Reconnaissance Personnel Shortfalls
AUTHOR Major James P. McIntyre, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Manpower
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
RECONNAISSANCE PERSONNEL SHORTFALLS
Mission preparation is a key element in the success or
failure of an operation. Reconnaissance provides the commander
key elements of information that will enable the development of a
thorough operation plan. The key to a strong reconnaissance unit
is experienced and well trained reconnaissance personnel.
The Marine Corps acknowledges the importance of
reconnaissance. Reconnaissance battalions and separate
companies' Tables of Organization have been created to support
the increasing roles of the Marine Corps across the broad
spectrum of today's conflicts. In a time of mandated reductions
in service strength, the Marine Corps has increased the size and
missions of its reconnaissance units. However, the current
manning and training of the existing reconnaissance units does
not support the increases in the Tables of Organization or
missions. In order to ensure it has the requisite reconnaissance
skills to perform all assigned tasks, the Marine Corps must
initiate new assignment policies and restructure its present
reconnaissance organizations.
The solutions to the Marine Corps reconnaissance problems
are the establishment of a primary military occupational skill
for reconnaissance personnel, restructuring of Marine
reconnaissance units, and the utilization of standardized
training packages. These changes will create a career path that
can be tracked by monitors, an all source reconnaissance
organization, and a training pipeline that will be cost effective
and concentrate on sustainment rather than indoctrination
training.
RECONNAISSANCE PERSONNEL SHORTFALLS
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. In a time of mandated reductions in service
strength, the Marine Corps has increased the size and missions of
its reconnaissance units. However, the current manning and
training of the existing reconnaissance units does not support
the increase in the tables of organization or missions. In order
to ensure it has the requisite reconnaissance skills to perform
all assigned tasks, the Marine Corps must initiate new assignment
policies and restructure its present reconnaissance architecture.
I. USMC view of reconnaissance units.
A. Infantry units with enhanced skills.
B. Reconnaissance considered a secondary military
occupational skill.
II. USMC current assignment policies to reconnaissance units.
A. Assignment is not HQMC directed.
B. Assignment is directed by MEF's resulting in billets
not being filled by the most qualified personnel.
III. USMC reconnaissance structure.
A. Size and scope of reconnaissance units were increased
in 1987 by HQMC.
B. HQMC did not provide dedicated personnel to fill the
billets.
C. Manning levels have not kept pace with the current
HQMC restructuring.
IV. Crux of the reconnaissance personnel problem: HQMC
failure to assign reconnaissance a primary MOS.
A. Personnel strengths are unstabilized.
B. Reconnaissance units need to be restructured.
C. Specialized MOS training programs need to be
standardized.
V. Current USMC reconnaissance problems can be rapidly
corrected.
A. Assignment of a primary MOS by HQMC.
B. Merging force reconnaissance company and
reconnaissance battalion.
1. To centralize reconnaissance efforts.
2. To form the foundation for a reconnaissance career
pipeline.
Mission preparation is a key element in the success or
failure of an operation. Reconnaissance provides the commander
key elements of information that will enable the development of a
thorough operation plan. The key to a strong reconnaissance unit
is experienced and well trained reconnaissance personnel. The
Marine Corps acknowledges the importance of reconnaissance.
Reconnaissance battalions and separate companies' Tables of
Organization have been created to support the increasing roles of
the Marine Corps across the broad spectrum of today's conflicts.
In a time of mandated reductions in service strength, the Marine
Corps has increased the size and missions of its reconnaissance
units. However, the current manning and training of the existing
reconnaissance units do not support the increase in the Tables of
Organization or missions. In order to ensure it has the
requisite reconnaissance skills to perform all assigned tasks,
the Marine Corps must initiate new assignment policies and
restructure its present reconnaissance architecture.
The Marine Corps has always viewed reconnaissance units as
infantry units with enhanced capabilities.
Assignment to both the force reconnaissance
company and reconnaissance battalion is not
driven by centralized standards. Mainstream
Marine Corps philosophy has been that
reconnaissance Marines are basically infantrymen
with some additional training, and there has
been great resistance to creating a primary
military occupational specialty (MOS) with its
own unique requirements or career path.1
Accordingly, assignment to these units has not always
been Headquarters Marine Corps directed, but often sourced
internally by Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters assigning
unit quotas to fill reconnaissance units. This method has
proven to be inadequate.
Commanders are reluctant to provide quality Marines whose
loss will degradate the parent unit's capability to fill its
critical billets. As a result, many reconnaissance billets are
filled with second-string players or remain vacant.
Many qualified Marines who have extensive reconnaissance
backgrounds are lost due to reassignment.
This problem persists due to the high rate of
personnel turnover and the time required to
train a reconnaissance Marine. Marines are
managed by the Manpower Department at
Headquarters largely by their primary MOS. A
Marine is eligible for transfer after two years
on station which is about the length of the
reconnaissance training cycle when one attends
the various schools (Amphibious Reconnaissance,
Airborne, SCUBA, Ranger). If his next
assignment is based as it normally is on his
primary MOS, it may remove him from the
reconnaissance community. Some attempts have
been made to monitor the secondary MOS, but this
effort has been unsuccessful, especially with
the need to fill out infantry battalions for
unit deployment. The assignment of the
0321/8654 MOS as a primary MOS would allow more
reconnaissance Marines to remain in billets they
have been trained for and enable them to use
skills they have been taught.2
Marines who remain in reconnaissance units for long periods
of time are viewed by many of their seniors as mavericks. The
Marine Corps is very parochial in its thinking. Extended duty
outside an individual's primary MOS is viewed with skepticism
and is considered career damaging. As a result, many experi-
enced reconnaissance Marines are attrited by promotion boards.
The Marine Corps has established its reconnaissance
doctrine in FMFM 2-2. Initially, the reconnaissance battalion
was tasked with the mission of conducting ground surveillance in
support of the Marine division and the force reconnaissance
company was tasked with the mission of conducting preassault
operations and deep reconnaissance operations to support the
landing force. In March, 1979, FMFM 2-2 was reviewed and both
reconnaissance units were assigned the following generic
missions:
Collecting information about the enemy.
Engagement of the enemy by supporting arms.
Capture of selected prisoners.
Implant sensors and beacons.
Conduct specialized terrain reconnaissance
including beach, road, route, and helicopter
landing zones/drop zone reconnaissance missions.
Conduct initial terminal guidance operations.
Conduct special missions as required.3
In 1985, the Marine Expeditionary Unit Specialized Operational
Capable MEU (SOC) was created by the Marine Corps and the
special missions assigned to reconnaissance units in FMFM 2-2
with Change 1 were defined as follows:
The MEU (SOC) must be able, in an extremis
situation, to conduct an emergency hostage
recovery mission from extended ranges, at night,
under EMCOM conditions to rescue hostages and
expeditiously withdraw and transport them to
amphibious shipping or another safe haven.4
To properly prepare for and accomplish these missions, the
Marine Corps needs a stabilized and well trained reconnaissance
community.
The crux of the Marine Corps reconnaissance problem lies in
its inability to recognize that reconnaissance skills are
perishable, and it is-more cost effective to maintain skills
than it is to constantly indoctrinate and train new personnel.
Training a reconnaissance Marine is quite
expensive. If the reconnaissance Marine attends
the Amphibious Reconnaissance, SCUBA, Airborne,
and Ranger Schools, the cost can easily exceed
$75,000 per man.5
Within the last three years, the Marine Corps has created
an additional company for the reconnaissance battalions assigned
to the First and Second Marine Divisions and five additional
force reconnaissance platoons for the force reconnaissance
companies assigned to the First and Second Surveillance,
Reconnaissance and Intelligence Groups. However, the present
manning levels of the reconnaissance units Marine Corps-wide
cannot support the Tables of Organization that existed prior to
the recent organizational expansion.
The attainment of suitable manning levels for
reconnaissance units is complicated by the extensive entry-level
skill training an individual needs to be in an operational
status. The skills gained during the Marine's initial
reconnaissance tour must be enhanced to prepare him to function
in a force reconnaissance unit. The average tour length for a
Marine assigned to a reconnaissance unit is two years.
Approximately two thirds of the Marines who successfully
complete their tours never again serve in another reconnaissance
billet. The remaining one-third are assigned to force
reconnaissance units for a follow-on three year tour. Once
reassigned, these Marines will receive additional specialized
training before assignment to an operational platoon. If a
Marine is retained for a second tour and is assigned to a
direct-action platoon, he will receive over one year of
intensive training--at a cost in excess of $100,000--to prepare
the individual for the emergency hostage recovery mission. On
paper, the Marine Corps has increased the missions and size of
its reconnaissance units, but it has failed to ensure that the
billets created are filled with properly trained Marines. As a
result, the Marine Corps reconnaissance capabilities have been
degraded due to personnel shortages.
The solutions to the Marine Corps reconnaissance problems
are the establishment of a primary MOS for reconnaissance,
restructuring of Marine reconnaissance units, and utilization of
standardized training packages. These ideas have been discussed
and briefed on numerous occasions but have been rejected by
traditionalists within the Marine Corps. The initial objections
were that basic infantry skills were being over-specialized.
The initial objections were reinforced by the fear that
recognition of reconnaissance as a primary MOS would create a
group of elitist. With the advent of the United States Special
Operations Command (USSOC), these arguments were expanded to
state this if the Marine Corps establishes reconnaissance as a
primary MOS, the Marines assigned to direct-action platoons
could be lost to USSOC. These arguments are irrelevant today.
Reconnaissance is much more than a refinement of infantry
skills; the demanding MOS criteria established by the Marine
Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES), the Marine
Corps Maritime Special Purpose Force Tasks, Conditions and
Standards and the Joint Fleet Marine Force Atlantic and Pacific
Standardized Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations
Capable Training Handbook requires extensive training in
explosive, electronics, communications, marksmanship and
specialized entry and extraction techniques. In today's joint
environment, the argument that Marines will be absorbed by USSOC
is even more irrelevant. The Marine Corps Campaign Plan of
June, 1989 develops a forward looking strategy for the Marine
Corps that places great emphasis on joint operations across the
broad spectrum of conflict.
Prior to 1987, the Army Special Forces faced the same
problems Marine reconnaissance units are confronted with today.
The Special Forces were undermanned and ill trained. Billets
were filled by unrestricted combat MOS's and often gapped. To
correct this problem, the Army in 1987 designated Special Forces
as a primary combat branch. As a result, all staffing
requirements were filled, training was standardized and Special
Forces Groups were regionally orientated. This move has paid
dividends. In three years time, billets have been stabilized,
personnel assigned to the units have been placed in a career
pipeline, and training has been standardized to ensure each
Special Forces Group maintains and possesses the same basic
skills. These moves have institutionalized a formidable force
that has not only strengthened the Army's combat effectiveness
but USSOC's as well.
The Marine Corps must follow the Army's example. In the
long term, a primary reconnaissance MOS may need to be
established. Manpower policies should be revised to serve
training and operational needs, not the convenience or
management philosophies of remote headquarters. 6 Initially,
present manning shortfalls can be augmented by Headquarters
Marine Corps screening personnel files and assigning experienced
Marines to reconnaissance units. However, this administrative
action can only be an interim measure. To ensure long-term
personnel stability in reconnaissance units, Headquarters Marine
Corps must institute procedures to develop a career program for
the reconnaissance community. The career program must be
structured to guarantee stability of personnel assignments
in the reconnaissance community. To accomplish this
Headquarters Marine Corps must develop a personnel pipeline that
assures early identification of potential enlisted and officer
candidates for assignment in the reconnaissance field. Once the
candidates are screened and placed in a training pipeline,
occupational field sponsors must track their progress. Marines
who successfully complete their initial reconnaissance tour
should be assigned follow-on assignments of greater responsi-
bility within the reconnaissance community. To ensure long-term
personnel stability in reconnaissance units, monitors at
Headquarters Marine Corps in concert with the reconnaissance
primary MOS occupational field sponsors must institute the
issuance of by-name orders for all personnel required to fill
reconnaissance billets.
FMFM 2-2 with Change 1 has narrowed the focus of the
reconnaissance battalion and the force reconnaissance company
missions. However, the FMFM fails to recognize that one unit
with the proper manning and skill levels can accomplish all the
missions that are currently assigned to two distinct units who
are opcon to two separate commanders.
While reconnaissance forces have been with us for
many years, they have never been properly
organized, trained or used in a manner that
exploits their potential.7
To enhance the Marine Corps manpower efforts to establish a
primary reconnaissance MOS and a training and occupational field
pipeline, it is incumbent on Headquarters Marine Corps to
develop an organizational structure that parallels manpowers
efforts. The present organization of reconnaissance units
creates areas of interest that will hinder the development of a
strong reconnaissance community with a primary MOS. This
situation not only stymies the development of a primary
reconnaissance MOS but additionally hinders the Marine Corps
efforts to adhere to the present Marine Corps Campaign Plan.
The campaign plan places great emphasis on reconnaissance units
to provide Marine Corps MAGTF's with Special Operation
Capabilities (SOC) that can either complement USSOC operations
through interoperability or support.
To ensure the Marine Corps can easily manage a primary
reconnaissance MOS and has the formidable resources to support
the reconnaissance requirements of MAGTF's SOC and USSOC, the
present reconnaissance organizational structure must be
redesigned. The present reconnaissance units within the Fleet
Marine Force must be composited to create one all source recon-
naissance battalion that is assigned to each Marine Expedition-
ary Force. The merging of the units will create reconnaissance
battalions capable of providing tailored reconnaissance
packages. These packages will support the missions stated in
FMFM 2-2 with Change 1 and the reconnaissance requirements
outlined in the Marine Corps Campaign Plan. The formulation of
the sole source reconnaissance battalions will provide an
excellent basis for enhancing the training programs and the
warfighting skills of the Marines assigned. Additionally,
restructuring will enable monitors to easily track a Marine's
career and ensure that all reconnaissance billets are filled
with competent individuals.
The establishment of a primary MOS and the reorganization
of the present reconnaissance battalions will assist in the
standardization of training. The focus will be redirected
toward maintenance of perishable reconnaissance warfighting
skills. Less time will be lost to indoctrination training and
formal schools, and more time devoted to sustainment training
and to perfecting perishable specialized skills. The key for
standardized training is to ensure that no matter to what unit
an individual is assigned, he will not have to be retrained in
his basic reconnaissance skills. The Marine Corps must
establish a progressive training program that complements the
establishment of a primary reconnaissance MOS. The program must
be geared to ensure continuity from initial entry into
reconnaissance units through placement in direct-action
platoons. The organizations to implement and oversee this
training are already in place and are resident in the Landing
Force Training Commands and the Special Operation Training
Groups of each Marine Expeditionary Force. The courses of
instruction to ensure the reconnaissance Marines are properly
trained are outlined in the Marine Corps Combat Readiness
Evaluation System; the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Fleet Marine
Force Pacific Standardized Marine Expeditionary Unit Special
Operations Capable Training Handbook; and the Marine Corps
Maritime Special Purpose Force Tasks, Conditions and Standards.
The Marine Corps reconnaissance problems do not require a
herculean effort to remedy. The hard part was accomplished when
Headquarters Marine Corps realized that to meet current mission
taskings the current reconnaissance units Tables of Organization
must be increased. To ensure that reconnaissance units are
mission capable, existing billets must be filled with quality
Marines. Headquarters Marine Corps needs to establish a primary
reconnaissance MOS, fill existing billets, restructure its
reconnaissance units and utilize standardized training packages
to ensure the personnel are properly trained. These simple
actions will provide the ground commander with well-trained
reconnaissance Marines.
ENDNOTES
1 "Marine Corps Reconnaissance: Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow," Marine Corps Gazette (October 1988), p. 63.
2 "Does Reconnaissance Need Fixing?," Marine Corps Gazette
(January 1988), p. 48.
3 FMFM 2-1: Amphibious Reconnaissance, p. 8, Ch 1.
4 Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Fleet Marine Force Pacific,
Standardized Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations
(MEU(SOC)) Training Handbook, p. I-3.
5 "Does Reconnaissance Need Fixing?," Marine Corps Gazette
(January 1988), p. 48.
6 "Does Reconnaissance Need Fixing?," Marine Corps Gazette
(January 1988), p. 48.
7 "Fixing the Reconnaissance Problem," Marine Corps Gazette
(January 1988), p. 44.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
FMFM-1. Warfighting, 1990.
FMFM 2-2 with Change 1. Amphibious Reconnaissance, 1979.
Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, Fleet Marine Force Pacific.
Standardized Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operational
Capable (MEU(SOC)) Training Handbook, 1989.
Magazines
Coates, Robert J., Capt, USMC. "Does Reconnaissance Need
Fixing?,"Marine Corps Gazette, (January 1988), 47-48.
Flanagan, Neil G., Sgt, USMC. "The Right Manpower Source,"
Marine Corps Gazette, (January 1988), 46.
Flores, Susan J., Major, USMC. "Marine Corps Reconnaissance:
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," Marine Corps Gazette,
(October 1988), 62-67.
Fox, Wesley L., Col, USMC. "Fixing the Reconnaissance
Problem," Marine Corps Gazette, (January 1988), 44-47.
Klimp, Jack W., Col, USMC. "Scouts and Scouting: A Lost Art?,"
Marine Corps Gazette, (July 1990), 75-76.
Wilson, Gary I., Major, USMCR. "The SRI Conceptual
Architecture," Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1988), 68-69.
Bulletins and Pamphlets
MCCDC/MCRDAC Group Reconnaissance Working Group After Action
Report, 1990.
Marine Corps Campaign Plan, 1991.
MCO 3501.12, Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System
Volume XI, Combat Service Support Elements, 1988.
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