The Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company: An Untapped Resource For The Low Intensity Conflict Environment
AUTHOR Major Timothy M. Riley, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Operations
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE AIRNAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY: AN UNTAPPED RESOURCE
FOR THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT
I. Theme: To introduce the concept of utilizing the Air
Naval Gunfire Liaison Company's (ANGLICO's) inherent structure
and capabilities to provide the Marine Corps a broadened
capability in its role in the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)
environment.
II. Thesis: As the Marine Corps reviews its current
capabilities for employment in the low intensity conflict
environment, examination of the existing structure and
capabilities of the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company shows
a potential to provide for a broadened role and mission.
III. Discussion: Within its structure, the Marine Corps
possesses a number of sufficiently trained forces with the
capabilities to respond to the majority of the mission
requirements of LIC. Marine forces committed in LIC have
the dual mission to support the host nation by conducting
stability operations and to defeat or neutralize military
opposition by limited objective operations. To meet the
total demands, some limited objective and stability oper-
ations are best performed by specially trained individuals
or units. As an enhancement to the MAGTF, or operating
independently, ANGLICO's benefit lies in its ability to
adapt its structure and procedures to integrate at all levels
into the combat power of allied forces. This integration
with the host nation and as an element of the Surveillance,
Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group (SRIG) allows ANGLICO
to be placed properly to be exploited as an intelligence
gatherer. In the search for forces that exist within our
present force structure that possess the capability to
contribute to our ability to meet current and projected
needs in the LIC environment, ANGLICO stands out as a force
worth considering.
IV. Summary: In the concern to maintain an adequate defense
while facing significant defense budget cuts, the force
structure of the future must demonstrate utility across the
spectrum of conflict. In determining the forces required,
we must look first to those capabilities that exist within
our present force structure. For the LIC environment, ANGLICO
provides that combination of equipment and structure.
V. Conclusion: The ANGLICO has the potenntial to provide
the Marine Corps with far more than its present mission of
providing coordination, liaison, and terminal control of air
and naval gunfire support. ANGLICO can support the Marine
Corps' role in the LIC environment without significant
alterations of mission, personnel, or equipment. This paper
focuses primarily on ANGLICO's potential to provide that
additional capability.
THE AIR NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY: AN UNTAPPED RESOURCE
FOR THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT
Outline
As the Marine Corps reviews its current capabilities
for employment in the low intensity conflict environment,
examination of the existing structure and capabilities of
the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company shows a potential
to provide for a broadened role and mission.
I. The Marine Corps in the changing budget environment
A. Roles and missions
B. Force structure guidance
C. Threat as it applies to structure
D. Marine Corps' historical involvement in LIC
1. Small Wars Manual
2. Combined Action Platoons
II. Employment of the Marine Corps in the LIC environment
A. Roles
1. Limited objective operations
2. Stability operations
B. The LIC players
1. Requirements
2. Forces
III. ANGLICO
A. Current mission
B. How employed
C. Structure
D. Capabilities
IV. ANGLICO's potential for expanded roles in LIC
A. ANGLICO as an enhancement to the MAGTF
B. Advantages of ANGLICO's structure in LIC
C. Applicable missions
1. Host Nation support/interoperability
2. MTT
D. Communication intensive
E. Intelligence gathering
V. Expanding ANGLICO's mission
A. Improvements
B. Enhancements
THE AIR NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY: AN UNTAPPED RESOURCE
FOR THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT
The United States military is currently enjoying the
success of a highly orchestrated mobilization and mass
deployment in the recently completed Desert Shield/Desert
Storm operation. In light of the looming budgetary cuts
and massive reorganizations that were about to take place,
this "opportunity" couldn't have come at a better time. While
the world watched and the military's focus of effort was on
"the war," the impending doom and gloom was put on the back
burner. However, soon, and much sooner than most desire,
the fanfare and honeymoon will be over and the celebrations
will come to a screeching halt.
Prior to this operation, the Marine Corps was heavily
involved in an internal review to determine what it really
needs to look like and to function so as to provide the optimal
contribution to the country's defense. The Commandant,
General A. M. Gray, has given his guidance on what consider-
ations must be given when looking to the Corps of the future:
In determining the forces required for our
future security needs we must evaluate the
capability that exists within our present
force structure. This is necessary because
fiscal realities, professional integrity,
and common sense mandate that we identify
and maintain those forces already in existence
that possess the capability to meet current
and projected security needs. (6:21)
In this paper I intend to highlight one of those exist-
ing organizations that I feel has the capabilities to meet
our current and projected needs. That organization is the
Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, or as it is more commonly
referred to, ANGLICO. Before addressing that area, though,
let us look at the threat and what is the best strategy to
face that threat.
Understanding who the enemy is and where forces would
likely be employed will obviously be driving factors in the
design and deployment of forces. United States military
planning in the postwar era has been dominated by the need to
deter and be able to defend ourselves and our allies worldwide.
During the past year, the basis of the world's geopolitical
structure has been radically changed. Within a short time
successive revolutions in Eastern Europe wrested one country
after another from the grip of communist rulers, and national
and social tensions frayed the fabric of thee Soviet empire.
These momentous events overturned the political and security
arrangements that have existed since the end of the Second
World War. Just as many people were seeing the dawn of a
peaceful new era, the post-Cold War era, the unpredictability
of the world showed how quickly a new threat can arise. We
found ourselves rapidly and extensively involved in leading
the coalition forces in South West Asia.
In developing our strategy, the U.S. resources must be
controlled and utilized to the end that our vital interests,
both domestic and foreign, will be effectively pnromoted and
secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.
A sound sense of priorities is essential to a sound strategy.
It involves choices, using a finite amount of resources, and
an ability to distinguish between the desirable and the
possible, the essential and the expendable.
With that in mind, we must remember that war, in some
form of organized, armed conflict, has been, throughout history,
the most persistent and repetitive manifestation of man's
tendency to utilize physical power as the ultimate argument.
In political and military terms, any attempt to maintain a
balance of power in the world must mean a flexible political
and diplomatic policy. It must mean some commitments overseas,
some alliances, some organized cooperative efforts with other
nations in mutual self-interest. As we can see in the turmoil
of today, these groupings are certain to change. Yesterday's
friends may be tomorrow's enemies. Significant in our political
and diplomatic elements of power is our concern for alliance
relationships and arms control.
In peace and war, allies function both as problems and
as solutions to our strategy. The United States, as a super-
power, has interests in many regions. The U.S. is just an
ocean away from most allies and is obliged to consider the
security concern of one ally with the total global outlook.
As we can see, the determination of the threat and the
forces to meet it is no longer just a matter of countering
the nuclear threat of the Soviet Union. It requires forces
that can deter aggression by their ability to respond rapidly
to a wide range of crises. The Commandant, once again, has
given his ideas on where we should be looking towards:
I believe there will be a war in the next
decade. Probably some Third World scenario.
The time to think about it is now. We need
to be able to conduct low-intensity warfare.
We need to be able to conduct revolutionary
warfare and defeat it. Sure, we have to be
prepared for NATO contingencies, but we must
not lose sight of the kind of conflict that's
most apt to confront us. We must be effective
at the low end of the warfare spectrum, in
the protracted conflicts that so often occur
in the Third World.(8:18)
Many Marines saw this mention of low-intensity conflict
(LIC) as a new mission with new tactics to be developed and
procedures to establish. In actuality, however, the Marine
Corps has an extensive background of participation in this
type of warfare. R. Lynn Rylander writes in his article
"The Future of Marines in Small Wars," that "from 1800 to
1934, the Marines landed 18O times in 37 countries. In the
1OO years preceding publication of the Small Wars Manual,
the Marines were actively engaged in small wars in all but
15 years." (2O:68) This manual, published by the Marine Corps
in 194O, eliminates the need to start from scratch when
exploring the world of LIC. In fact, the manual was reprinted
in 1987, as mentioned in its foreword, "as an aid to education
and training in the historical approach of Marine Corps units
conducting operations in low-intensity conflicts."(18)
Another significant historical participation of the
Marine Corps in the LIC environment was that of the combined
action platoons (CAPs) in Vietnam. CAPs involved putting
a squad of Marines in a village to work with the local militia
and attempt to "win their hearts and minds." As a concept,
there is much to be said about whether it worked or not, but
as an example of what can be done in the LIC environment,
there is a lot to consider. This personal interface with the
people was effective in the sense that it allowed our forces
to get "closer" to the conflict itself. By getting "close"
to the conflict, our forces were able to develop a better
understanding of the sources of the conflict and how in turn
to defeat it.(17:48-49)
To help better understand where the Marine Corps was
going and what roles it would play in LIC, the Warfighting
Center at Quantico did extensive research of these historical
examples to put together a draft "Operational Concept for
Marine Corps Employment in Low-Intensity Conflict." This
concept, even though still in the draft stage, is providing
direction for future development of doctrine, force structure,
and training in preparation for LIC operations.(3:31)
While there are a number of missions that may be encountered
in the LIC environment, this draft LIC concept has laid out
two fundamental types of operations that the Marine Corps
units can expect to encounter. These are categorized as
limited objective operations and stability operations. Limited
objective operations are explained in the concept as:
offensive combat operations (clandestine or
overt) characterized by limited pursuit and
of limited duration. They may also be
strategically sensitive and time sensitive.
These operations include amphibious/expedi-
tionary operations and pre-emptive seizures
in response to acts of terrorism, sabotage,
border incidents, reprisals, or military coups.
It goes on to explain stability operations as:
The goal of stability operations is political.
The response must be carefully calculated and
involve the total integration of political,
economical, sociological, informational, and
military resources....Missions falling under
this broad category may include: security
assistance, mobile training teams (MTT),
civil military operations (CMO), PSYOP, site
surveys, and combined action training.(16:1-5)
Then Marine Corps was already looking forward to support
the limited objective operation when the Marine Expeditionary
Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) enhancements
were added. These units have excellent capabilities to cover
these operations. The structure to meet the demands of
stability operations is one that is not easy to specify an
particular unit. This is the area that I think the ANGLICO
could most contribute to when looking for forces to conduct
this type of mission. What kind of force is required though,
and what capabilities should they have?
To quote General Gray again:
These forces must possess capabilities that go
beyond warfighting. To be successful, they
must be educated on the unique requirements of
nation-building operations, pacification, and
low-intensity conflict and have both a regional
and host country focus. Language capability
will be critical....Our objective in conducting
these types of operations should be the creation
of special trust and confidence between the
people of the host nation and the United States.(6:21)
What General Gray is setting the criteria for is reflected
in the makeup of the Army Special Forces. These units
possess unique capabilities to train, work with, and direct
indigenous forces. They must maintain specific area, cultural,
and language proficiency for a particular area of responsibility.
They are sent up in an flexible cellular organization with
a multiplicity of skills. A typical "A" team is composed
of two officers and twelve enlisted, most of whom are NCOs.
This structure of a high density of officers and NCOs enhances
their ability to conduct advisory missions. The structure
is also set up so that multiple teams can deploy and add
depth, while at the same time keeping the overall footprint
small so as not to "invade" a country. While used primarily
for training and assistance missions, the extensive training
these teams receive in other contingency operations allows
them to be flexible enough to adapt to a changing threat.
While the Special Forces structure gives an excellent
example of one solution, there are other areas to consider
when looking to the LIC environment. The emphasis in LIC
is not to escalate the situation so that increased military
force or units are required. The best way to do that is to
emphasize employing only the necessary force. These small
detachments must be able to accomplish a designated direct
mission or to assist indigenous forces against an internal
or external threat. Each situation is unique and must be
tailored to match the political and military objectives of
the commitment. Proficiency gained through experience of
participation on combined exercises with forces from many
different nations would go far in creating that sense of
trust and confidence in each others countries. Another
capability to consider is that of reliable tactical communica-
tions. Units operating in this environment must be able to
communicate to maintain command and control for themselves
as well as set it up in the country they are trying to aid.
Communication capability may also be required if the situation
changes and there is a need to link into some form of fire
support. The unit must be able to collect or have access
to a method of gathering intelligence. By establishing
trusting ties with the host country, areas such as terrain
and local warfighting philosophies can be obtained. Finally,
as these types of operations often require immediate action,
the ability to deploy rapidly and conduct a rapid insertion
is another consideration. Based on this "shopping list" of
desires for a unit capability to operate in the LIC environment,
I feel that the capabilities found in the ANGLICO can signif-
icantly contribute to this mission.
First of all, what is this thing called the ANGLICO? Part
of the reason that ANGLICO is so misunderstood and is such a
mystery to Marines is the fact that it hardly ever does any
operating with the Marine Corps. To better understand this,
one need only look at its mission:
To provide ground control and liaison agencies
for the planning and employment of naval gunfire
and US Navy/US Marine Corps close air support
for allied or US Army forces.
The ANGLICO enhances the combat power of the allied force it
is supporting by ensuring swift and accurate delivery of fires
from both surface and air delivery means. The ANGLICO unit
also has a full range of communications capabilities. This
capability provides a robust communications backup to command
nets within the allied force and also with adjacent US forces.
This is a unique capability of the US Marines which allows
them to extend command and control quickly. The ANGLICO
structure extends all the way down to the small unit level.
ANGLICO's organizational structure is also unique. Even
though designated a company in its name, it is organized as
a separate battalion with an infantry lieutenant colonel
commanding. At the tactical level, there are three separate
brigade platoons, each commanded by an aviator major. The
brigade platoons are task organized to support an allied or
Army maneuver brigade. There is a team at this level called
the brigade team comprised of the platoon commander, a Navy
naval gunfire liaison officer, and seven enlisted communicators
and artillerymen. Subordinate to each of the brigade teams
are two supporting arms liaison teams (SALTs). The SALTs
are organized to integrate with a maneuver battalion. The
SALT is commanded by an aviator captain who is assisted by
either an infantry or artillery officer who acts as the fire
support coordinator for the team.
Subordinate to each SALT are two firepower control teams
(FCTs). The FCTs provide the terminal control for the close
air support and the naval gunfire. The FCT leader is an
artillery lieutenant who has attended the tactical air control
party course given by the Marine Corps. He is trained as
a universal spotter, meaning he can control all supporting
arms. The FCTs are assigned to support the maneuver companies.
They also are augmented with enlisted communicators and
artillerymen. All in all, there are twenty-two teams if one
includes the division team, which is made up of the ANGLICO
commander, his staff and communications personnel. If the
entire unit is deployed, this team coordinates ANGLICO opera-
tions. It would also "fall in" on the supported division's
fire support element.
By being structured the way that it is, the ANGLICO can
easily task organize to send the structure or number of teams-
required to do the job. This is frequently done in order to
meet all the commitments that ANGLICO is tasked with. These
teams are capable of independent operations around the world
and can integrate back together to provide an increased
support structure.
There are currently four ANGLICOs in the Marine Corps:
two active duty and two reserve. The two active duty units,
1st ANGLICO, out of Camp Pendleton, California, and 2d ANGLICO,
at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, both are part of the respective
Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Groups. 1st
ANGLICO, however, is under the operational control of Fleet
Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPAC) as they support both I and III
Marine Expeditionary Forces.
With the organizational structure explained, I will now
turn to some recent operational experience that the ANGLICOs
had that will highlight some more of their capabilities as
they pertain to LIC. All four of the ANGLICO units were
deployed to Desert Shield. Lessons learned from the operation
are being distributed through the new Marine Corps Lessons
Learned System (MCLLS). These lessons learned highlighted
two key areas for the ANGLICO units; intelligence gathering
and the ability to act as a training team. The most signif-
icant use of ANGLICO during Desert Shield was its intelligence
gathering activities for the Marine Commander. Teams were
assigned to the Saudi Arabian National Guard for two weeks
at a time. Teams would then be relieved by other replacement
ANGLICO teams and the outgoing teams were debriefed by the
Marine Commanders. These debriefs provided the commanders
with insights into the operational capabilities of the
supported Saudi forces. Debriefs also identified significant
differences in the warfighting philosophies of the Arab forces
that could potentially create interoperability problems.
Further, the debriefs provided information on the operational
area. For example, the significance of any terrain in the
area that the ANGLICO unit might have discovered during
training with the Saudi forces. It was clear that the
ANGLICO unit was a valuable source of insight when the planning
for the offense was done. It was from some of these debriefs
that missions were assigned and matched with capabilities.
ANGLICO's ability to train allied units was also brought
out in the report. In the months prior to offensive operations,
the ANGLICO teams served with the Saudi forces during daily
training evolutions. It was here that they demonstrated their
capability to provide Allied forces with a vehicle for training.
This is particularly important considering the combined arms
nature of mechanized warfare. The Arab forces needed extensive
training in the concept of fire support and use of supporting
arms. One of the reasons the ANGLICOs were so effective in
this effort was their small unit orientation. As explained
earlier, the Firepower Control Teams (FCTs) are structured
to be provided at the company level. Consequently, their
training is focused on a small unit in a tactical setting
vice teaching in a large classroom situation. As an enhance-
ment to a MAGTF being sent in to conduct a mobile training
team mission, the experiences portrayed here support a strong
case for considering the ANGLICO in the planning stage.
What I have tried to do by highlighting some of the
capabilities of the ANGLICO is to show how easily they can
fit into the scenarios of the LIC environment without changing
anything in their structure or current personnel. This would
simply be adding to their current mission statement. ANGLICO's
flexibility for varied deployments and situations is evident
in their team structure. The density of officer-led teams
with a high number of NCOs provides an infrastructure much
like that of the Special Forces.
What could be changed, though, to improve ANGLICO's capabil-
ity to operate in the LIC environment? The number one area I
see a weakness in is that of language capability. For a unit
that is always deploying on exercises to support Allied forces,
there is no emphasis placed on getting bi-lingual capable
Marines to the ANGLICOs. In fact, it is not even considered.
I think it would definitely enhance their capabilities when
working with Allied countries and ease the transition period
that occurs upon arrival in country.
Granted, there is a shortage of personnel with language
capabilities, but identifying a need for them is a step in the
right direction. An area that might be a source for this
capability may be personnel with Foreign Area Officer (FAO)
experience. There is a possibility that someone might have
a background in artillery or infantry and they could be
assigned to an ANGLICO and become the "area" specialist for
that unit as well as being assigned as a tactical team member.
The active ANGLICOs are somewhat focused in regards to areas
due to the MEFs and contingency plans that they support. I
say "somewhat" due to the fact that if there is a situation
like Desert Shield, everyone will go to that area in order to
have enough ANGLICO support. Language is just part of getting
along with the host nation. Emphasis should also be placed on
study of certain key areas with regards to both their culture
and their historical origins.
Another area that would benefit ANGLICO's employment in
the LIC environment is training in civil affairs. While this
is a Marine Corps wide shortage due to civil affairs being
in the Reserve component, training of select personnel within
the unit could cover this shortage.
As the Marine Corps looks inward to determine where it
will go with its forces and what should those forces have the
capability to do, we must remember where the greatest oppor-
tunity for employment will be. That direction involves
serious consideration of the LIC environment. Although the
Marine Corps already possesses a significant capability to
function in the LIC environment, some existing organizations
should be evaluated to determine their capabilities for our
future security needs. ANGLICO is one of those units. They
have the inherent capabilities in their structure, personnel,
and equipment to provide the capabilities that are required
in the LIC environment. Their extensive experience of
operating in the joint/combined environment is another reason
for consideration. Emphasis of these capabilities is not a
recommendation to alter ANGLICOS primary mission, but to
highlight that potential to provide the additional capability
to the Marine Corps role in LIC.
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