant, essential. Terrain features did not exist. Units could not navigate using any method other than dead reckoning or by using the GPS. MSR layout before constr over long distances is dependent on the GPS. Every vehicle which will operate independently, or which has a leader in it requires a GPS. For engr ops this means virtually every vehicle in a cbt engr bn requires a GPS. The preferred system is satellite based rather than being dependent on radio towers

  Recommendation: That GPS or its equivalent be fielded to the engr force

 

5. Observation: Bde engrs need a Manoeuvre Control System (MCS) terminal in the bde TOC

  Discussion: Bde engrs are not able to borrow time on MCS terminals in the bde TOC. To control engr systems, forward reports, and track enemy and friendly obstacles, requires a dedicated MCS terminal

  Recommendation: Field an MCS terminal in every engr C2 cell from Corps through bde

 

6. Observation: The engr coy first sergeant (1SG) must have a dedicated vehicle

  Discussion: The requirement for the 1SG to be the coy logistical co-ordinator demands that he be provided a dedicated vehicle capable of moving between the bde trains and forward elements of the coy. This vehicle must be equipped with a GPS and sufficient radios to maintain communication with the coy and bde A&L net

  Recommendation: That, the engr coy 1SG be provided a HMMWV equipped with a GPS and two radios

 

7. Observation: Engr units must have compatible comm with the manoeuvre units they spt

  Discussion: Corps cbt engr bns attached to manoeuvre divs for cbt ops had trouble communicating with the manoeuvre units they were attached to spt due to non-issue of Mobile Subscriber Eqpt (MSE) or issue not being completed. This made rapidly changing task organisations difficult, if not impossible under current battlefield conditions. Units such as cbt spt eqpt coys and cbt heavy bns also found themselves directly supporting manoeuvre units

  Recommendation: All engr units must have MSE. Units that in peacetime were aligned to echelons above corps, found themselves supporting manoeuvre bdes. Likewise, corps cbt bns that had never had to spt manoeuvre units in home station training, found them attached to manoeuvre units for combat. This makes compatible comm essential 

 

 

SOURCE



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