Fire Support Coordination By The MAGTF Command Element--What Is Its Real Role?
AUTHOR Major David N. Penman, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION BY THE MAGTF COMMAND ELEMENT --
WHAT IS ITS REAL ROLE?
Our Commandant clearly delineated in FMFM 1,
Warfighting, what Marines must do to prepare for and conduct
war. The basic concepts -- commander's intent, focus of
effort, tempo, shaping the battlefield -- to name a few, are
all well known to us. We as Marines also know that at the
heart of our warfighting ability lies the combined arms of
the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. We learned from history
the supreme value of MAGTF employment as a combat multiplier.
What we have not learned from history is the best, most
efficient way for the MAGTF command element to fulfill its
role in executing the commander's intent.
A critical element in any commander's ability to shape
the battlefield, to project his "thoughts forward in time and
space," is the efficient employment of supporting arms. This
is especially true for the MAGTF commander. Unfortunately,
the doctrine and concepts currently written, or under review,
for the MAGTF command element do not provide for the
execution of these necessary functions. If the Marine Corps
is to operate efficiently in the future in the joint
warfighting arena, we must more clearly define the roles,
duties, and functions of the command element in fire support
coordination.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION BY THE MAGTF COMMAND ELEMENT --
WHAT IS ITS REAL ROLE?
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. Before the command element of a Marine
Air-Ground Task Force can achieve its maximum warfighting
potential, its fire support coordination responsibilities
must be more clearly delineated.
I. History of the MAGTF command element (CE)
A. Informal beginnings
B. First official use
C. Maturity of the concept
D. The CE today
II. MAGTF CE role in fire support coordination
A. Fire support definitions
B. Basic fire support role defined
C. Comparison to an FSCC
III. Need for an agency
A. Doctrine for and against
B. Pros and Cons
C. Relationship to individual duties
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION BY THE MAGTF COMMAND ELEMENT --
WHAT IS ITS REAL ROLE?
In order to understand the potential role and functions
of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command element
(CE) in fire support planning and coordination, one must
first have an appreciation for the role of the command
element itself. Not only should one understand the concepts
and principles under which we currently train and fight, but
one should be familiar with the historical perspective of how
these concepts evolved.
The "combined arms" concept or "air-ground" integration
essentially has its beginnings in the Pacific Theater of
World War II. One of the earliest examples of Marine air-
ground employment by a single commander is in Guadalcanal,
where General Vandergrift not only commanded two Marine
divisions and two Army divisions, but Marine numerous
aircraft squadrons from Henderson Field as well. The
experience gained at Guadalcanal highlighted the need for a
command structure that could better integrate the
effectiveness of the division/wing operations. Consequently
the Marine Amphibious Corps (MAC) was introduced and
maintained, although with varying degrees of success,
throughout the remainder of the war.
By wars end there was no doubt about the value of the
air-ground team as the best use of combat power. Refinements
in the command and control structure challenged the Marine
Corps in the early post-war years, but almost no doctrinal
progress was made before the activation of the 1st
Provisional Brigade for duty in the Korean War.
The use of the 1st Provisional Brigade, especially the
deployment of the Brigade as a MAGTF with its own CE, was a
milestone in MAGTF history. It marked the first time the
Fleet Marine Force (FMF) went to war as an integrated team.
During the Korean War, the combined arms team aspect of the
MAGTF concept certainly proved its supreme warfighting value,
but the same proof did not prevail for the headquarters.
Even before the armistice, the Harris Board was
reporting the results of the first systematic examination of
the MAGTF concept. The Board confirmed the need of a single
commander, and his need for an integrated air-ground staff.
The question of which commander, however, was not clear --
whether it should be a separate commander or a component
commander, serving as the task force commander with a
separate, or augmented, staff. (5:18)
In 1954 the Commandant of the Marine Corps attempted to
clarify the issue by promulgating a letter called The Marine
Air-Ground Task Force Concept. But confusion and divergent
opinions remained, especially over the employment of
aviation, and the 1954 letter was cancelled after only two
years. Another board, known as the Hogaboom Board, convened
in 1956 with a "sweeping mandate: to determine the optimum
organization and composition, to include equipment and
tactical concepts, for maximum FMF effectiveness to discharge
its mission." (5:22)
Some of the more interesting Hogaboom Board conclusions
which pertain to the headquarters issue include the
following:
- The air-ground task force type of command
structure was not normally required, or desirable for
amphibious operations.
- A table of organization should be developed for
a brigade-type headquarters.
- The division headquarters was designed not only
to command, plan, and execute division operations, but
to command attached aviation units as well. (5:23)
So this pattern of debate, for and against a MAGTF
headquarters, was set. Briefly some of the other highlights
in the MAGTF command element evolution are:
- Publication of MCO 3120.3, The Organization of Marine
Air-Ground Task Forces (27 Dec 1962), which "advanced the
broad employment policy of normally establishing a separate
headquarters for MAGTF operations involving 'substantial'
aviation and ground elements." It also provided for four
types of MAGTF's, ranging in size from the Marine
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to the Marine Expeditionary Corps
(MEC). (5:27)
- FMFM 0-1 superceded MCO 3120.3 in August 1979. One
of its key mandates said,
Regardless of the size of the MAGTF, it will
include the following four major components:
A command element
A ground combat element
An aviation combat element
A combat service support element (3:1-2)
Regarding the MAGTF headquarters, it said, "A notable
difference between a MAGTF headquarters and the headquarters
of the more traditional organizations... is that it is not,
in all cases, a permanent headquarters." (3:3-1) In fact,
most of the headquarters at the time were, at best, only the
nucleus of the operational requirement.
- In April 1983, MAGTF headquarters received their
first "permanent" status with the publication of Green Letter
No. 5-83: Development and Employment of Marine Forces. The
letter called for six full MEB headquarters, each capable of
fielding two MEU headquarters, and three MEF nucleus
headquarters, which would be flushed out by subordinate MEB
headquarters after compositing. (5:6)
- Except for FMFM 1, Operational Handbook (OH) 2, The
Marine Air-Ground Task Force, is the current how-to guide
document for MAGTF operations. Although not yet doctrine, OH
2's views of the CE are:
The command element (CE) is the MAGTF headquarters.
It is a permanent organization composed of the
commander, the general or executive and special
staff sections, the headquarters section, and
requisite communications and service support
facilities. (10:2-2)
Which brings us to FMFM 1, Warfighting. Surprisingly,
for being the cornerstone doctrine for our warfighting
philosophy, the book says very little directly about the
MAGTF. In the Organization section of Chapter 3 there are,
however, two insights worthy of note. After recognizing the
four basic "components," it says this about MAGTFs, "They
have no standard structure, but rather are constituted as
appropriate for the specific situation. The MAGTF provides a
single commander the optimum combined-arms force for the
situation he faces." (4:42) Then towards the end of that
section the following comment is made, "Further, we should
streamline our headquarters organizations and staffs to
eliminate bureaucratic delays in order to add tempo." (4:43)
The intent of this statement is certainly clear enough, and
all Marines must continuously review and evaluate the
functions our headquarters are actually performing.
So the history of the MAGTF headquarters has gone
around, should there be a separate headquarters or not? If
so, should it be permanent or not? Recently the wheel turned
slightly further by a return of "imbedding" a MEB head-
quarters into each of the MEF headquarters. But from this
state of flux we must attempt to examine the role of the
supporting arms personnel on the MAGTF CE staff.
As one might expect, the role for the staff is also
undergoing an evolutionary process. The current ideas, or at
least the terminology, Supporting Arms Special Staff (SASS),
dates to 1983, when it was introduced in the "7-series" of
operational handbooks. OH 7-1 stated in part:
To discharge the MAGTF command element's fire
support coordination responsibilities, fire support,
air, NGF [Naval Gunfire], and target information
officers are assigned to the MAGTF staff. In the
Handbook, these officers collectively are called the
MAGTF Headquarters Supporting Arms Special Staff. This
name replaces the title Fire Support Information Center
which doctrine provides no functions for, and which is
so close in phrasing to FSCC that in practice it leads
MAGTF staffs to attempt to perform fire support
coordination functions which are best performed by the
GCE. (9:1-2)
Today we can only speculate whether or not the author of
those words really understood the dilemma his words would
cause for future fire support personnel on the MAGTF staff.
One can believe the author's indent was to steer the micro-
manager type MAGTF staff personnel away from doing the GCE's
job for them, and clearly this remains an important concern.
On the other hand these words led to a perception that the
MAGTF command element staff has no requirement to perform
fire support coordination functions. The continual emphasis
on any words and phrases, e.g., "planning cell," which are
used to discourage the command element form doing one of the
subordinates jobs, tends to simultaneously deter the MAGTF CE
from doing the necessary fire support functions which are
best performed at the MAGTF headquarters. The lack of
performance of these functions, which current doctrine is not
fully providing for, results in a less than optimum execution
of the MAGTF commander's intent.
But what are some of these fire support planning and/or
coordination functions that cause some Marines to remain
steadfastly committed to only the GCE performing them? An
examination of the current FMFM's under development on this
subject frequently make reference back to the definitions in
Joint Pub 1-02. In an attempt to establish some common
ground, and avoid personal biased in the definitions, some
key Joint Pub 1-02 definitions follow:
Fire plan - A tactical plan for using the weapons of a
unit or formation so that their fire will be
coordinated.
Fire support coordination - The planning and executing
of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a
suitable weapon or group of weapons.
Target acquisition - The detection, identification, and
location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the
effective employment of weapons.
Target analysis - An examination of potential targets to
determine military importance, priority of attack, and
weapons required to obtain a desired level of damage or
casualties.
Allocation - The translation of the apportionment into
total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for
each operation/task.
Apportionment - The determination and assignment of the
total expected effort by percentage and /or by priority
that should be devoted to the various air operations
and/or geographic areas for a given period of time.
Considering these definitions, and the fluctuating
conceptual framework for MAGTF CE, what is envisioned as the
role for the MAGTF CE in fire support coordination? Although
each manual makes its own elaboration on the answer to this
question, the doctrinal publications currently under
development seem to share a general acceptance of the
following basic theme:
The role of the MAGTF CE in fire support
coordination is to implement the MAGTF commander's
intent which will be focused on operations which will
take place in the future. The MAGTF CE's effort is in
planning as opposed to the actual integration of the
delivery of supporting arms on enemy forces in close
proximity of forces of the GCEs. The ability of the
MAGTF CE to conduct fire support coordination is
centered around the Supporting Arms Special Staff (SASS)
in the MAGTF G/S-3, which is primarily a planning cell.
This cell is the focal point for fire support planning
and directing MAGTF supporting arms employment. (8:I-1)
This role statement was followed by a list of fire
support coordination tasks to be performed by the MAGTF CE
(see Figure 1). However, from the above role statement, the
dichotomy of purpose and function for the MAGTF CE begins to
unfold. Most military personnel who are familiar with the
duties and functions of a Fire Support Coordination Center
(FSCC) would say the role of the SASS is very similar to, if
not the same as, the role of the FSCC at high levels of
command.* Considering their similarities further, an obvious
question seems to be, "Why is the entire draft FMFM 2-7A
dedicated to, and in fact titled, Fire Support Coordination
by the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command Element?"
Admittedly, the MAGTF CE should not be actively involved
in the integration of fire and maneuver, like it is done at
the infantry battalion or regiment, but many of the MAGTF
CE's functions are still fire support coordination in the
terms defined above. But is the SASS an agency, like an
FSCC, or is the term, SASS, a security blanket label attached
to some of the special staff officers in the MAGTF
headquarters, who happen to be advisors to the commander on
the employment of supporting arms?
*(For comparison, Figure 2 is a list of duties required of a
Fire Support Coordinator (8:II-13))
Within the context of a discussion on command and
control systems, the draft FMFM 2-7 says, "The commander
establishes agencies to assist in organizing, planning,
directing, coordinating, and controlling fire support." (7:1-
6) A table which follows this statement, lumps in the SASS,
as an agency for the CE, right along with the FSCCs for the
GCE and the DASC (Direct Air Support Center) and TACC
(Tactical Air Command Center) for the ACE.
On the other hand, the draft FMFM 2-7A states
specifically SASS personnel do not work in fixed locations.
It further explains that although some of their work is done
in the MAGTF combat operations center (COC), many of the
duties the SASS personnel are required to perform must be
done away from the COC. Liaison and coordination with higher
and adjacent headquarters, on a myriad of issues, exemplifies
this need.
Although the latter employment of SASS personnel may
more closely relate to the long range, deep battle focus the
CE staff should maintain, it surfaces the old adage -- "Who's
minding the store?" -- when several of the SASS principals
are simultaneously away from the MAGTF COC. FMFM 2-7A
suggests that SASS personnel simply coordinate their actions
so that a representative is always present in, or available
to, the COC.
An alternating representative in the COC sounds like a
very good idea; one that would:
- reduce the manpower requirements of the MAGTF COC,
- allow the SASS personnel greater flexibility to do their
jobs as they saw fit, and
- make better use of a "generalist" fire support
representative.
But it is one that does not work, by my observations and
experience, in the Marine Corps today.
After serving on the SASS at the MEU, MEB and MEF levels
of command, in both FMFLANT and FMFPAC, through numerous
exercises and deployments, I have come to one conclusion:
COC watch officers, operations officers, G-3's, and
especially MAGTF commanders, don't want to hear what an
artillery officer has to say about the employment or
allocation of aviation. In fact, I believe there is even a
general hesitancy to accept the recommendation of the staff
air officer, when the issue is outside of his community.
After all, "What does a 'rotor-head' know about
fighter/attack aircraft?" Or consider a similar axiom, "Jet-
jocks know nothing about assault support."
Unfortunately, there is another very key aspect of the
fire support coordination responsibilities of the MAGTF CE
that goes unattended when the SASS does not function as an
"agency" with the MAGTF COC - targeting. One of the most
significant influences the MAGTF commander can have on
shaping the battlefield is through a very active targeting
system. The MAGTF CE is the key link to many internal, and
almost all of the external, intelligence gathering sources.
The target acquisition and target analysis processes, as
defined above, must be a continuous, 24 hour-a-day process.
The fluidity of the modern battlefield does not allow time
for target analysis to be done once a day when a member of
the SASS happens to get around to it.
But what are some of the specific tasks or duties
expected of the other supporting arms representatives on the
MAGTF CE staff? They parallel rather closely the duties of
their counterparts in an FSCC -- except for the actual
terminal clearance of fire missions on targets. The
following are examples of the duties of just the artillery
officer and the air officer, as they are sufficient to
illustrate the similarities.
For the Artillery Officer:
Normally functions as the fire support officer (FSO),
who coordinates the activities of the other members of
the SASS.
Prepares estimates of supportability, addressing MAGTF-
level considerations.
Establishes liaison with fire support personnel at
higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters.
Supervises the planning process for conduct of the deep
and rear battles.
Assists the air officer in reviewing offensive air
support requirements from elements of the MAGTF.
Coordinates with the MAGTF G/S-3 and personnel in the
joint intelligence center (JIC) concerning
recommendations for target priorities and attack
guidance.
For the Air Officer:
Advises the MAGTF commander on aviation matters.
If needed, prepares an aviation estimate of
supportability, addressing MAGTF-level considerations.
Consolidates MAGTF air support requirements.
Establishes liaison with the ACE, the GCE AirO, and the
AirOs of higher and adjacent forces headquarters. (6:1-6
-- 1-8)
Just looking at the amount of work involved to
"consolidate" and "review the offensive" air support requests
is a full time job, and to the degree that there are
immediate air requests to be sorted out, there is no future
planning be done. Similarly, when the AirO is out performing
his liaison duties with higher and adjacent headquarters, he
is not consolidating air support requirements.
So where does that leave the MAGTF command element in
regards to its proper and necessary role in fire support
coordination? I do not know. However, based on my personal
experience and review of the proposed "doctrine" on the
subject, the Marine Corps can't get there from here. Yes,
traditional functions and responsibilities of an FSCC belong
in the GCE, but the loose connotations of the SASS leave to
many important functions undone or only partially done. Many
of the duties and responsibilities of the individual
officers, and the SASS as a whole, are well thought-out and
make a good beginning, but more needs to be accomplished.
The Marine Corps needs to come to grips with the issue,
especially the aspects of fire support planning for the deep
battle and active, aggressive targeting. We need to stop
hedging around and make our doctrine say what we mean. If
what we want is an agency within the MAGTF CE to perform fire
support functions, planning and/or coordination, then we need
to name it appropriately and treat it like any other agency
currently in doctrine. If what we want is the MAGTF CE to
perform fire support functions on an informal basis, then we
need to drop the name "SASS" and stop expecting to find a
thing that isn't. Until the Marine Corps gets its internal
act together, we will continue to come up short with the
"higher and adjacent" headquarters (read joint community)
with whom the MAGTF command element must work.
Fire Support Coordination Tasks
of the MAGTF CE
1. The establishment of fire support coordination reports,
fire support coordination measures (e.g., fire support
coordination line) and fire support coordination procedures
when existing procedures are inadequate.
2. Tasking of elements of the MAGTF to perform those
functions required to integrate supporting arms with each
other.
3. Resolving of fire support conflicts between MAGTF
elements when these conflicts cannot be resolved at lower
levels.
4. Planning for future operations.
5. Recommending to the commander the apportionment of
aviation and naval gunfire efforts and where necessary,
reallocation of artillery assets belonging to the GCEs when
more than on GCE is in the MAGTF.
6. Conducting targeting functions to meet the MAGTF
commander's intent. A targeting committee may be formed
consisting of representatives from the GCE(s), ACE, CSSE,
G-2, and SRI Group.
7. Requests and coordinates external fire support or target
acquisition support with higher or adjacent forces.
8. Disseminates pertinent information to other elements of
the MAGTF and to forces outside the MAGTF.
9. Planning, in conjunction with the other MAGTF elements,
fire support including fire support for rear security. The
focus of the planning is usually deeper than the fire support
planning conducted by the other elements.
Figure 1
Duties of a Fire Support Coordinator
1. Advising the commander on fire support.
2. Coordinating the preparation of estimates of
supportability.
3. After receiving the commander's concept of operations,
preparing the fire support plan, with assistance from the
supporting arms representatives.
4. Ensuring that fire support plans can be implemented with
the fire support means available and , if necessary,
coordinating with the operations officer (G/S-3) and the
commander to secure additional means or to modify plans.
5. Recommending fire support coordination measures to the
commander.
6. Working with the operations officer as he establishes
boundaries, as these will impact on fire support coordination
measures.
7. Providing clearance on requests for fire missions and
airstrikes from subordinate units. Coordinating clearance,
when required, with senior and adjacent units. This may be
delegated to the appropriate supporting arms representative.
8. Disseminating target information received through FSCC
channels to other staff agencies and commands requiring the
information.
9. Advising the commander on the selection of targets,
attack guidance/target precedence.
10. Maintains close liaison and working relations with the
operations officer and the intelligence officer to ensure the
most effective planning and application of fire support.
Figure 2
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Department of the Army. Headquarters Department of the
Army. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Fire
Support for Corps and Division Operations, FM 6-20-
30. Washington, D.C., 1989.
2. Department of Defense. Office of the Chairman the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary
of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02.
Washington, D.C., 1989.
3. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine
Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM
0-1. Washington, D.C., 1979.
4. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine
Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1. Washington, D.C.,
1989.
5. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Training and
Education Center. Marine Corps Development and
Education Command. MAGTF Education Publication
History of the MAGTF. Quantico, 1989.
6. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development
Command. Fire Support Coordination by the Marine
Air-Ground Task Force Command Element, FMFM 2-7A
(Coordinating Draft). Quantico, 1990.
7. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development
Command. Fire Support in Marine Air-Ground Task
Force Operations, FMFM 2-7 (Coordinating Draft).
Quantico, 1990.
8. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development
Command. Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support
Coordination, FMFM 6-18 (Draft). Quantico, 1990.
9. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and
Education Command. Fire Support Coordination by a
Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), OH 7-1.
Quantico, 1983.
10. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and
Education Command. The Marine Air-Ground Task
Force, OH 2. Quantico, 1987.
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