Organizing Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Supply For Combat
AUTHOR Major William F. Johnson, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: ORGANIZING FLEET MARlNE FORCE (FMF) SUPPLY FOR COMBAT
I. Purpose. To identify the requirement for organizing FMF
supply activities for combat effectiveness and to investigate
the feasible alternatives for organizational structure.
II. Thesis: FMF retail supply activities should be structured
primarily for combat effectiveness and secondarily for
peacetime efficiency in accordance with Marine Corps
Doctrine.
III. Data: The appropriate organizational structure for the
Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs), has been a long
standing challenge for the Corps. Marine Corps Doctrine
mandates the task organization of units to enable the
operating forces to provide rapid crisis response, at any
level of conflict, to any area of the world. In developing
appropriate structures for the FSSGs, Combat Service Support
(CSS) commanders are faced with the dilemma of balancing the
requirements for mobility and combat effectiveness in a
deployed environment, while maintaining peacetime efficiency
in garrison. Supply, as a function of CSS, is one of the most
difficult areas to structure in meeting these requirements.
CSS Elements (CSSEs) are currently task organized at the
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Service Support Group (MSSG);
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Service Support Group
(BSSG); and Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Service Support
Group (FSSG) levels; but only the MSSGs are fully manned and
regularly trained as units. The BSSGs consist of a
headquarters nucleus and rarely receive realistic training as
a unit. The FSSGs are permanent, functionally structured,
MEF service organizations, which rarely deploy. More
importantly, due to pressures to maintain high levels of
peacetime readiness, they are becoming increasingly
entrenched in permanent, fixed facilities utilizing high-
technology mechanization and industrial
equipment.
IV. Conclusions. A 1987 Study by the Center for Naval
Analyses, internal Marine Corps staff documentation,
professional articles by some of the Corps Logisticians, and
personal interviews of cognizant headquarters personnel, were
utilized to determine feasible alternatives in dealing with
this CSS dilemma as regards to the supply function. A
possible solution centers around the compositing of BSSGs
by combining functional, building-block units from the
FSSG's with nucleus organizations from the Landing Support
Battalions Landing Support Party.
V. Recommendations. Critical personnel shortages in the FSSGs
promise to worsen with the quest for a post-war peace
dividend. Support for the residual MEF, after compositing
two BSSGs, will necessitate reducing FSSG services. CSS
facilities and equipment must be mobile or be deleted. CSS
training must become more operationally oriented in todays
fast-paced battlefield. Training must include both formal
instruction and practical experience in tactical dispersion,
mobility, and rear area security. As we resolve our CSS
structural dilemma, we must face the rear area threat head-
on.
ORGANIZING FLEET MARINE FORCE (FMF) SUPPLY FOR COMBAT
OUTLINE
Thesis: FMF retail supply activities should be structured
primarily for combat effectiveness and secondarily for
peacetime efficiency in accordance with Marine Corps
doctrine.
I. Combat Service Support (CSS) Element (CSSE)
A. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Service Support Group
(MSSG)
B. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) Service Support
Group (BSSG)
C. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Service Support
Group (FSSG)
II. Permanent organization in garrison
A. Fixed facilities
B. Data processing support
C. Personnel constraints
III. Doctrine
A. Warfighting doctrine
B. CSS doctrine
IV. The dilemma
A. Mobility
B. Combat effectiveness
C. Peacetime efficiency
V. Alternatives
A. Compositing
B. Permanent CSSEs
VI. Solutions
A. Organizational structure
B. Training
ORGANIZING FLEET MARINE FORCE (FMF) SUPPLY FOR COMBAT
The U. S. Marine Corps has long maintained its claim as
the Nations force-of-choice for crisis response. During a
recent force-structure review, the Commandant restated the
Corps basic mission and role in the Department of Defense:
To provide naval expeditionary forces as the most
flexible and effective crisis response for the Nation.
... We are uniquely configured to task organize air-
ground and logistics forces which can adapt to uncertain
geopolitical and economic situations, and in conjunction
with the Navy, provide the force-of-choice for crisis
response. These naval expeditionary forces can operate
from forward bases, or sustainable mobile sea bases,
which permits application of military presence on our
terms. This forms the basis for our posture as the
Nation's force-in-readiness for use in all levels of
conflict. (4:1)
Central to the capability to rapidly deploy task
organized air-ground and logistics forces in all levels of
conflict is the Marine air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). For
those less familiar with the Corp's expeditionary jargon, the
MAGTF consists of a fully integrated, balanced force
including a Command Element (CE), Ground Combat Element
(GCE), Air Combat Element (ACE), and Combat Service Support
Element (CSSE).
Flexible response capability is provided by tailoring
the MAGTF for the most likely employment, i.e. Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEUs) for light-intensity-conflict
(LIC); Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) for mid-
intensity-conflict (MIC); and Marine Expeditionary Forces
(MEFs) for high-intensity-conflict (HIC). (4:2-4)
Each MAGTF is sized for expected level of operations
under each scenario, LIC/MIC/HIC, as a MEU/MEB/MEF,
respectively. The relative size of these balanced forces can
be visualized by review of their respective GCE's. The MEU
GCE is a reinforced battalion; the MEB GCE is a reinforced
regiment; and the MEF GCE is a reinforced division.
The corresponding CSSE for the MEU/MEB/MEF under the
LIC/MIC/HIC levels of conflict is the MEU Service Support
Group (MSSG), the Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG), and
the Force Service Support Group (FSSG), respectively. The
task organized CSSEs are structured for combat effectiveness
in providing a variety of functions to the supported MAGTF.
(12:4-1)
The one significant exception to this approach in task
organizing Combat Service Support (CSS) organizations is the
FSSG. It is the only permanently structured CSS organization
in garrison. The FSSG is structured for efficiency in
garrison with its eight permanent functional battalions
collectively providing the six functional areas of CSS,
including supply, maintenance, transportation, deliberate
engineering, health services, and services. (12:4-1,4-2)
Any Marine who has served at both the battalion and
group levels in the FSSGs will agree that permanent structure
has in many instances become "permanent facilities." While
most military leaders would applaud the efforts of commanders
to increase output through technological efficiency, and to
improve working conditions for the troops, the FSSGs have
increased productivity and efficiency by increased reliance
on permanent, fixed, facilities; commercial industrial
equipment; and commercial supplies and services.
Unfortunately, some of these improvements, which do in fact
provide better service to the customer in garrison, are no
longer mere enhancements. These improvements are the very
mechanisms by which we accomplish the primary mission. Some
of this equipment cannot be deployed, and some functions
cannot be readily duplicated in a deployed environment. This
leaves key CSS functions, such as supply and maintenance,
highly dependent on tenuous host-nation-support in a deployed
environment
The Supply Battalions are probably the most difficult of
the FSSGs' functional battalions to organize for deployment.
Severe CSS personnel reductions in recent years have trimmed
the Supply Battalions from over 1,500 Marines and Sailors to
approximately 800 total personnel. To survive in this austere
environment, increasing dependency is placed on commercial
technology and trappings associated with fixed facilities.
The Battalion's Preservation, Packaging, and Packing
(P,P&P) Facility, which prepares all equipment and supplies
for shipment and storage, is a fixed, high output, materiel
preservation and wood box-making shop with heavy, commercial,
floor-mounted machinery. The facility is manned by a cadre of
experienced civilians and the normal influx of school-trained
Marines.
The worst case of not being able to deploy, however, is
the Battalion's retail supply activity, the Supported
activities Supply System (SASSY) Management Unit (SMU).
To support its customers with the level of materiel support
to which they have become accustomed during the Reagan
years, albeit with fifty percent manning, the SMU has become
totally automated. Its operation is dependent on a
sophisticated, fixed-base installation data processing
facility; a high throughput mechanized warehouse; a
commercial-item procurement section; and an ever-increasing
host of personal-computers.
While a Deployed Force Automated Services Facility
(DFASC) [deployed data processing facility] exists to support
the personnel, maintenance, supply, and other systems
functions for each MEB in a MEF, these hardware facilities
were outmoded years ago by the systems software they were
supposed to support.
In the case of the SMU, its main-frame, data-base
operating system software cannot be supported by the DFASC in
the field; additional local programs required to run daily
inventory file updates and minimum supply and maintenance
systems analysis for operations cannot be supported; and the
mechanized warehousing system cannot be supported. In
addition to crippling data processing constraints, the
mechanized warehouse with its automated conveyors; logistics
automated bar-code markers, readers, and scanners; and
automatic stock routing and location systems cannot be
deployed. Additionally, the local sources for commercial item
and services support cannot be deployed.
According to Marine Corps warfighting doctrine:
Fleet Marine Forces must be organized for warfighting
and then adapted for peacetime rather than vice versa.
Tables of organization of Fleet Marine Force units
should reflect the two central requirements of
deployability and the ability to task organize according
to specific situations. Units should be organized by
type only to the extent dictated by training,
administrative, and logistics requirements. (11:42-43)
Like the principles for war in general, there are guides
for the planning, organization , management, and execution of
CSS specifically, i.e. the seven principles of CSS as stated
in FMFM 4 Combat. Service Support:
(1) Responsiveness. Responsiveness is the provision of
the right support at the right place at the right time
and is the keystone of CSS;
(2) Simplicity. Simplicity is the avoidance of
complexity. CSS plans and operations should be
conceptually simple, structurally simple, and
procedurally simple.
(3) Flexibility. CSS plans and operations must consider
alternative organizational structures and procedures to
achieve both responsiveness and economy;
(4) Economy. Physical centralization of CSS assets
tends to foster economy, however at the expense of
responsiveness. Commanders must not allow economy to
hamper military effectiveness and mission
accomplishment;
(5) Attainability. Attainability is the ability to
provide the minimum essential supplies and services
required to begin combat operations;
(6) Sustainability. Sustainability is the ability to
maintain support throughout an operation; and
(7) Survivability. Survivability is the inherent
capacity of the organization and its capabilities to
prevail in the face of potential destruction.
(12:3-1,3-2)
Recognizing the duality of the challenge to CSS
commanders to balance responsiveness and economy, review of
both Marine Corps warfighting and CSS doctrine reveals the
priority of military effectiveness and mission accomplishment
over economy. It logically follows that FMF retail supply
activities should be structured primarily for combat
effectiveness and secondarily for peacetime efficiency in
accordance with Marine Corps doctrine.
Aside from real-world contingencies, exercises to test
the deployed capabilities of CSSEs are routinely conducted at
the MEU or MSSG level. At any one time there is at least one
MEU afloat. For a brief period, two MEUs are afloat, with
one in garrison conducting pre-deployment training. MEU/ MSSG
deficiencies in organization, operating procedures, and
personnel are corrected in the training process.
Meaningful testing of CSSE capabilities at the MEB or
BSSG level is less frequent, both from fewer contingencies at
this level of operations and fewer exercises. Further, for
cost and other reasons, most MEB level exercises are
conducted within motor-transport range of the supporting
FSSG. Due to pressures to maximize support and ensure
favorable exercise results, BSSG support is heavily bolstered
by trips to the FSSG in garrison. While the DFASC is designed
to support a MEB, it is never relied on in exercises because
of systems difficulties. From the CSSE's perspective, these
conditions create training artificialities which render these
exercises significantly ineffective in measuring deployed CSS
capabilities.
Meaningful testing of CSS capabilities at the MEF or
FSSG level is almost nonexistent. Exercises at the MEF level
are cost-prohibitive except for limited command-post
and staff exercises. Recent MEF-level employment in response
to real-world contingencies is limited to the recent
Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Southwest Asia.
While the Marine Corps enjoyed considerable logistical
success in its operations during Desert Storm, time was
clearly on our side in developing an ad-hoc, off-the-shelf
commercial data processing and retail supply capability. (3)
According to cognizant Headquarters personnel, a high-
capacity, commercial, Interim Force Automated Services
Facility (IFASC), was procured, shipped, and installed in a
modern, host-nation port warehousing facility in an around-
the-clock, herculean effort to create a deployed capability
that didn't exist at the outbreak of hostilities. Systems
and warehousing experts were brought in from key billets
throughout the Corps to get this new facility operational.
The retail FSSG supply facility was up and running and
dealing independently with wholesale materiel item managers
in December, four months after deployment of U.S. Forces to
the region. (3)
The efforts and expertise of the personnel responsible
for successfully developing a mechanized retail supply
capability in Saudi Arabia are highly commendable and are
rightly acknowledged. Indeed, this speaks very highly of the
dedication, ingenuity, and capabilities of our Logistics
personnel and our logistics surge capabilities in wartime.
The concern exists, however, that yet to be developed is a
mobile, comprehensive retail supply system at either the MEB
or MEF level of operations that can be deployed to ensure
initial or sustained supply support for the MAGTF.
Unlike the large, relatively secure rear area enjoyed in
Saudi Arabia, a world contingency where hostilities break out
in the amphibious objective area (AOA) at or near the outset
is not difficult to envision. As Major G. Wilson pointed out
in his 1984 article in the Marine Corps Gazette:
On today's fast-moving, high-technology battlefield of
unprecedented intensity, we will not normally be
afforded the time or luxury of large built-up support
areas. Brigade Service Support areas (BSSAs) or Force
Combat Service Support areas (FCSSAs) at fixed
facilities offer lucrative targets. (7:50-54)
Indeed, Spetsnaz-type tactics used not only by the Soviets,
but by many third-world nations employ specifically designed
mechanized units to destroy rear support areas. (6: 36-37)
This concern over the structure of our FMF retail supply
activities centers not only on the lack of mobility of
systems hardware and facilities, but also on the adequate
training of personnel to operate deployed hardware and
systems. If the MAGTF is really the Nation's force-in-
readiness to respond to real-world contingencies at any level
of warfare, each element of the MAGTF must be prepared to
accomplish its mission in short order.
The Supply battalions currently provide personnel and
military-occupational-specialty (MOS) training for the
standing task organizations of three MSSGs and two BSSG
headquarters nuclei and maintain supply support for the
residual MEF in garrison. From the personnel resource aspect
of this arrangement, the numbers are marginal. After
accounting for personnel who cannot be deployed for a variety
of reasons, the same Marines and Sailors are almost
constantly deployed. In addition to personnel shortages, the
most highly trained key personnel are kept in the rear to
ensure the continuous operation of the retail supply activity
in support of the MEF. This practice, coupled with critical
personnel shortages, results in the inevitable degradation
of supply support at the cutting edge.
Clearly, the Corp's CSS machine has room for structural
improvement, whether this might equate to a tune-up or a
result in a major overhaul. CSS types are the first to admit
it. The question is, how do we wrestle this anomaly of
providing flexible , effective CSS in a deployed environment
with an organization which is efficient in garrison? In the
same vein, shouldn't we attempt to optimize peacetime
readiness? The Corp's leaders have in fact wrestled with
this dilemma of how to structure CSS organizations,
facilities, and systems which are both effective in combat
and efficient in peacetime for decades. Unfortunately, the
problem is getting harder. Weapon systems now include
thousands of parts, to the tune of stocking over 35,000 line
items at each of the FSSGs' SMUs. Throughput for these
military equivalents to Sears and Roebuck department stores
is staggering, the First FSSG SMU averaging over 37,000
consumer level requisitions for parts and supplies each
month. Full mechanization is a must for this level of
operations.
In 1985 the Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff, RD&S,
tasked the Center For Naval analyses (CNA) to develop and
evaluate MEF combat service support and logistic system
structures to support Marine Corps operations through
1990/2000. The study developed and examined two general
approaches for organizing the functional assets of the FSSG
into a MEF CSSE, assuming the permanent structure of two
MSSGs in support of MEU deployments. The first approach
organized assets into functional supply battalions,
maintenance battalions, and the like, further broken down
into companies capable of providing sufficient assets for a
MEB but requiring compositing of functional detachments from
each functional battalion to form BSSGs for deployment. The
second approach organized the MEF CSSE along MAGTF lines with
permanent BSSGs as part of the MEF CSSE structure.
(2:1-4--1-8)
In an effort to determine the preferred alternative, the
CNA Study then evaluated both approaches against eight
criteria:
(1) Command and control
(2) Training and supervision
(3) Equipment limitations
(4) Peacetime requirements
(5) Transition from war to peace
(6) Facility requirements
(7) Administrative changes
(8) Philosophy of structure
(2: 1-7)
The study showed that for a variety of reasons, including
equipment and personnel resources, there were insufficient
assets to provide full support for two MEBs and a MEF
residual. Most of the criteria utilized to evaluate the
alternative structures favored the MEF CSSE structure that
organized assets along functional lines. Because not all of
the criteria favored one approach over the other, however,
the CNA offered conditional solutions to MEF CSSE structure.
(2:1-6)
The conditions proposed as key determinants in choosing
a CSSE structure were the expected times over which the MEBs
would deploy and consideration of requirements for MSSG
training and experience in providing rear area security for
the MEBs. The functional approach to MEF CSSE structure was
considered to be the preferred alternative if MEB deployments
were few and of short duration; however, the MAGTF permanent
BSSG structure was preferable for longer, more frequent
deployments. The permanent BSSG structure was considered to
provide better potential for training in rear area security
than the functional MEF structure requiring compositing to
form a BSSG. (2:1-6)
Colonel J. Woodhead III recommended a small-scale test
of the functional realignment of the FSSG's battalions into
companies capable of being composited into BSSGs, using the
FSSG's Motor Transport Battalion, in a 1986 article in the
Marine Corps Gazette
To form a BSSG the FSSG currently has to create as many
as 31 detachments, most if not all, without established
tables of organization or equipment. The restructure of
the Motor Transport Battalion into a headquarters and
three, near mirror image, line companies would greatly
simplify the compositing of BSSGs. The Motor Transport
Battalion would form a single motor transport detachment
with a functional platoon from each line company. The
following advantages would be realized:
(1) Less personnel/ equipment turbulence for
deployments.
(2) Unit structure corresponds to deployment and
employment.
(3) Organized to meet mission of supporting two MEBs or
four MEUs and the residual MEF.
(4) Compositing based on known strength, not nebulous
detachments.
(5) Task unit commanders get units, not collections of
people and gear.
(6) Combat service support units act as units and morale
responds accordingly.
(8:29-30)
There have been numerous appeals over the years for more
permanence in our task organized CSSEs. Colonel Woodhead made
such a case in a separate article in the Marine Corps Gazette
in 1987:
In reality we have permanent CSSE headquarters. We just
keep changing the people, equipment, and designations.
Unfortunately this results in lost time, wasted motion,
and perfection in re-inventing the wheel, rather than
using it. Since we have these permanent staffs (they
are repeatedly taken out of hide) the only question that
remains is how to man these structures. The approach
used by I MEF for a period, using landing support
companies (from Landing Support Battalion (LSB), FSSG3
as nuclei for the compositing of BSSGs, appears to have
merit. The mission of the LSB Landing Force Support
Party is to provide CSS until a CSSE arrives ashore
whereupon a landing support company could provide the
nucleus for the BSSG. The air and ground combat elements
of the MAGTF deserve professional, trained, and
organized support from people they train with, not a
collection of strangers busy trying to form in the midst
of a fight. The alternative is permanent BSSGs that fly
in the face of advantages to task organizing and
constrain the Corp's ability to weight its logistical
effort in accordance with MAGTF needs. (9:35)
Despite the inherent difficulties encountered in
resolving one of the Corps' most perplexing organizational
problems, the Corp's thinkers are not resting on their
laurels. Upon the Commandant's return from a recent trip to
Southwest Asia, he tasked his staff to look into the task
organization utilized by the FSSGs in the Gulf as a model for
the FSSGs' structure in garrison. (1:3)
Cognizant Headquarters personnel state that a
comprehensive effort is being initiated to resolve the FSSGs'
structural issues in response to the Commandant's concerns.
Headquarters is envisioning a jointly sponsored study by the
Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC)
as the MAGTF proponent, and the Deputy Chief of Staff For
Installation and Logistics as the supporting establishment
proponent. (10:3)
While a popular headquarters idea towards restructuring
the FSSGs involves formation of task organized direct support
MAGTFs at each level of operations, i.e. Division Service
Support Groups (DSSGs), BSSGs, and MSSGs, the required
personnel and equipment aren't available. The CSS
organization utilized in Southwest Asia absorbed the assets
of two FSSGs and additional staffs to support nearly a Corps
of Marines in a joint environment, which may not provide much
insight into the normal employment of a MEF, or feasible
alternatives for MEF CSSE structure. One aspect of the
organization, which appeared to be in a constant state of
flux due to the influx of both supporters and supported, may
provide food for thought. Somewhere between the CSSE
spectrum of MSSGs to FSSGs, support organizations provide a
range of functions, some of which can be provided by direct
support CSSEs, and some of which are best provided by a
general support organization. The general support mission
lends itself to centralization by function and efficiency
through economies of scale, not unlike our current FSSG
structure. (5)
Returning to the doctrinal requirements for rapid
mobility of our CSSEs and the shortage of personnel in the
FSSGs, which is certain to become more critical in the
upcoming peace-dividend force reductions, the Corps must
organize to meet known requirements effectively and forego
capabilities for which there is no immediately foreseeable
requirement.
Since the LIC level of contact is most probable, the
MSSGs should remain permanent. Next most probable in the
level of warfare is MIC, with the BSSGs in support of the
MEB. Here is where the going gets tough. As the 1987 CNA
Study pointed out, there are insufficient personnel levels
and equipment to support the MSSGs, two MEBs and the residual
of a MEF. If we are sincere in countering real world threats
to our rear area security, and if deployment of our MEBs in
MIC crisis response is realistically envisioned, we must
develop a creditable, rapidly mobile BSSG beyond the current
BSSG headquarters nucleus. Colonel Woodhead's building-block
approach of compositing platoons from functional companies in
the FSSGs' functional battalions with a landing support
nucleus to form BSSGs, appears to be a viable alternative,
albeit requiring major battalion reorganization.
From a supply perspective, a creditable deployed data
processing and retail supply and field warehousing system is
a must. If it is envisioned that the MEBs could be deployed
simultaneously in separate geographical locations, two such
systems per MEF should be developed and fielded. The Corp's
MAGTF II and Logistics Automated Information System could
well provide this capability should the requirement be
formally identified. (3)
From a personnel training perspective, periodic training
as a BSSG in the field, operating the systems that would be
in place when deployed, and total independence from the
supporting FSSG are basic requirements. CSS training should
include formal instruction and practical experience
in tactical dispersion, mobility, and rear area security.
The one remaining and difficult-to-resolve structural
issue is the residual MEF. According to doctrine we may
deploy as MEUs and MEBs -- but we "employ" as MEFs. After
reflection on recent events in Southwest Asia, it stands to
reason that we must be prepared to rapidly employ our FSSGs
to support MEF response to world contingencies in a HIC
environment. While functional structure and centralization is
inherent to the general support mission, and efficiency
through economies of scale is realized, we must remain
mobile. A single criteria should be utilized for determining
mobility: Move it or lose it! This must be enforced
ruthlessly, as it has been in the past in the Corps.
If we are really the Nation's force-of-choice for crisis
response in all levels of conflict, we'd better develop the
real capability to sustain that force, whether it be MEU,
MEB, or MEF. Otherwise, from a logistics perspective, our
claim is hollow.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps. Taskings in
Support of CMC SWA Trip. Memorandom, 10 October, 1991.
2. Center For Naval Analyses. Anaiysis of Marine Corps Combat.
Service Support. Structure, CNR 127/ April 1987.
3. Crutchfield, J. C., LtCol., USMC. Headquarters Marine
Corps, Code LPS, Telephone interview, 10 January, 1991.
4. First Force Service Support Group. Force Reduction Study,
16 April, 1990.
5. Gordan, D. E., LtCol., USMC. Headquarters Marine Corps,
Code LPM, Telephone interview, 16 February, 1991.
6. Hayden, H. T., LtCol., USMC. "The CSS Battalion (Rein)."
Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1986), 37-38
7. Wilson, G. I., Maj., USMC. "Updating the Corp's Logistics
Support." Marine Corps Gazette, (April 1984), 50-54
8. Woodhead, J. A. III, Col., USMC. "Reorganizing the FSSG."
Marine Corps Gazette, (October 1986), 29-30
9. Woodhead, J. A. III, Col., USMC. "Headquarters for Combat
Service Support." Marine Corps Gazette, (February 1987),
35
10. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, United States Marine
Corps, Code LPM. FSSG Organization for Combat in SWA.
Talking Paper, 10 December, 1990.
11. U.S. Marine Corps. Headquarters, United States Marine
Corps. Warfighting, FMFM 1, 1989.
12. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education
Command. Combat Service Support, FMFM 4, 1987.
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