Civilianizing Fleet Support
AUTHOR LCdr Suzanne Roberts, USN
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: CIVILIANIZING FLEET SUPPORT
I. Theme: There is both precedent and available capability for the
Civilianization of Navy fleet support. Such a move would provide sig-
nificant manpower and cost savings, and consolidate management of Com-
bat Logistic ship functions. The Military Sealift Command is ideally
suited to assume this expanded role.
II. Thesis: Imminent drawdowns and cutbacks will force the Navy to
choose between across-the-board reduced capability, or retention of a
strong combatant posture to meet an expanding variety of geographic and
threat scenarios. One possible and partial solution to the problem is
to use an alternative method of fleet support that provides consistent
effectiveness, but relieves pressure on Congressionally mandated end-
strength and budget reductions. The only proven alternative is civil-
ianization through the Merchant Marine and the Military Sealift Command.
III. Discussion: After an initial transfer of some Navy fleet support
ships to MSC in 1972, concern over the potential reduction in wartime
readiness and a general lack of incentive prevented any additional
transfer of ships or responsibility. Today, while facing the same kind
of budget constraints that motivated the first transfer, the Navy is
again being forced to consider civilianization of some assets in order
to avoid deep cuts in combatant forces. A 1990 CNA Study confirmed that
significant manpower and cost savings are realizable through transfer of
fleet support ships to MSC for civilian operation. It also resurfaced
a number of issues which are less positive and that remain unresolved.
Chief among these are the potential for increased convoy protection, re-
duced training assets for military personnel, a strongly negative impact
on the Women-at-Sea program, and an ongoing concern that civilian crews
cannot be relied upon to maintain high operational tempos and respond
consistently to military direction in wartime scenarios.
IV. Summary: Despite unresolved issues and uncertainty concerning
long-range impacts, the Navy is currently planning to transfer its
entire class of fleet stores ships to MSC for operation by the end of
FY 94. There are also ongoing discussions concerning future transfer of
a large number of fleet oilers as well as the entire complement of sal-
vage and towing assets. Projected efficiencies and savings provide an
excellent rationale for these transfers, but it is unlikely the Navy
would have taken action without current budget constraints and mandated
force reductions.
V. Conclusion: In the final analysis, civilianizing fleet support is
probably the best (and maybe the only) alternative to unacceptable re-
ductions in the Navy's ability to provide combatant force projection.
But the process and adjustment won't be easy, neat or painless. It
appears likely that as the Navy shrinks, MSC will expand. That repre-
sents good news for Merchant Mariners and American shipyards, but it is
too early to determine whether the overall and final impact will be
equally positive.
CIVILIANIZING FLEET SUPPORT
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. Imminent drawdowns and cutbacks will force the Navy
to choose between across-the-board reduced capability, or retention of
a strong combatant posture to meet an expanding variety of geographic
and threat scenarios. One possible and partial solution to the problem
is to use an alternative method of fleet support that provides consis-
tent effectiveness, but relieves pressure on Congressionally mandated
end-strength and budget reductions. The only proven alternative is
civilianization through the Merchant Marine and the Military Sealift
Command.
I. COMBAT LOGISTICS/FLEET SUPPORT
A. Capability and Status
B. A Precedent for Civilianization
C. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary Example
II. THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND
A. Organization
B. Funding
C. Fleet Structure
III. THE CNA REPORT
A. Potential Cost Savings
B. Potential Manpower Savings
C. Ongoing Issues
IV. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Transfer of Navy Stores Ships to MSC
B. MSC Transfer Issues
C. The Trend Toward Increased Civilianization
CIVILIANIZING FLEET SUPPORT
Fleet support -- which is also known variously as replenishment at
sea (RAS) and underway replenishment (UNREP) -- is a unique capability
which allows Navy ships to stay out of port for extended periods, thus
enhancing their ability to provide national defense policy mandated for-
ward presence and flexible response. It is also a capability which is
particularly dependent on significant training and specialized skills
to offset the danger and intensity of operations inherent in its overall
accomplishment. It is not an activity to be taken lightly or dealt with
easily. Classed by the Navy under the title of Combat Logistics, fleet
support ships must be ready to follow the combatant class of "warships"
wherever they go, including areas of conflict and heavy fire, in order to
sustain those operations for as long as is necessary to accomplish the
mission. In a wartime scenario, the U. S. Navy has routinely (although
not exclusively) relied on Navy-manned ships with significant defensive
and offensive weapon capability to provide fleet support. These ships
tend to be manpower intensive and, due to their high operational tempo,
expensive to maintain and operate. Those two factors, manpower intensity
and extreme expense, are rapidly becoming anathema to a suddenly cost- and
efficiency-conscious Navy.
Imminent drawdowns and cutbacks are forcing hard choices on the U. S.
military services. Each must choose where to cut and what to keep based
on rapidly changing geopolitics and anticipated military requirements.
The Navy, in particular, must choose between the standard across-the-board
cuts that normally follow reductions, or retention of a strong combatant
posture to meet an expanding variety of geographic and threat scenarios.
This time the proposed reductions are too deep to allow for a system of
equalized losses that would leave the fleet weaker everywhere. This time
such a system would leave the Navy in a combat-deficient status and unable
to perform its worldwide mission.
One possible and partial solution to the problem is to use an alterna-
tive method of fleet support that continues to provide equal effectiveness,
but relieves pressure on Congressionally mandated end-strength and budget
reductions. Such a move would also serve to centralize and standardize
combat logistical capability and responsiveness under a single manager,
while simultaneously reducing overhead and manpower costs. The most log-
ical and only proven alternative is civilianization through the Merchant
Marine and the Military Sealift Command.
This is not a new concept, although previous ship/function transfers
from the Navy to the Military Sealift Command (MSC) have been primarily
limited to non-combatant class areas -- except in one instance. As Mr.
Clinton H. Whitehurst, Jr. notes:
In FY 72, the Navy initiated a program to turn over operation
of a number of its underway replenishment ships to MSC. The
purpose of the move was to save money. In testimony on the FY
1974 budget, Secretary of the Navy John Warner estimated annual
savings as $760,000 for fleet oilers, $820,000 for fleet ocean
tugs, and $1,700,000 for store ships. (14:41)
But the Navy continued to be reluctant to relinquish its Navy-manned
combat logistics ships to Merchant Mariner crews. As Mr. Whitehurst, Jr.
explains:
From the Navy's point of view, shifting some underway replenish-
ment responsibility to MSC is a trade-off between dollar savings
and combat readiness. Navy officials, however, do not intend to
shift the entire mission to MSC. In fact, many senior naval
officers are concerned about the number of transfers that have
already taken place. They fear that savings obtained at the
sacrifice of combat efficiency may prove to be a false economy
in the long run, particularly in a wartime environment. (14:41)
Although those concerns are not without some validity, the same budget
pressures that initiated that first transfer in the early 1970's are again
with us. Until these current stringent reductions surfaced and persist-
ently stayed afloat, even in the face of Middle East mobilization, there
was little reason or incentive for the Navy to consider additional fleet
transfers. But civilianization of combat fleet support is, in spite of
all reservations, a proven alternative which offers significant efficien-
cies and advantages that generally offset the initial expense and adjust-
ment.
It is worth noting here that "underway replenishment of naval warships
is a task as old as navies themselves." (14:40) Indeed, according to Mr.
R. D. Mulligan:
Fleet support is as old as the Royal Navy which is generally
considered to have its origin in the reign of Henry VIII who
commanded the building of large armed ships to counter the
maritime power of France and Spain. Support in that period
was often provided by aging warships or prizes. Those early
supply vessels would be laden with provisions consisting of
livestock, timber, cordage and a whole range of other necessi-
ties. (10:1)
A civilian operated fleet support system also has a share in the history
of the United States, based on the considerable contributions made by
commercial ships throughout our early wars and revolutions. Those early
Yankee ship captains who plied the coast and challenged the British fleet
at sea, while keeping a small military fleet supplied with vital resources,
made no small impact on the war effort.
Interestingly enough, it is the British who provide us with the most
notably successful example of a civilian operated combat fleet support
system. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA), which is owned and operated by
the Ministry of Defence, is a civilian manned fleet whose primary role is
"to supply warships of the Royal Navy at sea with fuel, food, stores and
ammunition essential for them to continue operating while away from base."
(11:1) Officially created on 3 August 1905, the RFA has continuously
provided all fleet support for the Royal Navy in both peace and war.
It began by carrying coal bunkers and other stores, acquiring
a tanker fleet as British warships became oil burning during
World War I. The RFA saw service in every naval theatre of
operations (from the Arctic to the Pacific) in the Second World
War, including the Maltese, Russian and other convoys. Since
then it has supported the Royal Navy and the Army in Korea, Suez,
Cyprus, Beira, Kuwait, Borneo, Belize, Aden and in the Icelandic
Cod Wars. During the Falklands conflict in 1982, the RFA fleet
provided logistic support for the Task Force, tragically losing
RFA Sir Galahad to a heavy air attack at Fitzroy. (13:3-4)
The transition of ships from coal to oil burning is particularly signifi-
cant, since that literally thrust the world's fleet support into an along-
side refueling mode made possible by the ease of transferring oil through
flexible hoses.
Today the RFA has a sophisticated and increasingly modern fleet of RAS
ships. New construction is determined by the Ministry of Defence and, al-
though built along commercial lines, has additional equipment not normally
associated with merchant ships. (11:2) Although they remain largely un-
armed except for some basic self-defense small arms capability, the RFA
civilian mariner crews take considerable pride in their ability to sail
with the fleet into harm's way as necessary. (13:3)
The U. S. Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC) is comparable in many
ways to the RFA organization. Although considerably larger than its RFA
counterpart, MSC is also a government organization which depends almost
exclusively on civilian Merchant Mariners for ship operation. The primary
difference appears to be that MSC has continued as an auxiliary to Navy
fleet support rather than becoming the primary source.
During World War II and until 1949, there were four separate govern-
ment agencies controlling sea transportation, including the Army Trans-
port Service. After the lessons learned in that war, a decision to con-
solidate DOD ocean transportation resulted in the naming of the Military
Sea Transportation Service as the single managing agency. Renamed the
Military Sealift Command in 1970, that agency s primary mission was to
"provide the sea transportation needed to deploy and sustain U. S. forces
worldwide." (7:2) In 1984 that mission gained considerable stature when
the Secretary of the Navy designated strategic sealift as one of the
Navy's four primary functions -- having equal status with sea control,
power projection and strategic deterrence.
Prior to 1987, MSC functioned within two major chains of command:
first, as the single manager for ocean transportation reporting directly
to the Chief of Naval Operations; and second, through its operational
chain of command leading ultimately to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. In the latter chain, the MSC commander functioned as a Type
Commander, comparable to fleet commanders for surface, air and submarine
forces. In 1987, and with much resistance, MSC acquired a third chain of
command -- as a component command reporting to the newly established joint
service U. S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Responsible for all DOD
air/land/sea transportation worldwide, TRANSCOM also assumes combatant
control of all MSC common user sealift assets, including the responsibi-
lity to assign ship missions. MSC still maintains operational control of
these ships and manages their day-to-day operations, but loses assignment
and control authority during war scenarios. (7:4)
It is worth noting that approval of the TRANSCOM concept was a long
and highly contentious battle involving considerable political and DOD
maneuvering. The fight was led in part by high-level Army proponents,
who had long maintained that designation of MSC as the single ocean trans-
portation agency "was not an improvement and had only added another layer
of bureaucracy to the system. " (3:72) In the late 1970's, a major joint
exercise named NIFTY NUGGET served to convince even the skeptical that a
coordinated system for the assignment and employment of ocean assets still
did not exist. The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) was subsequently created
in an effort to "coordinate war planning among the services and maintain
a data base of all the available equipment for joint deployment." (3:74)
But having never received the authority or resources to handle the job,
JDA was generally considered a dismal failure. TRANSCOM replaced JDA in
1987, and brought with it component command authority and large staff re-
sources to tackle the job. Although still searching for their operational
niche in the DOD transportation arena, TRANSCOM has the potential to pro-
vide the much needed joint coordination that has been missing.
MSC's most important assets are the cost efficiencies and economies
in its use of Merchant Mariners, its unique funding structure, and the
wide variety of support services it has mastered.
MSC employs more than 11,000 people worldwide, with more than
83 percent of these employees assigned to seagoing jobs. The
largest single segment of MSC's afloat workforce -- more than
4,000 people -- come from the civil service sector. Another
large segment of this afloat force -- more than 4,600 people --
comes from private industry. When fully mobilized, MSC can gain
an additional 2,300 Naval reservists and nearly 30,000 merchant
seamen to crew the additional ships called into service. (7:6)
The primary benefits of Merchant Mariner and private sector manning are
realized through competitive bids and salaries, and by a maintenance pro-
gram which adheres to U. S. Coast Guard and American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS) standards vice Navy specifications. While still ensuring high stan-
dards of maintenance and readiness (in some cases more stringent than the
Navy), USCG and ABS rules allow considerably reduced manning in certain
critical areas. For instance, in certain classes of highly automated
ships and when all other requirements are met, engineering spaces can be
manned with a single watchstander during normal underway evolutions. (1)
This is a considerable efficiency when compared to the multi-person
manning required on Navy ships.
MSC's unique funding structure is also a significant advantage. With
the exception of MSC headquarters (which is funded through Navy Operation
and Maintenance appropriations), all MSC activities worldwide are financed
through the Navy Industrial Fund (NIF).
NIF is a revolving fund established to provide working capital
for industrial or commercial type activities of the Navy which
provide goods or services to agencies of the Department of De-
fense. NIF is not dependent upon Congressional appropriations
since MSC charges its customers for services provided in a manner
comparable to private business. The primary difference between
a government industrial fund and a commercial business is that the
objective of the government fund is to break even rather than re-
turn a profit. (9:2)
Regardless of the fact that MSC has not actually broken even in at least
the last 15 years of operation, NIF provides a flexibility that could not
be realized in an appropriated accounting system tied to the DOD budget.
It also means that MSC can provide the requested service for an extended
period of time limited only by the D0D customer's ability to pay the bill.
And since Navy fuel allotments and restrictions do not apply to services
provided by MSC -- whose bills reflect a "per diem rate" which collates
all expenses -- Navy fleet commanders may use MSC ships to enhance their
area of coverage without depleting their own fuel allowance.
It is indeed an enviable position -- to function in nearly all re-
spects like a commercial business without the pressure of having to turn
a yearly profit! Whether this arrangement would survive a potential
turnover of significant portions of Navy fleet support assets and respon-
sibilities (as in the RFA role) cannot be predicted. And although it
sounds like a virtually carefree existence, there are in fact stringent
controls and very closely scrutinized accounting procedures involved. NIF
accounting is most often portrayed as a control measure.
The NIF is designed to provide an effective mechanism for con-
trolling the cost of services provided, and a method of financing,
budgeting and accounting for these operations. These controls
allow MSC to measure the degree of efficiency and economy of its
operations and show the utilization of assigned funds, manpower
and scarce resources. It also increases the sense of financial
responsibility and cost consciousness of the establishments pur-
chasing from NIF activities. The NIF fiscal structure permits
immediate financing of peak loads and controlled retrenchment
during slack periods. (9:2)
Finally, MSC operates three separate and disparate forces which encom-
pass a wide spectrum of capability and function. The Naval Fleet Auxiliary
Force (NFAF) directly supports U. S. Navy combatant ships at sea through
all forms of underway replenishment, including alongside and astern
refueling and helicopter vertical replenishment (VERTREP).
The Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force was inaugurated in 1972 with
the transfer of one fleet oiler, TALUGA, to MSC after earlier
tests showed that civilian mariners could operate ships pro-
viding the naval fleets with logistic support at great savings.
She was returned at the end of FY 1983 after 39 years of Naval
service. During her final 11 years of naval support, as a unit
of MSC's NFAF, she conducted 2,960 underway replenishments. (8:1)
The NFAF is composed of oilers, ammunition ships, stores ships, fleet
ballistic missile resupply ships, ocean surveillance ships and fleet tugs.
These ships typically carry a Navy detachment ranging from 4 to 67 person-
nel to handle communications, supply requirements, conduct helicopter
operations and other duties not directly related to ship operation. NFAF
ships sail as part of battle group configurations, or serve as on-station
supply ships in routinely occupied ocean areas. The NFAF provides the
most immediate connection with Navy ships, and functions similarly to the
RFA in both mission and structure.
The Special Mission Support Force is involved in highly specialized
functions intended to provide an informational source of direct support
to Navy fleet commanders and operations. It includes oceanographic re-
search ships, missile tracking ships, and cable laying and repair ships.
These ships typically operate under a DOD sponsor, who not only determines
the type of ship and crew required, but also plots the exact schedule and
area of mission accomplishment. These sponsors also routinely provide
dedicated funding and onboard technical advisors responsible for inter-
preting and transmitting data. (7:6)
The mission of the Strategic Sealift Force is to "provide sea trans-
portation to sustain military forces, wherever needed, through delivery of
materials, petroleum products and other supplies." (7:3) Included in
this force are the long-term contracts with privately owned dry cargo and
tanker ships, ongoing spot charters with regularly scheduled commercial
ocean carriers, and the entire prepositioned fleet. The latter includes
the three Maritime Prepositioned Ship (MPS) squadrons that support U. S.
Marine Corps operations, approximately 13 Afloat Prepositioned Ships (APS)
that support Navy/Army/Air Force activitites, and 8 Fast Sealift Ships
(FSS) that provide fast and efficient roll-on/roll-off capability for both
fleet exercises and real-time mobilizations. (7:8)
In all (and excluding Desert Shield/Desert Storm surges), MSC operates
between 130 and 150 ships at any given time in all parts of the world. To
support that fleet, MSC maintains area/sub-area commands and field offices
worldwide. Although typically staffed by Navy personnel at the higher
echelons, the great majority of these staffs are comprised of Government
Civil Service employees with backgrounds in engineering, ship operations,
Navy supply systems and management, contracting and medical services. Put
simply, they provide all ship husbanding services required to support MSC
ships inport.
As a follow-up to the 1972 transfer of Navy support ships to MSC, and
in response to anticipated budget reductions, the Deputy Chief of Opera-
tions for Logistics requested a formal study of the feasibility of further
Navy ship transfers. Conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) and
released in July 1990, the study assessed the potential for achieving man-
power and cost savings by transferring specific classes of combat fleet
support ships to MSC for operation with civilian crews.
The study concluded that the transfer of 41 shuttle ships and
tenders to MSC would result in annual savings of almost 400
million dollars and possibly more. The savings derive from
substantially smaller crews on active MSC ships, and from the
smaller fleet of shuttle ships needed to accomplish the under-
way replenishment mission once they are freed from the constraints
on operating days per ship and on days at sea per crewmember that
are placed on Navy ships with military crews. (12:iii)
Shuttle ships in this case refers to UNREP oilers, ammunition ships and
stores ships. Tenders are repair ships which carry a large complement of
military maintenance personnel. In the latter, the study concluded that
"the operation of the tenders would be transferred to civilians, but mili-
tary personnel in the repair departments would continue to provide mainte-
nance services to other Navy ships and submarines." (12:5) In discussing
the anticipated crew reductions through civilianization, the study offered
the following explanation:
MSC is able to operate Combat Logistics Force ships with much
smaller crew sizes in part because skilled mariners are hired.
One reason for higher manning levels on Navy vessels is that
unskilled recruits constantly must be trained to replace more
skilled sailors who spend only a few years in uniform. MSC
crewmembers are more likely to remain on the job, as they pursue
maritime careers. (12:7)
Although the study focused on relative costs and potential benefits,
it also raised questions about the possible losses and potentially nega-
tive aspects of these ship transfers. Most of these issues have been
raised before by numerous other sources -- indeed some have continued as
discussion topics since the first transfer was enacted in 1972. But if
the current impetus toward civilianization of fleet support continues, and
the long-term fiscal picture certainly indicates that possibility, then
these issues must be resolved or accepted as part of the package.
It is certain that Combat Information Center (CIC) capability would be
reduced, although military detachments onboard MSC fleet support ships
would continue to have the ability to coordinate task group underway re-
plenishment operations and exercise formations. (12:7)
All weapon systems, including antiair warfare, are routinely removed
from Navy ships which transfer to MSC. They retain only limited small
arms capability for restricted self-defense. This raises the larger issue
of an increased requirement for Navy convoy protection of fleet support
ships in combat areas. It also represents an additional potential drain
on Navy combatant operations that may be difficult to support in the lean
years ahead. (4)
The reliability of civilian crews to maintain required high tempo ops
and to respond consistently under military control continues to be a pri-
ority issue. Since MSC NFAF crews typically operate at much higher tempos
than their Navy counterparts -- as much as two to three times more days at
sea per year -- it is somewhat difficult to adequately support a question
of their staying power. (4) The consistent response issue cannot be easily
predicted, although the performance of civilian crews during World War II,
Korea and Vietnam does not indicate a lack of resolve.
Less reserve onboard manpower to replace casualties, and fewer sailors
to form firefighting and damage control teams is also a concern. (12:7)
There is significant validity in the assertion that reduced manning must
also result in reduced crew on-the-spot replacement capability, as well as
smaller crisis response teams. However, it should be noted that MSC crews
receive the same team training in firefighting and damage control as their
military counterparts, and must be regularly certified by both Coast Guard
and MSC inspectors.
Finally, transfer of increasing numbers of fleet support ships to MSC
will result in considerable losses in Navy training and special program
areas. For instance, fewer opportunities will exist for military sailors
to develop fleet support skills. (12:7) Fleet support ships are typically
used as deep draft command training platforms for future carrier Command-
ing Officers. (4) And not least, the Women-at-Sea program will suffer an
enormous loss of already limited billets aboard Navy ships. Indeed, total
civilianization of fleet support would probably kill the program entirely,
unless Congress revoked the ban on women serving aboard combatants.
From a different perspective, MSC also has some difficulty with the
assumption of additional fleet support responsibility, although their con-
cerns lie primarily with the ships to be transferred and the time/money
constraints imposed. Navy ships transferred to MSC are always old, worn
and incompatible with union requirements for crew habitability. The re-
sulting necessity for extensive shipyard periods to upgrade material and
equipment, and provide minimum habitability modifications to smooth union
negotiations, rarely conforms with the Navy's intention for that ship's
continued operation without interruption. Time constraints also impact
on the ability to provide effective crew training, and to sufficiently in-
volve the Coast Guard and ABS in preliminary maintenance and equipment
issues. Finally, decisions to transfer ships are almost always made under
some duress and without thorough advance planning, which means sufficient
funding has rarely been programmed in the fleet budget to handle turnover
expenses. (4)
As this paper is being written, MSC is struggling to coordinate plans
to comply with the Navy's desire to transfer all seven Afloat Stores Ships
in the AFS-1 MARS class by the end of FY 94. (4) Considering that the
process begins nine months before actual transfer of each ship -- allowing
for inspection and development of a major work contract proposal for com-
mercial shipyard bidding -- early 1991 is not a moment too soon to start.
These ships present a particular problem because they have less capabil-
ity than the current MSC AFS class (smaller flight deck, fewer UNREP stat-
ions, less cargo capacity), are steam-driven and slower, and are extremely
labor intensive in cargo handling due to antiquated equipment. (1) Plans
for extensive shipyard modifications have already been severely curtailed
due to funding restrictions and ongoing operational requirements.
Nonetheless, MSC will crew these ships with approximately half the
size of the standard military crew. And although transfer costs are esti-
mated at about $8 million per ship, anticipated savings have been project-
ed at approximately $4.6 million per year per ship. (4)
The Navy is also "in the talking stage" concerning a proposal to
transfer the 177 class of UNREP oilers and the entire 22-ship salvage and
towing force to MSC. (2) If this is an indication of things to come, an
"American RFA" may well become a reality.
In the final analysis, civilianizing fleet support is probably the
best (and maybe the only) alternative to unacceptable reductions in the
Navy's capability for combatant force projection. But the process and
adjustment won't be easy, neat or painless. Unresolved issues are likely
to remain unresolved as budget constraints continue to force reluctant
leaders into quick decisions and urgent measures. There may be lessons
to learn from the British Royal Fleet Auxiliary experience. But odds
are, as is usual, we'll learn our lessons as we go. If the current trend
of fiscal constraint continues (as seems likely for the foreseeable
future), the increasing dependence on MSC operation of combat logistics
ships seems equally assured. As the Navy shrinks, MSC will expand. That
is undoubtedly good news for a Merchant Marine force that has faced an
uncertain future for the last decade or more. An expanded MSC equates
to increased sea-going billets and promotion opportunities. It is also
good news for American commercial shipyards, who perform the bulk of MSC
ship repairs and upgrades, and who have had a particularly difficult time
surviving the onslaught of foreign competition.
However, budget-motivated changes that save short-term dollars are
rarely without cost in the long-term, and "false economies" are most
often recognizable in retrospect. Hopefully, civilianizing fleet support
is more than good news for a few -- but also a good idea that will serve
the majority well. In any case, the implications for the next century are
worthy of today's contemplation.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Cook, David, Director of AFS Engineering Division for Military
Sealift Command. Personal interview about engineeering
issues in AFS transfers. Washington, DC, March 21, 1991.
2. Frump, David, CDR, USN, Director of Naval Fleet Auxiliary Division
for Military Sealift Command. Personal interview about Navy
ship transfers to NSC. Washington, DC, March 21, 1991.
3. Gibson, Andrew E., and Captain William M. Calhoun, U. S. Navy.
"Barely in Time: The Successful Struggle to Create the
Transportation Command." Naval War College Review, XLIII
(Autumn 1990), 72-80.
4. McDiarmid, James, Sealift Introduction Division for Military
Sealift Command. Personal Interview about the planned AFS
transfer to NSC. Washington, DC, March 21, 1991.
5. Military Sealift Command. AFS 1-7 UNREP System and Cargo Handling
Configuration. Washington, DC, 1991.
6. Military Sealift Command Legislative and Public Affairs Office.
Backgrounder. Washington, D.C., 1991.
7. Military Sealift Command Legislative and Public Affairs Office.
Command Brief for MSC. Washington, DC, February 1991.
8. Military Sealift Command Legislative and Public Affairs Office.
The Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force. Washington, DC, 1990.
9. Military Sealift Command Legislative and Public Affairs Office.
The Navy IndustriaT Fund. Washington, DC, 1990.
10. Mulligan, R. D. "Royal Fleet Auxiliary - A Changing Business."
RNEC Centenary Year Conference Presentation, 8 September 1989.
11. Royal Fleet Auxiliary. London, England: RFA, 1989.
12. Rost, Ronald F., et al. "Civilian Manning of Combat Logistics
Force Ships: The Potential for Cost Savings." CNA Research
Memorandum 90-130, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria,
Virginia, July 1990.
13. Wallace, David. "Ready for Anything -- The Royal Fleet Auxiliary
Today." The Magazine of Lloyd's Register of Shipping (100A1),
London, England, September 1979.
14. Whitehurst, Clinton H., Jr. The Defense Transportation System.
Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, 1976.
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