Khe Sanh And Dienbienphu: Different Wars -- Similar Battles
AUTHOR Major Dennis W. Reilly, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - History
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
KHE SANH AND DIENBIENPHU: DIFFERENT WARS -- SIMILAR BATTLES
The turning point for the French in the French-Indochina War was the
battle of Dienbienphu in 1954. The French and the Vietminh had been at
war for seven years, and the French were wearing down. Within two months
after their loss at Dienbienphu, the French pulled out of Indochina.
The battle fought in 1968 at Khe Sanh was the turning point for
the United States in the Vietnam War. Although this battle was won by
the U.S., the American people were disillusioned about the involvement
of U.S. troops in Vietnam. U.S. forces had been in Vietnam since 1960
and the end seemed nowhere in sight. In 1969, U.S. forces began pulling
out of Vietnam.
Although the battles at Khe Sanh and Dienbienphu were fought in sepa-
rate wars, there were remarkable similarities between them. My purpose
is to make a comparison of these battles.
In the middle of 1953, General Giap, commander of Vietminh forces,
drove into Laos. Fearful of being trapped, he pulled his forces back.
The French believed Giap planned to invade Laos, and the French established
defensive positions in the northwest corner of North Vietnam at Dienbienphu
in order to block future access by the Vietminh into Laos. But the Vietminh
never intended to invade Laos -- they only wanted to draw the French into a
final battle.
In the fall of 1967, General Westmoreland built up the base at Khe
Sanh to act as a springboard against Communist sanctuaries in Laos. Like
the French at Dienbienphu, the U.S. was led to believe that the North
Vietnamese intended to invade Laos. But Khe Sanh was used as a feint
to draw large U.S. forces away from the south in order that the population
centers in the south would be naked to assault by the North Vietnamese and
Viet Cong. The North Vietnamese never intended to defeat the U.S. in one
final battle as was done at Dienbienphu.
During the battle of Khe Sanh, the Dienbienphu analogy was preposterous.
The French had been trapped in an inaccessible valley with only a few artillery
pieces while the Americans had an array of howitzers and mortars. The French
lacked aircraft, but the U.S. forces could rely on a formidable fleet of
helicopters and cargo planes to carry in supplies and replacements and
to evacuate wounded. Above all, the besieged U.S. Marines were able to
count on the B-52 which would drench the surrounding North Vietnamese
with seventy-five thousand tons of explosives.
There were similarities to these battles. Both garrisons were
established to lure the enemy to a remote killing ground. Both outposts
could be shelled by direct observation. Both outposts were logistical
nightmares due in part to foul weather which hindered resupply efforts.
Most importantly, both combat bases were attacked by General Giap.
The battle of Dienbienphu marked the end of French colonialism in
Vietnam. The battle of Khe Sanh, the beginning of the Tet Offensive,
marked the beginning of the end of U.S. commitment in Vietnam.
Khe Sanh and Dienbienphu: Different Wars -- Similar Battles
Outline
The turning point for the French in the French-Indochina War
was the battle of Dienbienphu in 1954. The battle at Khe Sanh in
1968 was the turning point for U.S. forces in the Vietnam War.
These two battles were different in many respects, but these con-
flicts also had many similarities.
I. The French wanted to block the Vietminh from future access
into Laos at Dienbienphu.
II. U.S. Military forces wanted to block the North Vietnamese
infiltration into Laos and to stop their gaining control of
South Vietnam's northernmost provinces.
III. There were differences between Dienbienphu and Khe Sanh.
A. Khe Sanh was located on a plateau -- Dienbienphu was lo-
cated in a valley.
B. Americans at Khe Sanh had reinforcements nearby -- Dienbien-
phu did not.
C. Khe Sanh had outside artillery support -- Dienbienphu did not.
D. The perimeter of Khe Sanh saw the largest amount of airstrikes
in the history of war -- Dienbienphu had few airstrikes.
IV. There were similarities at Khe Sanh and Dienbienphu.
A. Both garrisons were established to lure the enemy to
a remote killing ground.
1. The French wished to end the French-Indochina War at
Dienbienphu.
2. The Americans wanted to cripple the North Vietnamese
beyond any question at Khe Sanh.
B. The initiative was with the enemy.
C. Both outposts could be shelled by direct observation.
D. Both outposts were logistical nightmares.
1. The foul weather hindered resupply efforts.
2. Both outposts were dependent upon aircraft and para-
chutes for resupply.
E. Both combat bases were attacked by troops under General Giap.
V. There were often comparisons by the press and politicians between
Khe Sanh and Dienbienphu.
A. Americans were concerned that Khe Sanh would fall just as
Dienbienphu had.
B. The Communists never regarded Khe Sanh as a re-staging of
Dienbienphu.
Khe Sanh and Dienbienphu: Different Wars -- Similar Battles
One of the major events for the United States in the
Vietnam War was the battle of Khe Sanh. Although U.S. forces
won this battle, Americans became gravely concerned and grew
increasingly disillusioned about the purpose and involvement
of U.S. forces in Vietnam. This 1968 battle marked a turning
point in the Vietnam War.
The battle of Dienbienphu was the turning point for the
French in the French-Indochina War. The French lost at Dien-
bienphu at the hands of the Vietminh, a national liberation
organization established by Ho Chi Minh. These Vietnamese
Communists were composed of patriots of all types -- peasants,
workers, merchants, and soldiers. Two months after their
defeat at Dienbienphu, France pulled out of Indochina. France
surrendered northern Vietnam to the Communists and granted
complete independence to Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam.
Almost to the end, the confrontation at Khe Sanh was a
story with the suggestion of the disaster that the French
garrison suffered at Dienbienphu. Although the two conflicts
were different in many respects, the battle of Khe Sanh in
1968 became linked historically to the battle of Dienbienphu
of 1954.
Dienbienphu was located in a valley eleven miles long
and five miles wide in the northwest corner of North Vietnam.
The village belonged to an ethnic minority, the T'ai, who
farmed rice and marketed opium which was brought down from
the surrounding mountains. France had their reasons for
their interest in Dienbienphu.
Indochina had been controlled by the French since 1893,
but in 1946 the Vietminh started a war to drive the French
out of Indochina. The French and Vietminh had been engaged
in a series of clashes in Laos, which lay to the west of
Dienbienphu. Because the Vietminh were moving their own
troops into Laos, the French thought that the Vietminh wanted
to take control of the region. But the Vietminh were merely
interested in the region along the Laotian border where the
French supply lines were stretched thin. In French eyes, Dien-
bienphu became the vital barrier at which to block the Viet-
minh's future access into Laos.
The United States' military commitment in Vietnam, just
as that of the French before them, was long and involved.
United States forces had occupied Khe Sanh on and off since
1962, and a steady buildup of forces started in late 1967
and early 1968. The Khe Sanh Combat Base was situated in a
sparsely populated area in the northwestern corner of the
northernmost province of South Vietnam. It was centered
on a sturdy concrete bunker built by the French, and it
controlled the routes leading into the northernmost province
of Vietnam. Because Khe Sanh was located near the demilita-
rized zone, the United States military wanted to use it as a
patrol base for blocking enemy offensive actions in Laos.
General Westmoreland, commander of U.S. forces in Viet-
nam from 1965 to 1968, visited Khe Sanh in his earliest
months in Vietnam. Here is what he wrote:
The critical importance of the little plateau
was immediately apparent....Khe Sanh could serve
as a patrol base for blocking enemy infiltration
into Laos; a base for (secret border crossing)
operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an air
strip for reconnaissance planes surveying the Ho
Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for defenses south
of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for
ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
(6:40,41)
General Westmoreland estimated that the North Vietnamese
were closing in on Khe Sanh as part of a maneuver designed to
grab South Vietnam's northernmost provinces. Therefore, he
built Khe Sanh to act as a springboard against Communist
sanctuaries in Laos. However, the North Vietnamese buildup
around Khe Sanh served to divert major U.S. forces away from
the South Vietnamese population centers. This would enable
the North to assault the cities in the South for the Tet
Offensive.
The factors surrounding the outcome of the battles at Khe
Sanh and Dienbienphu varied. The major differences included
defensive positions, distances from the combat bases to other
friendly units, outside artillery support, the use of air sup-
port, and the loss of life.
The defensive positions at Khe Sanh and Dienbienphu
played a major role in the battles. The French at Dienbien-
phu chose a valley position with the enemy holding the surround-
ing highground. General Navarre, the French commander
stationed in Saigon, rejected the notion that the Vietminh
could devastate his men with artillery deployed on the hills
above Dienbienphu. He didn't forsee that the enemy emplace-
ments would be protected by camouflage and anti-aircraft guns
against bombing from the air. He failed to anticipate that
the enemy's howitzers, positioned within easy reach of the
airstrip, would cut off flights in and out of the valley.
General Navarre chose a terrain presumed suitable for tanks --
only to discover that its cover of thick bush entangled
armored vehicles, and its monsoon rains flooded the plain in
the valley. The French position was completely isolated with
no hope of overland relief.
Khe Sanh was located on a plateau which was heavily
defended by U.S. Marines and South Vietnamese troops. The
real key to the defense of Khe Sanh was the control the
Marines had on the hill positions outside the perimeter of
the combat base. These hill positions enabled the Marines
to see enemy positions and avenues of approach. Although
the North Vietnamese pounded the base with as many as a
thousand shells and rockets a day, its infantry attacks
on the hill posts and the perimeter itself did no lasting
damage to the position. The Marine Command had complete
control of the plateau and the high ground surrounding
the area.
The remoteness of supporting units for the defense of the
French at Dienbienphu was influential in their defeat. As the
battle progressed, the French realized that they were doomed
on the battlefield unless they received a great deal of out-
side help. The United States was the only country that could
furnish that aid quickly and effectively. President Eisen-
hower did not completely oppose U.S. intervention, but he
refused to commit America alone without allies. President
Eisenhower's closest aid, Sherman Adams, observed, "Having
avoided one total war with Red China the year before in
Korea, when he had the United Nations support, he was in no
mood to provoke another one in Indochina...without the
British and other Western allies." (2:198) Consequently,
Dienbienphu was left without any outside support. With the
nearest friendly base one hundred miles away through rough
terrain, the French were powerless in giving access to the
high ground or to any area around Dienbienphu.
The U.S. forces at Khe Sanh had significant reserves
stationed to the south which could be called upon at any
time for reinforcement. The Third Marine Division estab-
lished The Rockpile, a base near Khe Sanh to be used for
artillery support, ground defense, and counterattacks. The
Army's powerful 175mm guns at nearby Camp Carroll could be
depended upon for fire support. Although these two support
bases became synonymous with frustration, discomfort, and
casualties, they were an important element in the defensive
scheme for Khe Sanh.
The French failed to realize the strength of their
enemy forces. The French were waiting for a direct Vietminh
assault against their garrison in the middle of the valley.
They built two artillery bases to the north and one to the
south. Instead of storming the center, the Vietminh attacked
the north first. The third artillery base was too far away
to give them fire support. By protecting this third base,
the French tied down one third of the total French combat
force which could not be moved to rescue threatened posts
elsewhere. Ground troops were left without any artillery
support for the defense of Dienbienphu. The reliance of
fire support from within their own defensive perimeter
became a fatality for the French.
The U.S. forces were well aware of the capability
of the North Vietnamese, but the U.S. didn't realize that
the intent of the enemy was to trap U.S. forces into the
expenditure of absolutely unreasonable amounts of men and
material to defend a piece of worthless terrain. The
tactic of providing fire support from The Rockpile and
Camp Carroll twelve miles away contributed to a victory
for U.S. forces at Khe Sanh.
Probably the most important reason that the battle at
Khe Sanh was won as opposed to Dienbienphu being lost was
the use of air support. Although the French had two hundred
planes of all types for their battle, the only of sup-
plying Dienbienphu was by means of parachute drops. Dien-
bienphu had no combat power to speak of, and just twenty-
two close-air combat missions flew daily over the village.
U.S. forces at Khe Sanh had two thousand attack planes,
three thousand helicopters, a fleet of B-52 transcontinental
bombers, and an all-weather airfield that could handle even
the large C-130 cargo planes. The air support used at Khe
Sanh was the greatest deluge of firepower ever unloaded on
a tactical target in the history of warfare prior to Opera-
tion Desert Storm. More bombs were dropped around Khe Sanh
than were dropped on the German cities in World War II. Over
three hundred close-air combat missions flew daily over Khe
Sanh.
The ratio of casualties differed in the two battles.
Approximately 2,000 French army soldiers and 8,000 Vietminh
lost their lives at Dienbienphu. The North Vietnamese lost
at least 10,000 lives in exchange for fewer than 500 U.S.
Marines. (2:540)
Despite the differences between the battles of Khe Sanh
and Dienbienphu, there were many similarities. Both Khe
Sanh and Dienbienphu had been established to lure the enemy
to a killing ground. The initiative in both battles was
with the enemy. Both positions could be bombarded by
artillery shells through direct observation, and both po-
sitions depended on aircraft for supplies. General Vo
Nguyen Giap commanded the North Vietnamese in both battles.
The resemblance between the two battles became irre-
sistable to American observers and officials. Marvin Kalb,
the CBS correspondent at the State Department, reported
that the "historical ghost" of the French disaster was
"casting a long shadow over Washington." (2:541) Once the
fighting started, General Westmoreland called the Khe Sanh
clash "a main attempt" by the North Vietnamese "to restage
Dienbienphu." (2:541) Although Khe Sanh and Dienbienphu
were outposts with little obvious connection to areas of
strategic importance, the French and the Americans both
believed they were securing crucial areas in Vietnam.
The French believed that their massing of troops at
Dienbienphu would bring them a victory and the end of the
French-Indochina War. The French wanted to draw the enemy
to a remote area and annihilate them, and likewise the
Vietminh strategy was to draw the French forces to the re-
mote area of Dienbienphu in order to destroy them. The French
were under the impression that the Vietminh were massing
their forces for an attack on Laos.
Like Dienbienphu, Khe Sanh was to be used to draw
a major enemy force far away from the populated coasts in
order to massacre them. General Westmoreland wanted a vic-
tory at Khe Sanh to be a single dramatic blow that would
cripple the North Vietnamese beyond any question or doubt.
He wrote the following: "Khe Sanh appeared important to
the enemy, according to captured or defecting North Viet-
namese officers, and hence should, as with air power and
a fairly small (four battalion) U.S. ground commitment
be denied to him." (1:343) But the intent of the North
Vietnamese was to divert a large part of the American forces
to Khe Sanh in order for the Communists to conduct a major
attack in the cities in the South. By giving the impression
that they were after the northernmost provinces of South
Vietnam, the North Vietnamese were able to draw American
forces to Khe Sanh.
The initiative in both battles was with the enemy. It
wasn't the nature of the U.S. Marines or the French to lie
and wait in ambush for the enemy to approach.
General Navarre underestimated the Vietminh in that he
anticipated a swift and headlong charge. Because the Viet-
minh troops lacked experience in attacking fortified en-
trenched camps, Giap vowed to strike only when success
was certain. After initially sustaining fearfull losses,
Giap called a halt to the fighting and issued the order to
"strangle" the French by encircling them with tunnels and
trenches. Because the Vietminh were digging these tunnels
and trenches under fire, they often advanced only five or
six yards a day. Contrary to French estimates, Giap spent
more than three months deploying his men before beginning
his assault on March 13, 1954.
The North Vietnamese dragged out the battle of Khe
Sanh from Jan. 21, 1968 to March 30, 1968, which was frus-
trating for U.S. Marines who were used to closing in on the
enemy and destroying them. Giap's long-range strategy was
to continue to bleed the Americans until they agreed to a
settlement that satisfied the Hanoi regime. For that reason,
the Communists were willing to endure terrible casualties
throughout the entire Vietnam War. On the March 28, 1968
edition of the "CBS Evening News," correspondent Jeff Gral-
nick made this report from Khe Sanh:
So there really is no end in sight. The
North Vietnamese in the hills out there beyond
the fog show no inclination to pull back or
attack. U.S. commanders show no inclination
just yet to drive them back. So for the Marines
and the Seabees and the rest here, there is
nothing to do but sit and take it, just to wait,
and hope they'll rotate out, leave before they
join the roster of wounded and dead here. (1:395)
In both battles, the enemy was positioned in such a
manner that their artillery could be used to fire upon the
French and the Americans without the aid of forward observers.
The French never beleived that the Vietminh were capable of
getting heavy artillery pieces up the mountains around
Dienbienphu, but the Vietminh soldiers demonstrated
phenomenal strength in dragging the equipment up the nar-
row jungle trails. From their position on the highground
overlooking the valley, the Vietminh used artillery to de-
stroy the French airstrip and other French posts. The French
had no nearby support bases to come to their assistance.
The North Vietnamese could pinpoint U.S. locations
at Khe Sanh from their own positions in the hills sur-
rounding the area, but U.S. Marines beat back all assaults
on the perimeter and outposts of Khe Sanh despite some sharp
night fighting. The Marines in the outlying hills and support
bases surrounding Khe Sanh were able to see first-hand the
North Vietnamese artillery firing into Khe Sanh and would
notify the base that incoming rounds were on their way.
Khe Sanh had more-than-adequate air support and fire support
from the outlying bases.
Both outposts were logistical nightmares -- in part be-
cause of the poor weather conditions. In both battles each
side was trying to cut off each other's supply lines and
at the same time build up their own supplies. Neither of
the garrisons could be furnished with necessities for battle
by overland routes.
The French had to depend totally on supplies by way of
air and parachutes. The French figured the oncoming rains
would cause difficulties for the Vietminh with the mud, but
just the opposite occurred. The low clouds hindered French
aircraft from bombing the Vietminh and made parachuting supplies
to the garrison difficult. Often the parachutes descended
on the outside of the defenses and into the hands of the
Vietminh.
Also at Khe Sanh, all ammunition, including supplies,
had to be brought in by air. The overcast sky and the rain
contributed to the slow-down of the American resupply efforts
and prevented fighter-bombers from hitting mortar and artillery
positions. It was dangerous for pilots to land when the
airfield was taking incoming artillery rounds. As the battle
progressed, the weather improved.
A key point in the similarities of both conflicts was
that both combat posts were attacked by troops under the com-
mand of General Vo Nguyen Giap. He believed in skillful strata-
gems to deceive the enemy into making a wrong assessment of
his intentions.
At Dienbienphu, Giap used thousands of coolies and
bicycles to move guns and ammunition through impossible terrain.
He deliberately created the impression that he would not
respond in strength at Dienbienphu by staging diversionary
actions around the country. His scattered assaults tied
the French down in different areas and made it impossible
for them to reinforce one threatened spot without inviting
an attack on another. Giap steadily built up his detachments
around Dienbienphu with the determination to wipe out the
whole enemy force there. He wanted to wear the French down
over a long period of time by means of a slow, modest course.
Giap watched General Westmoreland move troops to the
north in 1967 and in the first weeks of 1968. He didn't
attack the base at Khe Sanh until he knew the Communists
had successfully infiltrated many towns and cities in South
Vietnam for the Tet Offensive. Although Giap lost thousands
of his soldiers at Khe Sanh, he realized that the U.S. troops
would not remain in Vietnam forever, and he believed that great
strides would be made through long, drawn-out battles in spite
of his casualities.
Throughout the siege at Khe Sanh, Dienbienphu became
a subject of fascination to politicians and newsmen because
of Khe Sanh's possible impact on President Johnson and his war
policy. The reasoning went that the taking of Khe Sanh by
Giap would deal a major psychological blow to the administra-
tion's war policy just as the capture of Dienbienphu did
to French war policy in 1954. As the anniversary of Dienbien-
phu drew near, the Associated Press sent out a March 8 "Dien-
bienphu Special Report" by William T. Ryan. Mr. Ryan made
the following observation:
The war (Dienbienphu) was seven years old when
it ended. If, as most Americans do, one dates
the U.S. war in Vietnam from 1961, this one is
seven years old too. And in many in Vietnam wonder:
Is Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the military mastermind
of that 1954 battle, seeking anotber Dienbienphu
for precisely the same reasons he sought the first
victory at a frightful cost in human life? (1:369)
The United Press International issued this report:
Khe Sanh, just south (15 miles) of the De-
militarized Zone border, has become a focal
point of the war since the U.S. Joint Chiefs
of Staff guaranteed President Johnson in
writing that the base would not fall as did
Dienbienphu to the Communists in a similar
strategic situation fourteen years ago.
(1:373,374)
The Communists never regarded Khe Sanh to be another
Dienbienphu. General Giap contended that Khe Sanh assumed
an inflated importance because Americans chose to make it a
test of prestige. A lower ranking Communist officer who
had fought at Dienbienphu and Khe Sanh made this observation:
At Dienbienphu, the French and ourselves massed
for what we both expected to be a final battle.
The Americans, however, were strong everywhere
in the south. Thus we realized from the beginning
that we could not beat them decisively in a
single encounter like Khe Sanh. (2:541)
Although the 56 day battle at Dienbienphu and the 77
day battle at Khe Sanh were different in many respects, the
similarities between them were phenomenal. The Marine base
at Khe Sanh had become the symbol of American determination
in Vietnam just as Dienbienphu had become the symbol of
French commitment in 1954.
Bibliography
1. Braestrup, Peter. Big Story: How the American Press
and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crises
of Tet 1968 In Vietnam and Washington. Volume 1.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1977.
2. Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History, The First Com-
plete Account of Vietnam at War. New York, New York:
The Viking Press, 1983.
3. Millett, Allan. Semper Fidelis: The History of the
United States Marine Corps. New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co, Inc. 1980
4. Natkiel, Richard and Pimlott, John. Atlas of Warfare.
New York, New York: Gallery Books, 1988.
5. Pisor, Robert. The End of the Line: The Seige of
Khe Sanh. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1982.
6. Shore, Moyers S. The Battle for Khe Sanh. Washington,
D.C.: History and Museums Division Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps, 1969.
7. Shulimson, Jack. U.S. Marines in Vietnam An Expanding
War 1966. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums
Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1982.
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