Amphibious Shipping: Do We Have Enough?
AUTHOR Major Michael L. Warren, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH?
I. THEME: We do not have enough amphibious shipping to
accomplish the goals of our national strategy.
II. THESIS: We do not have enough amphibious shipping
presently, nor enough shipping planned in the future for our
Navy/Marine Corps Team to meet the requirement of our Na-
tional Military Strategy to respond expeditiously to any
contingency and project power ashore.
III. DISCUSSION: The Navy has 65 amphibious ships now
that provide a little over one MEF(AE) of sealift. The
latest version of the plan is to have 2.5 MEBs. This is not
enough amphibious lift to meet the commitments and potential
contingencies that this country's national strategy of
forward presence requires now. Airlift is not a substitu-
tion for, but a compliment to, our sealift capability. The
same can be said for MPF and all of Transportation Command,
they provide tremendous capability for this country, but do
not replace the amphibious mission.
IV. SUMMARY: To cover U. S. contingencies world wide, we
must have at least the amphibious shipping we have now . If
new roles and missions are developed for amphibious carri-
ers, then more shipping is required. We are already getting
behind on replacement; a large percentage of the amphibious
fleet is approaching block obsolescence. Action must be
taken now to fix this potential problem.
V. CONCLUSIONS: We must continue to build the LHD, LSD-
41, and the LX class of ships. We must plan for a follow on
to the LHD class and diversify the LX class. We need ships
capable of "over-the-horizon" operations. The amphibious
capability is important enough to our national strategy to
give up one of our Carrier Battle Groups.
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH?
Major M.L.Warren C.G. 9
Thesis: We do not have enough amphibious shipping present-
ly, nor enough shipping planned in the future for our
Navy/Marine Corps Team to meet the requirement of our Na-
tional Military Strategy to respond expeditiously to any
contingency and project power ashore.
I. How much lift is required?
A. What the National Military Strategy requires.
B. What the Navy requires.
C. What the Marine Corps requires.
II. Can that lift be done by the Air Force?
A. How much?
B. Capabilities and limitations.
III. What does the Navy have now?
A. How much lift is needed?
B. How many ships are needed?
C. What ships are planned to be built?
D. What is planned to be decommissioned?
IV. What type of ships should be used?
A. Large vs. more small ships.
B. Speed vs. survivability.
C. Defense vs. armament required.
V. What type shipping do we make up the shortfall with?
A. Similar platform / multipurpose / assembly line /
lost savings.
B. Reduce size to increase survivability of force
through numbers.
C. MPF ships.
VI. Forward bases vs. amphibious shipping (MPF)
A. Reduction of overseas bases.
B. Cost of ships vs. bases.
C. Flexibility / survivability of ships.
VII. Funding
A. Shipping should have priority until technology
allows faster means of similar tonnage.
B. Cost of ton per mile savings verses aircraft.
C. What can we afford?
D. What compromises can be made?
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING: DO WE HAVE ENOUGH?
Do we have enough amphibious shipping presently,
or enough planned for, for our future? Will it meet
the requirement of our National Military Strategy to
respond expeditiously, with sustainability, to project
power ashore? General A. M. Gray, Commandant of the
Marine Corps, stated this in 1988.
Amphibious shipping is this country's only means
of sustainable power projection. Amphibious ships
provide us the capability of forcible entry. We
do not today, have enough of them.
A closer look at our national strategy today, and what
amount of amphibious shipping is required, is needed to
determine how much is enough.
The National Military Strategy will provide a
basis to determine how much amphibious shipping will be
required by the defense priorities set forth in it. In
response to the dramatic changes of the past two years,
a new defense strategy has evolved. The new strategy
focuses on major regional threats that could harm U. S.
interests, while ensuring that our forces can provide
needed levels of forward presence to influence favora-
bly our world posture. (1: v) In President Bush's
speech of August 2, 1990 he stated:
Our new strategy must provide. . . the forces to
exercise forward presence in key areas, to
respond effectively to crises....Important
American interests in Europe, and the Pacific,
in the Mediterranean the Persian Gulf-- all
are key reasons why maintaining a forward
presence will remain an indispensable element
of our strategy. We will need forces that give
us global reach. No amount of political change
will alter the geographic fact that we are
separated from many of our most important allies
and interests by thousands of miles of water.
In many of the conflicts we could face, we may
not have the luxury of matching manpower with
pre-positioned material. We will have to have
air- and sea-lift capacities to get our forces
where they are needed, when they are needed.
Forward presence was emphasized by the President
and reiterated by the Secretary of Defense Cheney in
his statement of defense policy. (1: 1) In fact, one
of the stated defense policy priorities is that the
forward presence of U. S. forces will remain a key
element of U. S. strategy. Forward presence is the
capability to project power ashore. To project power
ashore from the sea requires one to have amphibious
shipping. Secretary Cheney has yet to state how much
shipping that will be.
The U. S. Navy interprets the amount of amphib-
ious shipping required to meet the current U. S. de-
fense policy based on Marine Corps requirements, and
studies, such as the Department of the Navy Long Term
Amphibious Lift Requirement and Optimum Ship Mix Study
Validation of 1987. The bottom line apparently being
the amount of funding it can give up from other ship
programs just to accomplish the minimum. Many Navy
officers have readily admitted that their Service has
had higher priories than amphibious operations or mine
warfare ( amphibious ships are used to support helicop-
ter minesweeping ). (6: 54)
The goals of the DON Lift Requirement have not
essentially changed officially to date. The attainment
of 75 amphibious ships by 1994, which has slid to 1999,
became the mid-term goal necessary to provide amphib-
ious lift for a Marine Expeditionary Force (Assault
Echelon) [MEF(AE)] and a Marine Expeditionary
Brigade(Assault Echelon) [MEB(AE)]. Already, the Navy
is considering the amphibious lift of 2.5 MEBs to meet
the requirement. (1: 102) Since two MEBs do not equal
one MEF in total capability or size, this is less than
what is required. The Navy's contention is the eventu-
al goal of two MEFs worth of lift was based on the
amphibious fleet's share of the Reagan-era goal of a
600 ship Navy. The Navy will not meet that goal now,
and is determining now what that goal will be.
The Marine Corps amphibious lift requirement has
been stable for several years. The current Commandant,
General Gray, testified before the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Subcommittee on Force Projection on 14 April,
1988.
The requirement is to have enough to lift two
Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) -- one in
the Atlantic and one in the Pacific. The Navy
and the Marine Corps realize that the two-MEF
lift goal, because of fiscal constraints, cannot
be an immediate objective. So, as a stepping
stone to that end, and in accord with the defense
guidance we have set an interim goal of enough
ships to lift the assault echelons of a MEF and
a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) by the
middle of the next decade. We now have the
ability to lift but one MEF.
This statement is as valid today as then. Howev-
er, with programed ship retirements, SLEPs, and re-
quired maintenance cycles, even one MEF of lift is
probably in question.
The two MEFs of lift are only the assault eche-
lons(AEs). The AEs consist of the units that would
lead an amphibious landing: the infantry, about half
the command element, some logistics personnel, and all
the rotary-wing aircraft -- about 20,000 Marines with
60 days of supplies. The balance of the MEF -- between
30,000 and 40,000 Marines -- comprises the assault
follow-on echelon and would travel in non-amphibious
vessels. (11: 61)
The reductions required in our military forces do
not, in themselves, reduce the amount of amphibious
assault forces required. It will require an evalua-
tion in how much our national strategy will be affected
by a reduction in expeditionary forces. Fiscal consid-
erations will probably reduce the current goal of the
Marine Corps from two MEFs of lift.
The lift that can be done by the U. S. Air Force
was demonstratively presented in Southwest Asia. A
massive airlift that nearly utilized the full wartime
capabilities of the Military Airlift Command(MAC) and
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet(CRAF) did a superb job of
supporting the war effort. About 93% of all MAC C-5
and 90% of its C-141 strategic airlift aircraft were
flying in support of Desert Storm. However, the total
tonnage moved represented a small percentage by com-
parison to sealift. As of December 31, 1990, the United
States had dispatched to the Persian Gulf 300,000
troops and more than 305,000 short tons of cargo by
aircraft. The CRAF flew approximately 20% of that
amount. Sealift transported 2.72 million short tons of
cargo and 190,000 barrels of fuel in the same period.
Limitations of airlift are not well understood by
most when compared with sealift. Airlift is considered
to be faster than sealift. This is of course true when
talking about a limited deployment being done. When
other factors are considered, sealift may not be so
slow after all. Speed, the supposed advantage of
airlift, is not always the case. A deployment is not
complete until the last aircraft is in place. That may
take more time to complete than it would take to bring
it in by sea.
The other limiting factors of airlift affect its
ability to haul cargo and personnel. There are only
109 C-5s and 234 C-141s available. The aging C-141
fleet was significantly degraded by the load placed on
them in the Iraq War. A replacement aircraft, even if
it is the C-17, will still not pick up the slack for
years to come. This force must support all U. S.
contingencies to include the reinforcement role to NATO
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization). The effect on
these resources for even simple airlift missions is
significant. A U. S. Central Command exercise in Egypt
took more than a quarter of the C-141 inventory and 11
C-5s to move a light-infantry battalion, devoid of
heavy equipment. Transportation of heavy equipment and
divisions of armor to a theater of operations is not
viable for airlift to accomplish.
A study by the Army's Military Management and
Terminal Service gives an additional perspective on
speed. The 101st Airmobile Division was to be lifted
on a hypothetical 6,000 mile mission strictly by air-
lift and then again strictly by sealift. The clock
started at the base with the division combat ready, and
stopped when the division was combat ready at the
destination. It took 19 days for the division to be
combat ready by airlift, and only required 16 days by
sealift. It is apparent that speed can be a relative
matter. (9: 34)
There are other problems associated with airlift.
Strategic airlift requires overflight rights which has
already caused problems in previous conflicts. Refuel-
ing en route and at the destination requires rights and
fuel significant supply. The destination and en route
stops must be safe. There can be no loitering aloft at
the end of the flight and transports can not fight
their way into an airfield. The fact that these air-
fields are necessarily well maintained, and usually
extensive in ground support equipment limits how many
there are, where they are located, and their proximity
to where your you want your forces. They would be
easily identifiable and high priority targets for air
and ground attack. The elements of surprise and decep-
tion would be extremely hard to obtain.
To get an idea of what the Navy has now, we must
look at the last fifty years. In 1945 the Navy had
1,728 amphibious ships, which comprised 40% of the
fleet. This capability had by 1991 diminished to its
lowest level since the pre-Korean war period. Compris-
ing only 11.9% of the fleet (65 of 545 total battle
force ships), the amphibious ships in active service
could lift the assault echelons of 1.15 MEFs. This is
possible only by using the total number of ships, which
in reality is reduced by the widespread disposition of
shipping around the globe, the 10 - 15% undergoing
maintenance and overhauls, and the Navy's use of these
assets for fleet flag ships and minesweeping. The Navy
is even now considering the use of Amphibious Readiness
Groups (utilizing the LHA/LHD class ships with Harri-
ers) as "sea control forces" to replace Carrier Battle
Groups in some areas.
Crises in the early 80's in Iran and Afghanistan
impressed on the Reagan Administration that a shortfall
in our power projection capabilities existed. Included
in the plan for a 600 ship Navy was the objective for
amphibious ships to lift the assault echelons(AEs) of a
MEF and a MEB. This lift translated to a requirement
for some 83 amphibious ships -- approximately 56 ships
for a MEF and 27 ships for a MEB. (6: 54)
The building of larger capacity multipurpose
amphibious ships, such as the 40,000 ton Tarawa (LHA-1)
class to replace the 18,000 ton Iwo Jima (LPH-2) class,
and with some compromises in a number of lift areas by
the Marine Corps, resulted in a reduction of the number
of ships required. The resulting number of 75 amphib-
ious ships by 1994 become the goal necessary to provide
the lift for the assault echelons of a MEF and MEB.
The requirement for this lift was established in the
1983 Department of the Navy Long-Term Amphibious Lift
Requirement and Optimum Ship Mix Study and validated
again in 1987. This goal came to be recognized as the
minimum acceptable. The Marine Corps at that time
still considered the ultimate goal to be able to lift
two MEF(AE)s. The developments in the world in the
last two years has resulted in the planning for exten-
sive cuts in military expenditures. How many of the 75
ships will be built will be determined by a study due
this summer on how many and what types of ships the
Navy can build with its current projected budget.
Today, 65 amphibious ships are in the fleet. The
construction of two new classes of shipping is under
way. These, with the planned construction of a third
class, are funded in an effort to attain the needed
MEF(AE) and a MEB(AE) of sealift. First of the ships
under construction is the Whidbey Island-class (LSD-
41). They are 15,700 ton ships that have a well deck
that can carry four LCACs and have landing space for
two CH-53E heavy-lift helicopters. There is also a
cargo variant of this class. The 40,500 ton Wasp-class
(LHD-1) multimission ships, capable of carrying 1800
Marines, are designed for the "over-the-horizon" expe-
ditionary mission with deck spots and maintenance
facilities for a mix of six to eight AV-8B Harrier
vertical/short take-off-land (V/STOL) attack aircraft
and up to 45 helicopters, plus well deck space for
three LCACs. The Wasp-class ships, similar in size to
a World War II Essex-class aircraft carrier, have fuel
storage capacity and aircraft maintenance facilities
that permit them to be tasked for a secondary "sea-
control" mission by off loading the Marines and their
equipment, then loading 20 AV-8Bs and LAMPS MK III
helicopters. It is interesting to note that this
mission not only degrades amphibious lift capability,
but provides the Navy with a small deck carrier that it
has fought against for so many years.
The third class of ship that is planned is desig-
nated LX. According to the Navy's 1989 Surface Warfare
plan, the LX would be configured to replace the 36
ships of the LPD, LSD, and LST classes. The LX is
expected to accommodate two helicopters and two LCACs
and will probably have a larger lift capability than
the LSD-41 class. There is also discussion on making
this the base class for variants that fulfill multiple
amphibious roles, such as fire support ships armed with
multiple rocket launchers.
The planned construction of these three classes
of ships would have just barely maintained the current
amphibious lift goal, considering over 50% of our
amphibious ships will reach block obsolescence shortly
after the turn of the century. The reduction in the
Navy budget has stopped construction until FY95 with
only three ships added to the fleet. Nine ships retire
in the years 1997-2000. That is not too bad, but the
big problem looms from 2001 until 2006 when 36 ships
reach the end of their service life.
One alternative to the block obsolescence problem
is to SLEP(Service Life Extension Program) the Iwo
Jima-class and Austin-class ships which would provide
another ten years of service. The price is not cheap,
and the Navy has avoided it in the past because of
survivability and maintainability problems. These
ships are ready to retire. They can not provide any
contribution to "over-the-horizon" or "sea-control"
concepts.
According to the Navy 21 study, our current
amphibious ships are too large, too slow, and are
lightly defended. Except in the area of defense our
newest class of amphibious ships have not changed.
There is an on going battle of large verses small
ships. The argument made for larger ships has been they
are more survivable, and more importantly, less expen-
sive. The down side is the loss of operational flexi-
bility and great risk in loss of the assets of one
ship, ie. most of a battalion landing team and all its
air assets. A three or four ship Amphibious Ready
Group would be stopped from accomplishing its mission
with the loss of one ship without the use of sophisti-
cated technology weapons. The Persian Gulf experience
demonstrated what one mine can do.
The speeds of our ships are too slow when one
considers the distances involved to potential crisis.
The reduction of forward bases and deployable ships
exacerbates the problem. We have the technology to
significantly increase their speed. The increase in
speed can half their transit time and reduce vulnera-
bility to attack en route.
The design of our amphibious ships must take into
consideration the possibility of attack by anti-ship
systems. Amphibious ships are planned by their nature
to sail in harms way for assault against hostile
shores. Each one must have self defense and surviva-
bility systems designed into them. The reduction in
Navy combat vessels to protect them requires this added
capability.
The new classes of amphibious ships being planned
and built represent a solid start on what type of ships
are needed. They support "over-the-horizon" assault
operations. The LX class of ships presents a valid
platform to follow through on for an updated version of
an old idea. The idea is to use mass production tech-
niques to reduce their cost and decrease production
time, thereby allowing more to be built. The Wasp-
class ships utilize an assembly line construction
process of modules that are separately built, and
joined when finished. The LX-class could, by using
assembly line techniques and building multiple variants
upon the same hull platform, result in a highly capable
amphibious fleet. These variants could provide the
types of support that are lacking now, such fire sup-
port ships in the form of multiple rocket launchers.
The size and versatility of the proposed LX allows
flexibility and survivability of the Amphibious Readi-
ness Group along the lines of Crisis Action Modules
(CAMs) of the latest doctrinal thinking.
The maritime Prepostioning Ships are not consid-
ered amphibious shipping in the sense that they can not
project power ashore against a unsecured beach. Howev-
er, they are significant power enhancers to the amphib-
ious fleet. They can carry more, are cheaper, and
augment the amphibious fleet in the Assault Follow-on
Echelon(AFOE) forces and the Maritime Prepostioning
Forces(MPF). More of these ships are needed.
President Bush has stated we are entering a new
era. We are reducing our overseas presence and the
bases inherent in that presence. Without those bases,
and given the distance from the bases that we do have,
we must operate from the sea. Although the cost of
ships are increasing, the cost of maintaining bases on
foreign soil are greater. We must pay ever increasing
military and economic aid along with the negative cash
flow from the bases and its dependents. Some of the
bases can not be maintained for political reasons.
Ships provide a mobile flexibility that a fixed base
can not; ships can move to where they are needed. We
need more MPF ships to enhance our power projection
capability in the future.
Since our national strategy is to be able to
project presence, we must be aware of what we can
economically accomplish with that strategy. Until
technology provides a better way, ships should have
priority over any other means of transportation. They
are much cheaper than aircraft in ton per mile. Trans-
port aircraft provide a needed compliment and capabili-
ty to national interests, but amphibious shipping and
their "black bottom" AFOE and MPF ships need to be kept
in perspective when appropriating funding. The bottom
line is to affect our economic stability as little as
possible while maintaining our freedom. Freedom is
gained through military victory and maintained by
having a strong military force.
Much rhetoric is made of maintaining the expedi-
tionary characteristics of the Fleet Marine Force and
its forcible entry capability. Marine Corps amphibious
warfare modernization priorities are discussed and
approved, such as by the Secretary of the Navy, H.
Lawrence Garrett, III.
The expeditionary capabilities of the Fleet
Force give the national command authority an
unmatched combat and forcible entry capability
that is ready while providing a wide range
of options as regional conflicts come to
dominate American strategy.
The problem is no one mentions or discusses how
this expeditionary force, with sustainable power, is
going to get to the theater of operations. The amphib-
ious shipping required to project power against a
hostile shore is virtually overlooked. It is assumed
that the Navy has enough-- that we can fix it later.
Later is now. We do not have the shipping required
now, much less in ten years. We need enough for a
MEF(AE) and a MEB(AE) at the very minimum. The lead
time to prepare forces for the next decade requires
action now. We need more emphasis on the amount of
shipping to support our "force in readiness", the
United States Marine Corps.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Cheney, Dick, Secretary of Defense. Annual
Report to the President and the Congress,
January 1991.
2. Galdorisi, George V., Cmdr., USN. "Making It
Work." Proceedings, September 1990, 72-76.
3. Gray, A. M., Gen., USMC. "Equipping Marines
for Combat in the Next Century." Marine
Corps & Gazette, 72 (June 1988), 9.
4. Hart, B. H. Liddell. "Marines and Strategy."
Marine Corps & Gazette, 74 (May 1990), 25-32.
5. Heim, Alan P., Maj., USMC. "Power Projection,
Amphibious Lift, and the Navy/Marine Corps
Team." Marine Corps Gazette, 71 (December
1987), 36-40.
6. Linn, Thomas C., Maj., USMC. "Amphibious
Shipping Shortfall Undermining Maritime
Strategy." Armed Forces Journal Inter-
nationai, April 1989, 54-58.
7. The White House. Nationai Security Strategy of
the United States, March 1990, 26.
8. Thompson, Ky L., LtCol., USMC. "For Want of a
Ship ...." Marine Corps & Gazette, 72 (June
1988), 62-66.
9. Trainor, Bernard E., LtGen., USMC(Ret). "A
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Face New Realities." Armed Forces Journal
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