Helicopters In Support: Marine Air Or Army Aviation?
AUTHOR Major David L. Leftwich, USA
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: HELICOPTERS IN SUPPORT: MARINE AIR OR ARMY AVIATION?
I. Purpose: To compare the current command and control rela-
tionships in both Marine Air and Army Aviation and to see how
these relationships either impede or enhance air support.
II. Problem: Responsive helicopter support is critical to the
Marine Ground Combat Element Commander's success. Because
aviation assets are not organic to large ground units and air
support is requested and subject to a somewhat lengthy avia-
tion combat planning sequence the support is often slow to
arrive.
III. Data: The Marine Corps and the Army both believe that
aviation is a maneuver element in its own right. Marine Corps
Air has the ability to influence the battle with both Close
Air Support (CAS) and Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI). It
is generally accepted that Army Aviation is very limited in its
ability to do BAI missions. Both services do have CAS-capable
aircraft employed, however the Army is limited to helicopters
for its internal CAS. The Army sees its air as maneuvering to
support the ground commander's concept of operations while
the Marine Corps sees its air in support of either a ground
campaign, an air campaign, or possibly both. Command Rela-
tionships within the Marine Corps do not facilitate speedy
support for the Ground Combat Commander. Placing aviation
units under the Operational Control of Ground Combat Element
Commanders in the Army has greatly improved both training
and support. The OPCON status can be canceled at any time
by the MAGTF Commander and the Air Combat Element reconsti-
tuted for `surge' operations. Superior speed in combat
means seizing the initiative and dictating the terms of
battle.
IV. Conclusions: The helicopter unit must support the ground
unit and around this basic cornerstone the organization must
be framed, staffed, trained, and equipped for combat. Continued
centralized control over the helicopter units, especially in
the fluid environment of combat, will only degrade their capa-
bilities and decrease their contributions to the fight.
V. Recommendations: Helicopter support can be decisive when
used quickly to counter an enemy's movement or when used to ex-
ploit success. Responsiveness means control, and control needs
to be shifted to a lower level for the helicopter assets to
make their full impact and to meet the needs of the GCE Com-
mander.
HELICOPTERS IN SUPPORT: MARINE AIR OR ARMY AVIATION?
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. The helicopter unit must support the
ground unit and around this basic cornerstone the organi-
zation must be framed, staffed, trained, and equipped for
combat.
I. Author's Background
A. Fleet Marine Experience
B. AH-1W (Cobra) Pilot
C. Army Background/Experience
II. Marine and Army Maneuvering Air
A. Army Aviation in Support of Infantry
B. Marine Air in Support of Ground or Air Campaign
C. Marine and Army Aviation Capabilities
III. Close Air Support and Battlefield Air Interdiction
A. Weaknesses in Capabilities of Both Services
B. Army's Command Relationships Improve Response Time
IV. Command Relationships discussed
A. Marine Air/Ground Task Force
B. OPCON - Better Training and Improved Response
HELICOPTERS IN SUPPORT: MARINE AIR OR ARMY AVIATION
by Major D.L. Leftwich, USA
CG #7
During the past two years and six months I have been
assigned with the Marine Corps. I am presently attending
the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at Quantico,
Virginia. Prior to Command and Staff I was assigned with
Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 26 at New River, North
Carolina. During my assignment with MAG 26, I was fortunate
enough to participate in two Combined Arms Exercises
(CAX's), two Carolina Combat Exercises, an Alpine Warrior-
Cold Winter Exercise, and a Mediterranean Deployment (Med.
Float).
The assignment with MAG 26 was not unlike any other
Marine Corps Helicopter Pilot's fleet assignment, except
I was not and am not a Marine. I am an Army Aviator and
I was serving as an exchange officer with the Marine Corps.
In the Army I flew the AH-1S (Cobra) and while serving with
the Marines the AH-1T and the new AH-1W (Super Cobra). The
opportunity to serve with the Marines was a highlight in my
fifteen-year military career and the experience was unlike
any other.
The Fleet Marine experience and my follow-on assign-
ment at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, plus
thirteen years of Army Aviation service, gives me a unique
background from which to draw observations, make compari-
sons, and assess the utilization of both services' heli-
copter assets.
Both the Marine Corps and the Army believe that avia-
tion is a maneuver element in its own right. The Army views
land combat as central to war, and closing with and destroy-
ing the enemy as central to land combat. The infantry and
armor mudsoldier has the "close with" role. All other
branches of the Army, including Aviation, are in support of
the mudsoldier and his decisive mission.(1:36) The Marine
Corps sees its air as maneuvering to support the Marine
Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander's concept of oper-
ations. So while the Army sees its aviation, or air, as
maneuvering to support the ground commander's concept of
operations the Marine Corps sees its air in support of
a ground campaign, or an air campaign, or possibly
both.
The Marine Corps with its full range of combat capa-
bilities integrated into a single-Service, air-ground,
combined arms team is an expeditionary Service by virtue
of its primary mission of overseas support within the
fleet and as an element of a joint force. (2:1) The
Marine "air force" includes aircraft covering the en-
tire tactical spectrum: helicopters of all types, in-
cluding attack helicopters; fixed-wing fighters; and
airlift/aerial refueling assets. The large number of
fixed-wing fighter aircraft owned by the Marines is
justified by the lightness of Marine ground forces and
their lack of heavy artillery or other fire support
means. (1:38)
Marine Corps Air has the ability to influence the battle
both with Close Air Support (CAS) and with Battlefield
Air Interdiction (BAI). CAS is air action against ground
targets in close proximity to friendly forces while BAI is
the operations conducted to limit reinforcement of enemy
supply routes, limiting reinforcement of enemy ground
forces, and destroying/neutralizing follow-on echelons.
(3:4-38) A weakness of Marine Air is its unresponsiveness
to CAS requests from the Ground Combat Element (GCE).
This weakness is a result of the administrative organiza-
tion of Marine Air.
In comparison the Army has developed a system that is
very responsive to the GCE. It is generally accepted that
Army Aviation is very limited in its ability to do BAI
missions. By doctrine the CAS mission for the Army is
presently an Air Force responsibility. However, with
modern technological changes, such as the Army's new At-
tack Helicopter (AH-64) and the new Multiple Launch Rocket
System (MLRS) that allows deeper targeting this could even-
tually change too. More than a few authors say the modern
helicopter is the right CAS aircraft. The helicopter has
already gained a decided edge over the fixed-wing aircraft
while conducting CAS both at night and in adverse weather
conditions. All four services presently have CAS-capable
aircraft employed under joint doctrine.
The secret to the Army's responsiveness is in its
command relationships. They change often in aviation de-
pending on friendly and enemy situations, logistical
sustainability, and mission-critical support require-
ments. One of the following command relationships is
established for each Army aviation unit:
o Assigned
o Attached
o Operational control
Assigned - The assigned relationship places aviation
units in an organization where such placement is rela-
tively permanent. The commanding headquarters admin-
isters assigned units for command and support functions.
Aviation brigades are assigned to divisions, corps, and
theater armies. Aviation battalions and companies are
usually assigned to aviation brigades.
Attached - This relationship places aviation units in an
organization where such placement is relatively temporary.
The gaining commander, subject to limitations imposed in
the attachment order, will exercise the same degree of
command and control over them as he does over the units
and people organic to his command. At times, Army avia-
tion elements and assets will be attached to other Army
aviation or ground maneuver forces.
Operational Control - Operational control is the typi-
cal command relationship of Army aviation maneuver as-
sets when they are employed with or by other members of
the combined arms team. Army aviation can place organic
assets, attack helicopter battalions, under the OPCON of
a ground maneuver brigade or higher-level commander.
Aviation forces are normally not placed in OPCON status
below brigade level except under special circumstances.
(4:2-2) A division commander normally will not place
more than a squadron/battalion aviation element under
OPCON to a brigade commander. Usually you have an 0-5
(aviator) working for an O-6 (usually an infantryman).
These three terms Assigned, Attached, and OPCON
are normally not used when referring to command relation-
ships in Marine aviation. Marine Corps policy continues
to emphasize the close integration of air and ground oper-
ations. A Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) with a
separate air-ground headquarters is normally formed for
combat operations and training exercises in which substan-
tial combat forces of both Marine aviation and ground units
are included in the task organization. Its elements are
drawn principally from Marine divisions (MarDivs), Marine
aircraft wings (MAWs), and force service support groups
(FSSGs). MAGTFs vary in size. There are three basic
MAGTF organizational structures:
o Marine expeditionary force (MEF) - roughly the size of
two Army divisions.
o Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) - roughly the size of
an Army infantry division.
o Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) special operations
capable [MEU(SOC)] - roughly the size of an Army brigade
(-) or two battalions. (2:5-7), (5:6-5,6-6)
The MAGTF includes four major components: a command
element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat ele-
ment, and a combat service support element. The Aviation
Combat Element is a task organization tailored for the
conduct of tactical air operations. The Air Combat Element
in the MEF is the Marine Aircraft Wing, while in the MEB
it is the Marine Aircraft Group, and finally in the MEU
it is a Helicopter Squadron (Reins). It includes avia-
tion command units with the necessary air control agen-
cies, combat units, combat support units, and combat
service support units which are provided by the Marine
Aircraft Wing (MAW) and appropriate force units. Air
operations are conducted in keeping with the principle
of centralized command and control at the level of the
MAGTF, in accordance with FMFM 0-1, Marine Air Ground
Task Force Doctrine. (6:3-6)
The MAGTF Commander makes provisions for direct lia-
ison between his subordinate commanders for activities
which do not require intervention of MAGTF headquarters.
(7:85) An important point to note here is that the com-
manders of the ACE, the GCE, and the CSSE are of equal rank.
Remember this was not the case in the Army when the assets
were placed under the Operational Control of a supported
commander.
Can the aviation element be responsive to the Ground
Combat Element (GCE) Commander's needs on the battlefield
and still be prepared to execute the Air Combat Element
(ACE) Commander's scheme of maneuver in support of the
MAGTF? Does the command relationship described above
enhance or detract from mission accomplishment?
Responsive helicopter support is critical to the GCE
Commander's success. Often in the Marine Corps, because
aviation assets are not organic to large ground units and
air support is requested and subject to a somewhat lengthy
aviation combat planning sequence, the support is frequently
slow to arrive. This Aviation Combat Planning Sequence is
included as Figure 1-1 from the Aviation Planning Instruc-
tional Publication (IP 5-1). (8:1-14) A glance tells the
reader that this is both cumbersome and complicated.
As previously mentioned the Marine Corps' command and
control of its aviation assets differs significantly from
the Army's. In the Marine Corps all aviation is controlled
by the ACE while in the Army the GCE's (Div) Airspace Man-
agement Element makes the necessary coordination for air-
space usage. The basic difference is that the ground com-
mander in the Army is responsible for the airspace over his
unit.
If helicopter assets were occasionally placed under
the operational control of their supported ground units in
the Marine Corps, a revelation in training would occur.
The ground commander, at the Regimental level, would be-
come more familiar with how to employ aviation units as
a maneuver element, while the subordinate aviation com-
mander would learn how to fight an entire squadron and
not just a flight of four aircraft. While occupying the
Click here to view image
same terrain in training there is a heightened awareness
of the tactical situation. Operating aircraft from the
field and having to be concerned with tactical dispersion,
camouflage, enemy situation, NBC threat, Assembly Area
security, ground to ground as well as ground to air com--
munications problems, and maintaining aircraft from a field
environment is "worst case" training, but this training
should not be overlooked.
Unlike Army Aviation, the Marine ACE has the whole
spectrum of aviation technology and while this is a tre-
mendous asset it also widens the area of interest for
the ACE Commander and increases the gap between the GCE
Commander's and the ACE Commander's concerns on the battle-
field. The ACE Commander has to be concerned with winning
the air campaign and this means that sometimes the ground
commander's needs must take a back seat. There is no
denying that the ACE in the Marine Corps needs its own
command structure; however, the aircraft permanently as-
signed to the ACE command should be re-identified.
The aircraft that are capable of striking deep,
outside the GCE Commander's area of interest, should be
controlled at a higher level of command. The aircraft
flying in the GCE Commander's area of operation needs
to be under his control, if not organic, at least OPCON
to him. Helicopter technology is changing rapidly and
as new machines are fielded they must be evaluated to
determine their proper place in the table of organiza-
tion.
The differences between the Army and the old Army Air
Corps could not be resolved when these same issues were
debated in the late forties. Their areas of interest and
concern on the battlefield became unmanageable for the
Army and the Air Force was the result. The Marine Corps
is facing a similar situation. Marine Corps Air, though
smaller in number of aircraft than the Army, has a much
more diverse capability. The Marine Corps has a mighty
array of aircraft and when they are employed using com-
bined arms tactics they make the Marine Corps a formida-
ble foe.
While the Marine Corps' air arsenal is more diverse
than the other services, one basic tenet concerning
helicopter operations needs to be reaffirmed. The helicop-
ter unit must support the ground unit and around this
basic cornerstone the organization must be framed, staffed,
trained, and equipped for combat. Remember that speed,
over distance or space is a weapon. Superior speed allows
us to seize the initiative and dictate the terms of combat,
forcing the enemy to react to us. It is a prerequisite for
maneuver and surprise. (9:32)
When a GCE Commander's request for a single UH-1 has
to be routed through the same channels as a request for a
deep bombing strike, then something is obviously wrong with
the system. Continued centralized control over the heli-
copter units, especially in the fluid environment of combat,
will only degrade their capabilities and decrease their con-
tributions to the fight.
Helicopter support can be decisive when used quickly
to counter an enemy's movement or when used to exploit
success. Responsiveness means control, and control needs
to be shifted to a lower level for the helicopter assets
to make their full impact and to meet the needs of the
GCE Commander.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Garrett, Thomas W., Colonel, USA. "Close Air Support: Which
Way Do We Go?". Parameters. XX No. 4 (December, 1990).
35-41.
2. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps.
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Pocket Guide. FMFRP 2-5A.
Washington, D.C., 16 August, 1989, 1-8.
3. U.S. Air Force. Headquarters Tactical Air Command. Tactical
Air Operations, TACM 2-1. Langley Air Force Base, Virginia.
15 April, 1978, 4-37, 4-38.
4. U.S Army. Headquarters Department of the Army. Army Aviation
in Combat Operations, FM 1-100. Washington, D.C.,
28 February, 1989, 2-1 thru 2-5.
5. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps.
The United States Army, IP 1-22. Washington, D.C., 1 April,
1986, 6-3 thru 6-5.
6. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps.
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Doctrine, FMFM 0-1. Washing-
ton, D.C., 1 March, 1989, 3-6.
7. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps.
Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1, Washington, D.C., 24 August,
1979, 84-88.
8. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps.
Aviation Planning, IP 5-1. Washington, D.C., 1 April
1987, 1-14.
9. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters United States Marine Corps.
Warfighting, FMFM 1. Washington, D.C., 6 March, 1989,
31-32.
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