Procurement Of Tactical Aircraft
AUTHOR Major Mark W. Kurtzhalts, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: PROCUREMENT OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
I. Purpose: Because of personal frustrations of
trying to affect minor changes in the F/A-18 and due to
inadequate planning and execution, the loss of a needed
weapon system, I wanted to know what made the process
so hard. The research uncovered a lot of variables
within the equation.
II. Problem: Administration, political and industrial
influences cause inconsistences. Interservice as well
as intraservice rivalries generate planning problems.
III. Data: The Department of Defense goals
established to raise the visibility of industrial base
issues at all levels within DoD. The United States
must preserve for the future generation the margin of
technological superiority it enjoys today. The DoD
must be prepared to facilitate the rapid exploitation
of technology to meet a crisis situation. To do this,
the Secretary of Defense has directed focus on two
points, streamlining the industrial base management and
practices, and promoting key defense product and
manufacturing process technologies. These technology
programs will provide options for strategies, tactics,
and operations required to carry a successful national
security program in a world filled with uncertainties.
IV. Conclusion: Development of advanced weapon
systems is political and emotional as well as
scientific.
V. Recommendations: In order to meet these goals
established by the Secretary of Defense, some changes
in well established trends will need to be
accomplished. One change that is a must is to make the
DoD personnel responsible for the development and
procurement more career oriented. Then they would
understand the extensive and complex regulations,
preventing mistakes managing contracting and
procurement.
Some priorities must be set in maintaining the
military industrial base at an adequate minimum level
in the presence of a decreasing defense budget.
Individual services will have to wake up to the
fact that they will have to develop weapon systems
jointly in order to be able to afford the technology
required to survive todays and tomorrows threats.
PROCUREMENT OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. A number of definite changes with
the development and procurement process throughout
the Department of Defense (DoD) will be required if
the armed services are going to acquire aircraft
with the best available technology with in a
decreasing defense budget.
I. Review of Department of Defense Procurement
Process
A. General Characteristics of the System
1. Risk Management
2. Funding Instability
3. Transitional Leadership Billets within
DoD
B. The Military Industrial Complex
1. Survival in an Austere Defense Budget
Environment
2. Regulations Affecting Contracting
3. Political Influence
C. Contract and Development
1. Fixed-priced vs. Cost-plus
2. A-12 Cancellation
II. The Armed Services
A. Planning
B. Interservice Rivalry and Joint Development
PROCUREMENT OF TACTICAL AIRCRAFT
There is a constant need to upgrade our weapon
systems that are used in the defense of our nation and
it's strategies. A number of definite changes with the
development and procurement process thoughout the
Department of Defense (DoD) will be required if the
armed services are going to acquire aircraft with the
best available technology within a decreasing defense
budget.
We must understand the acquisition process and
some of the problems prior to understanding the
procurement of a weapon system. Another way to state
this is how we ended up with what we got, like it or
not. Many pages have been written establishing
policies and procedures for acquisition as well as laws
for competition and contracting. The U.S. defense
acquisition methodology has several characteristics or
flaws.
The first characteristic is that defense
acquisition is fundamentally a business of risk
management. The U.S. has won the Cold War if by one
reason, it produced superior weapon systems. Although
more expensive per like weapon system, it eliminated
the need to match the numbers the Soviets were
producing. Because of the quality of our weapon
systems, we could fight outnumbered and win. The risk
is a matter of weighing the technical challenge,
providing a sensible plan to reduce risk and
demonstrate technical achievement before making major
commitments to a predictable schedule. (8:28) This
process has produced the world's most capable combat
systems. There's nothing in the commercial industry
that comes near to it. Trying to compare the
development of a commercial airliner to the development
of an F/A-18, A-12 or a B-2 is meaningless.
Another characteristic of defense acquisition is
funding instability. If a commercial industry takes on
a new development, the commitment is for sustained
multi-year funding. The DoD and Congress operate on an
annual funding basis. This, combined with having
two-year Congresses and four-year administrations make
the instability obvious.
Still another characteristic is the transitional
nature of the DoD leadership and decision makers. Most
of the people who come into jobs in the DoD leave after
a few years to go to industry, service companies or law
firms. For the past three undersecretaries of defense
for acquisition, the average length of service has been
a little more than a year. There is no way that, in
one year, someone coming in cold can possibly grasp the
complex nature of defense acquisition process and
procedures. Because the turnover is frequent, there is
no depth or continuity in policy, nor corporate
knowledge in the DoD management on policy, directives,
and regulations. Defense acquisition is a political
process first and a managerial process second. General
Skantze recommended that:
While the United States needs a strong,
experienced team of DoD acquisition leaders
who can enforce a steady, experienced, and
disciplined management philosophy, it is not
clear that it can be achieved given the
political nature of the process. One option
in the acquisition field could be to make
the key jobs career professionals rather than
statutory positions. (8:28)
A factor influencing the procurement of tactical
aircraft equation is the companies of the military
industrial complex. This also has a political base.
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974
developed the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
which identify requirements with which a company of
business must comply in order to contract with the
government. It also lays the ground rules in which the
government must comply with in the acquisition process.
In order to regulate the awarding of contracts,
Congress passed the Competition in Contracting Act of
1984. It was to promote full and open competition in
soliciting offers and awarding government contracts.
In a review of some of these procedures, Major Arms
concluded that:
Although the objective of the United States'
military procurement policy should be the
direct support of national military strategy,
in reality it is governed and dictated by domestic
business policies and interests.(1:7)
An example of this political/business influence is
the New York based Grumman Corporation. They were the
builders of the A-6, E-2 and the F-14, all which have
reached the end of their procurement contract. The
Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, canceled the F-14D
production in mid-March. Following an intense lobbying
campaign, Congress has just forced the DoD to release
funding for the building of 12 more F-l4Ds. This
brings up several other sub problems. One is keeping
corporations from going under. Second, the DoD and the
individual services, need to establish clear goals and
objectives for future aircraft requirements. This is a
must for the U.S. Navy in light of the cancellation of
the A-12, a carrier based, stealth, attack aircraft.
Thirdly, the funding for an aircraft such as the A-12
development should never have been fixed-price
contract.
The United States has maintained a large military
industrial complex since World War II. The bad news is
that the Defense Budget and hence the defense
industrial base is shrinking and will continue to
shrink regardless of the war in Southwest Asia.
Fifteen years ago, there was enough business to go
around. Today, with the cancellation of the A-12,
there is only one airframe start available for
competition in development and production. This is the
Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), a stealth fighter.
Some companies have diversified their products in order
to survive. For the first time, military aircraft
companies are teaming up as for the example of
Northrop/McDonnell Douglas and Lockheed/General
Dynamics/Boeing for the ATF contract bid. Is there a
need to protect the military industrial base? Part 6
of the FAR covers the awarding of contracts to keep
suppliers in business in the event of a national
emergency. Some companies are looking to foreign
military sales in order to keep production lines open.
To prevent the Fighting Falcon production line at
General Dynamics from shutting down before the USAF is
ready to begin it's Multirole Fighter (MRF) program,
Air Force officials have undertaken an increasingly
active role in supporting company efforts to sell the
F-16 to foreign allies. The USAF has not been actively
promoting its own products. It's because they thought
the F-16 basically sold itself. Now they've begun to
recognize that foreign military sales are going to be
supportive of the industrial base as well as of the
USAF's own force structure. How many aircraft
companies do we need? How do we preserve the
engineering skills and corporate knowledge to design
viable weapon systems for the future?
Not only is the defense industrial base affected
by the decreasing defense budget, but so are the local
economies. California has set aside $7 million for the
first six months of a program to sway defense
contractors to establish or maintain their businesses
within that state. The cancellation of the A-12
contract has affected the economies at both Fort Worth,
Texas (General Dynamics) and St. Louis, Missouri
(McDonnell Douglas) with over 4000 layoffs. This does
not include the many subcontractors throughout the
country. Proper contracting could have prevented this.
There are two types of development contracts,
fixed-price and cost-plus. With the latter, the
government pays all legally allowable costs the
contractor incurs during the life of the contract.
With fixed-price agreement, the contractor and the
Government agree on a target cost. Any deviation
between this amount and the actual cost may be borne
entirely by that contractor or shared in some
predetermined proportion with the Government.
Recently, the A-12 fixed-price development
contract came home to roost with great
consternation as to why the DoD allowed
such a contract for such a high-risk
program. It was not lack of sensible
DoD procurement policy. The policies and
regulations clearly spell out where
fixed-price and cost-plus type contracts
are applicable.
However, the pervading environment in the
mid-1980s was "hold their feet to the
fire." Fixed-price development contracts
with contractors up-front investment had an
aura of doing just that. It sounded like a
free lunch and both sides seemed enthusiastic.
A little corporate knowledge would have
revealed that in the mid-l97Os, Joseph Gavin,
the chairman of Grumman Aircraft, declared he
would refuse to accept an existing F-14
fixed-price production option from the Navy
because financially the corporation could not
survive it. The A-12 contract proved once
again that a fixed-price contract, even funded
to the ceiling, does not protect the
Government. (8:28)
Having a well thought out acquisition plan looking
well into the future is essential. Part of U.S. Naval
aviation's current difficulties can be attributed to
poor planning in having so many different aircraft
programs competing for funding in an austere budget
environment. With the exception of a couple of
squadrons worth of F-14Ds, the Navy has spent billions
of dollars of development funds on the A-12, P-7A and
the A-6F with no end product to show for it. The Navy
also withdrew from the ATF program and now has no
viable replacement for the aging F-14. The operational
requirement for the AX, a possible alternative for the
A-12, has not been written yet. This aircraft could
not be operational before the year 2005.
The Navy needs to replace 5,000 aircraft in the
next 20 years.(6:25) It needs to take a long, hard
look at what the airwing is going to look like
considering the present and future threat. This will
have to be done knowing that the numbers and
diversities of aircraft on board are going to be
reduced, so their capabilities can not be limited.
At the risk of over simplifying matters and not to
down play the unmatched skill of a Naval Avaitor,
there are a lot of similarities between USAF and USN
tactical missions. The major difference, which has
already been eluded to, is that the Navy operates off
of aircraft carriers. This is a great advantage over
land based aircraft when there are no airfields to
operate from, as there were in the Southwest Asian War.
However, the missions are essentially the same.
Maritime Air Superiority is the same as Vital Area
Defense, Air Superiority is Air Superiority, War at Sea
or Strike is equivalent to attacking a well defended,
high valued target. The only major difference in
aircraft should be the structural and performance
capability for ship board operations. Mission specific
idiosyncrasies can be handled by simple software
modifications.
This has been done in the past. The F-4 Phantom
II was the most successful and hence, prolific
fighter/attack aircraft ever built. It was
successfully employed by the USAF, USN and USMC for
many years as well as many other foreign air forces.
Another effort, the VFX, was not a total success. The
USAF ended up with the F-111 and the USN dropped its
version to opt for the F-14, in which had a lot of VFX
technology. Both derivatives were neither amazing
success stories; there weren't many success stories out
of the MacNamara era.
Well into the 1990's and beyond, U.S. tactical
aircraft will have to be smaller, less varied, more
versatile and cost effective in order to meet the DoD
force reduction requirements. Colonel Brinkley summed
up basic requirements for fighter aircraft by stating:
From the perspective of the pilots who will
fly U.S. air superiority fighters in future
combat, two essential requirements must
be met. The fighter must be stealthy enough
to operate below the detection thresholds of
air defense radars and weapons. In the visual
combat arena, the fighter must have the
performance, agility, and weapons necessary
to defeat the next generation Soviet
fighter. (2:49)
If there is going to be a consolidation of
missions into one aircraft in order to reduce the cost
of buying and developing two separate aircraft, the
weapons system must be modifiable. The F/A-18 set the
standard in this field. It was the first aircraft
developed that tactical fixed wing pilots designed the
cockpit, not engineers. It has programmable flight
control and weapon system computers. This made it the
most maneuverable aircraft with a user friendly cockpit
and weapon system employment. However, it lacks
stealth technology.
The Secretary of Defense, in reference to the
Persian Gulf conflict, stated:
We simply could not have done what we have done
as effectively and as efficiently and as low a
cost to life, both ours and the enemy's, if we
had not had that stealth capability. (3:10)
A technological concept costs a lot of money to bring
to practical use. This is the research and development
cost. If you don't buy a lot of airplanes, the R&D
cost as a percentage of production gets into very large
numbers, well into the double digits. The cost is
infinite if you only buy a couple of airplanes.
Stealth is a good example. The F-117A, of which only
59 were bought, had a flyaway cost of $42.6-million.
To oversimplify, The F-117A might be viewed as an
invisible, much longer range, night attack version of
the F-16, whose fly-away cost in that era was roughly
$13-million and well over 2000 were sold. Although the
F-16 has low observable technology vice stealth, it has
much greater maneuverability and the capability to
employ air-to-air weapons as well as air-to-ground.
The performance of the U.S. aircraft being able to
gain and maintain air superiority in a short time,
against what was determined to be a very sophisticated
air defense of Iraq, will fuel the political argument
that the technological quality of the present air
forces is adequate.
A reader of Defense Journal put the acquisition
of adequate weapon systems in stronger terms:
Personally, I consider air superiority
fighters in exactly the same context as my
pistols: when the gunfight starts, I want
the very best; `cause when it's over there
will be no second place silver medal - only
me and the dead bastard who picked the
fight. (7:48)
It can only be the self-serving interests of the
two major air services that prevent the progressive
development of tactical aircraft. The ATF was
developed with a carrier capable derivative. It was
dropped by the USN very late in the program. Was it by
parochial or political pressures for maintaining the
production line open for the F-14D? That airframe is
mid-1960s technology! The Navy is well behind in
having any low observables or stealth in its airwings.
The USAF had the F-16 operational in the late 1970s and
the F-117 in 1984. The USAF, who showed weak interest
in the A-12 program, was only too glad to see it
cancelled in order for them to pursue the MRF.
The only warriors that actually seek
interoperability are the junior officers whom are
constantly exchanging information and ideas on tactics
and software between fellow pilots of the other
services. No one service has the market cornered on
good ideas. Perhaps the development and establishing
the operational requirements and military
specifications of tactical aircraft should be left to
senior O-3s or junior 0-4s. Require these officers to
be past graduates of Fighter Weapons School (USN Top
Gun or USAF), Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) or
Strike Leaders Advanced Tactics School (SLATS). These
individuals will be the squadron commanders when the
aircraft becomes operational and will have to live, or
die, with it.
If you were to visit the McDonnell Douglas
aircraft plant at St. Louis, you would see the F-15,
F/A-18 and the AV-8B being made. These three aircraft
are moving down the assembly line not more than a few
feet apartg wing tip to wing tip. It is easier to get
technology transfer from the Soviet Union than it is
from the F-15 to the F/A-18. A simple software
exchange in the radar tape that would increase the
aircraft survivability normally takes three years. It
is even more difficult exchanging ideas from aircraft
of different manufacturers. This is all well and good
if you don't have to use it in a hostile environment in
the interim.
Imagine the amount of money the DoD could save if
the services could develop suitable aircraft on a joint
basis. The commonality of parts and support equipment
would reduce the stockpile in warehouses supporting
such a diversity of aircraft. It would also eliminate
the large number of aircraft specific (Mil Spec) tools
that cost so much. The development of software could
be expedited enhancing the aircraft survivability,
performance and interoperability in the joint theater.
The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) stated that: "As
the U.S. forces get smaller, we're going to be doing
more together, jointly."(4) This will have to work for
the acquisition process as well as operationally.
This is somewhat of a simplistic view of weapon
systems procurement considering the thousands of pages
of legislation written just to regulate it. The
personalities of the administration, Congress and
industry influence this complex process. Making this
bureaucratic process more efficient and eliminating
some of the emotional parochial obstacles will produce
better aircraft, in less time and more cost effective.
"Remember, your weapon system was built by the
lowest bidder. "(5)
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Arms, L.D. Majors USMC. "The Dangerous
Deception: The True Meaning and Ends of
Military Procurement." USMC Command and
Staff College, Quantico, October 1990.
2. Brinkley, Randolph H., Col, USMC(Ret). "Future
US Fighters are at a Cost/Technology
Crossroad. "Armed Forces Journal
International, January 1991, 49.
3. Finnegan, P., "War Emphasizes Stealth Need,
Says Cheney."Defense News, February 11.
1991,10
4. Kelso, Frank B., Admiral, USN. Address given
to the USMC Command and Staff College,
Quantico, Virgina,February 11, 1991.
5. Murphys Law of Combat
6. "Navy Faces aircraft Funding Predicament."
Defense News, March 25, 1991,60.
7. Schemmer, Benjamin J., "Will Stealth
Backfire?"Armed Forces Journal
International, January 1991,48.
8. Skantze, Larry., Gen. USAF (Ret) "Acquistion
Lacks steady Hand. "Defense News, February
18, 1991,28.
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