Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Operation: Do We Have The Mobility?
AUTHOR Major John H. Parker, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
Executive Summary
Title: Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Operation: Do We Have
The Mobility?
I. Purpose: To establish the validity of the amphibious
triad for conducting over-the-horizon operations and whether
or not this triad will lend itself to conducting successful
amphibious assaults.
II. Problem: The Navy and Marine Corps have developed
an over-the-horizon doctrine for conducting amphibious
assaults due to the changing battlefield and advanced
technology. Moving to this doctrine without solving the
mobility assault requirements, could prove disastrous in
an amphibious assault conducted against a hostile beach.
III. Data: Since the Second World War, the Marine Corps
has continued to improve its capabilities to conduct
amphibious operations through the procurement of new
equipment and the advent of modern technology. At the
same time, the forces that the amphibious task force will
encounter during the assault also have the capability to
inflict serious damage because they too have new weapons
and technology. As a result, the Navy and Marine Corps
have adopted the doctrine of conducting over-the-horizon
assaults to ensure the success of the assault. Although
a great idea, there are mobility problems associated with
the over-the-horizon concept that could jeopardize
amphibious assaults. The current assault lift with the
task force does not support over-the-horizon operations.
IV. Conclusions: The over-the-horizon assault greatly
enhances the success of the amphibious assault. With the
Amphibious Task Force lacking the assault mobility, the
over-the-horizon assault is doomed from the very beginning.
V. Recommendations: The Marine Corps must continue to push,
develop and procure the elements of the amphibious triad.
Only then will the Navy and Marine Corps possess a true
over-the-horizon assault capability.
Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Operations: Do We Have
The Mobility?
Outline
Thesis Statement: Over-the-horizon is the future of
amphibious operations but without an improved triad we
are advertising the capability prematurely.
I. Amphibious Operations History
A. Historical Background
B. Ship-to-Shore Triad
C. Over-The-Horizon capability
II. LCAC
A. Capabilities
B. Role
C. Limitations
III. AAAV
A. Replace AAV-7
B. Capability
C. Counterpart
IV. MV-22
A. Counterpart to AAAV
B. Replace CH-46
C. Capability
D. Alternatives
Over-The-Horizon Amphibious Operations:
Do we have the mobility?
Since its earliest beginnings, the United States Marine
Corps, with its amphibious capabilities, has played an
integral part in the national strategy of the United States.
The ability to project power on foreign shores through
the concept of amphibious landings has been one of the
primary reasons for the success and existence of today's
Marine Corps.
Between 1922 and the Second World War, after having
conducted numerous amphibious landings, the Marine Corps
became the pioneer of amphibious doctrine. It was during
this span that procedures for amphibious operations were
refined, often by trial and error. Even today, amphibious
operations are among the most complex of military operations
to attempt. The amphibious assault is an offensive
operation that relies on maneuver, speed and surprise.
The chief disadvantage to a force conducting an amphibious
assault is the requirement to build-up forces from nothing
to full combat power. The build-up of strength ashore
must be quick, uninterrupted, and include forces strong
enough to overcome the enemy. It is while this build-up
is occurring that the landing force is most vulnerable.
Tactical mobility determines how quickly the build-up
can take place. The typical surface-to-surface assault
practiced in the late 1980s has varied only a little from
the World War II models. In this "classical case," several
waves of amphibious assault vehicles containing infantry
in tracked vehicles (e.g., the LVTP-7) attack a beachhead.
The landing ships (Landing Ship Tank/Landing Ship
Dock/Landing Platform Dock) launch these amphibious vehicles
from close offshore, and the initial waves of LTVPs are
closely followed by waves of landing crafts, usually LCUs
and LCMs, transporting tanks and artillery. The workhorse
of the conventional landing, the LVPT-7, has a water borne
speed of about 6-11 miles per hour. As launch distances
are generally restricted to 4,000 yards (2 nautical miles)
from the beach, transit takes about 20 minutes which could
be a life time in a high threat environment. (7:104)
Since the classic amphibious assaults of World War
II, increased accuracy, range, lethality and numbers of
enemy precision guided munitions and mines have driven
the Navy-Marine team to over-the-horizon launch distances
in order to reduce the risk to the amphibious task force.
No longer can the amphibious task force afford to steam
boldly to within 4,000 yards of the beach before commencing
a ship-to-shore movement at conventional landing craft
speed. The proliferation of "smart" weapons, such as
ground-launched cruise missiles, throughout much of the
developed and even the Third World has rendered such assault
suicidal.
The advantage of over-the-horizon amphibious assaults
allows the amphibious task force the stand-off and maneuver
room it needs and in turn increases the area of concern
to an enemy defending against possible amphibious assault.
With an over-the-horizon landing, advantages for the
Navy include:
-increased reaction time to air-launched cruise
missiles
-reduced ship vulnerability to deep and shallow water
mines
-reduced ship vulnerability to shore-based direct
and indirect fire weapons
-increased capability to conduct feints
The Marine assault force will also enjoy increased
benefits as a result of this concept. Landing force
advantages include:
-the ability to attack at the time and place of our
own choosing
-a shorter window of vulnerability while crossing
the beach range
-a widely dispersed enemy defensive posture (6:361)
Ideally, the amphibious assault should land where
the enemy is weakest and not defending at all. Since it
may not always be possible to land where the enemy is least
prepared, 0TH capabilities must be capable of forcible
entry across opposed beaches. The United States, as a
global maritime power, can not afford to have a forcible
entry capability, whenever and wherever needed.
Before we can benefit from the advantages of 0TH,
there are several factors that will limit our capability
to conduct an over-the-horizon assault and must be overcome.
It will require all elements of the ship-to-shore movement
to negotiate the 30-50 mile run quickly, simultaneously
deliver combat troops and heavy equipment, over a variety
of beaches, and have the legs necessary for return trips.
Currently, the capability does not exist. Over-the-horizon
is the future of amphibious operations but without an
improved triad we are advertising the capability
prematurely.
The Marine Corps and Navy are in the process of
developing a triad of equipment to conduct 0TH amphibious
assault: (1) the air cushion landing craft (LCAC) (2) the
advanced assault amphibious vehicle (AAAV), and (3) the
MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor assault aircraft. Each element
of the triad is specialized, yet some degree of overlap
exists to provide the necessary redundancy for a combined
air and surface amphibious assault. (3:37-38)
A major milestone in the movement toward an 0TH
amphibious assault force was achieved when the first LCACs
began arriving in 1980. The amphibious capabilities of
LCAC, combined with its speed and range, provide a quantum
improvement in ship-to-shore movement. The LCAC employs
Hovercraft technology to skim across the ocean surface
on a cushion of air. It has a range of 200 nautical miles
and with a full payload can travel at speeds in excess
of 50 knots in sea state 2 and 40 knots in sea state 3.
Overloaded, it will still achieve 30 knots in sea state
2. Unconstrained by winds, tides, reefs, underwater
obstacles, beach gradients and beach trafficability, the
LCAC can cross the shoreline and proceed inland at speeds
up to 35 knots. In addition, it is less vulnerable to
mines than conventional landing craft. Ashore, it will
cross 20 foot ditches and 5 foot vertical obstacles, knock
down small trees, and climb gradients up 13 percent. (2:75)
It can also carry 25 combat troops in a special compartment.
The most significant operational characteristics of
the LCAC are its speed and its ability to cross beaches
that have been previously unassailable. The LCAC will
cross approximately 80 percent of the worlds coastline
as compared to about 17 percent for conventional landing
craft, enormously complicating a defender's task.
The LCAC is primarily a logistics support craft used
to haul combat support and combat service support equipment
ashore. Combat support and combat service support are
the most critical lift requirements during the first 90
minutes of an amphibious assault. There is no better or
faster way for the landing force commander to get his tanks,
light armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and their necessary
ammunition ashore during that crucial time, than by LCAC.
Essentially unarmored, the LCAC is not an assault
craft. Vulnerable to small-arms fire and light shrapnel,
the LCAC was not intended for tactical forcible entry.
The craft is simply too valuable, too big and too few in
numbers to be able to suffer attrition. This situation
will not change appreciably because the lift capacity of
current and planned amphibious shipping precludes increasing
the number of LCACs beyond projected quantities. (1:42)
As mentioned earlier, conventional landing craft travel
at speeds of 8-11 knots and must be launched from 3-5 miles
offshore. The LCAC is designed to replace the venerable
landing craft. The LCAC's greatest value is their
employment in the high speed build-up of combat power ashore
for the landing force.
Despite the capabilities of the LCAC other equipment
limitations prevent today's Marine air-ground task force
commanders from fully exploiting the new landing crafts
potential in over-the-horizon assaults. Today, for example,
a significant amount of the Marine Corps' combat force
continues to be transported ashore in tracked amphibious
assault vehicles (AAVs). These have been improved greatly
since World War II but are still hampered by slow water
speeds of well under 15 miles per hour. Moreover, the
combination of heat, noise, fumes, and motion make for
a very rough ride within the troop compartment during
waterborne operations. Troops can not be expected to retain
fighting effectiveness after more than approximately 30
minutes afloat in the current amphibians. Hence, the
horizon for the AAV is frequently only 4,000 meters
offshore. (1:40)
The current assault amphibian, designated the AAVP7A1,
has been upgraded in a number of ways since it first entered
service in 1972. The latest upgrade is intended to continue
the AAVP7A1 into the late 1990s at which time it will have
to be replaced. No further upgrades are planned.
The next generation assault amphibian must possess
requisite mobility, firepower, survivability and armor
protection to provide the Marine Corps with the capability
to conduct amphibious forcible entry and ground combat
operations into the second decade of the 21st century.
The AAV, currently in exploratory development is intended
to provide that capability. The new amphibian will be
designed for uninterrupted movement from ships
over-the-horizon to objectives at the shoreline or much
further inland. Overall, it will represent a greatly
improved assault capability, with higher speed both on
land and in the water, upgraded firepower, armor protection,
and enhanced survivability against enemy arms. Part of
this equation is well on the road to success. A goal
established for the AAAV program was to achieve 20 knots
over water with a tracked amphibian. This speed has been
reached in test models. (9:28)
Procurement of a follow-on assault amphibian must
take place soon, but with advanced technology and a
capability comes a price. Cost is the major prohibitive
factor. A recently published figure cites $6.6 billion
for research, development and procurement. That figure
is eight times the size of the Marine Corps' entire fiscal
year 1991 procurement budget. Given the apparently lean
years ahead, the Marine Corps will have a tough fight on
its hands.
As mentioned earlier, the LCAC and AAAV would
complement one another during the ship-to-shore phase.
Relying on the LCAC alone would drastically effect the
combat power build-up from 20 miles offshore. LCAC transit
time to the beach will be approximately 30 minutes; 10
minutes will be required to offload in the landing site;
30 minutes transit time back to the ship; 20 minutes to
enter the welldeck; and 30 minutes more transit time back
to the beach. This all works out to 90 minutes between
the time an LCAC makes its initial landing and returns
with a second load. Turnaround time for a third load to
the beach will be further delayed because of the need to
refuel the LCAC. (2:77)
Considering the amount of time required for LCAC
turnaround, and the lack of the AAAV, the battlefield
commander would be at great risk conducting an amphibious
landing over-the-horizon. With the current AAV, the only
way it could work with the LCAC, in 0TH operations, would
be for the LCAC to carry the AAVs. Each LCAC can carry
three AAVs.
Carrying the AAVs ashore in LCACs significantly reduces
the number of LCACs available to carry TOWs, tanks, LAVs,
artillery and other combat support and combat service
support units ashore. For example, 5 of the 6 LCACs
supporting a MEU would be required to land the 14 AAVs
normally assigned. Of the 33 LCACs supporting a MEB, 16
would be required to land its 47 assigned AAVs. (2:78)
By landing the AAVs by LCAC and remembering the turnaround
time of 90 minutes, a significant delay will occur in the
build-up of combat support and combat service support units.
Clearly, the need for the AAAV is evident, working with
the LCAC, for the rapid build-up of combat power ashore
in 0TH operations.
The third and final leg of the triad concept is the
MV-22. The MV-22 (medium lift assault) is the air
counterpart of the AAAV, intended to replace the CH-46
and CH-53A/D helicopters. The MV-22 is intended to
complement the CH-53E helicopter, which carries the heavier
combat loads, such as light armored vehicles (LAVs) and
M198 155mm artillery.
The MV-22 Osprey, when fielded, will provide the 0TH
air component for combined surface and air assault or,
when necessary, the all-air amphibious assault. The MV-22
is intended to replace the aging CH-46 which is entering
its 27th year of service. The aircraft was developed in
the early 1960s with the first one fleet-operational in
1962. The CH-46 lacks the range (approx. 60 miles) to
conduct over-the-horizon assaults (anywhere from 12-100
miles). Again, this places the amphibious task force at
risk to enemy weapons systems, limits the area of operation,
and drastically reduces the flexibility of the ground
commander. Along with the range limitations, helicopters
are slow moving and have a high heat and noise signature
making them extremely vulnerable to anti-air artillery
fire and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). With
the threat of sophisticated weapons, battles will be fought
at night and in adverse weather which hampers the CH-46
helicopter's operational capability significantly.
The solution to these problems is the MV-22 Osprey.
It was designed as and all-weather, medium-lift assault
aircraft, it will be capable of vertical take off and
landing (VTOL), short take off and landing (STOL) and
conventional fixed wing flight. It is being fitted with
forward looking infrared radar (FLIR), the Tactical
Navigation Global Positioning System (GSP), and a color
night vision compatible cockpit. It is capable of carrying
maximum pay-loads of 18,000 pounds (VTOL) or 23,000 pounds
(STOL), flying more than 1,000 miles without refueling,
with an in-flight speed of 300 knots. It is also capable
of carrying 18-24 passengers. (5:319)
One of the greatest advantages this revolutionary
aircraft presents, is its ability to provide dramatic
increase in lift, speed, and versatility in any weather,
day or night, from any amphibious ship in today's inventory.
Its primary benefit is seen in rapid surprise
over-the-horizon assault. The MV-22 Osprey will allow
a much more rapid closure to the beach, giving the
amphibious task force the option of operating from
over-the-horizon, out of range of many weapons systems.
As a result of this capability, it allows for many maneuver
landing points spread out over a much greater distance.
Tactical mobility is enhanced by the MV-22. It allows
the MAGTF commander to move freely on/or around the
battlefield. Extended range, speed and endurance of the
MV-22 open up a wide range of opportunities within a given
objective area and deny a potential adversary the option
of massing forces for a predictable amphibious assault.
The MV-22 with its latest technology by all indications
should be the aircraft to replace the CH-46. With new
technology comes a price that has to be paid. Individual
cost of the MV-22 is often stated as approximately $32
million. As a result of the cost factor, Secretary of
Defense Richard B. Cheney in 1989 canceled the MV-22 program
with only research-and-development funds programmed in
fiscal 1991. The research-and-development effort to date,
has validated the tiltrotor concept. Four full-scale
development aircraft are flying, and two more MV-22s are
nearing completion. Future plans call for operational
tests of the aircraft to continue with additional funds
hopefully being approved in the fiscal budget in FY-92.
(9:6) In the interim, recommendations have been made to
replace the MV-22 with existing CH-53s and CH-60s (Army
helicopters). (4:373)
In terms of MV-22 alternatives, neither the
CH-60/CH-53E meet the parameters set forth for medium-lift
assault requirement. The CH-60 is an outstanding
helicopter, but it does not have the load-carrying or range
capability for an assault helicopter. On the other hand,
the CH-53E has too much load-carrying capability for an
assault helicopter; it is not compatible with assault
landing zones; and commanders have to consider the risk
associated with putting too many Marines (the CH-53E can
carry 55 passengers) in a simple vehicle. As mentioned
earlier, the primary mission of the CH-53E is to provide
assault helicopter transport of heavy weapons, equipment
and supplies during amphibious operations and subsequent
operations ashore.
With the CH-60 being too small and the CH-53E too
big, another alternative, not a viable one, would be to
extend the service life of the CH-46. This would be a
quick-fix solution to the medium lift requirement. In
turn, this will set the Marine Corps back regarding the
over-the-horizon attack capability and would force the
Marines to go into the 21st century with 1960s technology.
In summary, the technology to modernize our
ship-to-shore triad is currently available. The high cost
of that technology has precluded the Marine Corps from
fielding the AAAV and MV-22. As a result only one third
of our triad is truly over-the-horizon capable. We may
be advertising the 0TH capability prematurely.
The vulnerability of ships and slow-moving assault
vehicles to modern weapons systems has made the traditional
concept of amphibious assault obsolete. Avoiding enemy
defense, and seeking to achieve tactical surprise, future
amphibious assaults will be launched from unprecedented
distances off-shore. The incorporation of the new
amphibious triad will transform the amphibious assault
into a daring but highly practical form of offensive
warfare. A full 0TH amphibious assault capability will
not exist until all the legs of the triad outlined above,
have been procured.
The LCAC, AAAV and the MV-22 will offer the Marine
Corps a unique degree of flexibility in moving troops from
ship-to-shore during over-the-horizon amphibious operations.
The proposed amphibious triad gives the MAGTF commander
the ability to control and quickly maneuver within a
battlefield area almost three times allowable by the current
amphibious triad. The amphibious triad will be a
significant leap forward into the 21st century in terms
of mobility and survivability for Marines and the Marine
Corps' expeditionary mission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Alexander, Joseph H., Col., USMC. (Ret) "The Next
Assault Amphibian." Proceedings November 1989
pp. 38-42.
2. Bailey, Thomas A., Maj., USMC. Over-The-Horizon
Assault by LCAC." Marine Corps Gazette January
1986, pp. 74-80.
3. Earl, Robert L., Lt.Col., USMC. "The Over-The-Horizon
Alternatives." Marine Corps Gazette October 1988,
pp. 37-38.
4. Flanagan, Robert M., Lt.Col., USMC. "The V-22 Is
Slipping Away." Proceedings August 1990, pp. 39-43.
5. Labrecque, Terrence P., CMDR, USN. "Seabased Logisitcs:
Viable or Not?" Marine Corps Gazette January 1990,
pp. 36-42.
6. Oneil M.S., Hartway II G.E. and Roe, M.W., Capts., USMC.
"Communications for Over-The-Horizon Assaults."
Marine Corps Gazette March 1989, pp. 34-40.
7. Truver, Scott C. "PHIBSTRIKE 95--Fact or Fiction."
Armed Forces Journal August 1987, pp. 102-108.
8. "V-22 Program Update" Marine Corps Gazette February
1991, pp. 6.
9. White, Carl. "The Corps' "Concept for the Future."
Sea Power November 1990, pp. 22-28.
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