Military

Further Reading

The Nature Of War And The Realities Of The Modern Battlefield
AUTHOR Major Andrew D. Walker, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Topical Issues
			EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE NATURE OF WAR AND THE REALITIES OF THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD
I. Theme:  The United States Marine Corps needs to adopt a concept of
warfighting consistent with the nature of war and the realities of the
modern battlefield.
II.   Thesis:   Although  maneuver  warfare  is  valid  under  certain
circumstances, the nature of war and the realities of the modern battlefield
call for a much more flexible doctrine of warfare.
III.  Discussion:  The decision to make maneuver warfare Marine Corps
doctrine is based on two assumptions. First, there are two components of
combat: fire and movement. Second, there are two styles of warfare based
on these components:  attrition style based on firepower, and maneuver
style based on movement. Additionally, Marine expeditionary forces can no
longer presume vast numerical and technological superiority.  Because
maneuver warfare has the potential for disproportionate success in relation
to effort, the conclusion is that a doctrine of maneuver warfare is
mandated. However, a model with more components of combat presents a
more complicated equation for success.  Firepower and maneuver can be
neutralized by other components, such as protection. Using six battlefield
operating systems (intelligence, firepower, maneuver, protection, command
and control, and logistics) as the components of combat, a concept of
warfighting can be developed based on the interrelationships of the
components. Because of these interrelationships, no one style of warfare is
acceptable for all environments, against all enemies. Instead, a concept of
warfighting that incorporates the principle of relative advantage is a more
flexible approach to war. Relative advantage refers to idea of using the
relatively stronger friendly component or components of combat against the
enemy's relative weakness or weaknesses while neutralizing his strengths.
Once the enemys ability to see and react on the battlefield is sufficiently
diminished, maneuver becomes a viable option.
IV. Summary:  The nature of war is more truly represented by a model with
six components of war instead of two.  The realities of the modern
battlefield are that the Marine Corps must be prepared to fight from both
numerical and technological disadvantage and advantage.
V. Conclusion:  The doctrine best suited to provide flexibility is that of
relative advantage.
THE NATURE OF WAR AND THE REALITIES OF THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD
				OUTLINE
Thesis Statement.  Although maneuver warfare is valid under certain
circumstances, the nature of war and the realities of the modern battlefield
call for a much more flexible doctrine of warfare.
I. Maneuver Warfare
   A. Assumptions and conclusion of maneuver warfare
   B. Relationship between combat power and maneuver
   C. Maneuver warfare as universal doctrine refuted
      1.  Nature of war
      2.  Realities of the modern battlefield
II. Components of combat
   A. Intelligence
   B. Firepower
   C. Maneuver
   D. Protection
   E. Command and control
   F. Logistics
III. Doctrine of relative advantage
   A. Assumptions of relative advantage
   B. Relationship between combat power and the components of combat
   C. Examples
THE NATURE OF WAR AND THE REALITIES OF THE MODERN BATTLEFIELD
           The challenge is to identify and adopt a concept of warfighting
           consistent with our understanding of the nature of war and the
           realities of the modern battlefield.(3:57)
   The United States Marine Corps has met this challenge by adopting
maneuver warfare as its warfighting style.  The adoption of maneuver
warfare is based on a conclusion made about the nature and realities of
modern battle. As with any conclusion, its truth depends on the validity of
its assumptions.  By examining these assumptions, it can be determined
whether maneuver warfare is truly consistent with the nature of war and
the realities of the modern battlefield.
   The cogent evidence presented to support acceptance of maneuver
warfare is presented in Fleet Marine Force Manual 1 (FMFM 1). The reasoning
is based on two assumptions about combat. First, combat has two basic
components:  fire and movement.(3:27)  Second, combat has two distinct
styles: "an attrition style, based on firepower, and a maneuver style, based
on movement."(3:28) The attrition style is described as the systematic
"destruction of the enemy's material assets by superior firepower and
technology."(3:28) Maneuver style applies strength against weakness with
"the object of shattering the enemy's cohesion, organization, command, and
psychological balance."(3:29)
           "Potential success by maneuver - unlike attrition - is often
           disproportionate to the effort made. But for exactly the same
           reasons, maneuver incompetently applied carries with it a
           greater chance for catastrophic failure, while attrition is
           inherently less risky."(3:29)
Because of the expeditionary nature of the Marine Corps  and  the
proliferation of "high-tech" weapons, the Marine Corps can no longer
presume vast numerical and technological superiority.  The conclusion is
that "an expeditionary force in particular must be prepared to win quickly,
with minimal casualties and limited external support, against a physically
superior foe.   This requirement mandates  a  doctrine  of  maneuver
warfare."(3:37)
   Maneuver warfare can be considered in terms of combat power as the
product of firepower and maneuver.   This can be expressed as a
mathematical relationship:  friendly combat power (CPf) equals friendly
firepower (Ff) times friendly maneuver (Mf) or CPf = Ff X Mf, where
firepower's primary use is to support maneuver. Additionally, the enemy's
combat power can be reduced by increased friendly maneuver because the
effectiveness of enemy fire is less against mobile forces which have
maneuvered to advantageous positions.  This suggests a mathematical
expression in which enemy combat power (CPe) is equal to enemy firepower
(Fe) divided by friendly maneuver or CPe = Fe / Mf. As maneuver increases
friendly combat power increases and enemy combat power decreases. The
more maneuver the better.  Certainly this seems to be the solution to
modern combat, or is it?
   The assumption that combat is composed of only two basic components
and therefore is defined by two styles of warfare is an over-simplification
of a complex concept. The U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 (FM 100-5), in what
it calls the dynamics of combat, describes two components in addition to
firepower and maneuver (FMFM 1's fire and movement).  These additional
components are leadership and protection.(2:12-13) Leadership is described
as the most important dynamic and the facilitator of the others. Protection
is the countermeasure to firepower and maneuver.  It follows that under
certain circumstances firepower and maneuver can be neutralized by
superior leadership and protection. Maneuver may actually uncover friendly
forces, thereby rendering them vulnerable to destruction by well led and
protected forces, in which case, combat power is not made greater with
increased maneuver. As the number of components to be considered grows,
the equation for success becomes increasingly complicated.
   As in any human behavior, war has innumerable variables.  If these
variables could be quantified into a model of warfare, then their effects on
war might be more clearly understood. However, to try to create a model
which included every component of combat would be impractical.  An
accurate model can be formed from six battlefield operating systems:
intelligence, firepower, maneuver, protection, command and control, and
logistics. A concept of warfighting based on the interrelationships between
these components will be a much truer representation of the nature of war
than a concept based on only two components.
   On today's battlefield, it is possible for the United States to enjoy a vast
numerical and technological superiority.  Certainly the U.S. enjoyed that
advantage in the Gulf War. The Marine Corps can expect a similar advantage
in many stabilization operations involving the third world.  There is no
doubt that the Marine Corps needs the capability to fight in an environment
of disadvantage; however an expeditionary force does not need to take
unnecessary risks when it enjoys numerical and technological superiority
simply in order to engage in maneuver warfare.
   To follow doctrine which assumes that all combat operations need to
take the form of maneuver warfare, and that the only enemies the Marine
Corps must be prepared to fight are those of equal or greater strength is
shortsighted and inflexible. Though maneuver warfare has much utility in
various situations, the Marine Corps must base its doctrine on a more
complex understanding of the nature of warfare, and on a more varied
modern battlefield.
   The object of warfare is victory. The idea that a commander has a choice
to seek victory on the one hand through the systematic destruction of the
enemy (attrition warfare), or on the other hand by shattering the enemy's
cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance (maneuver
warfare) ignores the complementary aspects of the two styles of warfare.
To imply that the enemy can be confused into surrender by intricate
maneuver alone is irresponsible. This may be true of a poorly led army with
low morale. But an army with the will to fight will not be overcome only by
maneuver. The enemy's means to resist must be destroyed before victory is
certain.
   The nineteenth century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz described
the nature of war when he wrote:
           How are we to prove that usually, and in the most important
           cases, the destruction of the enemy's forces must be the main
           objective?  How are we to counter the highly sophisticated
           theory that supposes it possible for a particularly ingenious
           method of inflicting minor direct damage on the enemy's forces
           and control of his will-power as to a constitute a significant
           shortcut to victory [maneuver warfare]?   Admittedly, an
           engagement at one point may be worth more than at another.
           Admittedly, there is a skillful  ordering  of  priority  of
           engagements in strategy; indeed that is what strategy is all
           about, and we do not wish to deny it. We do claim, however,
           that direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be
           the dominant consideration We simply want to establish this
           dominance of the destructive principle.(1:228)
Real confusion of the enemy will result from the systematic destruction of
his command and control systems, air defense systems and major weapons
systems. This destruction will limit his ability to observe the battle and to
fire back accurately. All warfare should attempt to do this.
   The destruction of enemy forces has become an important element of the
modern strategic objectives of war. An enemy left with a potent military
force poses a considerable threat of future conflict.  This opinion would
have met with disagreement from Sun Tzu, a fourth century B.C. Chinese
military theorist and early maneuverist. He wrote, "to subdue the enemy
without fighting is the acme of skill," and, "generally, in war the best policy
is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this."(5:77) These maxims
are held by maneuverists as the ultimate measure of success.
   However, Sun Tzu is referring to the Chinese practice of conquering other
warring states with relatively small professional armies.  To usurp the
conquered state intact with low casualties was to add power to the victor's
state without bankrupting it. Modern warfare is different in that it has
limited strategic objectives. Today it is unacceptable to absorb sovereign
nations.   The Gulf War is the most recent example of this reality.
Clausewitz saw modern warfare more accurately, writing in the nineteenth
century that:
           We are not interested in generals who win victories without
           bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle
           must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an
           excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of
           humanity.  Sooner or later someone will come along with a
           sharp sword and hack off our arms"(1:260)
The destruction of the offensive capabilities of a defeated enemy should
always be a strategic objective of modern war. The maneuverist's optimal
result, that of a bloodless war, is not consistent with the objectives of
modern war.
   As a commander must focus his tactics on the enemy and not terrain, the
style of warfare chosen for combat must be consistent with the capabilities
and intentions of the enemy.  The art of war is knowing what the
capabilities and intentions of the enemy are.  Clausewitz understood the
relationship of warfare to the unpredictable reactions of the adversary. His
"fog of war" is based on the elements of uncertainty that arose largely from
the impossibility of gauging enemy intentions and reactions.( 1:137)  The
commander who can properly counter the enemy's capabilities and intentions
will have freedom on the battlefield. This is not to suggest that warfare is
a step by step process which is reactive to the enemy.  Many proactive
operations can be prosecuted simultaneously, as long as the objective is to
destroy the enemy's means to resist. Once the enemy's ability to affect the
battle has been neutralized, victory is only a matter of attrition - enemy
attrition.
   Development of a doctrine or concept of warfighting must be based on
the interrelationships of the principal components of combat.  The six
operating systems of combat previously mentioned (intelligence, firepower,
maneuver, protection, command and control, and logistics) are appropriate
for this purpose. Instead of only one style of warfare, this more complex
model suggests many possible styles. The difference in styles of warfare is
in the application and integration of the different components of warfare to
bring about the destruction of the enemy's ability to fight.  To suggest
maneuver warfare or any one style of warfare is consistent with the
multifaceted nature of war is to ignore the need for the flexibility of
matching friendly strengths to enemy weaknesses in all the components of
warfare.   Before a concept of warfare can be created based on these
components, they must be defined, and their interrelationships understood.
Additionally, if this concept is to stand the test of time, future trends of
these components should be examined.
   "Intelligence operations are the organized efforts of a commander to
gather information on terrain, weather, and the enemy.  Obtaining useful
intelligence prior to the initiation of operations is a vital task."(2:46) The
art of war is knowing the enemy's capabilities and predicting his intentions.
Intelligence is principal to clearing this "fog of war" so that the commander
is able to see the battlefield accurately.
   The trend of the future will be real-time intelligence.    Real-time
intelligence is the optimal tactical intelligence. The goal is for all tactical
leaders to have an accurate picture of the battlefield at the very moment
they are making their decisions.  Real-time intelligence at all levels of
command would be the ultimate union of intelligence and command and
control. Just as the AWACS (airborne early warning and control system) can
be down-linked into the cockpit of a fighter aircraft, the target information
gathered by JSTARS (joint surveillance tactical aerial reconnaissance
system) needs to be down-linked in a usable form to  all  levels
simultaneously.  This will facilitate centralized control of fires but
localized execution. The principal shortcoming of intelligence has always
been getting the appropriate information to the right commander.  This
problem will resolve itself as computers network information, and the
information passed becomes that which the tactical commander wants,
namely critical  target information.   The  strategic  and  operational
commanders may need analyzed intelligence but the tactical commander's
primary concern is target acquisition.
   "Firepower provides the destructive force essential to defeating the
enemy's ability and will to fight."(2:12) Firepower can be used to facilitate
maneuver by suppressing enemy fires; or it can be use independent of
maneuver to destroy the enemy's operating systems (i.e. intelligence,
firepower, maneuver, protection, command and control, and logistics).
Firepower is the decisive element of combat.  If victory is gained by the
destruction of the enemy's means to resist, then firepower is responsible
for the destruction. All other components ultimately support firepower.
   Firepower of the future will be increasingly accurate with greater
effect, and susceptible to fewer adverse environments and less jamming.
The smart weapon is here to stay. However, dispersion and mobility will
critical to the survival of forces on the future battlefield.  To optimize
firepower, the systems will have to be able to fire on the move and
concentrate fires even while dispersed. The M-1 tank is an example of the
"fire on the move" technology present on today's battlefield. To concentrate
moving, dispersed fires, networked on-board computers will have to
generate the gun data for an entire battalion of self-propelled artillery
pieces, all in different locations.  No matter how effective one weapon
system becomes the integration of combined arms systems will always
allow for the most effective use of firepower.  Any one system can be
defeated when employed by itself. However, the effectiveness of a weapon
system employed as part of an integrated package is multiplied many times.
   "Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure
or retain positional advantage."(2:12)  It is the means by which firepower
can be concentrated at a critical time and place to achieve surprise, and
gain  momentum.     Technological  improvements  in  mobility  and
communications have given maneuver additional speed and flexibility.
However, maneuver will  rarely  be  possible  without  firepower and
protection. Though firepower must support maneuver, ultimately maneuver
supports firepower by positioning firepower to advantage on the battlefield.
Maneuver is the dynamic component of combat.  The less the enemy is
prepared to handle a dynamic battlefield the more maneuver becomes
effective.
   Maneuver on the future battlefield will stress dispersion and mobility.
Speed and freedom of movement will become increasingly important. The
air presents a medium that allows for both speed and freedom of movement.
Tilt-rotor technology will expand the horizons of maneuver tactics.
Distances, speeds, and loads will increase as vertical envelopment becomes
the maneuver of choice.
   Protection is "the conservation of the fighting potential of a force so
that it can be applied at the decisive time and place."(2:13)  FM 100-5
divides protection into two categories.  First, actions to counter the
enemy's firepower and maneuver, and second, actions to keep soldiers
healthy and their morale high. Though the latter actions are important, the
former actions are those which have application to a warfighting concept.
Actions to counter the enemy's firepower and maneuver include security, air
defense, dispersal, cover, camouflage, deception, suppression of enemy
weapons, mobility and counter-mobility.  More than any other component,
protection is structured to the enemy's capabilities. As enemy capabilities
are reduced, actions to provide protection can be reduced to afford greater
offensive flexibility.
   Protection techniques will also be needed on the battlefield of the
future. Effective protection starts as deep as possible on the battlefield.
"Star Wars" technology for anti-missile and anti-air defense is here today
with the Patriot missile system. Ultimately the use of space to position
defensive weapons will provide a versatility that cannot be matched.  No
matter how sophisticated protection becomes, the key ingredient will be the
individual warrior's desire to fight.  No protection will be sufficient to
protect an army that does not have the desire to fight.
   Command and control "must facilitate freedom to operate, delegation of
authority, and leadership from any critical point on the battlefield."(2:21)
The principal element of this component is leadership. It is leadership that
"will determine the degree to which the firepower, maneuver and protection
are maximized."(2:12)  Without competent and confident leadership, the
courage and competence of soldiers, the excellence of their training, the
capability of their equipment, and the soundness of their combined arms
doctrine are meaningless.
   For the force to be successful, this competent and confident leadership
must be present in the battlefield commander.  He must be decisive,
experienced, and able to affect the action. Clausewitz believed much of the
success of any operation was due to the "genius" of the commander. "Genius"
did not concern as much clever tactics as the ability to find a way to carry
on through adversity.  Combat requires a commander who would rather
advance on his own responsibility than remain waiting for orders.
Complementary to this "genius" is a plan flexible enough to allow for
shifting the focus of main effort.  With a commander decisive enough to
capitalize on a momentary advantage, and a plan that allows for exploitation
of momentary advantages, determination and flexibility are wed.
   The modern battlefield has produced many advantages in command and
control. However the strength of command and control is best tested when
no communications exist.  If the commander's intent is understood, and
subordinate independent action is encouraged and expected, then the enemy
will be incapable of stopping the force by disrupting command and control
systems.
   Command and control in the future will rely on reliable, directional,
covered, burst communications.   With the increased fluidity of the
battlefield, communications with adjacent units will become as important
as communications with superiors. The future will see the increased use of
artificial intelligence to make the standard decisions that fire support
coordinators and air controllers do today.  The computer will verify the
target information, compare it to restrictions, and decide who should fire
the mission. The challenge for the commander will be to use the technology
to its best advantage without becoming a slave to it.
   The final component is logistics.  It has been said by many that,
"amateurs speak of tactics; professionals speak of logistics." This maxim
recognizes the principal importance of logistics to warfare.  All else
becomes irrelevant if the forces in the field cannot be sustained. Napoleon's
march on Moscow is the classic example of what happens when this military
maxim is ignored. FM 100-5 lists six key sustainment functions: manning,
arming, fueling, fixing, transporting, and protection of the sustainment
system.(2:60) Technology on the modern battlefield has become necessary
to manage the incredible amounts of supplies required to fight a "high-tech"
army.  Computer systems for ordering and warehousing supplies have
become commonplace. Containerized shipping and cargo movement systems
are now utilized for rapid off-load and distribution. The future battlefield
should see artificial intelligence systems planning and executing lift and
sustainment operations to optlmize time and space requirements.
   No matter how "high-tech" the battlefield may become, certain tenets of
logistics will never change. Logisticians must anticipate the requirements
of combat if they are to keep up with demand. They must "push" supplies to
the front, rather than wait for requests to "pull" supplies forward.
Logistics must be integrated into the concept of operations from the
beginning of the planning process.  Logistics must be continuous and
redundant. Supplies cannot be interrupted because one mode of support is
temporarily or permanently lost.  The system must be responsive by
performing surge operations if the momentum and initiative are to be
maintained by maneuvering forces. Improvisation is required of every good
logistician. Those who can improvise will always have an advantage over
those who cannot.(2:62-63)
   To form a doctrine of warfare these six components must be brought
together in a workable concept. Combat power is not the simple product of
its parts (CP = IxFxMxPxC2xL).    The maneuverist would insist that
increasing maneuver increases combat power. But this is only true when the
enemy's mobility, countermobility, fire support, and command capabilities
have been brought under control through other means.  If the reality of
today's battlefield is that "the United States can no longer expect to enjoy
vast numerical and technological superiority,"(3:30) then maneuver warfare
may lead to the very disaster that needs to be avoided. Certainly maneuver
against an enemy with limited command and control that can no longer see
and react in its area of influence is the tactic of choice. However, a well
protected enemy with greater numbers of conventional arms and equal
technology is not automatically a candidate for maneuver.   Once the
battlefield has been shaped by a combined effort against the enemy's ability
to see and react, maneuver becomes viable.
   A doctrine of warfare must be flexible to every environment and enemy.
It must be adaptable to the jungle as well as the desert, be equally
applicable to high-intensity conflict and to low-intensity conflict, and
prove effective against "high-tech" enemies as well as primitive ones. What
must be considered in each situation is the unique and distinctive nature of
the environment and the enemy.  A relative advantage in one of the
components of warfare must be developed. Once one advantage is attained,
others can be developed. This is the doctrine of "relative advantage."
   This principle of relative advantage is valid at all levels of war:
strategic, operational, and tactical. Strategically, a country should choose
the type of war which matches its relative strength.  Using Clausewitz'
trinity of war (the government, the military, and the public) as the
components of a country's strength, a country with a stronger military than
its adversary should obviously engage in military action.  However, a
country with a stronger public will to fight but a weaker military than its
adversary may prefer to use guerrilla tactics; and a country with stronger
political means may find "cold" war tactics (i.e. economic and political
sanctions) to be its most effective strategy.
   At the operational and tactical levels, the six components of warfare are
the strengths to be evaluated. When all things are equal, combat is not so
different from boxing or individual combat. The knock-out blow is to the
head or his command and control system. But getting a good blow to the
head may not be easy. The boxer must work on his opponent's vulnerabilities
while trying to neutralize his opponent's strengths.  If the boxer can blind
his opponent (or take away his ability to collect intelligence), the boxer can
move about freely to strike the knock-out blow. The analogy can continue
with the boxer's arms being firepower, his legs being maneuver, his ability
to take a punch or avoid one being protection, and his corner personnel being
his logistic sustainment. Each boxer must find his relative advantage and
use it to reduce systematically his opponent's ability to resist. Of course,
if the opponent's relative advantage is used to greater gain, then the
opponent wins.
   The doctrine of relative advantage places great importance on the
preparation of the battlefield, as well as on enemy vulnerability analysis.
Knowing the enemy's weaknesses should always be the key to determining
the style of warfare waged. The enemy will always try to hide his weak-
ness, but initial operations structured to test all his components should
discover this weakness.  This concept of attacking vulnerabilities is
similarly expressed in the doctrine of maneuver warfare. The difference is
that maneuver is not the always the immediate solution.
   From an analytical perspective, combat power can be expressed by the
product of the friendly components divided by the the product of the enemy
components ( CPf=C2f X Ff X Mf X Pf X Lf/C2e X Fe X Me X Pe X Le). Combat power
increases as the enemy components are neutralized   Since all the
components are interrelated, as one falls the others become vulnerable.
   The war in Southwest Asia could have been described as maneuver
warfare. Both operationally and tactically, forces moved with such great
speed that the enemy could not react.  The air war taken alone is the
ultimate example of maneuver warfare: accurate ordnance delivered by fast,
highly mobile aircraft with centralized control and decentralized execution.
Or the attritionist might describe the same air war as "the systematic
destruction of the enemy's material assets by superior firepower and
technology."(3:28) Which is it? It is both. Commanders should attempt to
destroy and defeat the enemy in as many ways as possible simultaneously,
and not choose one style over another.
   The United States' doctrine, weapons, and tables of organization were
formed for fighting high- to mid-intensity conflicts.  Low-intensity war
will provide much different problems for maneuver warfare. The command
and control of insurgents is decentralized, and therefore is difficult to
confuse. Large formations of troops are purposely not present in guerrilla
warfare, and therefore cannot easily be maneuvered against. The insurgents'
vulnerability is their logistics.   Successful counterinsurgencies have
always started with the separation of the guerrilla from his support.
   The Soviets' inability to cut the Afghan rebels from their sustainment is
the reason for the defeat of a "high tech" army by a "low tech" army; not the
Soviets' inability to maneuver.  Though the Vietnam war was not an
insurgency, it was low-intensity in most cases. An argument can be made
that a type of maneuver warfare was practiced in Vietnam. However, it was
not effective because the jungle environment did not allow for the fixing of
the enemy. Their true vulnerability, logistics, was never fully neutralized
for primarily political reasons.   But for whatever reasons, maneuver
warfare was not the appropriate warfighting style.
   If the doctrine of maneuver warfare has alerted the Marine Corps to a
forgotten component of warfare, maneuver, then it has served its purpose.
Certainly maneuver is the dynamic factor of combat that positions
firepower for the destruction of the enemy.   But firepower is not
subordinate or even equal to maneuver. Firepower is the decisive factor in
combat. Firepower can support maneuver, but ultimately maneuver supports
firepower. Historically, maneuver was invented to concentrate firepower
for the maneuverer's advantage.   From Frederick the Great's oblique
formations to Napoleon's parallel columns, maneuver has always had the
purpose of concentrating firepower into the enemy's relative weakness.
   To use maneuver on today's and tomorrow's battlefields, the preparation
of the battlefield is crucial. It is only through the disabling of the enemy's
ability to fight that maneuver becomes viable. The disabling or neutralizing
of the enemy's components of warfare is done by applying the friendly
force's relative advantages to the enemy's relative weaknesses.  As the
enemy capability is diminished, the battlefield becomes free for use of
maneuver. This is not to say that maneuver cannot be used early in some
situations.  Maneuver may be the relative advantage the friendly force
enjoys. However, there are some circumstances where maneuver will not be
a relative advantage early in the conflict. Only after the enemy's ability to
stop maneuver is neutralized does maneuver become effective.
   Although maneuver warfare is valid under certain circumstances, the
nature of war and the realities of the modern battlefield call for a much
more flexible doctrine of warfare. The concept of relative advantage may
serve this purpose.
                              BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War Tr. Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
      Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
2. Department of the Army. Headquarters U.S. Army. Operations, FM 100-5.
      Washington, D.C., 1986.
3. Department of the Navy. Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps. Warfighting,
      FMFM 1. Quantico, 1989.
4. Silvasy, Stephen, Jr., Major General, USA. "AirLand Battle Future; The
      Tactical Battlefield." Miltary Review LXXI (February 1991), 2-12.
5. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Tr. Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Oxford
      University Press, 1963.