The Maneuver Warfare Dilemma: What It Will Take To Make It Work
AUTHOR Major Jeffrey J. Patterson, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE MANEUVER WARFARE DILEMMA: WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO MAKE IT WORK
I. Purpose: To identify manpower and training issues that need
to be addressed before we can fully integrate maneuver warfare
into the Marine Corps.
II. Thesis: The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its
warfighting doctrine, but it will take much more than rhetoric to
put this concept into practice. Our challenge, therefore, is to
identify needed changes in existing policies in order to bridge
the gap between concept and reality.
III. Discussion: Maneuver warfare is a philosophy for "fighting
smart" to ensure success in war. There is, however, a large gap
between the philosophical concept and its practical application.
Maneuver warfare is not a concept that can be practiced
independently by operational units. It requires the support of
the entire Marine Corps and in some cases it requires the support
of the entire nation as well. This paper takes an analytical look
at the following four key factors that determine success in war.
1. National will
2. Tactical and technical expertise
3. Leadership
4. Intelligence
By using these factors as a framework for analysis it examines
national service as a way of generating the national will.
Additionally, it examines existing rotation, assignment and
promotion policies to see if they support the maneuver warfare
concept. Finally, the paper examines training policies and
practices and intelligence capabilities to see if they can be
improved to better support the maneuver warfare concept.
IV. Summary: As a result of my analysis I have identified several
needed changes in our manpower and training policies that need to
be addressed before we can bridge the gap between rhetoric and
reality in the area of maneuver warfare.
V. Conclusions: Fundamental changes in policy will be required
to fully realize the fighting potential of maneuver warfare.
Although the Marine Corps has little influence over national
will, we can and should make changes in our personnel assignment,
promotion,and training policies to produce a Marine Corps that
can fully embrace the ideals of maneuver warfare
THE MANEUVER WARFARE DILEMMA:
WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO MAKE IT WORK
OUTLINE
Thesis: The Marine Corps has adopted maneuver warfare as its
warfighting doctrine, but it will take much more than rhetoric to
put this concept into practice. Our challenge, therefore, is to
identify needed changes in existing policies to bridge the gap
between concept and reality.
I. The definition of maneuver warfare
II. Keys to success on the battlefield
1. National will
2. Technical and tactical expertise
3. Leadership
4. Intelligence
III. Developing national will
1. Better media relations
2. National Service in support of foriegn policy
objectives
IV. Developing technical and tactical expertise.
1. Manpower policies that conflict with the maneuver
warfare philosophy.
a. Rotation and personnel assignment policies
b. Up or out promotion policies
2. The need for the Regimental System
V. Training our leaders for maneuver warfare
1. Learning decsion-making and military judgement
2. Intelligence training for our leaders
VI. The need for better intelligence capabilities
1. Understanding national assets
2. Intelligence dissemination
THE MANEUVER WARFARE DILEMMA.
WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO TO MAKE IT WORK
The term maneuver warfare has recently become a buzz word
used by many military professionals, but fully understood by only
a few. As a result of a small group of military reformers and
the Commandant's publication of FMFM 1 many Marines have adopted
the term to describe their philosophy of warfighting even though
their philosophies are often very different from one another and
from the intended meaning of the term. FMFM 1 has this to say
about maneuver warfare:
Maneuver warfare is a way of thinking in or
about war that should shape our every action...
It is a state of mind born of a bold will,
intellect, initiative, and ruthless opportunism.
In short, maneuver warfare is a philosophy for
generating the greatest decisive effect against
the enemy at the least possible cost to
ourselves - a philosophy for "fighting smart". (3:77)
In theory this sounds good, but in reality, wars are not won
by philosophers. Our challenge, therefore, becomes how should we
be organized and what must we do to put this theory into
practice. If maneuver warfare is fighting smart to ensure
success on the battlefield, we must first examine those factors
which can be developed in peace time to ensure victory in war.
Once we identify these factors, we must examine our existing
system of manpower and training to see if it contributes to their
development.
Military scholars will admit there are many factors that
contribute to success in war. As military professionals we have
come to know these factors as the principles of war. Upon closer
examination, however, I have consolidated these principles and
have determined that wars have been won or lost based on the
following four key factors.
1. National will
2. Technical and tactical expertise
3. Leadership
4. Intelligence
I will briefly address each of these factors and subsequently
examine present manpower and training policies to see if they
contribute to developing them. Where they fall short, I will
recommend possible changes to correct the shortcomings.
The first factor we must discuss to ensure success is
national will. Karl von Clausewitz in his study "On War" tells
us that war is composed of a trinity. He reminds us that the
trinity consists of the army, the people and the government. He
further states that without the people's support there can be no
army, and therefore, no success in war. (2:89) The Vietnam War is
the best historical example of this profound but simple
principle. The Vietnam War was lost for several reasons, but the
single most important cause was our failure to muster the
national will to win. (8:12) Ho Chi Minh, on the other hand,
never lost sight of this important fact. He focused his efforts
on consolidating the will of the Vietnamese people, while
destroying ours.
The entire philosophy of guerrilla warfare is based on this
principle. Despite our overwhelming technical and military
might, adversaries that adopt this philosophy of warfare remain
our greatest threat. This threat can not be defeated by
technology and weapons alone. We must win the "hearts and minds"
of our allies while uniting the will of the American people.
Galvanizing the national will must be an important part of every
national strategy. Unless the army, the people and the government
work in harmony, defeat is inevitable.
The next requirement for success in war is technical and
tactical expertise. This requirement is often overlooked in
today's literature on military thought. Too often, today's
writers lead us to believe that it is the military genius of
great generals that wins wars. Although it can be argued that an
army can not win without good leadership, the converse is also
true. More often than not, it is the technical and tactical
expertise of the soldier that allows great generals to
orchestrate stunning victories on the battlefield.
Frederick the Great was a great strategist, but it was the
superb discipline and training of his men that allowed him to out
flank and defeat his enemies on the battlefield. Prussia was
famous for its drill fields. They were the admiration of
European armies of the time. Prussian drills were designed to
perfect tactical mobility, firing skills and discipline under
fire. Frederick himself, admitted that it was the skill of his
army that allowed him to practice the the art of generalship when
he said:
Unless every man is trained beforehand in
peacetime for that which he will have to
accomplish in war, one has nothing but
people who bear the name of a business
without knowing how to practice it. (7:99)
No matter how masterful the plan, victory is not certain
until the opposing forces meet each other on the field of battle.
That force which is better equipped and trained will win.
Maneuvering a force on the battlefield to attack an enemy's
weakness is the job of generals, but defeating the enemy is the
job of Marines. Their success depends on firepower and tactical
and technical expertise.
By the same token, an army that is well trained and
equipped, but poorly led will quickly meet its demise. The last
and final requirement for success, therefore, is superior
leadership. Military leadership is the combination of many
factors; charisma, intellect, courage (both moral and
physical), decisiveness and strength of character are just a few.
Clausewitz thought this factor was so important he devoted an
entire chapter to it entitled "Military Genius."
The South's early success during the Civil War was both a
tribute to Robert E. Lee's fine leadership and a testimony to the
poor leadership of the Union Army at the highest levels. The
Army of Virginia, under Robert E. Lee, consistently out
maneuvered and out fought a better equipped and better supplied
Union Army. Lincoln tried many different generals , but it was
not until he found Grant that he had a leader capable of
defeating Lee.
The German Army in WW II was probably better trained and
better prepared than any of the Allied armies, yet their ultimate
defeat can be partially attributed to their poor leadership at
the very top. Despite the advice of his generals, Hitler chose
to direct the course of the war himself. His later policies and
decisions proved to be disastrous, and greatly contributed to his
own defeat. A study of history, therefore, demands that we
develop good commanders to lead the forces we send into battle.
The final requirement for success in war is superior
intelligence. Without it, commanders will not make the right
decisions. Decisions and their ensuing plans are based on the
commander's intent, and according to maneuver warfare doctrine,
the commander's intent should focus on the enemy. Decisions and
plans based on faulty intelligence often lead to disaster. Pearl
Harbor is a good historical example of what can result from poor
intelligence. Our failure to predict the Japanese attack cost us
the majority of the Pacific Fleet in one day. The Japanese
failure to locate our carriers during the attack allowed us to
regroup and eventually go on the counter-offensive earlier than
we had anticipated. Our intelligence failure was costly in terms
of lives and naval forces, however, the Japanese failure
ultimately cost them the war. Additionally, it can be argued
that the allies' success in WW II was as much a result of
superior intelligence as any other single factor. Had the allies
not developed ULTRA to break the Axis code, the world would be a
very different place today.
Good intelligence about an enemy prevents him from
surprising us. History has shown, time and time again, that
surprise has been a crucial element of battlefield success. The
unit that can deceive the enemy as to his true intentions can
achieve surprise and the victory that usually accompanies it.
Barton Whaley conducted a study of battles between 1914 - 1968.
He discovered that the victory rate of units that achieved
surprise was approximately 92 %. (10:App B)
Having defined maneuver warfare and briefly examined its
requirements for success, let us examine some of our present
military manpower and training policies in light of these
requirements. Concerning the requirement to develop national
will, I believe that we learned an important lesson from our
Vietnam experience. The Marine Corps has developed cordial
relations with the press and continues to stress media relations
in its formal schools. The recent experience in Southwest Asia
(SWA) indicates that this administration has learned it is best
to set policy and unify the national will, while it leaves the
fighting to the professionals.
The fighting in SWA, however, was short lived and we must
look for ways to solidify the national will in conflicts of
longer duration. As was previously stated, guerrilla wars are
the greatest threat to world peace and national security.
Therefore, We must look for ways to educate and unify the diverse
population of our country if we are to ensure public
understanding and support for future U. S. involvement overseas.
A mandatory national service program might be one way to achieve
this goal.
The definition of national service would have to be liberal
to allow for a wide variety in the selection of how one could
serve his country. Programs could include the traditional
conservation projects, urban renewal projects and helping the
sick and elderly. They could also include international service
projects that would support our policies overseas. As Clausewitz
has stated, "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with
other means." (2:69) As the leader of the free world and a nation
that relies heavily on foreign trade for its economic survival,
we are very much involved in world politics. Our "laissez faire"
policies of the past have contributed to the cause of the past
two world wars. Americans are citizens of the world, and as such,
we have an obligation to exercise a strong foreign policy that
promotes regional stability and world peace. However, we have
grown to rely too heavily on economic aid and technology to solve
world problems. This tendency has caused us to overlook our most
valuable asset - the American people.
Most Americans do not understand world politics, and as a
result they do not see the need for U.S. involvement overseas. A
national service program that included overseas projects would
increase the nation's awareness of world politics and thus
solidify its will should armed conflict become necessary. Despite
our many foreign aid programs, our intentions are often
misunderstood. The programs fail because the aid never reaches
the people who need it most. When it does, the people are not
made aware of the fact that it comes from the United States. We
are cornered into guerrilla wars because we fail to address the
root of the problems that cause these wars. Many Third World
countries are faced with problems of poverty, social inequality
and human rights violations. U.S. programs that are people
oriented would be better received and would further our own
understanding of foreign cultures and politics. They could
gradually introduce western ideas and values to Third World
countries and slowly destroy the seeds of insurrection and
instability. Additionally, should military involvement be
required at a later time, Americans involved in overseas projects
would be a great source of human intelligence.
Adversaries of a national service program would argue that it
would be too costly and impossible to organize, however, several
studies refute this argument. Micheal W. Sherraden and Donald J.
Eberly have participated in one such study to examine these
arguments. As they discovered, many western nations already have
some form of a mandatory national service program. Germany,
France, the Netherlands and Denmark link national service to a
military draft and many Third World countries use national
service to advance community development. Additionally, their
studies concluded :
There is reason to believe that a national
service program would pay for itself in the
value of its work and service projects
alone, and more than pay for itself if
additional economic benefits are considered. (4:174)
As a nation, we need to be more involved in world politics.
By doing so, we can help solve world problems before they reach
crisis levels. History has shown that we can win on the
battlefield, but we can still lose the fight in the economic and
political arena and eventually lose the war unless we have a
strong foreign policy to compliment our armed forces. A national
service system that included international service programs
designed to support of our foreign policy objectives overseas
would galvanize our national will and ensure that our military
victories were complete.
The next requirement for success in war is technical and
tactical expertise. Present Marine Corps promotion and assignment
policies, however, do anything but foster this goal. Take for
example, a Marine infantry officer. Upon graduation from his
basic training he can expect to serve two to three years in the
Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) before being transferred to a "B"
billet (independent duty such as, recruiting or barracks duty)
He will usually serve a total of at least six years working
outside his military occupational specialty (MOS) before
returning to the FMF. Unless he was fortunate enough to attend a
formal career level school, he will return to the FMF not to
practice his MOS, but to learn it. By the time he has learned
enough about the new weapons, policies and tactics to be
proficient, he is transferred back out of the FMF to another "B"
billet or staff job. Once again his tactical and technical
expertise begins to atrophy. It is not uncommon for a combat
arms officer to spend less than one third of his career actually
practicing his trade.
It is very difficult to stay current in your military
occupational specialty under these conditions. How can we expect
a Marine to be tactically and technically proficient if he is not
given ample opportunity to practice his trade. No civilian
organization could remain competitive in the business world with
such an assignment policy, yet we have allowed this policy to
thrive in the Marine Corps. The combat effectiveness of our Corps
would increase exponentially if we could delete non essential
billets and shorten the periods Marines spend away from the FMF.
A graph of a Marine's technical and tactical performance should
indicate a steady increase. It should not reflect a sine wave
that peaks once every seven or eight years.
The second manpower policy that degrades the combat
effectiveness of our Corps is our up or out promotion policy.
Our present promotion system is a classic example of the "Peter
Principle". We tend to promote our Marines to one level above
their competency level and then promptly pass them over and force
them out of the service. Some Marines are outstanding platoon
sergeants, but they do not possess the required managerial or
organizational skills to be good gunnery sergeants. By the same
token, there are officers who are excellent tacticians and
commanders at the company level, but who do not have the desire or
the skill to make the transition to the operational level.
Present promotion policies require us to pass them over and
eventually force them out of the service. Why must we dismiss a
Marine who is doing an outstanding job at one level for not being
able to handle the additional responsibilities at the next level,
especially if he has no desire to be promoted?
It could be argued that no one would want to stay in the
service without being promoted, but this argument only holds
water if pay raises are just tied to promotions. A Marine could
receive pay raises based on job performance and time in service
regardless of his rank. The civilian sector has operated this
way for decades and it has proven to be very effective. Upon
closer scrutiny, it actually proves to be a more cost effective
way of doing business. Take for example, the estimated cost of
training a pilot with 11 years of service. In 1976 dollars, it
cost $307,421. Under present policies, if the pilot fails to make
selection he will be forced to resign. In this case, the Marine
Corps would be forced to accept a self inflicted loss of
$307,421.(1:101) He may still be a superior pilot, even though
he may not possess the skill to be a squadron commander. Doesn't
it make monetary sense to keep him as a pilot?
Another example of our misdirected assignment policies is a
derivation of the one mentioned above. In our effort to be fair,
we often assign people to command billets that have no business
being in command. Consequently, the reverse is also true of
technical and staff billets. We should be less concerned with
fairness and more concerned with putting the right person in the
right job. Billets should be assigned by qualification and merit
alone. People who do not want supervisory billets should not be
assigned them and they should not be penalized if they are
competent technicians or staff officers.
In general, our entire assignment policy is disruptive,
expensive and counter to the adoption of a maneuver warfare
philosophy. The adoption of assignment policies more along the
lines of Britain's Regimental System could help alleviate some
of the above mentioned problems and help foster more esprit de
corps within the Marine Corps. (1:95-98) The Regimental System is
designed to build pride and loyalty in one's unit. It gives
Marines the feeling of security and belonging. Because officers
and men stay with their units longer, and always return to the
same unit after serving in "B" billets, they tend to know each
other better. As a result they learn each others strengths and
weaknesses. This is essential for understanding mission type
orders.
Mission type orders are a key element of maneuver warfare.
These orders rely heavily on commander's intent and unit standard
operating procedures (SOPs) . Units cannot, however, develop SOPs
or understand commander's intent unless they train together for
long periods of time. The Regimental System ensures units remain
together long enough to establish useful SOPs and long enough for
subordinates to intuitively know their commander's intent.
SOPs allow units to streamline the planning and execution
phases of an operation. This allows commanders to make decisions
and take actions quicker than the enemy. This ability allows the
commander to get inside the enemy's OODA loop, the theory being
that once inside it is easy to defeat him. Colonel Boyd describes
the OODA loop theory as follows:
The party that consistently completes the
cycle (Observation, Orientation, Decision
and Action) faster gains an advantage that
increases with each cycle. His enemy's
reactions become increasingly slower by
comparison and therefore less effective
until, finally, he is overcome by events. (3:84)
Having looked at manpower policy changes we could make to
better support our maneuver warfare philosophy, we will turn our
attention to training and education. There is a large debate
taking place over what should be the focus of effort in our
military training. There are those who argue that training should
focus on technology and tactics while others argue that training
should focus more on the art of war. In reality, success in war
requires an intimate understanding of both. Commanders cannot
practice operational art without first knowing the technical
aspects of their weapons systems and how to best employ them in a
tactical scenario. It is for this reason that, historically,
most military training has focused on the science of war. We know
today, however, that the art of war is every bit as important as
the science of war. The question then becomes not only how much
of the art of war do we teach, but how do we teach it?
The answer varies depending on the rank of the individual we
are dealing with. At the lower enlisted and company grade officer
level we should continue to concentrate our efforts on the
technical aspects of war. The Marine Corps' reemphasis on basic
warrior training is a step in the right direction. Tactical
packages in all formal schools from NCO through captain have
increased in quantity and quality. This trend should continue.
Formal school training for individuals, however, is not enough.
More formalized unit training is required. We must train at the
unit level to see if our warfighting team can apply the skills it
has been taught in a coordinated effort. This is also the level
where we can begin to integrate the art of war with the science
of war.
As we have discussed, personnel instability caused by our
manpower policies often make it difficult to conduct meaningful
unit training above platoon or company level. None the less,
unit training up to the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) level in
joint and combined environments is essential if we hope to
capitalize on the technical and tactical expertise of our troops.
Whenever possible, training should approximate actual combat
conditions. There are few short cuts. There is a big difference
between drawing blue arrows on a map and actually having to
execute them. Unit training evolutions such as Combined Arms
Exercises (CAXs) and Cold Weather Training at Bridgeport should
be expanded to include regimental, brigade and MEF size
headquarters. More "force-on-force" exercises should be
conducted whenever possible. We should train as we expect to
fight. Although war games and map exercises are a good way to
practice operational art they are not a substitute for field
training.
Another shortfall we experience in our training programs is
a belief that, something taught is something learned. Nothing
can be further from the truth. Although the critique or "hot-
wash-up" has become an important part of every exercise or
training evolution, we very rarely schedule time to redo an
attack or exercise to see if we have actually learned the the
lessons from our previous evolution. Time should be allocated to
redo every major evolution immediately upon its completion to see
if lessons have been mastered. Too often we wait an entire year
before we attempt a similar exercise and by then 50%, of the unit
has changed and we make many of the same mistakes that supposedly
we learned the year prior.
The same problem is evident in our formal schools. Very often
we schedule time to critique an exercise but we move on to a new
subject before we schedule time to perfect the previous one.
This problem is not only a result of assignment policies but it
is a result of our teaching philosophy as well. The Infantry
Officer Course (IOC) has been singled out by Bill Lind, a well
known military reformer and critic of the Marine Corps, on a
number of occasions as the premier example of how military
training should be conducted. I will, therefore, use IOC to
illustrate my point. The IOC has adopted a 4 step philosophy of
teaching. During the first step the basic concepts are taught in
the classrooms. The second step applies the lessons learned
through a series of sand table and map exercises. The third step
further applies those concepts in the form of a Tactical Exercise
Without Troops (TEWT). The final step is a field exercise or a
live fire exercise. Although the final exercise is critiqued, the
students move to the next subject whether or not they have
mastered the previous one. The schedule does not allow time for
the fifth and most crucial step -- practice. Practice must be
the final step prior to any test and in the case of the military,
war is the only true test. The difference between success and
failure in war, as in athletics, is practice.
Once a new play has been introduced, a team must practice it
over and over again before it can execute it without error. Too
often we feel that because something is taught and critiqued it
is learned Understanding how to do a particular task does not
equate to actually performing it. Repetition is the mother of
learning. The key to success is execution and the key to
execution is practice. In football the team that executes its
offense the best usually wins regardless of the type of offense
they play. In battle, the unit that executes its doctrine the
best will usually win. The need for repetition and practice
cannot be overstated. It reemphasizes the need to adopt a
Regimental System to keep our units together longer so they will
have sufficient time to practice as a team.
I have addressed some of the problems involving the the
technical and tactical education of our Marines but how do we
train our leaders in the art of war? First it should be noted
that the field grade level is the first level where it is
appropriate to shift our focus and concentrate on the art of war.
At this level, technical expertise should be assumed, however,
additional technical and tactical expertise may still be required
as a prerequisite. There are some who profess that to understand
operational art one must become a military historian. A knowledge
of military history is important, but it is only the beginning.
One must be able to apply history to present day technology and
circumstances. The ability to do so requires military judgment.
Military judgment is the ability to correctly and quickly surmise
a situation, make a decision, and then act upon it. Knowledge of
history can help in this process but it does not make us more
decisive. Military judgment, like military science, is best
learned through practice. Military education of our leaders
should focus on decision-making. Leaders should be given the
opportunity to analyze different situations and make decisions on
how to overcome the situation to ensure success. Formal schools
should use "force-on-force" scenarios assisted by computer
driven or manual war games designed to simulate battlefield
situations that require students to make these types of
decisions.
Whenever possible, real scenarios should be used to
familiarize the students with actual contingencies.
Additionally, students should be required to play the role of
potential enemies and devise and execute plans to defeat our
existing operation plans. By doing this, we can realize the
following benefits: (1) The most obvious benefit would be that
our war plans would be continually tested, evaluated and updated
based on the results of the war game. (2) Probably the most
important benefit relates to our final requirement for success in
war, intelligence. The students would learn a great deal about
potential adversaries and would become intimately familiar with
enemy weapons' capabilities and tactics.
Intelligence training is essential for military leaders.
Detailed knowledge about the enemy, terrain and weather are
required if our leaders are to make good operational decisions.
Since military decisions are based on intelligence, a large
portion of the training of our senior leaders should be in the
area of intelligence. Sun Tzu had this to say about intelligence:
Know the enemy, know yourself; your victory
will never be endangered. Know the ground,
know the weather; your victory will then be
total. (9:129)
It is imperative that Marine Corps intelligence capabilities
continue to improve. The importance of this requirement needs to
be reflected in our budgets as well as our training. One of the
biggest benefits of "force-on-force" exercises is that they
require the intelligence community to practice their trade in a
simulated combat environment against a thinking enemy. Too often
traditional exercises relegate the unit intelligence officer to
nothing more than the designer and monitor of his own scenario.
We need to exercise the intelligence community in all of our
training exercises. The MEU (SOC) program is a perfect vehicle
for doing this. Exercises should be conducted that require
intelligence officers to gather specific information about
particular trouble spots throughout the world. This would require
them to use national collection assets and other nonorganic
intelligence assets, as well as their own intelligence assets.
The drill of actually tasking, collecting, and analyzing various
sources of information would be invaluable to our intelligence
officers and their staffs.
The Marine Corps does not have, nor will it ever have, the
budget or the assets to be self sufficient in the areas of
intelligence collection and analysis. Therefore, we need to be
experts on how to exploit the assets of other existing agencies.
Close coordination with these organizations will ensure they
provided us with timely and meaningful products.
Another area where we need to be experts is the area of
intelligence dissemination. We need to improve on the way we
push tactical intelligence down to the using unit. A quote from
a letter of a battalion executive officer on the front lines in
SWA illustrates this point:
I'm briefed about what every Iraqi Army
Corps, Division and Brigade has done that
day. I know where the 'national assets'
are. I don't know what those four guys
with NVGs are doing 10 KM to my right or
who's behind the next hill.(6:4)
Too often intelligence is available but it never gets into the
hands of the people who need it the most. Intelligence
information is too valuable to be hidden behind a green door.
The formation of the Surveillance Reconnaissance and
Intelligence Group (SRIG) was designed to consolidate our
intelligence effort. Although it has centralized our
intelligence capabilities under one commander, it has not
consolidated our intelligence effort. The SRIG should
concentrate its efforts in the areas of tactical intelligence and
intelligence dissemination of all source intelligence. The
intelligence estimate is one of the first steps in the planning
process and it is the first requirement for battlefield success.
We need to strengthen our focus in this area if we hope to
continue to enjoy success in future wars.
In summary, it can be restated that maneuver warfare is a
philosophy of fighting smart. The Marine Corps has adopted
maneuver warfare as its warfighting doctrine, but it will take
much more than rhetoric to put this concept into practice. Our
challenge, therefore, is to identify needed changes in existing
policies in order to bridge the gap between concept and reality.
Some changes, such as an overseas national service program
require national support. However, other changes are simple and
can be done in-house. All of the changes will require command
attention at the Headquarters Marine Corps level. Everyone
believes in fighting smarter, but I have suggested ways that we
can better put our beliefs into action! Now it is up to the
leaders of our Corps and country to make the tough policy
decisions that will change the rhetoric into reality.
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Naval Post Graduate School, 1977.
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Paret. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986.
3. Department of the Navy. Headquarters United States Marine
Corps. Warfighting, FMFM- 1. Washington D.C., 1989.
4. Eberly, Donald and Micheal W. Sherridan. National Service:
Social, Economic, and Military Imports. New York, Pergamon Press,
1982.
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