The Myth Of The MAGTF
AUTHOR Major Jacob M. McFerren, USA
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
Executive Summary
TITLE: The Myth of the MAGTF
I. Purpose: To expose the lack of published doctrine for
fighting MAGTFs at all levels but particularly at MEF and
multi-MEF levels.
II. Problem: Although the MAGTF concept of the 1990s and
beyond is certainly a sound concept, it is not without its
organizational problems. Staff organizations, especially at
the higher levels, are redundant. The paucity of written
doctrine regarding MAGTF operations exacerbates the
confusion in the Marine Corps surrounding the MAGTF and its
employment.
III. Data: The MAGTF concept of a combined arms fighting
force consisting of an air arm, a ground force, and their
supporting logistical units, all responsive to a single
commander is an example of sound organizational evolution.
MAGTFs come in all sizes and do not fit neatly into military
categories.
The concept has an historical evolution that proves its
worth in two world wars and countless incursions in
countless foreign shores. Our political leaders, slow to
mobilize the Army have been relatively quick to use Marines
as an international tool of U.S. policy.
But as good as the concept is, it lacks published
doctrine to aid in education, deployment, and employment.
Doctrine is the interface between of theory and tactics and
when there is no doctrine there is no base knowledge, no
foundation to build on.
The Marines have embraced manuever warfare
wholeheartedly but MAGTF organization is incompatible with
manuever warfare. Draft publications admit the MAGTF
commander cannot influence the battle past the planning
stage. After this point, what use is the MAGTF staff? In
fact, given the recent deployment to the Persian Gulf, why
do we need three permanent MEF staffs and their concommitant
MEB staffs?
IV. Conclusions: Educationally, the Marine school system
still focuses on the primacy of the GCE. Together with a
unilateral history of deployment and a "my sandbox"
mentality against joint operations, the MAGTF may not
realize its operational potential.
V. Recommendation: The Marine Corps must study carefully
lessons learned from the Persian Gulf and organization for
combat at the MAGTF staff levels to cut the myth out of the
MAGTF concept to link the concept with reality.
The Myth of the MAGTF
Thesis: The MAGTF concept is a good one. Born on the
banks of the Potomac, nurtured through countless skirmishes
in distant lands, matured in the Pacific, it has become the
hallmark of the modern Marine Corps. It is the ultimate in
task organization, expeditionary potential, and operational
employment for any crisis, low-intensity, mid-intensity, or
high-intensity: or is it? In fact, the Marine Air Ground
Task Force may be more an organization of convenience, never
twice the same, put together under Naval constraints, and
organized contrary to implementing its own manuever warfare
doctrine.
I. Concept
A. Extant combined arms team
B. Unilateral deployment
C. Unilateral employment
D. Expeditionary nature
II. History
A. Combined arms team
B. Unilateral deployment prior to WWI and in certain
cases thereafter
C. A tool of policy, but not politically oriented
D. Problems
III. Doctrine
A. Manuever warfare vs. FMFM 1
1. Organization contradicts each other
2. MAGTF Cdr not a warfighter
a. Planning
b. SASS
c. SOC
3. Problems
IV. Deployment
A. Compositing
1. MEU (SOC)
2. MEB
3. MEF
B. Multi GCE operations, or operations above MEF level
C. Problems
V. Employment
A. Congress and modern warfare dictate joint operations
1. MAGTF by doctrine is a unilateral package,
therefore not a Joint multiplier but a joint inhibitor
a. Piece of the pie doctrine and attitude
b. Travel time to the objective
2. Force reduction and budget restraints demand
joint compatibilty
B. No doctrine for ops of multiple GCE or ops above MEF
level
1. Pre-Desert Storm
2. Post-Desert Storm
VI. Conclusion
A. Organization and doctrine opposed
B. Reality and doctrine opposed
C. Capabilities and reality opposed
D. MAGTF, as presented, a myth.
The Myth of the MAGTF
If it be now, `tis not to come;
if it be not to come, it will be now;
if it be not now, yet it will come.
The readiness is all. (Hamlet, v.ii.209-211)
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) concept is a
good one. Born on the banks of the Potomac, nurtured
through countless skirmishes in distant lands, matured in
the Pacific, it has become the hallmark of the modern Marine
Corps. It is the ultimate in task organization,
expeditionary potential, and operational employment for any
crisis, low-intensity, mid-intensity, or high-intensity: or
is it? In fact, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force may be
more an organization of convenience, never twice the same,
put together under Naval constraints, with a command
organization which contradicts its own manuever warfare
doctrine.
"MAGTFs are task-organized for rapid
deployment/employment. They offer any warfighting
commander-in-chief a readily available, self-sustaining,
combined arms combat force." (19:3) No other service
organization by itself can offer the CINC such a force in
one package. The moment the Naval-Marine task force sets
sail, the MAGTF becomes available for employment by the
National Command Authority and the designated regional
commander-in-chief. MAGTFs come in four variations,
generally relating in size to the Ground Combat Element
(GCE), the core around which the pearl of the MAGTF forms.
The largest MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
formed around a reinforced Marine division as the GCE. The
medium-sized MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)
formed around a reinforced infantry regiment. MEBs can be
further delineated as amphibious, Maritime Prepositioned
Forces (MPF), or Norway Air-Landed (NAL). The smallest
MAGTF, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations
Capable), [MEU(SOC)] has as its nucleus, the reinforced
infantry battalion landing team. There is a fourth type of
MAGTF, the Special Purpose Force (SPF) which is a completely
unique, one-mission, one time use force organized for
missions not appropriate for a MEF, MEB, or MEU. SPFs are
usually smaller than the MEU but need not be and in some
cases, may be larger. The point: like a pearl, each MAGTF
is unique; no two MEFs, MEBs, MEUs, and certainly no two
SPFs are the same, ever. The evolving doctrine admonishes
MAGTF planners to receive the mission, organize the MAGTF,
and then classify it by type. (21-3)
The author of the draft document for MAGTF operations
likens the MAGTF to the duck-bill platypus because neither
the platypus nor the MAGTF fall neatly into either animal or
military catagories. In fact, in Shakespeare's Antony and
Cleopatra Lepidus might as well have been asking Antony to
describe a MAGTF when he asked for a description of a
crocodile:
Lepidus: What manner o'thing is your
crocodile?
Antony: It is shaped, sir, like itself, and
it is as broad as it hath breadth; it is just
so high as it is, and moves with its own
organs; it lives by that which nourisheth it;
and the elements once out of it, it
transmigrates. (12:II.vii.40-44)
Indeed, the MAGTF like its reptilian-amphibian relative, is
a strange creature unlike any other: unique unto itself.
But this strange uniqueness is precisely what
proponents point to as an asset rather than a drawback to
the MAGTF. The MAGTF may be deployed by air, ground, or
sea. The amphibious squadron need not be tied closely to
the Navy's carrier battle group, leaving the Navy's
operational element free to conduct maritime business. In
fact, excepting the transportation from shore to shore
provided (most often) by the Navy, the MAGTF is the only
military unit in the United States inventory capable of
unilateral deployment and, should the need arise, unilateral
employment. No one else need become involved in the
operation.
The exceptions are if the MAGTF is an MPF or the NAL
MEB, in which case the U.S. Air Force flies the Marines to
link up with their prepositioned equipment in theater. But
these are exceptions and these two very different MAGTFs
lack a distinct capability found in other MAGTFs. Neither
the NAL nor an MPF MEB has forced entry capability. They
must enter the theater through secure or at least benign
ports both air and sea. However, the forward deployed MEUs
certainly have forced entry capabilities both by surface and
helicopter borne means (although limited to about a company
sized unit per wave in the air). And since these units are
forward deployed and available to the president in a
relatively short time, the expeditionary nature and
unilateral employment options make the MAGTF a useful tool
of U.S. policy no matter what the animal looks like. In
this past year alone, the President has unilaterally used a
MAGTF in Liberia and Somalia where a forward deployed
MEU(SOC) performed Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
These operations are just the latest in a 216 year
history of unilateral employments of United States Marines
abroad. Over 175 times Marines have gone ashore "From the
halls of Montezuma, to the shores of Tripoli . . ." and
places not so well known. Although the employment was
unilateral the landing force was always in some way
supported by its naval parent. Quite often this support was
naval gunfire as in Korea in 1878. This supporting arms
concept was the nascent stage of "the concept of a fully
integrated, independently sustainable combined arms force."
The Advanced Base Force concept proposed by a course of
instruction in 1910 required "the development for procedures
for close integration of artillery with infantry forces.
." (18:6) This concept was used successfully in Vera Cruz
(1914), Haiti (1915), and Santo Domingo (1916). WWI saw a
large scale deployment of Marines integrated into the
American Expeditionary Force (AEF) under General J.J.
Pershing's command, and consequently, the increase in size
of the Corps. Moreover, WWI saw the birth of Marine
Aviation, although not in its close air support role
initially but in anti-submarine roles. Later, both Marine
squadrons flew bombing missions but in support of British
and French forces. In any event, the stage was set for the
maturation of MAGTF concepts in the next world war, although
with some important limitations. (18)
Prior to WWI, and as we have seen in certain cases
thereafter, the Marines were primarily deployed and employed
unilaterally. "Send in the Marines" became a populist
battle cry especially in the years after the Spanish-
American War when our new Manifest Destiny was most
manifest. The U.S. Navy, aided in part by Alfred T. Mahon's
treatise, Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783
surged ahead to command the world's seas and took the Marine
Corps with it. (1:612) The naval projection of ground
forces became the international policy tool of the
president. Sending in the Marines did not necessarily mean
the United States was at war. Quite the contrary, it might
be argued otherwise. The president needed relatively little
if any popular or congressional support to land a contingent
of Marines, execute his policy, re-embark, and set sail.
The small "footprint in the sand" left behind by these
incursions hardly provided reason for much more than howling
and gnashing of teeth by the country involved. And, of
course, without an international forum extant, such as the
League of Nations or the United Nations, there was little a
country unable to retaliate in kind could do to deter
American presidents from walking softly and wielding the
Marines.
At home these military forays were an internal
political boon. Since the Marines were constantly at sea,
did not - - for the most part - - consist of the young men
of the neighborhood, and were volunteers for foreign service
in an expeditionary force, there was very little political
reason nationally for a president not to practice gunboat
diplomacy when and where he decided. Marines, although an
integral tool of policy, were - - and to some extent remain
today - - an apolitical entity to the American people and
internal politics. To land Marines in Honduras, Nicaragua,
Lebanon, Somalia, Liberia, the Cambodian island of Koh Tang
takes relatively little notice and costs relatively little
at home or abroad for a president. So presidents have
landed Marines in the past; so they will land Marines in the
future.
But what does the MAGTF of the 90's do when it hits the
beach? How does it do whatever it has been landed to do?
What is MAGTF doctrine? Clausewitz describes military
theory in On War as the general study of war that,
lights up the whole road for him (the commander),
facilitates his progress, educates his judgement, and
shields him from error." Furthermore, theory, ". . . should
educate the mind of the future leader in War, or rather
guide him in his self-instruction, but not accompany him to
the field . . . ." (4:141-142) Theory is not war by
algebra. Tactics, on the other hand, are those ends and
means to which one applies theory to win on the battlefield.
This application of theory to tactics is doctrine.
Doctrine is the philosophy of war meeting the reality of
resources. Doctrine is the base guide through which one
tests theory; doctrine marries the best of theories with the
cold truths of battlefield limitations. Doctrine requires a
shared base of theoretical knowledge. The Marine Corps
philosophy, its theory of modern war, is found in FMFM 1
Warfighting. This book embraces manuever warfare as its
doctrine. Simply put, manuever warfare advocates bold and
audacious movement, ". . .rapid, violent, and unexpected
actions creating a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating
situation with which the enemy cannot cope and which
shatters his cohesion. (21:8-15) The tenets of manuever
warfare have been available to military organizations since
Hannibal and probably before, and might be best summed up as
initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. Of these
tenets, initiative is mostly personality dependent; agility
is a matter of task organization and equipment available;
depth is terrain and supporting arms dependent.
Synchronization, the aggregate of all a leader's combat
power focused at the precise moment and place (time and
space), is the most important, and moreover, the most
"teachable" and "learnable". Synchronization is where
doctrine becomes important, not as a battle drill on the
operational level but as a baseline of knowledge: a start
point. Doctrine is the blank canvas and painter's pal let
staring the artist in the face. The artist is limited only
by the physical realities of the dimensions of the canvas,
the color spectrum, his imagination, and his baseline
knowledge of his craft. Once the artist touches brush to
canvas the end result will necessarily be an individual
result of schooling and personality. The same is true in
the military art.
Presently, the Marine Corps suffers from a paucity of
this baseline knowledge for fighting the MAGTF. There are
more than a few publications which mention fighting the
MAGTF, fewer still that try to describe the military
duck-bill platypus, and none (yet) that actually get to the
business of fighting the mammal/animal/amphibian/reptile.
(2:6)
Perhaps one of the factors contributing to the dearth
of doctrine is the MAGTF organization itself. A combined
arms team responsive to a single commander appears quite
simple on the surface. The three elements, ground combat
element (GCE), aviation combat element (ACE), and combat
service support element (CSSE) all respond equally to the
command element (CE), who coordinates these assets to fight
the battle. However, as the emerging publication MAGTF
Operations notes emphatically:
. . .because of span of control problems,
most MAGTF commanders must excercise their
authority through chains of commands.
d. Because of all this, (unique situations,
remote location of MAGTF commander in
relation to action, size of MAGTF) a MAGTF
commander has very little ability to
influence a battle joined. His main
opportunity to influence a battle is during
the planning stage. Once the battle is
joined, the MAGTF commander can usually only
influence the battle by providing fire
support or committing the reserve. (21:4-1)
To influence an ongoing battle directly then, the MAGTF
commander must establish a MAGTF reserve either by holding
out elements from the GCE, ACE, or a combination of both.
Either way, this inhibits the GCE's ability to successfully
accomplish his mission. Quite often the rule of thumb
becomes "the MAGTF reserve is employed by the GCE
commander." If that is indeed the case, then the MAGTF
commander does not have a reserve; it is in fact the GCE
reserve no matter what one chooses to call it. This leads
us to a quandry brought on by the physical constraints of
the organization. If the MAGTF commander takes a reserve,
he ultimately may denigrate the accomplisbment of his own
mission. If he does not, he may also denigrate the
accomplishment of his mission. From a manuever warfare
perspective, the MAGTF commander faces a lose-lose
proposition. He personally is not able to influence the
battle through bold and audacious operational moves against
the enemy because he does not have MAGTF troops directly
responsive to him. The MAGTF commander, as LT Gen Cheatham
says, is then relegated to ". . .tactical guidance,
establish(ing) liaison, and allocat[ing] resources." (11:3)
Relegating a commander to guiding, liaisoning, and
allocating has sparked a heated debate in the Corps about
whether or not the MAGTF commander is a warfighter. But
there really should be no debate; if the commander of the
MAGTF is a marine, he is a warfighter. However, this
superficial debate masks the real one. Without MAGTF troops
how does the commander directly influence the action? If
the organization of the MAGTF precludes the MAGTF commander
from directly influencing the battle once joined, what is
the purpose of the MAGTF commander and staff? With proper
staffing and subordination, could not the GCE or ACE
commander and his staff perform allocation functions? It
would appear so.
The MAGTF staff's purpose and position becomes even
more obtuse as one considers the Marine Corps' practice of
compositing MAGTFs. The recent war in the Gulf provides an
excellent study in compositing. The first MAGTF to arrive
was an embarked MEU; in time it was joined by MPF MEBs,
which built into a MEF, until eventually elements of three
MEFs were in theater both ashore and afloat. The total
deployment took about four months.
Amphibious shipping limitations prevent the
simultaneous deployment of any MAGTF larger than a MEB.
However, as BG (ret) Simmons told a group of Command and
Staff College students recently: "The aphorism is, the Corps
deploys by MEBs and fights as divisions." (15) Besides the
obvious truth of his statement, the general's statement
hides another deep-rooted belief still harbored today even
in Marine resident schools. That is, ultimately everything
supports the GCE. Time and again at the Command and Staff
College, during examples, excercises, and graded
requirements students are told to apply MAGTF answers to
questions actually requiring a GCE solution. Until the
Corps can shake its philosophical focus on primacy of the
GCE, the MAGTF commander will remain unable to influence the
battle just as the evolving doctrine states.
In fact, the composite MAGTF in Southwest Asia (SWA)
fought as a curious mix of an Army Corps and a MAGTF. I MEF
was given operational control of the Tiger Brigade of the US
Army's Second Armored Division. This 5700 man army
air-ground task force came complete with attack air (AH-1
Apaches), supporting artillery (including a battalion of
multiple launch rocket systems or MLRS), and logistic
support, but rather than keep the separate brigade as MAGTF
troops they were placed under operational control (OPCON) of
2 MarDiv. The two main GCEs in country, 1 MarDiv and 2
MarDiv operated as divisions under the command of LT General
Boomer, I MEF commander and commander, MARCENT (Marines,
Central Command).
Prior to the massive deployment, many heated
discussions centered on who would actually be in charge once
all the MAGTFs from MEU to MEF composited. The question
was, which GCE would be superior and which ones subordinate,
and what then would those less than equal staffs do,
especially at MEF level? The answer? Only a single MEF
headquarters deployed in country: I MEF from the West Coast.
Headquarters II MEF on the East Coast remained in CONUS and
Headquarters III MEF remained in Okinawa; they would not
have had a purpose in SWA even though their respective GCEs,
ACEs, and CSSEs were deployed. The headquarters elements
were "extras under the MAGTF concept. However, recognizing
the need for overall fire support control and air control at
the I MEF Hqs, the Marines formed a corps-like Fire Support
Coordination Center (FSCC) which controlled fires and a
corps-like Direct Air Support Center (DASC) which controlled
the air. These were not planning cells but operational
cells senior to the division FSCCs and DASCs. They not only
coordinated and allocated, but also directed those entities
on the battlefield for the I MEF commander. To quote one
officer who served on the I MEF staff when asked about staff
organizations and command and control relationships, "We
were making it up and writing it down while we were doing
it." (16) The MEBs afloat remained afloat for the most
part. Although one did land eventually, it was absorbed
into I MEF. (16) In fact, command and control for these
multi GCEs was managed as the now defunct OH-6 suggested;
the MAGTF commander functioned simultaneously as the GCE
commander. (19:3-3) While not overburdensome for the
commander, the added weight of double duty for the MAGTF
staff required additional personnel until by G-day the MAGTF
staff for I MEF numbered in excess of 2500 marines! (16)
So, without the additional MEF headquarters in theater there
were no multi-MEF operations, only the compositing of
elements of the three MEFs under the beefed-up headquarters
of I MEF.
Had the Corps decided to deploy multi-MEF headquarters
no doubt further command and control problems would have
surfaced concerning standardization, operational procedures,
equipment shortages and compatibility (especially in the
communications and data-processing areas), and personal
working relationships between relative strangers.
Leaving these headquarters while deploying their
elements suggests unnecessary redundancy and begs the
question: Are existing MAGTF staffs on both coasts at MEB
and MEF level necessary for successful deployment and
employment of their units in combat operations? Recent
events suggest otherwise.
Unilateral deployments of MEU(SOC)s aside, the current
structure of MAGTF staffs and consequent compositing for
larger deployments needs to be addressed and quickly. MAGTF
deployment by doctrine is unilateral. Modern warfare from
drug interdiction to the next global confrontation dictates
otherwise. More importantly, the United States Congress
demands joint operations by law. Joint operations are
inherently more complicated than single service forays.
FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, addresses life in the joint
world for MAGTF doctrine at the operational level:
Perhaps most important, a MAGTF commander
must be prepared to articulate the most
effective operational employment of his MAGTF
in a joint or combined campaign. If he
cannot, he will in effect depend on the other
services to understand fully the capabilities
of the MAGTF and employ it correctly, an
assumption which is likely to prove
unwarranted. (17:29)
Recently a Marine general speaking at the Command and Staff
College at Quantico expressed his frustration regarding
joint operations: "As far as I am concerned the more joint,
the more problems." The general, who was speaking under
non-attribution, went on to suggest that a MEU(SOC) or some
other MAGTF would have been more suited to conducting
Operation Just Cause in Panama . . .unilaterally!
Regardless of the Marine Corps' lack of strategic airlift
and true special operations abilities (not capabilities) the
sheer magnitude of occupying a country, changing its
government, and rebuilding it staggers the imagination.
Panama City swallowed in excess of an army division; the
airborne airfield seizures at Rio Hato and Tocumen /
Trujillo airports took the entire 75th Ranger Regiment and a
reinforced brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division. 58
C-141 Starlifters and dozens of C-13O Hercules flew in the
initial assault phase of the operation, supported by Air
Force fighters and special operations aircraft. Joint
Special Operations Command orchestrated operations
throughout the theater that would dwarf a boat company into
insignificance. And all within thirty-odd hours of
notification. To suggest that a MEU(SOC) could have
achieved - - unilaterally - - such results is wrong. In
fact, they could not. In fact, the MEU(SOC) afloat could
not get there quickly enough to react the the National
Command Authority's exeution time and so the operation was
carried out with only the in-country marines at Rodman Naval
Base. The point of the matter is, such "my piece of the
pie" attitudes and doctrine passed on from generation to
generation of Marines will eventually hurt the Corps.
Insistence that the MAGTF always be employed unilaterally
and husband its resources will necessarily result not in the
MAGTF concept being thought of as a joint multiplier but as
a joint inhibitor.
Force reduction and future budget constraints demand
joint compatibility. Moreover, recent events have shown
once again, the US military will fight not only joint but
also combined, and perhaps, unified. Now the Marine general
can increase his joint problems not only algebraically but
geometrically. Reality tells us no one can do it alone; the
services will all be too small. Reality tells us we
probably will not be able to do it in one language.
The Marine Corps recognizes its paucity of published
doctrine for MAGTFs with multiple GCEs, and operations at
MEF and multi-MEF level. There is no more self-critical,
analytic service in the United States. The Corps was caught
- - along with the rest of the services - - in the
micro-world of low-intensity conflict when Saddam Hussein
invaded Kuwait. Pre-Desert Storm myopia is understandable.
The money for training was in special and covert operations
not in World War II-like sea deployments and European Plain
armored envelopments. The post-Desert Storm period will
necessarily refocus attention on the drug war, but no longer
in a myopic way. Already initial impressions from SWA are
flowing back to Quantico through the Marine Corps Lessons
Learned System beating their authors home. (2O) These
suggest some stark truths for the MAGTF regarding reality,
organization, doctrine (or lack of it), and capabilities.
No doubt the Corps will study these lessons closely and act
to excise the myth from the MAGTF retaining the concept of a
tightly organized, standardized, combined arms team capable
of operating in any environment with anyone. It must, and
soon. The readiness is all.
Bibliography
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Quantico: May 1990.
3. Burkhard, Alfred E., Jr., MaJ, USA. "Amphibious of
Ambiguous? Is the Corps Caught in the Confluence?"
Command and Staff College, Quantico: May, 1990.
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remain unnamed. 6 April 1991.
17. U.S. Marine Corps, Campaigning. FMFM 1-1. Quantico: 1990.
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