The Deception Of Detente'
AUTHOR LCDR James R. McMillan, Jr., USN
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE DECEPTION OF DETENTE'
I. Purpose: To establish the validity for NATO to maintain its
military strength in Europe until the military threat posed by
the Soviet Union has been reduced by substantiated reforms.
II. Problem: The West has seized the opportunity, during an era
of reduced tensions in Europe, to reap 'peace dividends' by
cutting defense budgets and reducing their military force
structure. The result is a weakened NATO, potentially incapable
of repelling military adventurism by the Soviet Union.
III. Data: Separating the reality from the rhetoric of Soviet
reforms is difficult, if not impossible. Despite claims to the
contrary, Soviet defense spending continues to increase in real
terms by 3% annually, accounting for as much as 17% of the GNP.
Soviet efforts to convert to a civilian industrial base were
unsuccessful due to insufficient funding, while annual economic
and military aid to client states, such as Cuba and Vietnam,
exceeds $15 billion (1989). Glasnost has continued to face tough
resistance at all levels of government. Opposition parties still
have not been permitted to run candidates, thereby allowing the
Communist Party to maintain its control over the new Soviet
democracy. Although Soviet foreign policy has garnered the most
reform laurels, the Soviet Union has failed to control one of its
major beneficiaries (Iraq) and continues to support client states
hostile to the West. The Soviets claim they will only maintain a
force adequate for unquestionable defense, yet Soviet military
production continues to double that of NATO. The Soviet Union is
improving strategic offensive ballistic missile systems and
continues to add advanced ballistic missile submarines and
sophisticated naval combatants to their inventory.
IV. Conclusions: The Soviet Union has not ended the Cold War;
they have only changed the format. By establishing closer ties
and reducing tensions with the West, the Soviet Union has used
diplomacy to reduce Western defense spending. The Soviets are
currently exercising financial `load-shedding' by reducing their
worldwide military presence. The Soviets are substituting
quantity with quality in their military arsenal, using their
'peace dividends' to enhance weapon quality and continue their
support of client states hostile to Western interests.
V. Recommendations: The U.S. and its Western allies must
provide the Soviets with an atmosphere favorable for the success
of Perestroika, Glasnost, and the reforms in foreign policy and
military force structure. The West must not, however, allow
Soviet reform propaganda to weaken the political ties and
military strength of NATO. The military presence and strength
that has maintained peace in Europe for over 40 years should
continue until the reality can be distinguished from the rhetoric
of Soviet reforms.
THE DECEPTION OF DETENTE'
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. Although pro-Western trends in the Soviet
Union appear to be bringing the Cold War to an end, a prudent
Western Alliance should maintain its military strength until
reality can be distinguished from the rhetoric of Soviet reforms.
I. Changes in the Soviet Union
A. Long standing policies and doctrine
B. Events within the Warsaw Bloc
C. Soviet leadership
D. Cold War
II. Economic Restructuring
A. Perestroika
B. Market Economy
C. Centralized control
D. Military versus civilian industrial base
E. Public perception by the West
F. Military spending trends
G. U.S./USSR GNP comparisons
H. Economic aid to client states
III. Political/Government Reform
A. Glasnost
B. Tolerance for diverse political views
C. Democratization Soviet-style
D. Legislative process
E. Communist Party resistance to change
F. Gorbachev nears dictator status
IV. Foreign Policy
A. Diplomatic changes
B. Troop withdrawals
C. Soviet position during Coalition war with Iraq
D. Soviet opportunities in Latin America
E. Warsaw Pact nations
V. Military Overhaul
A. Reductions in deployed nuclear and conventional arms
B. NATO military reductions
C. Impact on U.S. military capabilities
D. Advances in Soviet weapons and delivery platforms
VI. Soviet Reforms -- Reality or Rhetoric
A. Changes to the Cold War format
B. Possible Soviet motives
C. Stability of the Western Alliance
THE DECEPTION OF DETENTE'
Soviet troops, tanks, and missiles are leaving Eastern
Europe and are heading back to the Soviet Union. The Berlin
Wall and its guards are gone, and Germany is united under a
single flag. The U.S. and the Soviet Union were allied against
a third world threat! Is this the Soviet Union we have known
for nearly fifty years, and is Nobel Peace Prize winner Mikhail
Gorbachev the type of leader that the West would expect to see
live to political maturity in the Soviet Union? For decades
the United States and our Western Allies have been playing
economic hardball with the Soviet Union, and now we seem to be
only one out away from a stunning victory in the forty-five
year old Cold War.(3:9, 4:7)
The sudden changes in Soviet economics, internal politics,
foreign policy, and the military have removed the certainty
with which the West could evaluate the Soviet threat.(4:3-5)
Western public opinion of the Soviet Union has shifted from
that of an 'evil empire' to that of a remorseful former foe who
now wants to seek peace and prosperity. Peace and prosperity
for whom and for how long are questions the West should be
pondering. Although pro-Western trends in the Soviet Union
appear to be bringing the Cold War to an end, a prudent Western
Alliance should maintain its military strength until reality
can be distinguished from the rhetoric of Soviet reforms.
Through economic restructuring (Perestroika), the Soviet
Union is attempting to overhaul its grossly inefficient
economic system. Centralized decision-making was purportedly
the primary cause for the failure of the economy, but a
technologically antiquated industrial base and a monetary
system that are incompatible with the world market also share
in the blame for economic failure.(3:9-11) We may accept the
shortcomings of the ruble; however, closer scrutiny of the
Soviet economic blunder would indicate that the real problem
with the economy may not lie with decision-makers and outdated
industry, but more so with a massive defense budget and the
monopolization of industrial might by the military.(8:4)
Soviet defense spending has increased steadily for the past
twenty five years.(4:4) In 1988 alone, the Soviet Union spent
the equivalent of $300 billion on their military programs.
Under Gorbachev, total military spending has continued to
increase in real terms at an annual rate of 3 percent, while
the U.S. has experienced a steady decline in excess of 11
percent annually. It has also been estimated by Western
sources that in 1989, Soviet military spending represented as
much as 17 percent of their gross national product (GNP). This
figure is nearly twice the estimate that the Soviets officially
reported. U.S. military expenditures for the same time period
equated to less than 6 percent of the U.S. GNP.(3:33, 4:4-5)
According to Nikolai Petrakov, an economic advisor to
President Gorbachev, the Soviet economy needs a massive
injection of at least $10 to $12 million to pay for consumer
goods to achieve any significant progress in the Soviets
transition to a Western market economy. $12 million seems
insignificant when this same economy has pumped on an annual
basis as much as $5.5 billion (1988) in military and economic
aid to Cuba.(3:24) An additional $10 billion is also provided
to other clients such as Afghanistan, Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Ethiopia.(4:5) Even the most elementary economist could
surmise that trimming a little fat from the $15 billion in
handouts to regional outcasts could provide the financial
impetus to give the Soviet economy its much needed shot in the
arm. Since the needs of Cuba out-weigh the needs of a
struggling Soviet economy and the lofty goals of Perestroika,
we might ask ourselves what purpose the Castro regime continues
to serve in the Soviet grand strategy,
For over two years, the Soviet leadership has boasted of
their military reforms and ongoing efforts to convert the
economy from a military emphasis to civilian production. They
have also aired an overly optimistic goal to reform the Soviet
economy in as little as 500 days. This crash program was
proposed by prominent Soviet economist Stanislav Shatalin and
endorsed by President Gorbachev in support of his own economic
Perestroika. A recent Defense News interview with Vladimir
Lopatin, a member of the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies
and an advisor to President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian
Republic, indicates several contradictions (`big gaps' as he
calls them) between Kremlin words and deeds. The former Soviet
Army major cited that currently no established government
agency, institution, or committee is capable of implementing or
overseeing military reforms in the central government of the
Soviet Union. Lopatin further indicated that efforts to
convert the economy from military to civilian production have
actually been undermined in recent moves by President
Gorbachev. (9:18)
In September 1990, President Gorbachev approved a state
conversion program without consulting Soviet legislators or
government departments affected by the program. The program,
designed to shift the economy to civilian production vice
military, provided $14 billion for the conversion effort. This
gesture played well with Western press initiatives to show the
new face of the Soviet Union, but it did not, however, fare so
well with the Soviet legislators who had expected at least $64
billion to ensure the success of the program. With one hand
(Gorbachev) is voting for the market economy, and with the
other hand he is signing the decision on the preservation of
the military-industrial complex," Lopatin says, "This sort of
approach practically dooms Perestroika."(9:18)
The policy of Glasnost (openness) is an outward indication
that the Soviet Union is beginning to exhibit greater tolerance
for and recognizes the potential value of diverse political
views. Demokratizatsia (democratization) has surfaced as a new
word in the official party dictionary. Democratization, in the
Soviet sense, can in no way be compared to the Western version,
but it has opened the door for public participation in the
party's political processes. Voters are now being provided
with a choice in most elections. Contested elections are even
held for the Congress of People's Deputies, a legislative body
of 2,250 deputies that meets annually. From this group of
elected officials, the Supreme Soviet is elected and may now
serve up to eight months per year. President Gorbachev also
intends to expand the role of the Supreme Soviet commissions to
include participation in the decision-making processes of
foreign policy and strategic planning. Further advances on the
local and regional level include the shift of many previously
appointed political positions to elective positions and the
establishment of a commonwealth of sovereign states within the
Soviet Union. (3:11)
The success of Glasnost in the Soviet Union is extremely
critical to the security of Europe and other Western interests.
Tough resistance to political change currently exists at every
level of government from local party bosses up to the central
committee, posing a considerable threat to the success of
Glasnost. Gorbachev's sweeping political changes, supposedly
for the betterment of the governed people, has helped build an
extremely powerful political base from which the President can
operate and control the affairs of state. From this position
of political power, Gorbachev can implement his economic
reforms and 'regulate' the degree and speed of success of his
other reform programs.(3:11)
Despite the pronounced frustration with communism and the
appearance of the democratic institution of a voting public,
the Communist Party remains in power. The predominant reason
political control is maintained is not because the people want
it that way, but because no opposition political parties have
been tolerated by the incumbent. The people may vote for the
candidate of their choice, but all the choices are party
members. Thus, the Communist Party remains in control of all
governing bodies.(3:11) The advantage of Glasnost and the
limited public participation in the nation's politics is that
the central government can now hold the public, as well as
local officials, responsible for the success or failure of
their local and regional governments. The reduction of public
unrest and hostility toward the central government and
Communist Party would also be a welcome by-product of the new
political openness.
Soviet foreign policy has taken on a new perspective in
recent years. Normalization of relations with China, setting
up diplomatic ties with South Korea, and the agreement to
restore consular relations with Israel are just a few of their
diplomatic initiatives. Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait provided the Soviet Union with an excellent opportunity
to show the world the sincerity of its desire to cooperate with
the West in reducing regional tensions. With the world
watching, the Soviet Union exchanged diplomatic visits with
Baghdad to try to solve the conflict peaceably. The Soviets
even voted with the United States on United Nations sanctions,
condemnations, and resolutions against Iraq. The final act
required to erase Western doubts about Soviet sincerity would
have been for the Soviets to take a stand either financially or
militarily against their client state Iraq. With the Soviet
Union as his chief benefactor, a decisive stand by the Soviets
could have sent a message that even Saddam Hussein may not have
been able to overlook.
In the Coalition's war with Iraq, the Soviet Union sent a
misleading and unfortunate message to Saddam Hussein. They
left their military advisors on station in Iraq. Soviet
military support was never publicly offered to U.S. or
coalition forces, and financial support of this magnitude was
probably never considered. The Soviets could have chosen to
remain silent and continue to work the diplomatic front, but
instead they chose to let their ambassador to the United States
publicly challenge the U.S.' intent in the war, asserting that
excessive force was being used against Iraq. This statement
could have been extremely detrimental to Arab unity within the
coalition, but fortunately, the Soviet outburst was ignored and
the coalition remained intact. Saddam Hussein continued his
uncompromising stance, with what he may have believed to be the
indirect support of the Soviet Union, only to lose the
stability of his own country as well as Iraq's newly founded
19th Province. Opportunity knocked for the Soviet Union to
take a stand on the side of 'right' and 'might', but the call
went unanswered. Why?
Many reasons may exist as to why the Soviets failed to
seize the opportunity afforded them by Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait. The true reason, or reasons, may never be known, but
the many possibilities that come to mind lead to some
interesting questions. Did the Soviets underestimate the
U.S./Coalition resolve to free Kuwait? Did they underestimate
the U.S.' ability to keep Israel out of the war, and thereby
hold a coalition force together? Or did the Soviets think that
Iraq could actually win the war? These are all good questions
that provoke thought, but all are unanswerable from our vantage
point. The one thing that has been answered is that when an
opportunity was provided for the Soviet Union to show its
sincerity in the quest for regional peace, they opted to sit
(not stand) behind their client state, allowing the U.S. to
jump into what could have been another Vietnam.
The Soviets, although lacking in the Middle-East, have made
some significant overtures for reducing tensions in Latin
America. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista Government was persuaded
by Moscow to hold free elections. Moscow has also urged a
reluctant Castro to implement major economic and political
reforms. Whenever Soviet desires are met with resistance, a
corresponding reduction in military and economic air may be in
order. At face value these actions may seem impressive,
considering that they are positive and are conducted in the
Western Hemisphere. Regardless of the fanfare, the Soviets
still view Latin America, especially Cuba, as a strategic
goldmine.(4:19) Many Latin American countries are economic and
political disasters, needing and waiting for a helping hand.
Reduced military obligations in Eastern Europe may provide the
financial impetus for the Soviet Union to expand its influence
through economic aid to Latin American countries, and with
U.S.-Soviet relations on an upswing, there may also be less
hesitation on the part of these countries to cooperate with the
Soviets.
Experts at the art of propaganda, the Soviets claim that
their new foreign policy contributed to the unification of East
and West Germany into a single German state. As a result of
other actions taken on their part, the Soviets also accept
credit for the many new governments that have emerged among
their Warsaw Pact allies. They further claim that it should
now be clear to the world that their new foreign policy and
military activity are not frivolous, but are in earnest and
meant to last over the long-haul.(2:33) To cut the noose from
around the neck of a man you have just hung is hardly grounds
to accept credit for saving his life. Germany has only
returned to the state in which it existed prior to the Soviet
occupation at the end of World War II. The reunification was
not as a result of Soviet good will or revised foreign policy,
but rather the product of economic bankruptcy on the part of
the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has done nothing more that
lighten its external load so that it may financially reinforce
internal reforms and militarily quell civil unrest throughout
the union.(4:11-13) As to the clarity of its actions, a
detailed look at the `reforms' and `cutbacks' within their
military structure makes a perfectly clear picture of the
Soviet's true intent!
From a military perspective, the withdrawal of troops from
Afghanistan, Mongolia, and Eastern Europe, coupled with the
reduction of deployed conventional and nuclear armament,
indicate a new direction in the way the Soviets intend to do
business. The Soviet Union now assures the West that they will
only maintain a military force sufficient enough to leave no
doubt as to the Soviet Union's ability to defend itself.(2:33,
4:62) The dividends from such actions will undoubtedly go
beyond the Soviet Union's wildest estimates and expectations.
NATO has already initiated the transfer of thousands of
pieces of military hardware from Central Europe to NATO
countries in Northern and Southern Europe, in compliance with
the spirit of the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Treaty.
Although this is an opportunity for several NATO countries to
update their weapons inventory, it also serves to draw on vital
U.S. war reserves stored in Germany.(5:36) Even prior to these
cuts, the Soviets were breathing a sigh of relief. Most
notably, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, former Chief of the General
Staff of the Soviet Army and current arms control advisor to
Mikhail Gorbachev, stated, "The NATO Bloc has changed. It is
no longer a military union in constant readiness. . ."(1:26)
Whether the General's assessment is correct or not is not
important. What is important is the Soviet Union's perception
of the strength and conviction of the NATO alliance. Has NATO
lost too much of its military leverage already? How long
before NATO will begin observing the first of many Soviet
treaty violations, coupled with major slowdowns and fabricated
obstacles at the bargaining table?(6:1)
Although the U.S. refuses to hold talks with the Soviet
Union on cuts in naval forces, the propaganda of Soviet
military reforms has provided the Congress of the United States
the impetus it needs to give the Soviets exactly what they
seek. As a result of cuts to the defense budget, the U.S. Navy
will experience cuts to surface combatants that will bring
force strength down to a level not seen since the start of
World War II. Beginning in 1992, an entire class of
anti-submarine warfare frigates is scheduled to be eliminated.
Forty of the forty eight will be sold or mothballed, while the
remaining eight will go to the reserve fleet. All four of the
Iowa Class battleships, the main battery for naval gunfire
support in amphibious operations, are scheduled to be returned
to mothballs.(7:4) The amphibious capability of the U.S. Navy
has been in steady decline since our massive military presence
in Europe began decades ago, and in view of continued budget
cuts, it is highly unlikely that this trend will change. With
loses in amphibious capability, loses in naval gunfire support
ships, and an army that no longer stands guard in formidable
numbers in Europe, how will the U.S. get back into Europe when
the Soviet Union decides that opportunity knocks?
The most publicized of all Soviet reforms has been the
reduction of their vast arsenal of weapons. Tank production
has been cut in half, down to about 1,700 annually. Artillery
and multiple rocket launcher output has also been reduced, but
at a much less significant level. Even the tremendous nuclear
capability of the Soviet Union is being scaled down with
respect to the total numbers of missiles. Although the
cutbacks seem to reinforce the `new thinking' of the Soviet
Union toward reducing the threat, again we must go beyond the
headlines. A reduction of 50% in tank output pales
insignificant when this new figure of 1,700 tanks is still
double the annual output of NATO. Obsolescent tanks are being
eliminated on a unilateral basis, but serve only to aid in
standardizing and modernizing the reorganized army. Some
minor increases in antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air
missile systems have also been observed, but the real
eye-opener is the Soviet advances in strategic offensive
missile systems.(4:5,35-36, 11:23)
The removal of vast numbers of intermediate range nuclear
weapons in Europe by both the West and the Soviet Union has
served to accelerate the spirit of detente' and reduce the
chance of global conflict. This is certainly good news for
Europe, but what about the threat to the United States?(4:4)
What about the thousands of intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBM's) currently stockpiled in the Soviet inventory? The
Soviets' present capability could destroy the United States in
the span of thirty minutes. Is it any surprise that the Soviet
Union considers their strategic nuclear capability to be their
number one concern?(4:7, 10:11-15)
The Soviet Union is currently upgrading their entire ICBM
force. They are now focusing on greater yields, mobility for
enhanced system survivability, and an increased warhead
capability for existing weapons. Older weapons are being
destroyed, and the destruction is well documented for
propaganda sake. The production rate, however, of more modern
strategic offensive missile systems such as the SS-18, -24, and
-25 ICBM's and the SS-N-21 and -23 submarine launched ballistic
missiles (SLBM's), have not changed in the past two years. To
ensure the delivery and survivability of these systems, the
Soviet Union has continued to maintain its ship production;
producing larger, more sophisticated combatants and
submarines.(3:34-35, 4:5,36,51-56) For a country on the brink
of economic disaster, the failure to reap `peace dividends' in
their nuclear output adds considerable uncertainty about the
`new thinking' of the Soviet Union and should be taken as a
warning to the United States, if not all Western nations.
The media has had a field day with the new Soviet
initiatives in foreign policy and military cutbacks.
Unfortunately, if we look past the photogenic smiles and
hand-shaking sessions, we can find many reasons to view these
maneuvers with caution and some alarm. Let us not assume for
even a minute that one morning the Soviets woke up and decided
that the West was no longer a threat, and that our form of
government, our economic programs, and military structure were
compatible with Soviet interests.(4:100-102) The Soviets have
been dueling with the West for quite a while now, and all it
has accomplished is to solidify the Western Alliance and
destroy the Soviet economy.(4:47) Although it may not be as
overt as it once was, the Cold War is still on, but continues
under a different format. Soviet military and economic aid
will continue to support client states hostile to Western
interests.(4:17) Soviet normalization with regional foes will
simply remove an immediate threat to the national security of
the Soviet Union and allow time for military cutbacks and a
budget-breather for Soviet defense spending.(3:31) When NATO
countries respond in kind with immediate military cutbacks (for
the sake of saving a buck), we fall right in line with the
revised Soviet game plan.(8:2-15)
Closer diplomatic ties and business relations with the West
has also opened the door for the eventual transfer of sensitive
military technology.(4:11) This technology will certainly aid
in Soviet military modernization and contribute exponentially
to reductions in defense research and development spending. It
does not require a defense analyst to surmise at this point
that the advantages the Soviets can gain through normal
relations by far exceed the gains they made in prior tactics
against the West. With current economic conditions as they are
in the United States and other Western nations, the Soviets
could have picked no better time and format to initiate their
grand deception through diplomacy.
We can applaud the new direction the Soviets have taken and
wish them the best for the success of Perestroika and Glasnost,
for both must succeed. Successful Perestroika, without
corresponding advances towards a Western-style democratization,
could produce an empire more economically and militarily
formidable than the combined assets of the Western
Alliance.(3:11,143) The West should therefore view the Soviet
reforms and proclaimed successes with great caution and
scrutiny. Our allied military strength has kept peace in
Europe for over 45 years, and to lessen our resolve at the
first signs of reduced tensions implies weakness and a
breakdown in a long-standing, effective coalition. Weakness
provides opportunity, and opportunity for the Soviet Union has
often provoked adventurism and on occasion, war. Let the West
maintain its defense and encourage continued Soviet reforms and
friendly initiatives. Make the Soviet Union show us the
reality, and not the rhetoric, of Perestroika and Glasnost
before the West jeopardizes a peace we have worked so hard to
preserve.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Akhromeyev, Sergei. Cold War Traces Linger in West. Defense
News, October 29, 1990.
2. Akhromeyev, Sergei. U.S.-Soviet Ties Slowly Evolve. Defense
News, March 11, 1991.
3. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power, 1989.
Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 1989.
4. Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power 1990.
Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 1990.
5. Hitchens, Theresa. NATO to Move Weapons from Central Europe.
Defense News, December 17, 1990.
6. Hitchens, Theresa, and George Leopold. Soviet Treaty
Compliance Threatens SNF Talks. Defense News, March 11,
1991.
7. Holzer, Robert. Navy to Shrink Surface Ship Fleet to 55-Year
Low. Defense News, December 3, 1990.
8. Kipp, Jacob W. Where Then is the Threat?: Soviet Military
Doctrine in the Post-Cold War Era. Military Review,
December 1990.
9. Leopold, George. Ex-Soviet Major Says Kremlin is Stifling
Military Reform. Defense News, October 15, 1990.
10. Powell, Colin L., General, USA, CJCS. Enduring Realities,
Enduring Defense Needs. Defense 90. Washington, D.C.:
The Pentagon, September/October 1990.
11. Zaloga, Steven J. Soviet Military Developments: The Case of
the Vanishing Tanks. Armed Forces Journal International,
March 1991.
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