A New World Order--Again?
AUTHOR Major Dennis C. Thompson, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: A NEW WORLD ORDER--AGAIN?
Introduction: The recent changes in the global geopolitical
situation have created an opportunity for the establishment
of a new world order. Throughout history, bold and visionary
leaders have taken advantage of changes in the global
situation to better further the interests of their nations.
Otto von Bismarck. Chancellor of Germany from 1861 to 1890,
was one such leader. An analysis of his use of military
force and alliances would be instructive for U.S. leaders
facing the impending new world order today.
Part I: Bismarck's Wars 1861 to 1871. Bismarck used
military force, or the threat of it, to obtain political
goals in the best interests of Germany. Through the
manipulation of a show of force situation and three quick
wars, he altered the balance of power in Europe. As a result
of his efforts and a superb Prussian-led military, Germany
became the premier European military power.
Part II: Bismarck's Alliances 1872 to 1890. After the
Franco-Prussian War in 1871, Bismarck was faced with keeping
a defeated France from seeking revenge. To avoid a two front
war situation, he devised a series of six alliances to isolate
France from the other European powers while simultaneously
gaining allies for Germany. The ultimate purpose of these
alliances was to allow Germany to strengthen its economic and
military position.
Part III: Evaluation of Bismarck's Use of Force and
Alliances. Bismarck skillfully played the European states
against each other to ensure a stable European balance of
power. His alliance system is considered to be a masterpiece
of statesmanship. Bismarck's diplomatic machinations greatly
reduced any possibility of Germany being forced to fight a
two front war.
Part IV: Applicability of Bismarck's Practices Today. The
political systems and roles of Bismarck's Germany and the U.S.
today differ markedly. These differences must be considered
when attempting to apply Bismarck's techniques and practices
to the U.S.'s situation today.
Conclusion: A study of Bismarck's use of military force and
alliances offers U.S. leaders insight on ways to capitalize
on geopolitical changes for the betterment of their country.
While his Machiavellian methods are incompatible with U.S.
values, Bismarck's pragmatic and deft statesmenship provides
U.S. leaders with guidance for shaping today's new world
order.
A NEW WORLD ORDER-AGAIN?
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. An analysis of Bismarck's use of
military force and the alliance system he created will
reveal whether or not his techniques and practices have
relevance for U.S. leaders in the impending new world
order.
I. The European World Order in 1860
A. Multi-polarity Nature of Europe
B. Germany's Position in the European Order
C. Bismarck's Background and Perspectives
II. Bismarck's Wars 1861 to 1871
A. Polish Insurrection
B. Danish-Prussian/Austrian War
C. Austro-Prussian War
D. Franco-Prussian War
III. Bismarck's Alliances 1872 to 1890
A. Three Emperor's League
B. Dual Alliance
C. Alliance of the Three Emperors
D. Triple Alliance
E. First Mediterranean Agreement
F. The Reinsurance Treaty
IV. Evaluation of Bismarck's Use of War and Alliances
V. The Applicability of Bismarck's System of Alliance and
Alignments to the Role of the U.S. in the New World Order of
the 1990's.
A. The Political Realities
1. German Political System
2. U.S. Political System
B. The Role of Each Nation
1. The Role of Germany in Europe
2. The Role of the U.S. in Global Affairs
A NEW WORLD ORDER-AGAIN?
Many Western leaders, in particular U.S. President
George Bush, tout the need to take advantage of the
opportunities created by the apparent changes in the Soviet
empire and the U.S.-led coalition victory in the recent
Middle East conflict to establish a new world order. But,
there seems to be some uncertainty as to what this new world
order should look like and how to direct the political,
economic and military resources towards achieving the desired
ends. The prospect of a new world order as a result of
changes in the geopolitical or military situation is not a
new phenomenon. Throughout history there have been major
upheavals in the established world order that have led to
dramatic changes in the status quo. Ambitious and visionary
leaders have taken advantage of these changes to shape the
emerging world order to better serve their nation's interests.
One such visionary leader was Otto von Bismarck, the
Chancellor of Germany from 1862 to 1890. He personified
German nationalist aspirations, and was a master of realpolitik,
the art of politics based on practical and material factors.
He often succeeded where others who based their politics on
more theoretical or ethical principles had failed. His
deftness in diplomacy earned him a great reputation. An
analysis of Bismarck's use of military force and the
alliances he created will reveal whether or not his
techniques and practices have relevance for U.S. leaders in
the impending new world order of today.
The European World Order in 1860
To better analyze Bismarck's use of military force and
alliances, the European world order of his time, the role of
Germany, and his background and perspectives must first be
considered. After Napoieon's final defeat at Waterloo, the
European states met in Vienna in 1815 to decide the future of
Europe. The results of this meeting, known as the Congress or
Vienna, were the work of the five major European powers--
Austria, Britain, Prussia, Russia, and the defeated France.
The focus was on territorial arrangements and the restoration
of the legitimate sovereigns who had been displaced by
Napoleon. The desired outcomes of this Congress were the
containment of France and the equitable division of the
European balance of power. (14:21) On paper, the distribution
of territory, hence power, seemed to preclude one state from
enjoying a marked advantage over any other one. But the Congress
of Vienna did little towards building a foundation of lasting
peace in Europe.
From 1815 to Bismarck's assumption of power in 1862, Europe
was racked by numerous revolutions due to the conflict between
liberal and conservative forces. The liberal movements
emphasized individual freedoms while the conservatives stressed
societal order. The result of the Vienna of Congress, the
clashes between the liberal and conservative movements, and
changes to the balance of power caused by the Industrial
Revolution was an uneasy peace. Though no major war was fought
during this period, the established order was sorely strained.
A unified Germany was new to the ranks of European
powers. At the time of the French Revolution, more than 330
German states were bound together by in the Holy Roman
Empire. (20:213) Despite a common language and trade
relationships the divergent interests of these small states
and principalities prevented unity. The ideals of the French
Revolution and a hatred of Napoleon were initial unifying
factors. At the Congress of Vienna, Austrian representatives
successfully worked to keep the numerous German states
separate to ensure the continuance of Austrian dominance
of German affairs. After the Congress, 38 unique states
formed a loose German Confederation.
In 1849, Prussia emerged as a potential natural leader
of the German states, but King William Fredrick II refused
to pursue that role. An unsuccessful revolution sparked by
the liberals in 1849 resulted in lost popular support for
their cause. The failure of this revolution "pushed Germans
towards militarism" as a means of ensuring stabilitiy and
economic growth. (20:215) Germans felt that elected parliaments
could not get things done, but princes and the upperclass,
with power and force, could. Prussia and Austria clashed
diplomatically in 1850 over leadership of the German states,
with Austria prevailing. However, the influential customs
unions, Zollverein, gained even more power under Prussian
leadership in the late 1850's, resulting in increased trade
and prosperity due to the abolition of customs barriers.
This increased economic interaction among the German states
led to a growing desire among Germans for a unified Germany.
William I replaced his weak predecessor in 1861. A
soldier by training and temperment, he wanted to increase
the military prowess and national status of Prussia. Though
he respected the constitution, William I nevertheless fully
intended to retain his executive authority over the elected
parliament, thus causing a struggle for the leadership of
Prussia. He received support from his newly appointed prime
minister, Otto von Bismarck. Prussians did not protest too
strongly against Bismarck's efforts against the parliament
because there was little discontent due to economic prosperity.
Plus, the Prussians were proud of the fact that their army had
been built into the strongest military power in Europe. (20:230)
The appointment of Bismarck as prime minister, or
chancellor, was a key factor in the continued movement of
Prussia as the leader of the German states. Born on a typical
Junker estate in 1815, he was the product of mismatched parents.
Junkers were a Prussian specialty, landed gentry who worked their
own estates and often needed public employment to supplement
their incomes. The military officer corps was a commonly chosen
position. (18:9) Bismarck's Junker father was a former officer,
a huge, dull and unenterprising farmer.
In contrast, his mother was the daughter of a Prussian
bureaucrat. She was high-strung, often ill-tempered, with a
restless, inquisitive mind. She had little love for her husband
or a Junker's country lifestyle, and devoted her life towards
ensuring that her children received the best education possible.
Though he had an undistinguished educational career, Bismarck
benefited from his educational opportunities. Bismarck inherited
his father's frame and his mother's spirit and brains. (18:10)
He had the ability to anticipate the moods of others, a trait
which would serve him in good stead during diplomatic negotiations.
Bismarck's principal desires were "to uphold the status
of his sovereign and class, to increase the strength of Prussia
and unify German states around Prussia." (15:88) He has been
labelled a realpolitik. Most statesmen were realists but
Bismarck's distinctive qualtiy was his ability to recognize
the limitations of his powers and those of Prussia. He
regarded politics as the art of possibility. Rich notes that
"Bismarck was an artist in statescraft as Napoleon had been an
artist in war." (15:86) He never let policy be bound by fixed
goals or preconceptions. Bismarck remained aware of long term
goals and broad perspectives, but concentrated on the urgent
requirements of the moment. His plans allowed for errors or
accidents, and he prepared to respond to any move by the
opposition, no matter how stupid, if it had an impact on the
proceedings. Bismarck was able to choose the most opportune
and least dangerous political course, realizing that there
was rarely a single solution to a specific political problem.
Bismarck never hesitated to abandon an unsuccessful
policy and take another tack to regain the political
intitiative and recoup losses. The maintenance and defense
of his ultimate creation, the German empire, became the aim
of all Bismarck's policies. Bismarck was a rare political
genius, he knew when and where to draw the line. He was not
a political gambler and would not wage war until all other
means had been exhausted and the odds were in his favor. His
wars were fought for clear, limited purposes, and when the
advantages of war no longer justified the risks, he then
became a staunch proponent of peace.
Bismarck was aware that most Germans craved national
unification and saw the advantages of Prussia providing the
leadership for such a nationalist movement. (11:123) But
there were two major obstacles to Prussian dominance of
a unified Germany-- Austria and France. Though he did not
eschew the use of military force, Bismarck was aware of the
hazards of war. He realized that Prussia needed allies and a
diplomatic scheme that undercut the alliances of Prussian
opponents while securing the moral advantage in any international
conflict. Prussian "iron and blood" would only be used under
the most favorable circumstances, and even then Bismarck
never abandoned efforts to attain his desired ends by peaceful
means.
Bismarck's War: 1861 to 1871
Bismarck used military force very effectively on several
occasions from 1862 to 1871 to further the interests of Prussia
and create a German empire. He exploited European instabilities
and differing national agendas to enhance Prussia's position. A
revolt in Russian held Poland in 1863 gave Bismarck a chance to
gain Russian goodwill. Most of Europe sided with the Poles, but
Prussia supported Russia and sent troops to its Polish border
to cooperate with Russia if required. Russia crushed the
revolt and Prussia became Russia's favorite in German affairs.
The next situation Bismarck skillfully manipulated was
the Schleswig-Holstein question. The duchies of Schleswig
and Holstein were considered to be German states. The Danish
government was trying to incorporate Schleswig territory.
The Diet of the German Confederation decided to send troops
into Holstein, a member of the Confederation, to defend the
independence of both duchies. Bismarck maneuvered Austria
in to joining Prussia in sending an unreasonable ultimatum
that Denmark abide by an earlier treaty. Thus Bismarck
simultaneously negated Austria's advantage as leader of the
Confederation and made Germany appear as the champion of
international law and the German national cause. The Danes,
expecting external support, refused to accede and war was
declared by Prussia and Austria in 1864. The German forces
were quickly victorious. Bismarck established a joint rule
of the contested duchies with Austria. A situation was created
making it possible to "engineer an incident between Austria
among the great powers and by isolating Austria." (15:91)
The possibility of a war with Austria for the leadership
of Germany must have been in Bismarck's mind when the
settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question was implemented.
He quickly began laying the groundwork to persuade the German
populations and smaller states to accept Prussian leadership
and to isolate Austria. The Russian tsar, still grateful for
Prussian support during the Polish insurrection in 1863, could
be expected to stay out of any internal German problems. To
prevent any French interference, Bismarck hinted to Napoleon III
that benevolent neutrality in the event of a Austro-Prussian war
could result in France receiving Rhineland territory. (9:92)
Napoleon took the bait and even helped Bismarck arrange an
alliance with Italy to threaten Austria's southern territories.
When Bismarck felt that war with Austria was finally
inevitable, he charged that Austria had violated the earlier
treaty brokered after the war with Denmark. Prussian troops
were sent into Holstein, causing Austria in 1866 to declare
war and mobilize its forces. Most German states sided with
Austria, the expected vigor of a Austro-Prussian conflict.
However, the Prussian army defeated the Austrian forces in
less than seven weeks. Bismarck quickly moved to prevent
external interference and to prevent any humiliation of Austria.
His aim in the war was to expel Austria from German affairs.
which could be achieved without annexing substantial
Austrian territory or conducting a victory march through
Vienna. Thus Bismarck ensured that Austria would remain out
of German affairs without creating a vengeful neighbor.
Prussia's remarkably rapid victory over Austria ruined
the plans of Napoleon III, who had counted on a long war in
Germany that would exhaust both sides and allow France to
intervene and dictate terms to the German states. (11:56)
Napoleon felt that Bismarck owed him some territory and, when
such offerings were not forthcoming, he set out to humuliate
Prussia. Bismarck used France's request for compensation in
the Rhineland to persuade southern German states to ally
themselves militarily with Prussia for mutual security. He
then manipulated the Spanish succession situation, in which a
Prussian prince was oftered the Spanish throne, to agitate
both France and Germany. France was goaded into declaring
war on Prussia in 1871. Again, the war was short. The
Prussian army quickly defeated the vaunted French forces.
The rapid Prussian victory was no fluke. The Prussian
army was powerful, well-led and prepared. But Bismarck had
successfully isolated France from the other European powers.
He played on British, Russian and Austrian fears of French
expansionist designs. Britain and France were traditional
enemies. Austria was still angry with France over Napoleon's
neutrality in the Austro-Prussian war. Russia remained grateful
for Prussian support during the Polish insurrection. Thus France
had been diplomatically ostracized before the hostilities, and
Prussia was able to focus on defeating France because it did not
have to worry about external interference. (13:77) Bismarck
dictated the type of French government to be in place after
the fall of Napoleon III and demanded a huge war indemnity,
plus the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. This was not a
particularly stiff penalty for a country as wealthy as
France, especially considering that it officially started the
war. But the French ego had been wounded and Bismarck's
intent of defeating France without creating a vengeful future
foe was not fully realized.
In three quick wars, Bismarck had changed the balance
of power in Europe. France was no longer the dominate power
on the Continent. Austria had been pushed but of German
affairs. Russia remained friendly to Prussia and Britain
was preoccupied with its overseas empire. Prussia was now
the leader of the German states and the major military
power in Europe. Bismarck had created his German empire,
with Prussia as its head and heart, and now had to maintain
and defend it.
Bismarck's Alliances 1872 to 1890
After the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck was faced with
keeping France from seeking revenge by starting another war.
He was not concerned with being defeated by a weakened France,
but rather wanted to prevent the outbreak of war in order to
allow Germany to strengthen militarily and economically. He
was, however, afraid of a two front war against France and
another major European power, such as Russia. Bismarck's aim
was to prevent French revenge for the humiliating loss of 1871
via moderate and unprovocative policies. So he devised a series
of six alliances to isolate France from the other powers. His
premise was that by gaining the support or neutrality of Austria
and Russia he could successfully keep France diplomatically
quarantined. He also counted on continued traditional British
hostility towards France. Italy was not considered to be a factor.
The first alliance, the "Three Emperor's League,"
loosely bound Germany Russia and Austria in 1873. Germany
and Russia pledged military support for defensive means.
Austro-Russo tensions were eased. But Russian and German
defensive ties were strained when Russia lost much of its
gains in Turkey at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, where
Bismarck acted as an "honest broker" to prevent a change of
balance ot power in the Balkans. (6:330) To counter Russian
coolness, Bismarck formed an alignment with Austria in 1879,
the "Dual Alliance." This treaty provided for a minimum of
neutrality between each member in the event of war, and for
military support if either was attacked by a Russian-led
alliance. The threat of Germany fighting a two-front war
alone against Russia and another power was eliminated.
But Bismarck did not want to alienate Russia, and in
1881 negotiated the "Alliance of the Three Emperors."
Though not a true alliance, Germany, Russia and Austria
pledged neutrality in the event one of them was attacked by
a fourth power, specifically France. Thus Bismarck calmed
Russian fears of an Austrian attack and kept Russia from
looking to France to counter the Austrian threat. (6:334)
The fourth alignment was the 1882 "Triple Alliance" which
pledged mutual support between Germany, Austria and Italy
if one member was attacked by two or more great powers.
This alliance also detailed specific responses in the event
Germany was attacked by France. Again, Bismarck had secured
support to counter possible French aggression and isolated
France from any potential allies.
In 1887, he influenced the creation of the "First
Mediterranean Agreement," in which Italy, Britain, Austria,
Spain and Germany agreed not to alter the status quo in the
Mediterranean, Adriatic, Agean or Black Seas without prior
consultation between all parties. This measure hindered
French expansion in those areas and again separated France
from potential allies. Bismarck's final alliance, the 1887
"Reinsurance Treaty," further separated France from Russia by
guaranteeing Russian and German neutrality if either was
attacked. Thus Germany was protected from a Franco-Russo
attack while Russia was shielded from German-Austrian
aggression.
A commonality of all, these alliances was the continued
isolation of France from the other powers. Bismarck played
on Russian and Austrian fears of each other to contribute to
German security. Another similarity was that these alliances
were defensive in nature. Bismarck never alarmed the other
powers by entering offensively oriented associations because
he knew that the other states would band together to counter
this perceived threat to the balance of power.
Evaluation of Bismarck's Use of Force and Alliances
Bismarck was a master of depriving a potential enemy of
allies by playing upon the fears and ambitions of the other
European powers. German aid would be given in return for
future neutrality or non-interference in German affairs.
To gain negotiating advantages and to preclude future
vengence by defeated foes, vanquished states were not treated
too harshly. To accomplish German objectives, Bismarck used
diplomacy and the army. Military force was normally used as
a last resort, but with devastating speed and effectiveness.
Bismarck ensured that military objectives supported the political
goals, often despite the protests of the German generals. He was
not hesitant to intervene and give the army specific taskings and
deadlines to strengthen his bargaining position. By insisting
on quick negotiations, he often caught the other powers off
guard.
Hartmann has remarked that "Bismarck's alliance system has
never been surpassed for pure ingenuity." (6:340) This system
provided a check on the possibility of a general European war.
Bismarck shrewdly picked allies that would both deprive France,
or any other threatening power, of support while strengthening
Germany's position. Through the use of these defensive alliances,
Bismarck either gained military support against aggression
or the neutrality of other power, both of which eliminated
the threat of Germany fighting on two or more fronts.
But Bismarck's efforts were not without cost. After the
Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck used Germany's new military
position to fashion a state system within Europe based on
general consent. This new state system rested on isolating
France from continental allies and forcing her to embark on
colonial schemes which would bring her into conflict with
Britain and Italy. But, the very nature of the peace which
followed the Franco-Prussian War was precarious. Germany now
had a bitter enemy who would remain so until the "lost" provinces
of Alsace and Thorraine had been recovered. In the broader
sense the nature of that war touched off a military
revolution in Europe when the other states realized that the
Prussian victory was due to superior organization, military
education and, initially, manpower. As a result, Europe
became increasingly militarized.
Bismarck's system of alliances bound individual states
to Germany on the basis of their particular needs. It was a
system which required constant attention to the needs of the
moment, and was tied to no general understanding or mutual
problem among the European states. Bismarck had created a
system which fragmented European politics and precluded the
development of multilateral alliances among most or all of
the European powers based on mutual interests.
The net effect of these alliances during the period 1871
to 1888 was general peace in Europe. Bismarck gave Germany
time to gain power in a relatively peaceful environment. His
moderate and non-provocative policies, coupled with his
intricate alignments, kept Germany out of any conflicts.
Germany was able to use the benefits provided by the
Industrial Revolution to strength and modernize all aspects
of her infrastructure, economy and military. The various
small states of the German empire were welded into a single,
organized and powerful entity under Prussian leadership and
values. (6:345) Through Bismarck's efforts, Prussia had
achieved national greatness and the German empire was solidly
built. And in his efforts to further Prussian and German
greatness, Bismarck became the guarantor of peace. (3:349)
Applicability of Bismarck's Practices Today
To consider the applicability of Bismarck's use of
military force and alliances to the U.S.leadership today, the
political realities and position of Bismarck's Germany and
the U.S. today must be compared. Germany in the time of
Bismarck was ruled by a constitutional monarchy. But Kaiser
William I exercised absolute executive authority and did not
have to answer to any sort of electorate. Bismarck was the
beneficiary of minimal, if any, supervision by his Kaiser and
a relatively homogenous German populace. He was considered
to be the hero of national unity. European statesmen thought
him to be the unrivalled master of their craft, and none, to
include the Kaiser and parliment, dared to dispute his
superiority. (3:225) Bismarck was able to pursue his goals,
the maintenance of the status of his king and class, the
strengthening of Prussia, and the unification of Germany
around a strong Prussia, with singleminded purpose.
In contrast, the U.S. political system is markedly
different from the one in Bismarck's Germany. There is a
system of checks and balances that diffuse the political power
and preclude the rise of a strongman or dictator. The
President must deal with an often intransigent Congress. And
the President and Congress are responsive to public opinion
because both are answerable to the voters. U.S. society is a
polygot mixture of diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds.
This hetergeneous composition forces elected officials to
consider widely disparate viewpoints. As a result, U.S.
policies, foreign and domestic, often appear, and are,
confusing and nebulous.
The roles of Bismarck's Germany and the U.S. today are
similarily different. During the 1860s, Prussia was a rising
military power in Europe, the center of global affairs at that
time in history. After 1871, the unified Germany was the
predominant continental military power for more than two decades.
Germany's power was based on its martial prowess and Bismarck's
intricate diplomatic manipulations. The center of influence
in Europe shifted from France to Germany during Bismarck's
tenure. But Germany was one of five major European powers.
The balance of power in existence during the late 1800s
prevented one nation from attempting to dominate without
having to consider the almost certain interference or
intervention of a third major power. Bismarck used this
balance of power to devise alignments which benefitted
Germany at the expense of France. Germany's interests were
limited to Europe.
The U.S., however, has been a global superpower since the
end of World War II. Due to recent events in the Soviet
empire, it is the only remaining superpower. The U.S. is a
superpower in the fullest sense; militarily, economically and
diplomatically. It is the acknowledged leader of the free
world, and is considered the champion of democracy, human
rights, and tree trade. Most of the world looks to the U.S.
for leadership and guidance. In this increasingly
politically and economically interdependent world, the U.S.
has numerous vital interests globally. To protect these widely
distributed interests, the U.S. is a party to many alliances,
all of which are defensive in nature and seek to deter
aggression while promoting global stability and furthering
U.S. ideals and interests.
There are similarities between the situations that
Bismarck faced and that U.S. leaders confront today. Germany
was a military power, and dominated the balance of power in
Europe after its stunning victory over France in 1871. The
U.S. is currently the premier global military power, and its
astonishingly quick victory in the Middle East, coupled with
the changes in the Soviet empire, has had a significant
influence on the world's balance of power. Both nations
faced a new world order. Bismarck seized the intiative and
shaped the new order to the benefit of Germany during the
latter quarter of the 19th century. Though the world is more
complex and interdependent that the one of the. late 1800s,
U.S. leaders must embark on a similarly bold course. But is
Bismarck a suitable role model for U.S. political leaders?
Bismarck was able to operate with virtual impugnity,
answerable only to a sovereign who gave him a free rein.
Bismarck and his counterparts in the other European powers
did not have to deal with public opinion or changing
political leadership. Thus, they were able to negotiate
to balance the power equation without fear of public
disapproval. Leaders of modern democracies, especially the
U.S., do not have the authority to act independent of popular
support. Bismarck cared little for the welfare of the German
people; rather his aim was to strengthen Prussia through the
unification of the German states.
Bismarck was able to easily employ military force when
other means to achieve desired goals failed. The German
military was a tool of force to be used as William I and
Bismarck deemed necessary. U.S. leaders must justify the use
of military force to the American public. Bismarck and his
Kaiser developed the German army as they saw fit, the only
constraint being the ability of the country to pay for the
military expansion. The voters of the U.S. influence the
size, characteristics and employment of their military
forces.
On the surface, it would appear that Bismarck's actions
have little to offer U.S. political leaders on how to manage
the new world order confronting them. But in reality, U.S.
leaders could take some lessons from Bismarck. His focus
was on the enhancement of Prussia's status, and all efforts
were directed towards goals that were in Prussia's interest,
as Bismarck saw them. All means were used by Bismarck to
better serve national interests, including military force.
Bismarck preferred to achieve desired goals peacefully because
he understood the devastating and ambiguous effects of war.
He had intuitive insight into Clausewitz's dicta that "war
was merely a continuation of policy" and that "in war nothing
was certain."
Bismarck's statescraft provides U.S. leaders with
valuable lessons. He was pragmatic and unencumbered by
idealistic notions. He realized that political problems
were not solved by simple solutions. Compromise was
acceptable if it was in Germany's best interests. Emotion
did not color his efforts. To preclude future hostility,
vanquished enemies were not humiliated. Bismarck kept
military objectives in consonance with his political ones.
He understood the true nature of relationships between
nations, and sought to shape the new European situation for
the betterment of German interests.
U.S. political leaders should consider pursuing national
interests with the same vigor as Bismarck. U.S. leaders
could not, and should not, be as secretive and manipulative
as the German chancellor: but the pragmatic approach for
achieving attainable goals displayed by Bismarck is a good
guide. Bismarck was audacious and ambitious, yet cautious
and calculating. He boldly shaped the new world order of his
day to serve his country's interests. U.S. political leaders
today are also facing a new world order. A study of Bismarck's
use of military force and alliances could give U.S. leaders
some ideas on just how to shape this new order for the
furtherance of U.S. interests.
BIBILIOGRAPHY
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