"My Kingdom For A Horse" - Problem Of War Termination And Modern Military Strategy
AUTHOR LCdr Mary K. Rich, USN
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: "My Kingdom For a Horse" - Problem of War Termination and Modern Mili-
tary Strategy.
I. Theme: War termination is a complex process for linking policy and
strategy to the postwar settlement which must address the issues that
precipitated the conflict.
II. Thesis: "Simple old soldiers" must not press for complete military vic-
tory; similarly, political leaders must not abdicate policy to strategy.
III. Discussion. The struggle to resist military defeat and capitulation, ac-
cording to Clausewitz, should be tied to the belligerent's military and eco-
nomic capabilities to continue resistance, as well as his war aims and na-
tional policies. The difficulty of war termination is compounded when a bel-
ligerent refuses to accept political defeat after he has been defeated
decisively on the battlefield. War termination models attempt to rationalize
this paradox and envisage other factors that contribute to ending wars:
domestic politics, perceptions of relative strength, bureaucratic interests,
and most importantly, expectations about the postwar settlement --
sovereignty, political stability, economic recovery. The war in the Pacific
between the United States and Japan was a struggle of unprecedented dimen-
sions, representing the difficulties of war termination in modern industrial
societies where belligerents have unlimited means to impose their will on the
enemy. The relationship of war aims and belligerents' motivations and percep-
tions to war termination, when examined against the record of military and
political events that coalesced in the final months of the Pacific war to end
the fighting, validates the utility of war termination models. More impor-
tantly, the interaction of opposing strategies and objectives highlights the
problems of restoring peace when war termination is shortsighted.
IV. Summary. The concept of total war introduces a new paradigm in war
terminations that is especially relevant in modern industrial societies where
belligerents have unlimited means to impose their will the enemy. In total
war a belligerent who has suffered strategic defeat may nonetheless in
desperation choose to exhaust his remaining resources, rather than accept
political defeat.
V. Conclusions. Strategy must serve policy; specifically, the objective of
military strategy is to win wars and thus achieve the political objectives for
which the war is fought. Just as military planners need to understand that
statesmanship can also be decisive for achieving victory, so too must politi-
cal leaders be sensitive to the limitations of military strategies and be
ready to modify war aims to end hostilities. To this end, an accurate ap-
praisal of the costs of contained resistance and military prospects for vic-
tory is essential.
"My Kingdom For a Horse"
The Problem of War Termination and
Modern Military Strategy
Thesis. "Simple old soldiers" must not press for complete military victory;
similarly, political leaders must not abdicate policy to strategy.
I. War Termination Models
A. Concept of Strategic Defeat
B. Underlying Assumptions
C. International Relations
D. Bureaucratic Politics
E. Relationship of War Aims
1. Concept of Unconditional Surrender
2. Associated Military Strategy
II. Historical Analysis of WWII - Japan's Perspective
A. Domestic Politics
B. Japanese Military Strategy
C. Opposition to Unconditional Surrender
D. Potsdam Declaration
E. Surrender
III. Historical Analysis of WWII - U.S. Perspective
A. Military Planning
B. State Department Interests
C. Role of Unconditional Surrender
D. Potsdam Declaration
E. Soviet Entry into War
F. Atomic Bomb
"My Kingdom for a Horse"
The Problem of War Termination and
Modern Military Strategy
War termination is a complex problem confronting modern nation states.
Since this century's first Great War the nature of international conflict
has perhaps for the first time approached Clausewitz's concept of total war.
That the unlimited means of waging war today can be decisively translated
into battles of annihilation is demonstrated only too clearly by the recent
Gulf War. The struggle to resist military defeat and capitulation, accord-
ing to Clausewitz, should be tied to the belligerent's military and economic
capabilities to continue resistance, as well as his war aims and national
policies.1 However, other concerns also arising far from the battlefield
but not addressed by Clausewitz -- national prestige, competing bureaucratic
interests, and international politics -- compound the difficulties of war
termination. Consequently, no longer is battlefield victory the sine qua
non for war termination; rather, it may be nothing more than the prelude to
war termination. In the era of total war, we might well adapt Clemenceau's
adage that war is "too important to be left solely to the generals," to "war
termnation is too important to be left solely to winning the war."
1. Peter Paret, "Clausewitz" in Makers of Modern Strategy ed. Peter Paret
(Princeton, 1986), 199, 210.
Except insofar as winning 'incidentally' involves war termination,2 the
transition from war to peace (ie., conflict resolution) encompasses more
than ceasing hostilities because it also defines what happens after war
ends. That is, the victor is concerned that the enemy does not renew
hostilities after a short interlude of peace.3 However, expectations of
postwar settlements -- sovereignty, political stability, economic recovery
-- irrevocably affect how wars end in a total war milieu. This paper will
examine the problems of war termination between nations and focus on the
role of military strategy in ending wars. Specifically, this paper will
discuss war termination issues against the backdrop of the Pacific war be-
tween the United States and Japan (1941-1945), and correlate military opera-
tions with Grand Strategy. Clausewitz's assertion that war is based on ra-
tional choices and calculations, arrived at by relating means to ends, is
largely refuted by the evidence of modern warfare which uses unlimited
means.
Fighting protracted wars is costly and exhausting. Theoretically, when
the goal of hostilities is the total destruction of the enemy, resistance
will continue down to the last man. However, not since the destruction of
Carthage has a war culminated in such a fashion. Conflict between bel-
2. Janice Gross Stein, "War Termination and Conflict Reduction or How
Wars Should End" in Jerusalem Journal of International Relations (Fall,
1975), 1. A.J.P. Taylor's How Wars End (Hamish Hamilton, 1983) is a good
example of equating war termination with the 'incidental' cessation of
hostilities.
3. Michael I. Handel, Ward Strategy and Intelligence (Frank Cass, 1989),
457.
ligerents will cease when they are able to agree mutually upon a settlement.
The problem of war termination, then, is to negotiate terms for ending the
struggle that will be binding without effecting the total destruction of the
enemy.4 Negotiating terms, in turn, will be influenced by perceptions of
the belligerents in reference to their respective power. Studies of war
termination within this framework have narrowly focused on norms for ad-
judicating relative military strength, which will then allow belligerents to
decide whether victory can be attained at a price they are willing and able
to pay.5 This approach to war termination necessarily assumes a rational
calculation of costs versus benefits.
The concept of strategic surrender provides a ready reference for cal-
culating costs versus benefits. In this model, a belligerent's residual
power to continue resistance is weighed against his expectations about the
postwar political settlement. If a state has unharnessed resources that it
can mobilize or commit to strengthen its bargaining power, then it may be
willing to incur additional war costs to achieve something better than
defeat or stalemate. However, when continued resistance can no longer in-
fluence the outcome, the loser will surrender his war-making capability and
accept the political terms dictated by the winner. In a total war the
denouement is reached when the loser has no hope of exhausting his op-
4. Lewis A. Coser, "The Termination of Conflict" in Journal of Conflict
Resolution (December l961), 347.
5. For examples of war studies in this category, see H.A. Callahan, What
Makes a War End? (Vanguard, 1944) and Fred C.Ikle, Every War Must End
(Columbia University, 1977).
ponent's manpower, nor has the economic resources with which to reverse his
own losses but wishes to preserve his remaining strength against further at-
trition. In either case, the strategic surrender model posits that
capitulation is preceded by a rational calculation of political outcome, ap-
praisal of military prospects, and estimation of the cost for continued
resistance.6
Rational calculation must be predicated on knowledge of both sides'
strengths and goals, that is, relative present and future military strength,
its effect on continued resistance, and value of political stakes. Addi-
tionally, one or both of the belligerents must be able to compare costs and
benefits of alternative courses of action.7 Critics of the rational model
of war termination charge that rival bureaucratic interests, and not indi-
viduals influence the decision to end a war, and further, that knowledge of
the enemy's political goals and values, or even of one's own, is incomplete
or imperfect. The ability to measure the proportionality of war costs --
human losses, industrial ruination -- in relation to the objectives -- ter-
ritorial acquisition, security -- are certainly chimerical at best.
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the rational model is defended by its
proponents on the premise that a policy maker who lacks comprehensive knowl-
edge will nonetheless act rationally to "satisfice" [sic] within the bounds
6. Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender (Standford, l958), 5-27.
7. Handel, 470-473.
of information that is available.8 If, for example, the available evidence
points to defeat, then the loser will rationally cut his losses.9
Another assumption underlying war termination is that military victories
produce predictable political outcomes. Although wars are fought to achieve
political objectives, social, economic, and international constraints may
intervene to prevent the victor from translating military success into
decisive political advantage. The Arab-Israeli Wars aptly illustrate the
tenuous linkage between military victory and political events.10 Further,
the terms "victor" and "defeated" tend to be defined solely by military
criteria. Such a narrow definition, however, may not reflect the postwar
world wherein a belligerent who has emerged victorious nonetheless lacks the
resources to shape the new international order.11 This paradox was recog-
nized almost a hundred years ago in a memorandum of May, 1892, from the
Chief of the Russian Imperial General Staff, General Obruchev, to the Rus-
sian Minister of War:
In any case, the conflict will end with a general congress; and at that
congress the party that at the moment represents the strongest force
will carry the greatest weight. The peace treaty will be written not so
much by the victor, if the latter has exhausted his forces, as by the
8. William O. Staudenmaier, "Conflict Termination in the Nuclear Era" in
Conflict Termination and Military Strategy ed. Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith
A. Dunn (Westview/Frederick A. Praeger, 1987), 18-19.
9. Kecskemeti, 9.
10. For a discussion of the tenuous linkage between military victory and
political positions, see Staudenmaier, 2O-21 and Stein, 9-10. In Martin Van
Creveld's The Transformation of War (Free Press,1991), the difficulties of
linking military and political outcomes is cited as one of the reasons con-
ventional warfare has become obsolete among modern nation states.
11. Janice Stein, 7-8.
side that has preserved its forces and can threaten to launch a new war
under conditions advantageous to itself.12
Issues of international relations offer a broader view of war termina-
tion than can an analysis of military outcomes alone. Of interest here are
the role and impact of military and political leaders, the influence of
domestic politics, including public opinion, and states' perceptions (or
misperceptions) of one another. For example, when it is not possible to at-
tribute rationality to war leaders -- Adolf Hitler, Saddam Hussein -- then
the premise that decision-making itself is rational is subject to chal-
lenge. Likewise, military leaders may pursue irrational objectives (honor,
prestige, etc.). Prolonged fighting or reversals in battlefield fortune may
cause a shift in public support for the war and lead to war weariness. In
democracies this element of Clausewitz's famous war trilogy may contribute
to a decision by the government to terminate hostilities (Vietnam). War
termination from the perspective of international relations must also con-
sider policy making and bureaucratic politics.13
Bureaucratic politics in relation to foreign policy making represent the
interests and behavior of different groups and individuals within the fed-
eral bureaucracy -- Congress, Defense Department, Department of State -- who
maneuver to shape Presidential decisions and actions to reflect their per-
ceptions of national security interests. Bureaucrats are defined as
civilian career officials, political appointees, and military officers. The
12. George F. Kennan, The Fateful Alliance (Pantheon/Random, 1986), 265.
13. Handel, 458-470.
"public" influences foreign policy formulation only insofar as its senti-
ments and perceptions of national security interests are at great variance
with those of the bureaucracy. At the White House level, maintaining Amer-
ican power and prestige underlie national security decisions, which are con-
ditioned by domestic politics, the economy, and personal interests. The in-
teraction of individual motives, organizational interests, and sources of
power of the various participants is unpredictable. Consequently, the dif-
ferent strategies developed by bureaucrats to shape the President's perspec-
tive on an issue may only be coincidental to the final decision. In the
words of President Kennedy: "The essence of ultimate decision remains im-
penetrable to the observer -- often, indeed to the decider himself."14
Within the context of war termination, bureaucratic politics will inter-
vene to determine both the political objectives of the war as well as the
military strategy for defeating the enemy. As the war progresses, percep-
tions about battlefield trends and correlation of forces will underwrite
changes in the military and political objectives articulated by the dominant
bureaucratic participants. More importantly, however, bureaucrats will
maneuver to shape postwar foreign and domestic policies to secure both long
term U.S. interests and their primacy in postwar decision making; that is,
to influence the postwar political configuration.15
14. Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Brook-
ings Institution: 1981), 5-6, 14-15, 63-82, 116, 232.
15. In fighting to a Finish (Cornell University, 1988) Leon V. Sigal has
disaggregated the major bureaucratic players involved in the Pacific war and
examined how the conflicts arising from their diverse motives and organiza-
tional interests affected war termination.
Before turning to the final months of the war when military and politi-
cal events coalesced to end the fighting, I will examine U.S. war goals to
determine their relationship to war termination. The formula for uncondi-
tional surrender expressed U.S. and coalition war goals. Although it served
as the basis of war propaganda to forestall war weariness and sustain our
Allies in the bleakest moments of the war, it failed to articulate meaning-
ful political objectives for the war.16 Indeed, its very ambiguity com-
pounded the dual problems of formulating military strategy and allocating
limited war resources in far-flung and vast theaters of operations.
The concept of unconditional surrender originated with President
Roosevelt, who foremost wanted a legal basis for terminating hostilities.
He attributed the failure of World War I to secure a lasting peace to the
postwar settlement which Germany repudiated because it was harsher than the
original armistice agreement.17 Thus in Roosevelt's mind there would be no
"broken promises" to rankle the enemy after the war.18 Additionally, uncon-
ditional surrender would provide the victors with carte blanche to restruc-
ture Japanese society -- military occupation, postwar punishment of war
criminals, disarmament -- and thus to eradicate the militarism responsible
16. Anne Armstrong, Unconditional Surrender (Rutger's University, 1961),
8-11, 59-63; Maurice Matloff, Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars: FDR as War Leader
(U.S. Air Force Academy, 1964), 5-8, 9-12. For a discussion of the peace
treaty as a legal instrument, see Stein, 2-3, 13.
17. Brian L. Villa, "The U.S. Army, Unconditional Surrender, and the
Potsdam Proclamation" in Journal of American History (June 1976), 69-70.
18. Matloff, 3,11; Armstrong, 40, 44-45.
for Japanese aggression. This concept of war as a crusade to vanquish evil
reflected his concern for a lasting peace, and likewise appealed to public
sentiments for redressing the infamy of Pearl Harbor.19
President Roosevelt was unwilling to articulate his political objectives
for the war because he wanted to postpone the postwar political settlement
until after victory had been won. He had no desire to preserve the European
balance of power system and accordingly did not want to be bound by politi-
cal or territorial concessions to either America's enemies or allies.20 In-
stead, he supported a new international order embodied in a United Nations
organization to maintain peace. Unconditional surrender, as a formula for
total victory, would also provide the lowest common denominator for coopera-
tion among the Allies and thus overcome the inherent difficulties of coali-
tion warfare arising from conflicting political goals.21
In conformance with the policy of unconditional surrender, President
Roosevelt refused to allow military strategy to serve the ends of policy.22
Insofar as military exigencies did not intrude upon policy, the sole end of
strategy was to achieve the destruction of enemy armed forces, and thus
remained divorced from political considerations. To the State Department
the President delegated planning for the postwar settlement; thus the State
19. Kecskemeti, 25-26; Villa, 70-71; Matloff, 1O-11; Armstrong, 16-21.
See also John W. Dower's War Without Mercy (Pantheon/Random, 1986) for a
valuable discussion of the dimension of racism in the struggle to uproot
evil and tyranny.
20. Matloff, 11-12.
21. Armstrong, 39; Matloff, 12.
22. Armstrong, 249-251.
Department had no role in strategy formulation. That President Roosevelt
separated military strategy from political aims may be deduced from examina-
tion of the record of the major Allied war conferences during the first
years of the war: Casablanca, First Quebec, Moscow, Cairo, Teheran, Second
Quebec. Those were attended by the Commanders in Chief and their military
staffs for the purpose of planning military strategy and priorities, but
were inconspicuous for the absence of political advisers from the State De-
partment.23
Although military strategy in the Pacific was subordinate to the policy
of defeating Germany first, the pressing problem of defending the Southwest
Pacific theater from imminent Japanese encroachment demanded immediate ac-
tion. However, ad hoc plans to prevent further Allied collapse conflicted
with Lend Lease production schedules and logistic capabilities, and
divergent British and American strategies for resource allocation. When
combined defensive operations under the British Supreme Allied Commander in
the Pacific (Field Marshall Wavell) failed to hold Burma in 1942, they were
abandoned; the headquarters was dissolved and responsibility for planning
defensive operations was reassigned to individual theaters of operations:
Central and Southwest Pacific theaters under American cognizance; and
India-Burma-China under the British.24 Consequently, Allied strategy for
defeating the Japanese reverted to the Rainbow series of war plans prepared
23. Armstrong, 5-6; 49-50.
24. Grace Pearson Hayes, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
World War II (U.S. Naval Institute, 1982), 61-81.
in 1939.25
Rainbow 5 assumed the rapid fall of the Philippines and strategic
maritime defensive operations to contain Japanese advances using limited
resources. Once British and American forces had defeated Germany and Italy,
they would be reassigned to the Pacific.26 However, by late 1942, half of
the available American ground forces and one-third of Army Air Corps were
fighting in the Pacific, and by December 1943, American manpower in the Pa-
cific outnumbered that in Europe.27 The amphibious island campaign underly-
ing maritime strategy to interdict Japanese sea lines of communications had
required greater army ground and air resources than originally projected.
Additionally, failure to establish unity of command in the Pacific dupli-
cated manpower and logistics requirements.28
Notwithstanding these inefficiencies and shortcomings, American supe-
riority in firepower, mobility, logistics, and wartime production were
decisive in reversing Japanese victories.29 Japan's defeats at Midway, the
Solomons, New Guinea, and the Marshalls crippled Japanese offensive capabil-
ity. Additionally, strategic bombardment and naval interdiction of Japanese
25. Hayes, 88, 96-103; Clayton D. James, "American and Japanese Strategy
in the Pacific War" in Paret, 711.
26. James, 710-711; Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (Indiana
University,1973), 270.
27. Weigley, 270-271.
28. James, 720-721, 726-729.
29. James, 729. For an overview of American military operations in the
Pacific, see Weigley, 269-311 and Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski's For
the Common Defense (Free Press, 1984), 430-470.
sea lanes virtually paralyzed industrial production and denied Japan's ac-
cess to critical raw materials.30 Yet the war did not end. Although Japan
had exhausted its resources to continue the struggle, it was willing to
prolong the war. Conversely, America's policy for total victory was
stalemated by conflicting courses of action.31 The denouement of rationally
calculating policy and appraising military prospects was at hand. In-
transigence prevailed, however, and fighting continued for another year.
Why?
Historical analysis of events from January to August 1945, juxtaposed
against the construct of different war termination models, suggests a number
of complex reasons for the continuation of hostilities.32 Although there is
agreement on the essence of the historical record, each model imputes dif-
30. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) (Pacific), Japan's Struggle to
End the War (Government Printing Office, 1956), 3, 10-12; Togo Shigenori,
The Cause of Japan (Simon and Schuster, 1956), 275-276; Gar Alperovitz,
Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (Elisabeth Sifton/Penguin, 1985),
154; Robert J.C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Standford University,
1954), 11; and Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War (Pantheon, 1968), 181-202.
31. For an overview of conflicting military strategies, see Weigley, 269-
311 and Hayes, 479-482, 492-507, 563-566, 588-590, 603-624, 645-652. For war
termination from the perspective of key State Department individuals see
Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War (Newberry
Awards Records, 1985; James F. Brynes, Speaking Frankly (Harper and
Brothers, 1947); and Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era Volume II (Riverside,
l952).
32. Sophomoric historical analysis will not be conducive to war termina-
tion studies. This analysis must avoid the military historians' usually
narrow focus of ascribing simple cause and effect relationships to histori-
cal events, with little consideration for the complexity and inter-
relationships of diverse factors. Judging military history, one would think
that diplomacy and politics played no apparent role in history. At the same
time, the antipathy of diplomatic historians to military history must also
be eschewed.
fering degrees of significance to the motivations of the belligerents and
their perceptions of events. Let us now examine those motivations and per-
ceptions and how they interacted to end the fighting.
On the Japanese side, military reverses and domestic economic paralysis
helped to strengthen the political voice of moderates who wanted to end the
war. Indeed, the Japanese defeat at Saipan has been linked to the fall of
the Tojo war government which represented the militaristic interests of the
officer corps. Japanese collapse in Okinawa further eroded the credibility
of the military to win the war, and an even stronger "peace" government than
the one following Tojo's fall emerged a week after hostilities broke out
there.33 Although intransigent militarist factions still survived in the
new government, the peace-seekers had greater political room to maneuver for
ending the war. Regardless of their inclinations, the different political
cliques recognized the desperation of Japan's position to further prosecute
the war, based on reports of fleet, air, and merchant ship losses and
deteriorating economic capacity. However, each pursued a different course
of action: continue fighting with renewed vigor and sacrifice; negotiate an
end to the war; or surrender unconditionally by accepting the Allied
terms.34
Those political leaders who wanted to offer further resistance based
their prospects on the existing strength of the army, which numbered three
33. USSBS (Pacific), 1-3, 6; Saburo Hayashi, Kogun: The Japanese Army in
Pacific War (U.S. Marine Corps Association, 1959), 111-112.
34. USSBS, 1-4; Shigenura, 274-335; Ienaga, 203-228; and Butow, 166-188.
million even after the fall of Saipan. This was clearly a force capable of
inflicting heavy losses on the Allies.35 Additionally, the Allies had only
occupied a small proportion of the territory which Japan had seized earlier
in the war. Japanese military strategy had been formulated to offer prog-
ressively stiffer resistance, culminating in the eventual defense of the
homeland island. To that end, at the beginning of 1945 military operations
in China shifted from annihilation of the Chinese Chungking forces resisting
in the interior provinces, to preparations for repulsing American amphibious
landings along the coastal areas of South and Central China. Priority was
given to destruction of air fields in China from which American B-29 bombers
had operated to sink Japanese shipping in the China Sea and to launch raids
against Japan proper. Army divisions in China were also shifted to Man-
churia and Korea to prepare for anticipated Soviet entry into the war, based
on intelligence reports in March 1945 of Soviet troop buildup in Siberia.
(Their political objective in regards to their fear of opening of
hostilities with the Soviet was to offer the Russians generous terms in ex-
change for neutrality.) Finally, units in Okinawa were transferred to the
homeland to bolster defenses for "the decisive struggle." This redirection
in strategy reflected the uncompromising Army position that Japan would
35. USSBS (Pacific), 1. This military manpower figure included roughly
460,000 (Hayashi, 173) for the army in Manchuko [Manchuria]. Taken alone,
this assessment of Japan's military power is validated by the difficulties
of Allied war planners and commanders alike to project the casualties for
invasion of the Japanese homeland. For a further discussion of these dif-
ficulties, see Hayashi, 102-112; Sigal, 109, 116-117, 119, 121, 205-206; Al-
perovitz, 10; Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued (Princeton University, 1961), 180.
resist to the bitter end.36
Supporting the militarists in part were moderates who opposed uncondi-
tional surrender. They hoped to conduct wartime diplomacy backed by Japan's
creditable military capability so as to win concessions from the Allies for
ending the war. Specifically, they wanted to preserve the "national
polity"37 and sovereignty of the Emperor, and were willing to disarm
unilaterally, but be left to prosecute their own war criminals. They were
also willing to cede conquered territories (with perhaps the exception of
Korea and Formosa, for reasons of agricultural autarchy). As Japan's posi-
tion steadily deteriorated during the early months of 1945 the moderates
pressed to negotiate an end to the war before its military strength was to-
tally exhausted. They attempted to parlay their fear of Soviet belligerency
into a request for Soviet mediation to end the war on terms more acceptable
than unconditional surrender. The request reflected their belief that
Soviet interests would also be served by having a strong postwar ally for
its looming confrontation with the United States.38 They rejected approach-
36. Hayashi, 90-91, 137-146, 169-175.
37. National polity reflected the unique characteristics of the Japanese
nation -- purity, filial piety, virtue, loyalty to the Emperor -- that set
the Japanese people apart from all other peoples. See Dower, 221-222.
38. Shigenori, 279, 286; Butow, 112-141; and Sigal, 49-54. It is
dumbfounding that Stalin did not attempt to extract from the Japanese the
same -- if not better -- territorial concessions ceded to him by the Allies
at Yalta in exchange for neutrality, without having to fire a single shot!
When juxtaposed against the American pessimism in June 1945 about not being
able to stop the Soviets from advancing against Japan if they wanted to,
Stalin's restraint from political duplicity is even more remarkable. The
Americans would not have been able to prevent Stalin from mediating peace in
the Pacific any more than they could have prevented Soviet forces from in-
vading Manchuria. In view of Japanese reluctance against opening a second
front in Manchuria in 1941 to coincide with Germany's offensive into the
Soviet Union, certainly Soviet mediation could have been explained in terms
of Stalin's "gratitude" to Japan.
ing neutral countries for mediation because they believed that the United
States would only reiterate its demand for unconditional surrender: if the
Soviet Union with its influence and strategic interests in the Transamur
region were unable to negotiate acceptable peace terms for Japan, then
neutrals likewise could not.39
Advocates of unconditional surrender within the wartime coalition
government feared the annihilation of the Japanese nation and people. They
were willing to accept the Allied terms to end the war immediately pending
only the clarification of the Emperor's sovereignty. The peace proponents
rejected the political objectives of both the militarists and the moderates
concerning the Soviet Union: the militarists' desire for neutrality on the
grounds of lost opportunity,40 and the moderates' for mediation on the basis
of pragmatism. They correctly interpreted Soviet equivocation since March
1945 on Japanese peace proposals41 as an ominous signal of Soviet inten-
tions. The peace leaders further recognized the futility of negotiating a
separate end to hostilities with the Chungking forces because of U.S. in-
fluence in China.42 In view of Japan's bleak prospects for influencing ei-
ther the military or political peace terms, the unconditional surrender ad-
39. Shigenori, 286.
40. The time to forge cordial relationships with the Soviet Union would
have been when Japan was militarily strong, not weak as in her current posi-
tion. See Shigenori, 280.
41. For discussions on Soviet maneuvers to avoid "answering the mail,"
see Feis, 54-57, 65, 68-69, 92; Shigenori, 296, 298, 301, 307; and USSBS
(Pacific), 7-8.
42. Shigenori, 303.
vocates were unwilling to sacrifice additional resources to continue Japa-
nese resistance. Ending the war immediately would secure the underpinnings
of Japanese postwar reconstruction; further belligerency would risk certain
devastation.
The loss of Okinawa intensified the political debate within the govern-
ment to end the war. The political leaders perceived Okinawa as a strategic
defeat because it undermined all prospects for winning or ultimately turning
back an American invasion of the homeland.43 The position of the peace ad-
vocates remained unchanged. However, for the moderates the defeat at
Okinawa reinforced the urgency for Soviet intercession because similar
losses could only weaken Japanese wartime diplomacy which depended upon suc-
cessful military operations. Although sobered by the Okinawa defeat, the
militarists nonetheless continued to advocate a strategy of attrition to im-
pose unbearable losses on the Americans. If the U.S. nonetheless persisted
in its invasion of the homeland, then Japan could make peace after inflict-
ing as much damage as possible on Allied landing forces.
Despite efforts to end the war, the Japanese government publicly sup-
ported an increased war effort to bolster domestic confidence and army
morale.44 Privately, divergent factions within the cabinet continued to
struggle to reconcile the different military and political strategies for
43. Shigenori, 317.
44. Public discussion of foreign policy is often targeted to domestic
audiences vice other governments. See Stein, 22. American observers inter-
preted Japan's war rhetoric as indicative of the government's intransigent
position, not simply as propaganda to appease army fanatics. See Sigal, 147-
53.
ending the war. The unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945 further
underscored Japan's untenable position for continued resistance. When the
cabinet was unable to agree on a course of action, the Emperor in June 1944
initiated a conference of the Supreme War Direction Council.45 After
listening to the members' official opinions, the Emperor asked them to con-
sider a plan for ending the war and defending the home island.46 The Im-
perial desire for peace influenced war policy only insofar as the members
would be able to concur on a strategy for implementing it. If consensus
could not be reached and one of the dissenting members resigned, the cabinet
would dissolve. Successive collapses of the Japanese government would have
exposed the fragileness of the peace initiatives and perhaps invited an army
coup to reassert military control over the war effort. Although the Army
Minister refused to support unconditional surrender to the last day of the
war, he was also unwilling to resign out of fear of jeopardizing the
stability of the government and thereby prolonging the war.
The United States issued the Potsdam Declaration on 26 July as a final
appeal to the Japanese government to surrender. The declaration detailed
the conditions for surrender, threatening annihilation of Japanese armed
45. The Supreme War Direction Council was established in August 1943 to
formulate political and military policy for prosecution of the war, includ-
ing manpower and economic decisions. Its members were limited to the
Premier, Foreign Minister, Army Minister, Navy Minister, Army Chief of
Staff, and Navy Chief of Staff. Because the Council excluded secretaries
and lesser members, its deliberations were private, thus removing inhibi-
tions on free exchange of opinions. See USSBS (Pacific), 4 and Shigenori,
283.
46. USSBS (Pacific), 7.
forces if Japan did not capitulate. The essence of the declaration pres-
cribed military occupation, disarmament, prosecution of war criminals, and
cession of conquered territories. The declaration was ambiguous in its
omission of the national polity and role of the Emperor -- the two key is-
sues at stake for Japanese moderates and peace advocates. The peace advo-
cates immediately urged acceptance of the declaration to dispel any American
misperceptions about Japanese peace intentions.47 However, the final con-
sensus of the War Council was to defer acceptance of the Declaration until
the Soviet Union responded to the latest request for mediation. In the in-
terim, debate continued over the war crimes clause as well as the ambiguity
surrounding the future form of Japan's government and the role of Emperor.
There were, however, no objections to ending the war.
On 6 August, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima; on 8 Au-
gust, the second bomb hit Nagasaki; and on 9 August, the Soviet Union en-
tered the war against Japan. In the continuing debate on acceptance of the
Potsdam Declaration after these events, the army still intimated that it was
capable of inflicting another "Okinawa" on the Americans and insisted on
four conditions for surrender: no occupation, unilateral disarmament, Im-
perial sovereignty, and Japanese jurisdiction of war crimes. The Emperor
initiated another meeting of the War Council to break the deadlock. He
stated that in view of the gravity of the crisis, he did not wish to risk
47. When the press queried the premier about Japan's response to the
Potsdam Conference, he blundered into using a word that had varying shades
of meaning. The press sensationalized its coverage of the cabinet's
response by depicting the more severe meaning of the premier's term. See
Shigenori, 313 and Butow, 143-149.
the annihilation of the Japanese nation by prolonging the war, and therefore
could no longer rely on the performance of the army to restore peace.48
Whereupon the Japanese government surrendered to the American government on
10 August and accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration with the under-
standing that surrender did not prejudice the Emperor's sovereignty.
On 13 August the cabinet received the American reply which stated that
the authority of the Emperor upon surrender would be subject to the Supreme
Commander of Allied Power,49 and additionally that the ultimate form of
government would reflect the will of the Japanese people. The cabinet ob-
jected to making the Emperor subordinate to another individual and believed
that popular sovereignty would subvert the national polity. The army
resisted further compromises that would threaten the national polity and
refused to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. The army stated
its desire to continue the war until its sole condition of preserving the
national polity for surrender could be accommodated. The Emperor again in-
tervened to avert army opposition from undermining Japanese prospects for
peace. He reiterated that not accepting the Potsdam Declaration would im-
peril the national polity and risk annihilation of the Japanese nation.50
48. USSBS (Pacific), 8-9.
49. Obviously to be appointed, as there had been no Allied Supreme Com-
mander in the Pacific except for a couple brief months in the beginning of
the war. See Taylor, 199.
50. It is purely speculative to impugn ulterior motives to the Emperor
for his firmness to end the war, but the question of whether Hirohito wanted
to destroy the political power and traditional social and cultural prestige
of the military is intriguing. Recall Stalin's staunch admonitions to his
countrymen to offer fierce resistance to the invading Germans on the grounds
of national survival. The Soviets refer to World War II as their Great
Patriotic War, which immeasurably enhanced both Stalin's and the Red Army's
prestige. It's a counter factual fantasy to imagine that had Japan not sur-
rendered and successfully turned back the planned American invasion on the
He ended the war accepting the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, and asked
the cabinet to draft an Imperial rescript announcing Japan's surrender for
broadcast to the people.51
The motivations and perceptions of Japan's American counterparts in the
war were equally complex. Military strategy in the spring of 1945 for total
victory was attenuated by persistent service rivalries and the difficulty of
ending the war quickly with minimum casualties.52 The Navy postulated that
a maritime strategy of naval blockade alone would compel Japanese capitula-
tion. Army Air Force planners likewise advocated an independent strategy of
strategic bombardment for overcoming stubborn Japanese resistance. The
Army, however, maintained that a ground invasion of the homeland was essen-
tial for achieving decisive victory, and that aerial bombardment and naval
blockade weakened but did not destroy military resistance.53 The dif-
ficulties confronting the Joint Chiefs of Staff in melding the services'
divergent military strategies into a unified plan were only exacerbated by
the imperative for rapid victory.54 In addition to vindicating the effec-
(cont.)
home island, the Japanese Army would have enjoyed incalculable prestige in
Japanese politics and society.
51. USSBS (Pacific), 9.
52. The political leadership had imposed a twelve month deadline on the
services for victory in the Pacific following German capitulation. See
Villa, 74.
53. Sigal, 88-89, 137.
54. The compromise strategy reached planned for an amphibious invasion of
Kyushu. Further operations to land on the Tokyo plains were deferred pend-
ing the Kyushu outcome. See Sigal, 121.
tiveness of their respective strategies, the service planners also wanted to
establish the preeminence of their service in the postwar world and thus in-
crease their share of the declining defense budget following demobiliza-
tion.55
The belief that a military solution was necessary for the defeat of
Japan dominated planning to end the war. However, planners had doubts about
achieving the twelve month deadline for victory because of the difficulties
of logistics preparations and estimates of Japanese capabilities for in-
flicting heavy losses on the American forces. Military leaders thought the
policy of unconditional surrender would prolong Japanese resistance and thus
increase American casualties. Accordingly, Army and Navy planners recom-
mended retaining the Emperor to induce Japan to surrender.56
The State Department however opposed the military's efforts to modify
the President's surrender policy. The majority of its members supported un-
conditional surrender as the basis for reforming Japanese postwar society.57
55. Sigal, 178-17 and Perry McCoy Smith, The Air Forces Plans for Peace.
1943-45 (John Hopkins University, 1970). In fact, the Army Air Corps estab-
lished a separate planning division in 1943 to establish the autonomy of an
independent Air Force after the war. This division concentrated on
strategic bombing as the sole mission of the new service, with the goal to
obtain the lion's share of the postwar defense budget by consolidating all
aircraft. In addition, this division was relieved of all responsibility for
current military operations: its only mission was to plan for eventual ser-
vice autonomy.
56. The diplomatic record of General Marshall's opposition to uncondi-
tional surrender should not be confused with his support of the Army's
ground invasion p1an. He thought military strategy by itself could not
depend on Naval blockade or aerial bombardment to force Japan to accept un-
conditional surrender. See Villa, 75-92; Feis, 64; and Sigal, 111, 119-120,
137.
57. Vl1la, 88-89.
The objective for purging militarism from the Japanese national character
required a fundamental transformation of Japanese social and political in-
stitutions; retention of the Emperor would ultimately subvert that trans-
formation.58 Thus the costs and military risks attendant on invading Japan
were not compelling military reasons to abandon political objectives.59
Military planning for the invasion led the Joint Chiefs of Staff to
study the effect of Japanese political and military resistance on strategy
and conversely, the political and military effect of unconditional surrender
on Japanese resistance. The Joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) study which con-
sidered those issues concluded that the concept of unconditional surrender
was incomprehensive to the Japanese, but that if the Japanese people equated
with the concept with national annihilation, then they would resist fier-
cely. However, Imperial sanction of surrender, whether on conditional or
unconditional terms would restrain resistance. The study further concluded
that shared authority between the Emperor and the occupational commander
would ensure postwar political stability.60 Thus the military occupation of
Japan which was postulated for postwar military and social reform provided a
military reason for retaining the Emperor and thus mitigating the uncondi-
tional formula.61
A separate JIS study on Army Air and Navy strategy to end the war ex-
pressed a similar belief about unconditional surrender and recommended
58. Sigal, 128; Villa, 89.
59. Villa, 74-79.
60. Sigal, 85-86, 98-99, 131-32, 256-51; Villa, 80-84.
61. Villa, 81.
clarifying the meaning of the policy. Both studies estimated that the war
would end by fall 1945 if the Japanese people understood that surrender
would not imperil their existence. The State Department rejected both
studies. General Marshall countered with a suggestion for a new declaration
demanding the surrender of the Japanese people and explaining the terms of
unconditional surrender, to which the State Department agreed.62 Such a
declaration, however, had to be issued when the enemy was weak so as not to
be misperceived as a concession.63
The beginning of hostilities on Okinawa in April delayed the declaration
until the military outcome of the campaign could be determined. Although
American forces defeated the Japanese the U.S. suffered its highest army
casualties and naval ship losses of the war to date. Military planners thus
feared that Japan would threaten to inflict similar losses if the U.S. per-
sisted in demanding unconditional surrender.64 Officials calculated that an
appeal for unconditional surrender hinged on one of three decisive blows:
the atomic bomb, which was promised in late July; Soviet entry into the war,
expected in August; or an invasion of the home islands, planned for Novem-
62. Villa, 82-83.
63. Villa, 85; Ikle, 85-86.
64. It is ironic that while American planners thought the Japanese would
perceive the capture of Okinawa as a phyrric military victory, Japanese mod-
erates in turn rued their loss at Okinawa because it undermined their
wartime diplomacy to end the war. The Americans were correct in their ap-
praisal that the Japanese would use the threat of more Okinawa's to negoti-
ate for conditions for ending the war. The problem was governments are not
single actors, but comprised of divergent groups representing dissimilar
perceptions.
ber. Therefore, the opportune time for issuing the declaration would be
sometime in July.65
Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew, however, was dissatisfied about
linking statesmanship to military eventualities. He favored retaining the
Emperor to preserve postwar order and relations with the U.S. to counter the
threat of Soviet hegemony in the Far East.66 Grew appealed to the Presi-
dent to reconsider retaining the Emperor in light of those postwar political
objections. The President was sympathetic and directed additional study of
the surrender policy.
Members of the new committee were free to express personal views and
were not constrained to represent their organizational interests. Almost
unanimously they voted to approve retention of the Emperor to induce sur-
render and ensure postwar political stability. Dissension focused on
whether to make the declaration an appeal for surrender or an ultimatum
threatening Soviet entry into the war and invasion of the home island.67
The resulting draft declaration incorporated both of those views.
The President departed for Potsdam with the draft declaration to attend
the last major Allied conference of the war, 12-26 July. Accompanying him
was Secretary of State James Brynes who ultimately influenced the President
to delete the references in the declaration for retaining the Emperor, as
well as those warning of the pending Soviet entry into the war and invasion
65. Villa, 87.
66. Sigal, 97; Grew, 1447.
67. Sigal, 124-125; Villa, 87.
of the home island. Brynes was reluctant to have the President compromise
the policy for unconditional surrender and risk alienating the American pub-
lic.68 The President however agreed to preserve the Imperial institution to
effect an orderly surrender if the Japanese asked to retain the Emperor as a
condition for surrender.69
Although Soviet entry into the war was imminent, the President did not
discuss Far East issues with Stalin at the Potsdam Conference. His reluc-
tance to talk about Japanese defeat and demand for surrender may have been
motivated by his desire to avoid confrontation on the question of joint mil-
itary occupation. President Roosevelt had first approached Marshall Stalin
about entering the war against Japan in December 1941 immediately following
the attack on Pearl Harbor.70 Stalin replied that he could not risk a two
front war while he was fighting large scale operations against Germany.71
Successive Allied defeats in the Pacific in 1942 and the unprecedented
"kill-or-be-killed" nature of combat led military planners to postulate that
Soviet entry into the Pacific war was essential to destroy Japanese armed
forces for victory. Planners desired to use air bases in Siberia and con-
duct combined Russian-American ground offensives in China against the Japa-
68. Sigal, 248-252; Villa, 89; Brynes, 209-210.
69. Villa, 90-91. This agreement underlied the response to Japan's con-
ditional acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration.
70. United States Department of Defense, The Entry of the Soviet Union
into the War against Japan: Military Plans (Mimeograph, 1955), 1.
71. United States Department of Defense, 2. Additionally, the Soviet Union
signed a Non-Aggression Pact with Japan on 13 April 1941. See Alexander
Werth, Russia at War (Carrol & Graf, 1964), 121.
nese Kwantung Army.72 Based on that planning, the President reiterated his
request for Soviet participation at Teheran in 1943, to which Stalin tenta-
tively agreed, but not before Germany had been defeated.73 Thus military
strategy for total victory in the Pacific influenced policy74 and contrib-
uted to the Yalta territorial concessions for "inducing" Soviet entry into
the war.75
Although the Soviets promised participation in the war with Japan, dis-
cussions between American and Soviet military planners on concept of opera-
tions, intelligence, and Soviet capabilities and intentions in the Far East
were frustrated by poor Soviet cooperation. The Soviets were reluctant to
share details of their planning or respond to American queries for informa-
tion, and tended to only engage in combined planning discussions to leverage
Lend Lease material.76 Lack of Soviet and American military collaboration
to defeat Japan also reflected differing Soviet and American views on
72. United States Department of Defense, 5-6
73. Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, The Soviet Far Eastern Build-up and the Manchurian
Campaign, Fegruary-August 1945: Lessons and Implications (Soviet Army
Studies Office, 1988), 8.
74. Since military strategy provided the cohesion for coalition warfare
during World War II, Roosevelt might also have been motivated to use com-
bined Russian-American military planning to cement closer ties with Stalin.
75. See Kipp, 7. Preparations for war with Japan were undertaken in the
summer of 1943; the Teheran Conference was in November 1943, and Yalta in
February 1944. For a discussion of Soviet military planning in the Far
East, see also Lilita I. Dzirkals, "Lightning War" in Manchuria: Soviet Mil-
itary Analysis of the 1945 Far East Campaign (Mimeograph, 1976) and
Alexander Vasilevsky, "In the Far East" in Main Front: Soviet Leaders Look
Back on World War II ed. John Erickson (Pergamon-Brassey's International
Defense, 1987).
76. United States Department of Defense, 31-38; Hayes, 720.
strategy and policy and later, distrust. By early 1945 prospects for peace
in the Pacific were more sanguine and military planners revised their
estimates of Soviet participation accordingly, stating participation was
desired but no longer essential.77 No attempts were made however to dis-
suade Soviet belligerency against Japan. American and Soviet relations were
strained, and the U.S. was not in a position to use force while fighting the
Japanese.
The decision to drop the atomic bomb was similarly motivated by dif-
ferent perceptions of its utility to policy. The atomic bomb was regarded
as an extension of strategic bombing and careful considerations of its ef-
fect on the postwar settlement -- international control of atomic energy,
diplomacy, deterrence, savings in American lives -- were overridden by mili-
tary and political exigencies for achieving total victory.78 The atomic
bomb was a shock to both the Japanese and the Soviets. To the former it im-
pressed upon the Japanese the urgency of accepting the Potsdam Declaration;
to the Soviets it irreparably damaged relations with the West and contrib-
77. United States Department of Defense, 71. This view conflicts with
military pessimism about achieving the twelve month goal for victory in the
Pacific and subsequent initiatives to modify the unconditional surrender
formula. The contradiction could be explained by growing distrust of the
Soviets and service rivalries to establish the preeminence of their respec-
tive service. See Sigal, 106-7.
78. For the reaction of the Soviet peop1e to the atomic bomb, see Werth,
1037-1038. For a discussion of sharing the bomb with Stalin, see Martin J.
Sherwin, "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic-
Energy Policy and Diplomacy, 1941-45" in American Historical Review (October
1973), 945-968. For a comprehensive and controversial discussion of the
atomic bomb on diplomacy, see Alperovitz's, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and
Potsdam.
uted to a hard-line ideology obsessed with maintaining Soviet security at
the expense of postwar economic reconstruction.
War termination is a complex process for linking policy and strategy to
the postwar settlement which must address the issues that precipitated the
conflict. Strategy lust serve policy; specifically, the objective of mili-
tary strategy is to win wars and thus achieve the political objectives for
which the war is fought. Just as military planners need to understand that
statesmanship can also be decisive for achieving victory, so too must
political leaders be sensitive to the limitations of military strategy and
be ready to modify war aims to end hostilities. To this end, an accurate
appraisal of the costs of continued resistance and military prospects for
victory is essential.
The concept of unconditional surrender in World War II introduced a new
paradigm in war termination that is especially relevant in modern industrial
societies where belligerents have unlimited means to impose their won
the enemy. In total war a belligerent who has suffered strategic defeat may
nonetheless in desperation choose to exhaust his remaining resources, rather
than accept political defeat. The danger of this scenario is the formula-
tion of military strategies that either produce pyrrhic victories or cul-
minate in annihilation of the enemy. "Simple old soldiers" must not press
for complete military victory; similarly, political leaders must not abdi-
cate policy to strategy.
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