Close Air Support: Where Do We Go From Here?
AUTHOR Major Robert A. Lodge, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
I. PURPOSE: To highlight the necessity for the Marine
Corps to make germane changes to close air support (CAS)
doctrine and policy, to purchase needed equipment, and to not
become enraptured with the quick-won success in the Gulf War,
because like all wars, it was unique. Our next war will be
very different.
II. PROBLEM: The stunning victory by allied forces in the
Gulf War against a supposedly formidable enemy has given many
the giddy feeling that our armed forces, especially our air
forces, are all powerful. The intense, elaborate, and
extremely accurate fire power that was displayed by allied air
forces has given some the mistaken notion that air power alone
can win a war - possibly the next one. If unchecked, this
notion could be catastrophic, especially to the Marine Corps.
As this country's expeditionary force in readiness, the Corps'
very existence depends upon its ability to provide CAS for the
landing force.
III. DATA: After six weeks of the most intense and accurate
bombing that any combatant has ever experienced, and four days
of equally rapid and violent ground warfare, the fourth
largest army in the world capitulated to an allied force led
by the United States. It was a war unlike any before, and
probably unlike any that will follow it. Who could have
imagined that almost one million armed warriors could square
off on a battlefield, and six weeks later one side would come
away victoriously while suffering less than 500 casualties?
It boggles the mind. In retrospect, all studies and analysis
of previous wars were made to look ridiculous as TV analysts
nightly "fought" the war before actual combat commenced. The
allied results were so impressive, and the American people so
mesmerized by the stunning television video of "smart" bombs
destroying enemy targets, that the armed forces today face an
insidious threat: defeat as a result of a dramatic victory.
The danger to the Marine Corps is in not recognizing that
fact.
IV. CONCLUSION: In this era of high technology, CAS
procedures developed in previous wars will become increasingly
less effective and eventually cease to be of value unless the
Marine Corps uses foresight in planning and instituting
necessary changes.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: That the Marine Corps must revise and
change its CAS doctrine, procedures, and equipment to ensure
CAS remains a viable mission.
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
OUTLINE
THESIS: In this era of high technology, CAS procedures
perfected in previous wars will become increasingly less
effective and eventually cease to be of value unless the
Marine Corps uses foresight in planning and instituting
necessary changes.
I. Evolution of CAS
A. By the Marine Corps
B. By other air forces
C. Through doctrine
II. Significance of CAS
A. To aviation combat element
B. To ground combat element
C. To MAGTF commander
III. Role of CAS on battlefield
A. Availability factors
B. Influencing factors
C. Threat factors
1. Enemy
2. Training
3. "Friendly-fire" casualties
D. Enhancing factors
IV. Future CAS availability
A. As provided by other services
B. As provided by Marine Corps
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
The country is awash in the euphoria of a great victory:
Saddam Hussein, the reincarnation of Hitler, has been crushed.
The victory won in the desert . . . is not only historic. It is
also classic. It will be written about by military historians for
decades to come. More important, it will be studied in military
academies as an example of a perfect military operation. (5:7)
As we rush to celebrate the thrashing of what was once
the world's fourth-largest army, we must not lose sight of two
very important facts: (1) the enemy air and anti-air defense
threats were extremely deficient, almost to the point of being
non-existent, and (2) the next war will not be fought like the
last one! Retired Army Colonel David Hackworth pointedly
notes:
Air power did a most impressive job and virtually won this war by
itself. Air was the hammer and the ground and naval forces were the
anvil. Air power worked here because of the desert terrain; once
the allies achieved air supremacy, air-to-ground attacks could
continue unimpeded. Few future battlefields will be similar. This
campaign cannot serve as a model for the future. (3:49)
American air forces "owned" the skies over Kuwait and
Iraq; they could do whatever they wanted, whenever they
wanted, but, as allied commander General H. Norman Schwarzhopf
correctly noted, Saddam Hussein was not a military strategist
or tactician; he was a fool. He allowed us more than six
months to develop our plan and to build our forces. Our next
enemy was watching; he will not be so generous. So what
conclusions can be drawn, what lessons are to be learned, and
where do we go from here?
Many strategists, particularly those specializing in
aviation, have the mistaken belief that a war can be won with
air power alone. Unlike in any other country, air power is
the basis of U.S. military strength. Still, blind faith in
this single power can be potentially catastrophic. The idea
that we can defeat a hostile ground force by simply pummeling
its lines of supply and communication has yet to be proved in
the annals of war. This was clearly illustrated in the
Vietnam War. North Vietnam resisted intense U.S. bombing for
years. (7:2) As was shown again during the recent Gulf War,
until ground forces physically occupy enemy territory the
enemy cannot be considered defeated. It is in this physical
occupation of territory that air power plays a significant
role -- a role neither realized, nor appropriately recognized,
by most military strategists or ground force commanders.
For the better part of the past ten years, the "hot"
topic of discussion among military strategists has dealt with
maneuver warfare. However, these discussions have usually
pertained to the rapid and decisive movement of ground forces
only. Among Marine strategists, these discussions recently
have focused on the argument that the Aviation Combat Element
(ACE) of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is more than
a supporting arm. They argue that the ACE is an additional
maneuver element fully capable of assisting the MAGTF
commander in winning on the battlefield. Whether we consider
the ACE a maneuvering element, or just the focus of main
effort, is irrelevant. What is important, and is the key
issue that most maneuver warfare discussions consistently
neglect, is the integration of air power, specifically close
air support (CAS), for the maneuvering ground forces. As this
country's expeditionary force in readiness, the Marine Corps
must address the CAS issue.
In this era of high technology, CAS procedures developed
in previous wars will become increasingly less effective and
eventually cease to be of value unless the Marine Corps uses
foresight in planning and instituting necessary changes. As
difficult as it may be for some Marines to believe, the Corps'
very existence is at stake. Whether by surface assault or
airborne assault, attacking Marines must be able to depend on
CAS in the carrying out of their amphibious mission. As the
old saying goes, "The times they are a changin." The Marine
Corps must be prepared to change with them.
Close air support has been around almost as long as there
have been airplanes. Within the Marine Corps, CAS dates from
the fighting in Nicaragua in 1928. (9:363) At one time or
another, "every major country with an air force has tried it
[CAS] in some form." (13:101) Used extensively, CAS has met
with varying degrees of success -- the Marine's heroic defense
in the battle of Khe Sanh; in failure -- the defeat of the
Israeli Air Force (IAF) in the early days of the 1973 Yom
Kippur War. After most wars, whether having participated or
not, the Marine Corps has introduced new weapons and modified
its tactics and procedures to increase the effectiveness of
CAS. The Corps should do no different today.
By definition, CAS is "air action against hostile targets
which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which
require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire
and movement of those forces." (1:70) To understand this
definition fully, one must first understand the difference
between air support that potentially has immediate impact on
the battlefield (CAS), and air support that "shapes the
battlefield" (deep air support). Once this distinction is
understood, the "detailed integration" of CAS must be
considered.
Material and troops are easier to keep away from the battle than to
engage at the front. They are easier to destroy when they are in
assembly or configured for movement than when they are deployed to
do battle.
Consider this analogy: one well-placed bomb on a tank
factory or assembly area can destroy many tanks, or at least
prevent further tank production; one well-placed bomb on the
battlefield destroys one tank. (13:160) Thus, a decision must
be made: do we concentrate air power against immediate targets
or targets that may "ultimately" affect us on the battlefield?
Before answering that question, I believe a more fundamental
question needs to be considered: Is CAS obsolete?
Until the Yom Kippur War, if air superiority had been
attained, CAS had usually been available to the superior
force. However, the early events of the Yom Kippur War
changed forever the traditional idea of air superiority. For
the first time, "an armed force with a vastly inferior air
force was able to gain and maintain air superiority in certain
cases strictly through the utilization of an extensive air
defense system." (10:37) The combined efforts of the Egyptian
and Syrian air defense systems were so effective that the IAF
lost 61 aircraft while performing CAS missions. (2:34) Now
the IAF no longer views CAS as a viable mission, believing
that it is too difficult for pilots to identify friendly
forces on the ground, and that their primary mission is to
destroy the enemy. (13:101)
In this country, before the Gulf War, it was said:
Few of today's tactical commanders, brigade and below, have much
confidence that CAS will play a major role in their part of the
battle. First of all, no ground commander in his right mind would
commit himself to mortal combat relying on a key weapon system that
might or might not be there. (2:37)
This skepticism exists primarily within the Army and, I
believe, is caused by the ground commander's lack of awareness
and knowledge of the air battle. This skepticism must never
be allowed to exist within the Marine Corps!
MAGTF commanders must make a conscious decision, and they
must convince their leaders of the wisdom of this decision:
not to commit Marine ground combat element (GCE) forces until
air superiority has been established. This is an important
decision, and one the MAGTF commander must stick to
religiously. While CAS is third on the list of priorities to
the ACE during amphibious operations (after establishing air
superiority and extending the air defense umbrella), within
the context of direct support for the GCE, CAS is the most
important priority.
Let us suppose for a moment that CAS is not a viable
mission. In my opinion, because of a lack of sufficient naval
gunfire and artillery support, this supposition calls into
question whether the Marine Corps can conduct a surface or
airborne assault on anything other than an unopposed beach or
undefended landing zone -- both beyond the reaches of the
enemy. In other words, the Marine Corps would no longer have
a mission! Therefore, while CAS may be third in the order of
priorities to the ACE, it is the most important priority to
the MAGTF because it allows the MAGTF to conduct amphibious
operations.
CAS is the MAGTF commander's "ace-in-the-hole." It gives
him a power projection capability. It allows him to have an
immediate and immense impact on an enemy's ability to fight.
This impact, while usually temporary, allows the supported GCE
commander to maneuver his forces in a ship-to-shore movement.
Once ashore, there are considerations that may affect the
availability of CAS; therefore, the GCE commander must take
these into account while preparing his fire support plan to
support his scheme of maneuver. First, maintaining air
superiority over the amphibious objective area (AOA) is almost
as critical as gaining it. Second, as part of "shaping the
battlefield," deep air strike missions may take precedence,
thus limiting sorties allocated to CAS. Finally, his unit may
not be the focus of main effort, or a unit on his flank may be
deemed in more trouble, and so require the preponderance of
air support. (2:37)
While CAS missions are generally conducted (and are most
effective) in a low threat environment, it does not follow
that CAS will be unavailable when "total" air superiority does
not exist. Still, one must consider the trade-offs: the
accuracy of the weapons delivery is inversely proportional to
altitude and airspeed; these factors are in turn inversely
proportional to the enemy threat. For example: the greater
the threat, the lower the altitude and the faster the speed of
the CAS aircraft, and thus the greater the risk to the
accuracy of the CAS mission.
Most current writing (pre-Gulf War) concerning CAS has
dealt with "The Threat." With central Europe as the likely
battle zone, Soviet doctrine and weapons the enemy, and the
Yom Kippur War the last "real operational test," few
commanders viewed CAS as viable in the next war. (2:34) With
the results of the Gulf War not yet fully analyzed, but with
initial indicators of CAS effectiveness very positive (except
for "friendly-fire" casualties), we are already looking at the
"next war." For the foreseeable future, most pundits play
down the idea of a central European war, and with the current
Soviet doctrine of employing tactical air defenses well known,
and with the Soviets again reeling from another embarrassing
defeat of their weapons systems, I would argue that CAS is
indeed still a viable mission, especially if properly used in
the maneuver warfare concept of battle. Still, we must not
stop analyzing our enemy, or revising and changing our
doctrine, procedures, and equipment to ensure that CAS remains
a viable mission.
It is very important that we closely analyze our victory
over Iraq from every perspective. We must not be misled by
the sanitized version of the war that we saw on television.
As the war progressed, it quickly became obvious that our air
forces faced a "paper tiger" enemy air force. We cannot lose
sight of the fact that vastly improved radar-controlled air
defense systems and heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles
integrated with improved methods of interception by highly
sophisticated and heavily armed "look down, shoot down"
fighter aircraft, if properly used by an enemy, could make
current CAS aircraft's chances of survival marginal at best.
These potential defense improvements by our adversaries
underscore three significant facts: (1) that ground force
commanders must be extremely knowledgeable of the capabilities
as well as the limitations of supporting aviation assets, (2)
that ground force commanders must use the hours of darkness
and periods of reduced visibility due to weather conditions as
the primary means of concealment when moving their forces, and
(3) that advanced technology must be incorporated into current
and future CAS aircraft to increase their survivability.
The ground force commander's knowledge, or lack of it,
concerning his aviation assets could well decide the outcome
of a battle. It is commonly recognized by commanders that
"battlefield situations which may be in doubt can usually be
resolved by the commander who can bring the greatest amount of
firepower to bear on his enemy at the critical moment." (8:11)
Because of our enemy's capability to launch an attack or
stop our own attack with his superior numbers of tanks and
artillery, tactical surprise is one of our best weapons. A
unit's ability to operate effectively during the hours of
darkness and periods of reduced visibility due to weather
conditions makes surprise possible. To achieve this
effectiveness, a commander must initiate a training program
that will give his unit the necessary experience to function
successfully during these periods. The most critical factor
of this training program is realism.
Although our soldiers are of the highest quality, they still do not
train realistically enough for war. There is too much emphasis on safety.
As a result, units do not train for integrated combat in a live-fire
environment, where artillery, armed helicopters, close air support jets,
armored vehicles and soldiers replicate the violent and confusing
conditions found on the battlefield. You don't learn football by going to
the gym and watching videotapes. You learn by getting bruised on the
field. (3:49)
With today's "zero-defect" mentality, safety during
training is of paramount importance, thus causing many
commanders to shy away from combat oriented training. Yet,
battle-tested commanders are well aware of the risks involved
in employing supporting arms: the likelihood of "friendly-
fire" casualties. Anytime supporting arms are used "in close
proximity to friendly forces," avoidance of friendly
casualties is a foremost concern of commanders. Nothing
lowers the morale of the "grunt" more than suffering
"friendly-fire" casualties. Besides the fact that it is a
tragic waste of manpower, the psychological impact could
change the tide of the battle in favor of the enemy.
Regrettably, in the Gulf War, almost as many American troops
were killed by "friendly-fire" as by the Iraqis. Most of
these casualties were the result of errant CAS missions. It
is a sad fact that our overemphasis on restrictive safety
measures during peacetime training exercises most likely had a
significant impact on these unnecessary and tragic casualties.
Experts claim that "such errors are inevitable in the
chaos of battle," and point to the fact that in previous wars
approximately 30 percent of American deaths were caused by
fellow Americans. Despite the improved accuracy of today's
weapons, the potential exists for U.S. forces to sustain even
higher friendly-fire figures. One reason for this is the
emphasis on launching offensive maneuvers at night, compounded
by many of our allies possessing the same weapons as our
enemies. "In the heat of battle, when a guy is getting shot
at and a target appears, more often than not he'll shoot,"
says one Army lieutenant colonel. This "shoot first, ask
questions later" mentality can only increase the potential for
more friendly-fire casualties. (4:33)
Improvements not specifically designed to improve CAS,
but to decrease friendly-fire casualties, will surely be made,
and will undoubtedly improve CAS. However, I disagree with
these "experts" and their feeling of "inevitability." I
firmly believe friendly-fire casualties reveals an inherent
deficiency in our ability to closely integrate airpower (or
for that matter, any supporting arm) with maneuvering ground
forces -- in other words, a lack of proper training! To
accomplish a CAS mission successfully requires constant,
intense training -- training that we fail to do enough of. As
important as training may be, it is not the only area of
concern.
As we begin to look to the future, each of the services
is involved in a joint study to decide which type of aircraft
is needed for tomorrow's CAS missions. Unfortunately, they
are not making much headway. Since as far back as 1970, the
Congress has addressed the issue of CAS aircraft. Efforts
were made to adopt a single aircraft to meet the future CAS
requirements of the nation's four "air forces." While it was
recognized that this achievement would be positive in many
respects, it was finally decided that this goal was not
"realistically achievable." The unique combat requirements of
each service ruled out a single CAS aircraft.
For example, the Army is oriented toward attack helicopters that
can maneuver and can be used with frontline troops. Within their
limitations, helicopters can deliver effective fires; however, a
good part of the Army's CAS requirements is met by fixed wing
aircraft that are more survivable and deliver larger volumes of
firepower. The Air Force can perform this mission for the Army .
The Marine Corps and Navy require fire support aircraft which can
operate from aircraft carriers. Historically, the Marine Corps and
the Navy have operated the same aircraft; however, since Marine Corps
aircraft must be capable of moving ashore in support of amphibious
assaults, its aircraft must operate from small austere airfields.
(11:19/20)
It was because of these earlier efforts that the Marine Corps
opted for the V/STOL concept that led to today's AV-8B
aircraft, the Marine Corps' primary daytime CAS aircraft.
Tomorrow's CAS aircraft must be capable of doing many
things, not the least of which are: (1) penetrating enemy air
defenses at low altitude, (2) conducting air-to-surface
attacks to support the GCE's scheme of maneuver, (3) carrying
a variety of weapons to include precision guided weapons for
point targets and area coverage weapons for both fixed and
mobile targets, and (4) communicating with both airborne and
ground controllers. Additionally, future CAS aircraft must be
"reasonably affordable" within future defense budgets. (6:12)
This last condition is probably the most critical as it
will undoubtedly affect the others.
One point no one argues over is the cost. A fixed-wing, close air
support aircraft that can cope with the threat, accomplish the
mission with accuracy in adverse weather or darkness, and has the
command and control, navigation and pilot-workload-reducing systems
necessary to rapidly and flexibly integrate itself into the battle
at the front line is the most expensive fighter one can buy.
(2:35-36)
Tremendous sums of today's money will be required to save
lives on tomorrow's battlefield. Our leaders must continue to
be convinced to spend this money!
With all the above in mind, visualize a black, wet and
stormy night. Low ground fog has reduced the visibility to
less than a couple hundred feet. It was just this type of
night when General Washington crossed the Delaware River in
his attack on Trenton during the Revolutionary War. It is
also the type of night that we, as future MAGTF commanders,
should want if we ever have to "land the landing force" on
some hostile, distant shore.
As commander of this landing force, we will undoubtedly
want to know if sufficient firepower will be available to
support our landing. Until artillery can be brought ashore
much later in the landing, two means of fire support are
available: naval gunfire (NGF) and air support. There are
factors, that when considered, make the availability of both
of these supporting assets questionable.
Presently, the Navy is woefully lacking in NGF ships -- a
situation that will get worse! The massive demonstrations of
firepower that we regularly saw played out on our television
screens during the recent Gulf War, as the big 16" guns of the
battleships Missouri and Wisconsin battered the Kuwaiti
coastline in support of Marine forces, will be but distant
memories; these two dreadnoughts will soon be mothballed as
part of budget cutting measures. Thus MAGTF commanders will
be left with one supporting arm as their Marines prepare to
make an amphibious assault against a hostile shore -- the ACE.
In the future, given the parameters of this fictitious
scenario, even the ACE will be hard pressed to meet the MAGTF
commander's demands. While many types of aircraft can provide
CAS, currently only one Navy or Marine aircraft can provide
day and night all-weather CAS: the A-6E Intruder. The only
carrier-based, all-weather, night-attack aircraft in the U.S.
arsenal, the A-6E is a formidable weapon system, capable of
carrying up to eight tons of ordnance with a range and payload
exceeded only by the giant B-52. However, the A-6E has
serious deficiencies that greatly reduce its effectiveness on
the modern battlefield. Lack of airspeed and maneuverability,
and the dangers imposed upon it by the limitations of the
ordnance that it carries, make the A-6E extremely vulnerable
in a high threat environment. Realizing that the A-6E is the
only all-weather aircraft in the inventory, and because of the
recent canceling of its replacement, the A-12, the Navy is
making every effort to extend the Intruder's service life well
into the 21st century.
Upgrades under the Systems/Weapons Improvement Program
allow the A-6E to carry such weapons as the HARM, Harpoon,
Maverick, and SLAM missiles; all are extremely accurate laser-
guided weapons that were used with great effect during the
Gulf War, but unfortunately cost more than one million dollars
each, and thus are rarely delivered in peacetime. According
to retired Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn, former Deputy Chief of
Naval Operations for Air Warfare, "The 120-mile range SLAM and
the 80-mile range Harpoon can attack heavily defended targets
while the A-6E remains at a safe stand-off distance ....."
The A-6E also will receive radar upgrades, giving the aircraft
internal means to identify its target more easily. (12:29)
Still, these upgrades can be considered only if the A-6E
makes it to the next battlefield. In the realities of today's
world, for Marines, that becomes no easy task.
Currently, the Marine Corps has three A-6E squadrons, a
total of 30 aircraft. By 1993, this number will be zero. In
slightly more than two years the Marine Corps will be totally
dependent upon Navy or Air Force aircraft to provide night,
all-weather CAS in support of an amphibious assault. In the
recent Gulf War, with a reinforced Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF) in theater, 20 Marine A-6E's were flying in support of
the MEF. Had a "foul weather" amphibious assault been
necessary, the availability of only 20 all-weather aircraft,
even if they were dedicated strictly to CAS, could have proven
catastrophic to the landing force. Had this amphibious
assault been necessary, most of the offensive air support
would have been necessarily provided by non-Marine aircraft.
Unfortunately, neither the limited number of aircraft, nor the
service that provides them, is not the ground commander's
major problem. The availability of aircraft is his real
problem.
Aircraft arriving within the AOA can come from only two
sources: a land-based airfield or an aircraft carrier. Since
the U.S. lacks suitable numbers of advanced foreign airfields
for use in an emergency, and the Marine Corps does not
regularly have any carrier-based attack squadrons, there is
little chance that Marine aircraft will be supporting an
amphibious assault until an airfield has been seized or an
expeditionary airfield can be constructed. Yet, there usually
will not be enough time to do either. The astute reader may
now be contemplating this question: "In a joint environment,
why can't the Navy or the Air Force provide the Marine Corps'
night/all-weather CAS requirement?"
Currently, the Navy is desperately fighting to maintain
its carrier task forces. It remains to be seen how many
carriers will be available once budget cuts are made. Without
question, in the future there will be fewer than there are
today. For a MAGTF commander to assume that any of these
limited assets will be available continuously during an
amphibious assault could be a fatal mistake.
The NIMITZ class nuclear aircraft carrier is an awesome
weapons platform unique to U.S. naval forces. Used in the
right scenario, it is extremely effective; used incorrectly,
it becomes an extremely vulnerable floating target. In the
Gulf War, the Navy was initially very leery of bringing its
carriers into the Persian Gulf, but eventually four carriers
sailed into the Gulf to oppose an enemy with a limited air and
sea capability. Should our next enemy possess a credible navy
or air force, we cannot expect this type of carrier support.
In a war between the super-powers (we must plan worst case
situation), or even in a third-world conflict similar to the
Falklands War, where British forces faced a country with a
potent air force and a potential submarine threat, the
aircraft carrier could be subjected to massive air attacks by
enemy bombers armed with long range anti-ship cruise missiles,
complemented by attacks from enemy submarines armed with sea
launched cruise missiles and torpedoes. Consequently, most,
if not all, Navy aircraft would be used in defending the
carrier task force -- not in supporting the Marines ashore.
As for the Air Force supplying the necessary support,
don't count on it; comparable problems exist. The Air Force's
principal all-weather aircraft, the F-111 and F-15E, are too
few in number, based at airfields inaccessible to Marines, and
most likely would be dedicated to supporting the Army's
"airland" battle -- not Marines!
Now let us assume for a moment that we can somehow seize
an advanced airfield, or better yet, a country like Saudi
Arabia gives us free use of its airfields, or that sufficient
carrier aircraft are available to support the GCE's scheme of
maneuver during a late night assault. Does this mean the
ground commander will automatically have continuous and
effective CAS available to him? It is highly unlikely,
because a new set of problems arise.
It has often been said that a unit will fight only as
well as it has trained. Only through detailed planning and
extensive realistic training can the Marine Corps expect to
successfully receive CAS. As previously mentioned, the most
critical factor of any training program is realism: the
closer to realistic combat conditions, the better. Yet,
little actual planning and even less actual training is
conducted on the squadron and battalion levels, especially
between Navy or Air Force squadrons and Marine infantry
battalions. If CAS techniques must be learned in the heat of
battle, many lives will needlessly be lost.
We will never know how our forces would have fared had
the Iraqis put up a determined fight. Could allied air forces
have provided the necessary CAS? To prepare our forces
properly for tomorrow's CAS environment, we must refocus our
priorities. We can begin by revamping our training.
Tomorrow's training environment, while not ignoring troop
safety, should stress "proper coordination, positive
procedures for target identification, firm direction of the
attacking aircraft in the target area, and accurate weapons
delivery." (8:14) First stressed in 1968, these points remain
valid today. Of note is the fact that all except the last
point is controlled by the maneuvering ground force. This is
a significant factor, one that most ground commanders fail to
comprehend.
Once a ground commander makes the decision to employ air
support against a target impeding his attack, he expects a
prompt response to his request. Therefore, the ACE must
ensure that supporting aircraft arrive in sufficient numbers,
on time, and carrying the proper ordnance necessary to destroy
the target. From the ground commander's point of view, timing
is the most crucial factor. (8:11) To a Marine unit halted on
an enemy beach, a minute can seem like an eternity: any delay
could mean the difference between life or death. Yet, there
are many factors that will cause significant delays -- not the
least of which are communications failures, target acquisition
and marking, availability and experience of the forward air
controller (FAC), and the delivering aircrew's experience.
It has long been known that communication is the key to
command and control, and, therefore, to success on the modern
battlefield. Communication must be rapid, secure, and
reliable. (8:13) It was not for a lack of other lucrative
targets that the Gulf War's air campaign's initial targeting
was against the Iraqi command and control system. Today, most
Marine infantry units cannot consistently complete tactical
air requests due to recurring communications failures. In a
world where we can transmit both orally and visually through
thousands of miles of space, our small unit leaders are often
unable to communicate with an orbiting aircraft less than five
miles away. This is primarily due to the unreliability of the
FAC's UHF radios.
Hand in hand with communications failure are the problems
of acquisition and marking of targets. On one thing CAS
pilots agree: for a reasonable degree of accuracy, targets
must be marked -- either by someone or by something. It is
almost physically impossible for a pilot to "fly at tree-top
levels, navigate, maneuver to avoid enemy defenses, keep track
of friendlier, acquire enemy targets, maneuver to attack enemy
targets, and live." (2:35)
Some would argue that because of the proliferation of
sophisticated, mobile air defense weapons systems, and our
supposed inability to mark a target consistently and
accurately, that CAS may not be feasible even in a low
intensity environment. I would counter by pointing to the
remarkable success of laser-guided munitions during the Gulf
War. Laser-guided technology, while still in its "infancy,"
has proven itself reliable enough to work consistently in a
CAS environment, almost to the point of being considered a
force multiplier. But what if a pilot is unable to find his
target via laser-designation?
Currently, the PPN-19 RABFAC, a beacon/transponder used
by FAC's to designate targets, is the only device available to
the ground commander for control of aircraft in the all-
weather/night environment. However, it is useable by only the
A-6E. This capability needs to be extended to other aircraft.
Even if aircraft availability, communications failure, or
target acquisition and marking are not a problem, two
variables remain that could endanger the outcome of a CAS
mission: the FAC and the aircrew in the attacking aircraft.
Present Marine Corps task organizations assign three aviators
to each infantry battalion and one to each regiment to act as
air officers (AO) and FAC's. Additionally, tank battalions,
reconnaissance battalions, and light-armored infantry
companies each rate two FAC's/AO's. However, continuous low
aircrew retention rates have often resulted in this policy
being short changed. The truth is: usually, only deploying
units get their full complement of aviators. Additionally,
most Marine aviators mistakenly consider a tour of duty as a
FAC/AO to be an undesirable interruption to their flying,
while also being a non-career-enhancing tour that is the
result of some previous mistake. But, because the role of the
FAC in the CAS mission is indispensable, the Marine Corps
should find a way of enhancing the prestige of this billet and
the importance it plays within the air-ground team. (8:65)
An aviator assigned as a FAC/AO receive basic instruction
in air-ground operations (insufficient compared with what they
need) and normally spends 12 to 18 months with a ground unit.
Again, during aviator "shortages," this policy is not always
adhered to. The Marine Corps' adoption of the "rent-a-FAC"
program during the 1970's and 1980's was intended to alleviate
these shortages by assigning FAC's to infantry battalions only
when they were operationally needed, but this policy caused
additional problems. These "rent-a-FAC's" were normally the
least experienced aviators in the squadron, and therefore more
likely to have trouble in carrying out their mission. They
could not give the ground commander the aviation knowledge and
expertise that he so desperately needed, and, just as
important, these junior aviators didn't receive the aviation
tactical training they so desperately needed. Because of its
inadequacies, and increased aviator retention, the "rent-a-
FAC" program was discontinued in 1987. With today's beginning
downward trend in aviator retention, FAC availability will
again become an issue.
Equally important as the FAC is the aircrew flying the
CAS mission. Aviators don't magically acquire bombing skills.
Operational training must include sufficient periods of live
ordnance delivery, target acquisition techniques, and CAS and
communication procedures to produce an aviator capable of
destroying a target on his first attack -- essential in a high
threat environment. (8:5) Today, not enough training is
allotted to the CAS mission to accomplish these goals. The
current A-6E Training and Readiness Manual calls for only two
CAS missions to be flown every six months, hardly the
requisite number to prepare an aircrew for the hazards of a
CAS mission.
Fortunately, there are some glimmers of hope on the
horizon. The ground commander can expect dramatic
improvements in CAS weapons-accuracy with the addition of the
F/A-18D Hornet aircraft during the mid 1990's, and the
increased production (and I hope "hands-on" training) of
laser-guided air-to-ground munitions that were so effective in
the Gulf War. But, these two items, in of themselves, are not
enough. There are still many things that need to be done to
further improve the success of the CAS mission.
Some possible improvements include enhancing the "under-
the-weather" F/A-18D to make it "all-weather," and using a
data-link system between aircraft, FAC's, and remotely piloted
vehicles for real-time intelligence on the battlefield. The
role of the FAC would be dramatically improved with the
purchase of new radios with increased range and reliability.
Target acquisition would be dramatically improved with the
availability of a "RABFAC-like" piece of equipment that is
lightweight, data-link and long-range capable, and can be used
by all CAS aircraft. A "cheap fix," obtaining colored marking
rounds (red, yellow, purple, etc.) for use by tanks,
artillery, and mortars for daylight CAS missions also would
help significantly.
Can we accomplish any of the above? Yes! With
appropriate foresight, and the proper allocation of funds
toward critical areas, the Marine Corps can continue to be the
trend-setter in CAS procedures. If any of the above
suggestions make it down to the "operator" level, the Marine
Corps' capability for improving its CAS techniques will be
dramatically improved. Yet, if the Corps flatters itself too
much for its success in the Gulf War, without seeing the war
for what it really was, and adjusting accordingly, our very
existence is in danger.
Meanwhile, those in the Fleet Marine Forces will continue
to do what Marines have always done -- compensate for the many
inadequacies that exist -- and find ways to improve our
mission capability as it currently exists. Otherwise, CAS
will die a premature death! And so might the Marine Corps!
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms. Washington D.C.: The Joint Chiefs of
Staff, January 1, 1986.
2. Garrett, Thomas. "Close Air Support: Which Way Do We Go?"
Parameters, Vol XX, No.4, U.S. Army War College
Quarterly, December 1990.
3. Hackworth, David H. "Lessons of a Lucky War." Newsweek
Magazine, 11 March 1991, pp.49.
4. Hammer, Joshua. "Risking "Friendly Fire"." Newsweek
Magazine, 4 March 1991, pp.33.
5. Keegan, John, "How the War was Won," Washington Post,
March 3, 1991, Section C., p.7.
6. Kennedy, R. C. "Close Air Support Design Alternative
Study (CASADA)" Phase 1, Vol II - Mission Requirements
Package. Science Applications International Corporation,
Dayton, Ohio, January, 1989.
7. Lind, William S., "If We Fight This War, Can We Win?,"
Washington Post, August 19, 1990, Section C., p.2.
8. May, Donald L. "Control of Close Air Support in
Conventional War." Air War College, Maxwell Air Force
Base, Alabama. April 1968.
9. Moskin, J. Robert. The US Marine Corps Story. New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1977.
10. Naviaux, Jacques C. Close Air Support - A Major Dilemma.
Marine Corps Gazette, July 1982, pp. 37.
11. New, Noah C. CAS - A User's Product. Marine Corps
Gazette, May 1974, pp. 19-20.
12. Steigman, David S. "Navy Ponders Options After A-12 is
Killed." Navy Times, January 21, 1991, p. 29.
13. Warden, John A. III. The Air Campaign - Planning for
Combat. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press,
1988.
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