"Maneuver Warfare" And The MAGTF
AUTHOR Major Thomas F. Western, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
Executive Summary
TITLE: "MANEUVER WARFARE" AND THE MAGTF
I. Purpose. To discuss the validity of "Manuever Warfare"
and B. H. Liddell Hart's indirect approach, as it applies to
the MAGTF.
II. Problem. Despite the publication of FMFM-1, "Maneuver
Warfare" doctrine has not been completely accepted by the
Marine Corps. This is a result of a misunderstanding of the
concepts, and a reluctance to change.
III. Discussion. Two ideas proposed by Liddell Hart are
especially instructive. Liddell Hart's indirect approach,
especially the concepts of the line of natural expectation
and the expanding torrent, amplify existing "Maneuver
Warfare" doctrine and are especially applicable to MAGTF
doctrine. The MAGTF possesses all the elements required for
modern combat, under one commander. The GCE and ACE
combination facilitates rapid action, that allows the MAGTF
commander to steal the initiative from an adversary, and
never relinquish it. The members of a MAGTF all wear the
same uniform, have attended the same schools and have the
same heritage. This has the potential to reduce internal
friction and concentrate combat power.
IV. Conclusions. The MAGTF must become the driving force
and orchestrate the subordinate elements, guided by
"Maneuver Warfare" doctrine, to work together and accomplish
the MAGTF's mission. The CSSE must work to push forward
logistics support before it is requested. The ACE should be
used as a maneuver element or a reserve to facilitate the
MAGTF commander getting inside the enemy commander's OODA
loop. The dominance of the GCE must be tamed. The GCE must
exploit enemy weaknesses and protect it's limited combat
support assets
"Maneuver Warfare," and the MAGTF
Outline
Thesis Statement. The doctrine of "Maneuver Warfare", as
expounded in FMFM-l and expanded by B. H. Liddell Hart's
indirect approach, establishes the foundation for future
operations. Acceptance of these concepts and application of them
to our MAGTF doctrine is essential for continued success.
I. "Maneuver Warfare"
A. Where the Marine Corps is Today
B. Where the Marine Corps needs to go.
II. "Manuever Warfare," B. H. Liddell Hart's indirect approach.
A. The natural line of expectation.
B. The expanding torrent.
III. "Maneuver Warfare" and the MAGTF.
A. The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE).
B. The Air Combat Element (ACE)
C. The Ground Combat Element (GCE)
D. The Command Element
"MANEUVER WARFARE" AND THE MAGTF
For more than a decade, the Marine Corps has been
anguishing over adopting and accepting the doctrine of
"Maneuver Warfare." The Corps has been the target of
scathing attacks by civilian academics bent on achieving
their ideas of military reform, usually along the lines of
the German General Staff model. In response to these
attacks and the consequent unpleasant limelight, Marines
have alternately counterattacked, ignored the reformers, and
finally accepted "Maneuver Warfare" to varying degrees.
However, even with the publication of FMFM-1, acceptance is
not complete. Why... because the reformers abandoned the
principles that they espouse and frontally attacked a
surface. B. H. Liddell Hart presents an interesting
perspective and provides sound advice, when he says
In all such cases, the direct assault of new ideas
provokes a stubborn resistance, thus intensifying the
difficulty of producing a change of outlook.
Conversion is achieved more easily and rapidly by
unsuspected infiltration of a different idea or by an
argument that turns the flank of instinctive
opposition. (6:xx)
The doctrine of "Maneuver Warfare," as expounded in
FMFM-1 and expanded by B.H Liddell Hart's indirect
approach, establishes the foundation for future operations.
Acceptance of these concepts and application of them to our
MAGTF doctrine is essential for continued success.
With the publication of FMFM-1 the Marine Corps has
officially adopted "Maneuver Warfare" as doctrine. As a
result, some visible changes have been effected. "Maneuver
Warfare" concepts have begun to infiltrate doctrinal manuals
and educational institutions. In OH 6-1, "Maneuver Warfare"
is described as the Marine Corps ground combat doctrine.
The Infantry Officers Course (IOC) at The Basic School has
taken the lead by restructuring its entire curriculum to
indoctrinate new infantry officers in the concepts of
"Maneuver Warfare." The Marine Corps Command and Staff
College incorporates the ideas of the "commander's intent"
and the "focus of main effort" (FOME) into its course work
and practical exercises. The pages of the Marine Corps
Gazette are continually filled with articles on "Maneuver
Warfare."
Despite all of the above, one gets the impression that
all the commotion is just a fad and that, for the most part,
"Maneuver Warfare" is still a "red-headed step child."
Actual employment of "Maneuver Warfare" is not as pervasive
as we would like to think. If the unit commander
understands the concepts and believes in them, then the unit
will be employed accordingly. At the Command and Staff
College, a grand total of one hour is devoted to FMFM-1.
This is enhanced by a gratuitous visit by Bill Lind, the
leading "Maneuver Warfare" proponent. That is the sum
total. Application of "Maneuver Warfare" to MAGTF doctrine
is never even discussed.
The Marine Corps must cast off its traditional GCE
myopia. Contrary to popular belief, the GCE is not the
center of the universe. The MAGTF must become the driving
force, employing its subordinate elements to accomplish the
MAGTF mission. The concept of operation, the courses of
action, and the scheme of maneuver must be the MAGTF's, and
not the GCE's.
The name itself has served to confuse the issue. Many
Marines equate "Maneuver Warfare" with mechanized vehicles
and sweeping blue arrows. Some began using terms such as
"commander's intent" and "focus of main effort," without
understanding the subtle, but important, meanings.
Confusion and misunderstanding still surround the concept,
and there is still more than a little reluctance to accept
the new doctrine. This is understandable, bureaucratic
institutions are notoriously slow to accept change, and the
Marine Corps is no different. Perhaps a different
perspective on "Maneuver Warfare" will help amplify the
concept. B. H. Liddell Hart's theory of the indirect
approach is a more complete and less confusing concept.(6)
Two ideas proposed by Liddell Hart are very instructive.
The first is what he calls the line of natural expectation,
which is taking the route, path, direction or approach that
the situation would naturally dictate. This would be very
direct and probably expected by the enemy. Such an action
would be attacking what Bill Lind calls a surface, but would
be applicable to almost any endeavor.(8:73-80) The natural
line of expectation is not necessarily a geographic one and
it transcends the tactical, operational, strategic and grand
strategic spheres of activity.
The second element, and perhaps the most instructive,
is the theory of the "expanding torrent." Liddell Hart
describes a torrent of water as it encounters a series of
dams or banks. The water beats against the obstruction
until a breach is found or created. The water initially
dribbles through and begins to widen the crack. The pent up
water on either side begins to wear away the shoulders of
the breach and the water behind pours straight through. The
breach is widened until the flow of water is equal to the
original torrent. The obstacle becomes ineffective and it
begins to crumble as the rush of the torrent passes by.(8:9)
It has been popular, in recent years, to expound on the
capabilities of the MAGTF. When a new mission or concept
arises someone immediately professes the suitability of the
MAGTF for that mission. This may be true, though I suspect
not in all cases, because the MAGTF is an incredibly
versatile and diverse instrument that comes in a single,
compact package. This package can be modified, in any
number of ways, to adapt to any number of situations and
missions. To operate effectively, according to the
"Manuever Warfare" doctrine, some adaptations must be made
and some mind-sets must be altered.
The element that requires the most significant
adaptation is the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE).
The CSSE is the heart of the MAGTF. Should an opponent cut
out the heart, the brain and limbs will quickly wither and
die. It is as essential for the members of the CSSE to
understand the concepts of "Maneuver Warfare" as it is for
members of the other three elements. They must also
understand the meaning of "focus of main effort" (FOME) and
its effect on designating priorities. The CSSE must also
limit the burden of the bureaucracy on the maneuver
battalions and squadrons.
"Maneuver Warfare" will require the CSSE to become
proactive and not reactive. Through the use of liaison
officers and monitoring of the tactical nets, the CSSE will
have to anticipate the immediate needs of units in contact
and push these forward.(8:34) Mobile-loaded packages of
supply classes I, III, and V, moving with appropriate
maintenance and repair capability and tailored to a specific
unit, will facilitate tactical operations. Situational
awareness on the part of all members of the CSSE is
essential to ensuring support at the critical time and
place. The GCE and the ACE will be preoccupied with the
battle. This will have two effects; the first is requesting
resupply when it is a crisis and delay could be disastrous;
the second is enemy units they have bypassed will pose a
problem for the actual conduct of the resupply and all other
CSSE operations. Use of helicopters or routes that avoid
by-passed enemy units will have to be used.
Rear area security will be a prime concern and a
primary responsibility of the CSSE. The standard
configuration of a MAGTF includes but a single GCE. There
will not be sufficient maneuver units to accomplish the GCE
mission and protect the CSSE. The CSSE must become more
self-sufficient in terms of its own defense.
During the Korean War a standard tactic of the North
Koreans was to infiltrate large numbers of infantry into the
rear areas of U.S. units. The infiltrators would cut main
supply routes (MSR) and attack CSS and fire support
units.(14:57-73) Usually these units were unprepared and
unable to deal with this threat and chaos resulted.
However, there were many examples of the rear units forming
temporary tactical units and defending themselves, such as
the rear units of the Army's Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division
during the First Battle of the Naktong.(14:60) To protect
against rear area attacks by the North Koreans, the Marines
started to keep their CSS close behind the combat units,
which provided some measure of protection.(2:B-17) German
General Balck provided his rear units with anti-tank weapons
and successfully destroyed significant numbers of Russian
Tanks. Combining these examples and maturing the ideas
holds promise for effectively dealing with rear area
security issues.
The rear area faces two threats. One threat is from
unconventional forces and the other is from enemy manuever
units focusing on and attacking the rear area. To deal with
terrorist or spetsnaz type forces, the personnel in these
areas will have to be on alert. They must question and
report situations that are suspicious. They must be armed
and ready to defend themselves and their immediate area.
This requires a defense plan and each Marine must know his
part. The second threat is more serious. Since time
immemorial, armies have been paranoid about their rear area
because they are prime targets for enemy attack. However,
if the positions are developed properly with personnel
trained and ready, attack of a rear area could be a two-
edged sword.
The CSSA or CSSD when immobile for any length of time
must organize for self-defense. This would consist of
forming separate cantonments that can become defensive
strongpoints. These should be set up in belts that are
mutually supporting and completely dominate the area.
Tactics and techniques of a position defense are employed to
organize and coordinate the fires of the cantonments. A
tactical decision will have to be made regarding the
dispersion of these cantonments and compromise between
ability to conduct CSS operations and protect from air,
artillery and ground attack. An alarm or warning system
must be developed to signal an enemy infiltration or direct
attack. When the alarm is sounded each Marine picks up his
weapon and assumes his defensive role. The intent is to bog
down an enemy attack in a morass of mutually supporting
strongpoints that delay him and disperse his effort. This
will break up his attack, stripping away his infantry
causing him to reach his culminating point. The attacker's
vulnerability to counterattack by the GCE or ACE is
increased.
There are two arguments against the CSSE providing for
its own defense. One is based on the concern for over-
taxing the Marines of the CSSE and the second is the
consequent degradation of service support to the MAGTF.(16)
There will be some degradation of support, however, the
overall negative effective will be less than taking maneuver
units out of the line and committing them to rear area
security. This concept should not overly tax the CSSE
Marines either. They will conduct their normal duties until
a potential problem arises, then move to their defensive
positions. At night, they will be required to conduct local
security patrols and establish listening posts. The local
security will require only a few Marines and can be done on
a rotating basis. During the day, Military Police patrols
and routine movement of Marines executing routine duties
will provide for security. The degradation of support will
be minimal and more than offset by the depth added to the
MAGTF battlefield.
The ACE in "Maneuver Warfare" has been the subject of
widespread debate. Some of the reformers have suggested
that all the Marine Corps needs is a slow attack plane for
close air support.(9) This is absolute foolishness and
seriously undermines the credibility of its proponent. To
support his contention, Mr. Lind uses the example of the WW
II German pilot Hans Rudel, whose exploits on the Russian
front are legend.(9) Colonel Rudel is famous for his record
of tank kills and sorties flown. He flew in a Junkers JU-
87G "Stuka" specifically configured to attack and kill
tanks. The slowness of his aircraft and the ability to spot
ground targets are cited as an example of what Marine
aviation should be able to do. Mr. Lind conveniently
overlooks several facts that are pertinent to the argument.
The first is that no other pilot came anywhere close to
Rudel's record. Rudel was not flying against an integrated
air defense, such as can be found in many countries today,
and Rudel was shot down over thirty times. Additionally Mr.
Lind expresses doubts about the survivability of
helicopters; what would make a slow fixed wing plane anymore
survivable. The Stuka had to be withdrawn from operations
over Britain because of prohibitive losses.(13)
The modern battlefield is complex beyond imagination,
especially in the air. Surface-to-air-missiles (SAMS),
Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) and sophisticated target
acquisition and fire control radars are combined into
integrated air defenses. The air-to-air threat presents a
similar impediment to survival, especially to slow planes.
survival of any and all aviation assets requires a complex
combination or "package" of fighters, attack, and electronic
warfare planes. All of these aircraft will have
complicated avionics systems to facilitate mission
accomplishment. Without this integrated air effort, the
close air support planes "can't get there from here."
The application of the ACE in "Maneuver Warfare" has
some interesting historical precedents... U.S. Marine
historical precedents. Marine Air Groups (MAG) 24 and 32
were assigned to support U.S. Army operations in Luzon,
Philippines during January and February 1945. As a part of
this operation MAGs 24 and 32 provided support for the First
Armored Cavalry Division's 100-mile-dash to Manila. Their
mission was to conduct reconnaissance ahead of, and behind
the division, and to guard the division's open left
flank.(5::342-:347) The missions of the division and of MAGS
24 and 32 were very successful.
This is a classic example of employing the ACE as a
maneuver element. The air groups were apprised of the
ground commanders objective, given a mission and a desired
effect. The air group commanders used their own tactical
judgement in employing their assets to support the entire
operation. Therein lies the key to employment of the ACE in
"Maneuver Warfare." Convey to the ACE the mission of the
MAGTF and the commander's intent. Ensure the ACE is kept
apprised of the operations of the other elements of the
MAGTF. Assign them a mission that states the desired effect
on the enemy and establish priorities. Then, allow the ACE
to employ his assets to accomplish the mission and defeat
the threat, as he sees fit. The ACE must be responsive to
the MAGTF commander's will, not the GCE. I don't mean to
imply that the ACE will not provide air support to the GCE.
All elements of the MAGTF will do what is necessary to
accomplish the mission. The ACE is the MAGTF commander's
means to influence and shape the battle before the GCE gets
involved.
The ACE is the most mobile and flexible of the elements
of the MAGTF. If it can't directly win the ground battle,
it can effectively set up our enemies for defeat, and not
just by close air support. The objective, in "Maneuver
Warfare," is to interrupt the enemy commander's thought
process and degrade his ability to command his subordinates
and fight the battle. The ACE can attack this objective by
disrupting the enemy's plans, interdicting his
communications, separating his forces and suppressing his
fire support. Every time the enemy commander tries to
adjust, the MAGTF commander frustrates this initiative with
his ACE. This induced frustration combines with what
Clausewitz called friction, to breakdown the enemy's ability
to operate. The MAGTF commander begins to get inside what
Colonel John Boyd calls the Observation, Orientation,
Decision, Action (OODA) loop.(8:5) B. H. Liddell Hart
refers to it as "dislocation of the enemies psychological
and physical balance."(6:6) If the ACE only partially
accomplishes this, it has been successful.
The GCE has been the focus of attempts to move the
Marine Corps to a doctrine of "Maneuver Warfare." OH 6-1
Ground Combat Operations was written with the concepts of
"Maneuver Warfare" in mind. Although the adoption of
"Maneuver Warfare" has been most complete in the GCE, there
is still a long way to go.
Many times in modern history prophets have forecast the
waning influence of infantry on the battlefield. Artillery
in WW I, and subsequently armor and air, had supposedly
neutralized the infantry. These forecasts have been based
on the superiority of new and emerging technology. The
plane, tank, or firepower of some new weapon has repeatedly
made the infantry "obsolete." However, the infantry has
always managed to, not only survive, but prove itself
indispensible. The reason for this success, indeed the
success by any element on any battlefield, is expressed by
John English in his book On Infantry:
... the infantry arm was primarily sustained on the
field of battle through the tactical ability and applied
intelligence of man.(3:217)
The employment of infantry in "Maneuver Warfare" will
force some uncomfortable situations on the leadership of the
GCE. Plans will have to flow into operations. Once the
operation has begun, flexibility to adjust to the situation
is paramount. Decisions will have to be made on "sketchy"
information. Subordinate leaders will have to be trusted
and allowed to lead. Following up the holes or "gaps" in
the enemy defenses found or created by the lead platoons and
squads may require early commitment of the reserve. The
initial FOME may have to become a fixing force to prevent
the enemy from cutting off the breach. Close coordination
with the ACE to maintain or exploit the breach until the GCE
can commit its reserve will begin to attack the enemy
commander's mind. The ACE can quickly present another
problem for the enemy to react to before he has been able to
contain the breach. This employment of combined arms will
attack the enemy commander's ability to cycle through the
O0DA loop.
The technique to accomplish this is not well understood
by many Marines. This is the infiltration attack. The term
"infiltration" immediately conjures up images of individual
Marines using stealth to creep into enemy areas undetected.
Most Marines associate infiltration with snipers or
reconnaissance units. When employed by the GCE it is
something all together different. This is an attack with
all the associated fighting and employment of combined arms
concomitant with that activity. Upon contact with heavy
resistance, the attackers slide off and bypass it. The
attacking elements continue to infiltrate in and around the
enemy defenses. (8:11)
B.H. Liddell Hart's expanding torrent helps to
conceptualize what is happening. As a company commander,
Rommel was exceptionally adept at this technique.(iS)
During the first battle of the Naktong, the North Koreans
nearly destroyed the U.S. Army Twenty-fourth division with
this type of attack. The twenty-fourth division's situation
was restored by committing a U.S. Marine brigade and
elements from adjacent divisions in a frontal and very
costly counterattack. (14)
The remaining elements of the GCE are a potential
vulnerability that an enemy can exploit. Compared to many
potential adversaries, including those in the "third world,
the GCE is short on artillery, armor, and mechanized assets.
These assets must be husbanded and employed at the critical
time and place and not exposed before. The tendency of
apportioning out our engineers and reconnaissance assets
tends to decrease their effectiveness and sustainability.
The practice of having reconnaissance teams control
supporting arms, except on high value targets, compromises
its presence and detracts from its mission. Tactical
excellence and intelligent employment of all GCE assets,
while avoiding the natural line of expectation are the road
to GCE success.
The MAGTF command element has the daunting task of
orchestrating the subordinate elements. The principle
impediment to success of a MAGTF is the potential for each
of the elements to pursue it's own agenda. This will cause
us to dislocate our own balance before the enemy has the
opportunity. Failure is assured. However, when focused on
the objective and working together, the MAGTF can be greater
than the sum of its parts.
As a self-contained package, the MEB and the MEF can
sever its lines of communications and operate independently.
With mobile CSSD's, fuel and rearming points (FARPS), and
aerial refueling, a MAGTF can operate much as General W.T.
Sherman did on his march to the sea. This can provide a
theatre Commander in Chief (CINC) an operational maneuver
group that can make deep penetrations or operate in an
enemy's rear area and sustain itself for a considerable
length of time.
The MAGTF is especially suited for Liddell Hart's
concept of the "expanding torrent," The scenario fits in
both offensive and defensive operations. In the defense,
the enemy attack is blunted in the main battle area or
allowed to penetrate and then counterattacked in its rear or
flank. A breach is found or created by a ground or air
counterattack. The forward echelon of the enemy attack is
cut off and isolated. The MAGTF commander commits his
reserve, which consists of portions of the ACE to exploit
the breach and disrupt the follow-on echelons. The sudden
shock of massed air attack combined with the ground attack
opens the crack until it reaches torrent proportions. This
further demoralizes the enemy. His withdrawal becomes a
route. In offensive operations a gap is found or created
and the scenario above is repeated.
The MAGTF commander has at his command an integrated,
sustainable and potent force. There exists no other
commander with access to such a versatile force, whose
members all wear the same uniform, speak the same language
and have the same heritage. This fact alone reduces
internal friction to a level that other organizations can
only imagine. The MAGTF has the potential to cycle through
the OODA cycle at amazing speed. Whole-hearted adoption of
"Maneuver Warfare" doctrine will exploit this unity and make
the MAGTF an irresistible force.
Bibliography
1. Brickhouse, Maj. Kevin G. "A Primer on Maneuver
Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette October 90, 38
2. Craig, Brigadier General E. A. Special Action Report,
First Provisional Marine Brigade, FMF, 11
September, 1950
3. English, John A. On Infantry. Praeger, 1984.
4. Fuller, Major General J.F.C. The Conduct of War 1789-
1961. Greenwood Press, 1981.
5. Garand, George W. and Strobridge, Truman R. History of
U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II,
Volume IV, Western Pacific Operations. Historical
Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1971.
6. Hart, B. H. Liddell. Strategy 2d ed. Signet, 1974.
7. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM-1, Warfighting,
1989.
8. Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Westview
Press, 1985.
9. Lind, William S. "Maneuver Warfare and Marine
Aviation." Marine Corps Gazette, May 1989
10. McBreen, LCPL Brendan B. "Commanders Intent." Marine
Corps Gazette, October 1989, 63.
11. Moore, Maj Scott R. "The Art of MAGTF Warfare."
Marine Corps Gazette, April 89,
12. Operational Handbook 6-1. Ground Combat Operations.
13. JU 87, Stuka. Rand McNally Encyclopedia of World War
II.
14. Robertson, Dr. William Glen. Counterattack on the
Naktong, 1950. Combat Studies Institute, 1985.
15 Rommel, Field Marshall Erwin. Attacks. Athena Press
1979.
16. Sayen, Major John J. "A Review of OH 2-6 MAGTF Rear
Area Security." Marine Corps Gazette, December
1989, 25.
17. Saxman, Major John B. "The Role of Marine Aviation in
Maneuver Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette, August
1989.
18. Sherrod, Robert. History of Marine Corps Aviation in
World War II. Combat Forces Press, 1952.
19. Walter, Capt. David L. "Infiltration: An Indirect
Method." Marine Corps Gazette, March 1990, 38.
20. Woodhead, Colonel John A. III. "Resolving the Rear
Area Threat. Marine Corps Gazette, February 1988,
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
