Incorporating LAAD Into The Ground Combat Element
AUTHOR Major Dennis Judge, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: INCORPORATING LAAD INTO THE GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT
I. Theme: To establish that a problem exists in the current
employment of MAGTF Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) assets and to
show that incorporation of LAAD into the GCE would provide the MAGTF
Commander a better integrated air defense.
II. Thesis: To deal with the increased air threat and to provide
the MAGTF Commander and his subordinate ground commanders the freedom
to maneuver, the Marine Corps needs to rethink its employment of Low
Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) missiles and incorporate some
"Stinger"/LAAD units in the Ground Combat Element (GCE).
III. Discussion: On today's modern battlefield the greatest threat
to the MAGTF comes from enemy aircraft. The Marine Corps Integrated
Air Defense System (IADS) is designed to give the MAGTF Commander the
air defense weapons mix, density, depth and mutual support to defeat
this threat. The Air Combat Element Commander (ACE) is the MAGTF
Commander's executive agent for Anti-Air Warfare (AAW). Utilizing
the Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS), the ACE Commander
exercises centralized command and decentralized control over MAGTF
IADS. The Stinger low altitude air defense missile represents the
low end of the IAD system. The Stinger is an effective but a limited
weapon that is only possessed by LAAD Battalion in the Marine Air
Wing (MAW). LAAD units are usually employed in either general
support of the MAGTF or in direct support of a particular unit.
These methods of employment have problems due to the LAAD
organizational structure. These problems include command and
control, logistical support, and training. The MAGTF Commander and
his subordinate ground unit commanders have the most to lose over
this poor employment of LAAD. Air defense is not just the ACE
Commander's responsibility but every commander's responsibility.
Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has failed to train, equip, or
provide the ground commander the authority to carry out this
responsibility. Incorporating some organic LAAD assets in the Marine
Division, and providing training to the ground officers in the
employment of LAAD, would provide the GCE the means to conduct air
defense and integrate into MAGTF IADS.
IV. Summary: The introduction of the Light Armored Vehicle Air
Defense variant (LAVAD) in LAI Battalion, along with a Regimental Air
Defense Platoon (RAD) in the maneuver regiments is needed. These
LAAD units supported by a consolidated Marine Air Defense (MAD)
Battalion in the MAW, would better serve MAGTF IADS.
V. Conclusion: Making these changes in the Marine Corps LAAD
organization in conjunction with improved officer training, would be
cost effective and would dramatically improve MAGTF air defense. By
incorporating LAAD units in the GCE, the MAGTF Commander would be
able to deal with the increased air threat, maintain centralized
control and coordination, achieve greater integration, and gain more
flexibility to maneuver and win on the modern battlefield.
INCORPORATING LAAD INTO THE GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT
OUTLINE
Thesis statement: To deal with the increased air threat and to
provide the MAGTF Commander and his subordinate ground commanders the
freedom to maneuver, the Marine Corps needs to rethink its employment
of Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) missiles and incorporate some
"Stinger"/LAAD units in the Ground Combat Element (GCE).
I. LAAD in the MAGTF's Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)
A. MAGTF Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) command and control system
B. Concept of IADS employed by the MAGTF
C. The Stinger low altitude air defense missile
D Current LAAD organizational structure
II. The problems with LAAD employment
A. LAAD unit employment and support relationships
B. Stinger limitations in General Support (GS)
C. Problems that hinder LAAD units in Direct Support (DS)
II. The ground commander's role in unit air defense
A. Ground commander's air defense responsibility
B. Lack of training, equipment and authority
C. The commander's inherent need to control fires in zone
III. The concept of incorporating LAAD assets into the GCE
A. Light Armored Vehicle Anti-Air variant (LAVAD)
B. Benefits of MAGTF LAAD reorganization
1. Training continuity and logistical support
2. Synchronization of air defense with ground maneuver
3. Maneuver unit integration into MAGTF IADS
C. Command relationship between the ACE and GCE
IV. Proposed reorganization of LAAD assets
A. Regimental Air Defense Platoon (RAD)
B. LAVAD Company
C. Marine Air Defense (MAD) Battalion
V. Air Defense Training
A. Division LAAD proficiency training
B. Officer Training
INCORPORATING LAAD INTO THE GROUND COMBAT ELEMENT
The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander is responsible
for the security and protection of his forces from surprise and the
effects of enemy weapons. On today's modern battlefield the
greatest threat to MAGTF's combat power comes from the threat of
enemy jet aircraft and helicopters. To defend against this increased
threat, the Marine Corps should consider incorporating some
"Stinger"/Low Attitude Air Defense (LAAD) units in the Ground Combat
Element (GCE). This would provide the MAGTF Commander with the air
defense density, depth and mutual support needed to meet this threat
and still provide him the degree of control and integration
necessary to maneuver and win on the modern battlefield. To
understand why some LAAD assets should be incorporated as an organic
part of the GCE, we need to examine first, the Marine Corps'
Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) and the current organizational
structure of LAAD: second, LAAD support relationships and their
problems; third, the dilemma air defense poses to the ground
commander; and fourth, a concept for LAAD reorganization and officer
professional training that would improve MAGTF air defense.
The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) Commander or Tactical Air
Commander (TAC) is the MAGTF Commander's executive agent for
conducting the Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) portion of the MAGTF's air
campaign. The ACE Commander exercises his authority through the
Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). According to FMFM
5-52, "MACCS provided the ACE Commander with means (personnel,
equipment, communications facilities, and procedures) required for
the effective command, coordination, and control of all MAGTF air
operations, including the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)." The
Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) is the senior MACCS agency from
which the ACE/TAC directs all air operations. All air space
management and air defense control measures originate from the TACC.
Subordinate to the TACC and the primary agency responsible for AAW in
its assigned sector is the Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC).
(11:ch 1, par 1005) According to doctrine in FMFM 5-52, "The TAOC
is responsible for the surveillance, detection, identification and
destruction of enemy aircraft and missiles."
MACCS employs a concept of defense-in-depth, that strongly relies
on MAGTF air defense weapons mix, density, and mutual support at
critical points, to gain and maintain air superiority over assigned
air space. Utilizing centralized command and decentralized control,
MACCS through the TAOC, combines the capabilities of fighter
aircraft, Hawk medium altitude air defense missiles and Stinger low
altitude air defense missiles into an Integrated Air Defense System
(IADS). IADS provides the weapons mix, density and coordination to
effect mutual support and makes air defense in-depth possible for the
MAGTF.
The Stinger low altitude air defense missile represents the low
end of the IAD system. It is a man-portable, shoulder-fired,
supersonic, guided missile system, that can also be pedestal mounted
on a vehicle, such as a HMVV (PMS/Avenger) or a Light Armored Vehicle
Air Defense variant (LAVAD). Stinger uses a passive infrared (IR)
radiation seeker and proportional navigational guidance to acquire,
track, and engage aircraft. It also possesses an IFF (Identify
Friend or Foe) system to assist the gunner in aircraft
identification. (11:ch 2, par 2001)
As the war in Afghanistan showed, the Stinger is easy to employ
and very effective. The Mujahedin Stinger gunners compiled a record
of 269 kills out of 340 Stingers fired. They proved very clearly
that the Stinger is a very deadly weapon against helicopters and jet
aircraft. (20:Pt I, pars 1-11)
Man-portable, and tactically mobile, the Stinger is designed to
provide forward point air defense for the assault echelon of the
MAGTF. With an effective envelope between 4000-6000 meters, the
Stinger's range is comparable to that of the 81mm mortar. Because of
this limitation, and the Stinger's reliance on visual target
acquisition, the Stinger must be employed forward to effectively
defend friendly vital areas and units. This is out of necessity due
to the speed of jet aircraft and the increased standoff range of air
delivered ordinance.
In addition, the Stinger weapon system is dependent on MACCS for
cueing of enemy aircraft and currently possesses no capability of
engaging targets at night or during periods of reduced visibility.
The Stinger is organic to the Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD)
Battalion in the Marine Air Control Group (MACG) of the Marine Air
Wing (MAW). Each LAAD Battalion possesses a battalion headquarters,
a Headquarters and Service Battery and 2 Firing Batteries. The
Firing Batteries each possess a Battery Headquarters and 3 Firing
Platoons. The Firing Platoons each have a Platoon Headquarters and 3
Firing Sections. Each Firing Section has a Section Headquarters
Element and 5 two man Firing Teams. (See page 4.)
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LAAD Battalion can field 90 Stinger Teams, a firing battery, 45
Teams, a Platoon 15 Teams and a Section 5 Teams. (11:ch 5, par 5012)
By doctrine, a LAAD Platoon will normally be deployed to support a
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), a battery will usually support a
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and a battalion will support a
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). However, since Marine IADS
usually is not employed in operations smaller than MEB size, MEUs
routinely deploy with only a LAAD Section vice a platoon. (16:1-2)
LAAD Units are usually employed in either general support (GS)
of the MAGTF, or in direct support (DS) of a particular unit.
Employed in the general support role, LAAD units position Stinger
Teams to best support the entire MAGTF based on the MAGTF Commander's
established air defense priorities. Low level air defense missile
engagement zones (MEZs) are established at vital areas as FMFM 5-52
states, "to defend a specific installation, agency, or geographic
location." LAAD units are also employed to reinforce IADS along key
avenues of approach and cover low level gaps in the defense created
by terrain or other factors.
In the direct support role, LAAD units position Stinger Teams to
best support a supported unit. A LAAD unit assigned the direct
support mission employs its Stingers Teams based on the supported
unit commander's air defense priorities and responds immediately to
any air threat inside the supported unit's sector or zone of action.
Although these forms of employment seem logical, there are
problems associated with them that need closer examination.
The Marine Corps' employment of LAAD in general support is driven
by the concept of integration and is employed to provide the MAGTF
with the optimum air defense weapons "mix" and "density" necessary to
to do the job. Stinger is used in this role to compliment Hawk and
fighter aircraft in IADS. There can be no doubt that anti-air
weapons "mix" and "density" are the keys to an effective IAD system.
The question is, can this best be achieved with stinger employed in
general support of a MEF or MEB. I think not. Utilizing the Stinger
missile in general support of a MEB or MEF, is similar to employing
an 81mm mortar in general support of the MEB or MEF! The Stinger's
limited range and capabilities make its employment in this fashion
inappropriate.
Unfortunately, the organizational structure of the Marine Corps
meager LAAD assets, in the Marine Air Wing , reflects this logic. If
this logic of organization was followed in the division for indirect
fire weapons, all the mortars would be concentrated in a Mortar
Battalion in the Artillery Regiment.
Fortunately, mortars are not organized and employed in general
support of the division. Although they could be organized in this
fashion they have shown they can be far more effective employed at
the battalion level and still integrate into the fire support plan
with other division fire support assets.
Similarly, it is my contention that a LAAD Battalion/LAAD
Battery should not be employed in general support of a MEF/MEB.
Employing the Stinger totally in this fashion is not appropriate or
practical. Ideally, LAAD units should only be employed in general
support of MEU/regimental sized units and below. LAAD units employed
in this fashion would more efficiently perform their air defense
mission and still integrate into the larger MAGTF IAD system.
The direct support mission is a far more appropriate mission for
LAAD units. It is what the Stinger was designed to do and it is
usually the way the United States Marine Corps and Army employ their
Stinger units. (22:ch 7, par 9d) In this role LAAD units are
particularly adept at supporting maneuver units, combat support
units, headquarters units and mobile combat service support units.
However, unlike artillery in the direct support role, LAAD units
require logistical support (classes I, III, and VI) and security
from the supported unit. This dependence on the supported unit by
most Stinger/LAAD units forces the supported unit to assume the
logistical burden of responsibility for LAAD that it normally
assumes only for organic and attached units. (11:ch 4 par 4004b)
As a Rifle Company Commander in the Fleet, I rarely saw a LAAD
unit train with my battalion. During a 1983 Combined Arms Exercise
(CAX), I had occasion to be supported by Stinger/LAAD Teams. My
first impression of these Marines, as I observed them, was that
they were, "fish out of water." I remember coaching the young
Corporal Section Leader on the scheme of maneuver and helping him
plan and coordinate the movement of his teams to support the company.
LAAD Sections are typically lead by junior NCOs, who are by
necessity, forced to work in isolation at maximum radio range from
their platoon headquarters. They are usually begging for supplies
and lack the additional communications equipment and crypto-gear to
effect close coordination with the units they are supporting.
Compound these problems with a normal supported commander who knows
little about air defense and it is easy to see the difficult time
LAAD small units have in direct support.
Combined with the fact LAAD Marines are ridiculed by the MAW for
not being members of a "true" aviation unit and are generally
rejected by ground marines for being members of the Wing, and its
easy to see why LAAD Commanders feel they can best be employed in
general support.
The paradox is that direct support is the best way to employ
LAAD. Unfortunately, the current organization of LAAD assets and the
unique doctrinal relationship LAAD units have with supported units,
does not facilitate this mission. The individual who has the most to
lose over this poor employment of LAAD assets is the MAGTF Commander.
However, the individual who will bear the brunt of enemy air attack
is the ground unit commander.
The ground unit commander in the GCE and the Combat Service
Support Element (CSSE) is the key in air defense. Contrary to
popular belief, air defense is not the ACE's responsibility, but
every commander's responsibility. To quote OH 6-1, Ground Combat
Operations, "Air defense is a critical component of the commander's
responsibility for security and protection of his force."
Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has failed to train or equip and
provided the ground commander the authority to carry out this
responsibility.
Officers at The Basic School (TBS) receive only the briefest
information concerning air defense and are not exposed to air defense
planning and employment of LAAD. This ignorance concerning air
defense and the proper integration of air defense in a concept of
operations has reinforced the argument that LAAD assets remain
consolidated in the MAW.
In additIon to poor training, the ground commander has to contend
with the lack of unit weapons to prosecute an active air defense.
Equipped with only organic small arms (M16A2 rifle) and heavy machine
guns (M-2 50 cal.), the ground commander has no real effective means
to defend the unit. The Marine Corps has attempted to address this
problem doctrinally by publishing FMFRP 5-54, Small Arms Defense
Against Air Attack in 1988. However, unit training in active air
defense still remains a low training priority. Marines still receive
only rudimentary training in air defense and rarely if ever exercise
as a unit. Lack of ranges, target drones, time and ammunition
prevent most units from developing and maintaining this unit combat
skill.
However, the problem that appears the most perplexing, from a
doctrinal stand point, is the ground commander's lack of authority to
control LAAD fires in his zone of action. This appears to be
inconsistent with other fire support doctrine. Currently the ground
commander controls all fires within his boundaries short of the
coordinated fire line (CFL), with the exception of LAAD fires.
Presently, the only time a ground commander would have the authority
to control LAAD fires is when a LAAD unit is attached to a unit on an
independent or semi-independent mission.
Doctrinally, the authority to control air defense fires is held
by the ACE Commander and decentralized through MACCS via the LAAD
chain of command. (9:ch 3, par 3202 d(1)e) This system provides the
ACE Commander with firm control over MAGTF airspace but unfortunately
strips the ground commander of the authority, and control he needs to
provide close-in air defense for his unit.
The point is, if the ground commander is going to be held
responsible for the air defense of his unit, he must be given the
means to provide that defense. Providing the ground units organic
LAAD assets would provide the ground commander the means and
authority to conduct a limited but effective air defense.
In the case of the new Light Armored Vehicle Air Defense variant
or LAVAD, this will be done. (2) The LAVAD, when introduced into
the Fleet Marine Force in the mid 90's, would remain in the Light
Armored Infantry (LAI) Battalion and will be organic to the Marine
Division. (See page 11.) The LAVAD, with its increased mobility and
versatile 25mm gun and Stinger weapons system, would be ideally
suited to support the LAI Battalion or other MAGTF motorized/
mechanized units. The LAVAD would be crewed by Marines with she 7212
air defense MOS, and will remain under the command and control of the
LAI/ground commander. The commander would control and coordinate the
LAVAD's fires through the Air Defense Officer in the Fire Support
Coordination Center (FSC), and will integrate the LAVAD into MAGTF
IAD system via MACCS utilizing the new lap-top Weapon Direction Unit
(WDU).
This new introduction of LAAD assets into the Marine Division via
the LAVAD has the potential to be a good start, but does not go far
enough. More LAAD assets need to be moved from the Marine Air Wing
and incorporated into the Marine Division. Although, it would be
ideal to incorporate LAAD assets into every ground combat and combat
service support unit, manpower and budget constraints makes this an
impractical solution for the Marine Corps. Therefore, a compromise
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concept to solve the dilemma is needed. The compromIse concept I
propose envisions a LAAD organizational structure that keeps some
LAAD assets in the MAW, for MAGTF general support needs, and
incorporates the remaining LAAD assets in the Marine Division as
organic combat support for the GCE.
This redistribution of MAGTF LAAD assets would significantly
improve low altitude air defense. The greatest benefit of this
redistribution would be that LAAD Marines would cease being "the red-
headed stepchildren" of the MAGTF. Because division LAAD units
would work routinely with the same units before deployment, they
would gain acceptance as part of the unit they support. From this
acceptance would grow an association and camaraderie shared by
infantry battalions with other combat support units. This
established training continuity would foster a relationship of
teamwork, develop standard operational procedures (SOPs) and promote
greater tactical proficiency.
In addition to a closer training relationship, the incorporation
of LAAD assets into the division would provide better a logistical
support relationship for the GCE LAAD Marines. Ground units would
automatically plan for LAAD support and take care of them as team
members, rather than after-thoughts on the Gunny's list. Battalion
unit leaders would take a keener interest in organic/attached LAAD
teams and would report their performance personally through
professional and social contact with the unit's Air Defense Officer
(ADO) or Air Defense Staff Noncommissioned Officer (ADSNCO). This
would informally give LAAD leaders a greater degree of control over
their widely dispersed teams and would facilitate LAAD small unit
discipline and pride.
However, the greatest benefit of incorporating LAAD assets into
the division would inevitably be the closer synchronization of low
altitude air defense with the scheme of maneuver and fire support
plan, a key element to the success of the Stinger in Afghanistan.
(20:Part I, par 13) The LAAD Platoon Commander/LAAD Section Leader,
acting as a special staff officer on the regimental/battalion staff,
would assist the commander in his assessment of the battlefield from
the anti-air perspective, perform staff estimates, and develop the
unit's air defense plan. The ADO/ADSNCO along with the unit Air
Officer (AO) would be able to provide the complete enemy and friendly
air picture for the ground commander. This is a picture that
presently is not provided to the ground maneuver commander.
The ADO/ADSNCO, due to the new technology resident in the mobile
Air Defense Command Post (ADCP) (to be fielded in the mid 90s), would
be able to provide the commander with real time access to external
electronic warning/cueing (EW/C) available to MACCS. (2) The ADCP
will have the capability to down link EW/C from airborne sources like
AWACS,ship borne sources, TAOC EW/C, and Hawk radar and the LAAD
Lightweight Early Warning Detection Device (LEWDD). These ADCPs
collocated with a Regimental Landing Team or Battalion Landing Team
Fire Support Coordination Center would automatically transmit the
real time air picture to WDU lap-top computers down to the LAAD
Section and Team level. The WDUs would provide automatic
re-transmission of the data to adjacent units, provide the ADCP with
automatic position location of the LAAD Teams, and pass other
information/reports from the Sections and Teams to the Command Post
up the MACCS chain. (7:ch 5, 1-17)
Incorporation of LAAD assets into the division combined with the
new technology resident in the ADCP and the WDU would provide the
ground maneuver commander with the weapons, authority and control to
conduct low altitude air defense. It would aLso allow the ground
commander to integrate into the MAGTF IAD system and become an
extension of the decentralized MACCS LAAD chain of command.
This command relationship would be similar to the command
relationship that currently exists between the ACE and the GCE
regarding the terminal control of Close Air Support (CAS). In this
relationship, the ACE Commander on behalf of the MAGTF Commander
would still be the overall coordinator for MAGTF air defense. He
would exercise command and control over those air defense assets
organic to the ACE and in addition coordinate the intergration of all
MAGTF air defense assets into a cohesive IAD system. (See page 15)
The unit ADO/ADSNCO and his LAAD Teams or the Tactical Air
Defense Party (TADP) would interface with MACCS, plan employment and
control unit low altitude air defense in the same manner the unit AO
and his Tactical Air Control Party (TACP), interface with MACCS, plan
and control Close Air Support (CAS). (See page 16) The results would
be that division ground units out of necessity, would become more in
tune with air defense and in time would acquire the same skill at
employment and coordination of LAAD that they currently possess
coordinating and employing CAS.
However, reorganizing Marine Corps LAAD assets and training to
support this concept must be realistic. Manpower and budgetary
restraints make it obvious that any proposal to acquire additional
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LAAD equipment (not already in development) and personnel is
unrealistic. Therefore, any incorporation of LAAD into the Marine
Division must restructure and if possible consolidate existing and
planned assets.
I envision the results of such a structure would shift 1 battery
of LAAD from the MAW to the Marine Division. These 45 LAAD teams
would be divided up into 3 platoons and placed in the table of
organization for each maneuver regiment. These Regimental Air
Defense platoons or RADs would be organic to the Headquarters Company
in each regiment and would be under the command and control of the
Regimental Commander. (See page 18) The RAD platoon would be able to
perform organizational maintenance (1st echelon) on all organic
weapons and equipment. Equipped with man-portable Stinger missiles,
RAD Platoon would provide the right mix of mobility and tactical
flexibility to the Regimental Commander.
With these assets the regiment would provide low altitude air
defense for its battalions, team members, and its direct support
artillery, based on the air threat and the Regimental Commander's air
defense priorities. The Regimental commander would coordinate
employment of his LAAD teams with the Division Commander and would be
directly tied into MACCS via the TADP for MAGTF IAD cueing,
coordination/reporting.
LAVAD assets resident in the LAI Battalion would remain under the
command and control of the Division Commander. The LAVAD variants
would be employed in direct support of highly mobile motorized
/mechanized MAGTF units and could also reinforce RAD platoons. The
Division Commander and his ADO would coordinate the employment of GCE
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LAAD assets with the ACE Commander and would also be tied into MACCS
via the Division TADP for MAGFT IAD cueing, coordination/reporting.
The remaining MAGTF LAAD assets would consolidate with the Light
Anti-Air Missile (LAAM) Battalion to form the Marine Air Defense
(MAD) Battalion. The MAD Battalion would be organic to the Marine
Air Control Group of the MAW. MAD Battalion would consist of: 1
headquarters battery, 2 Hawk missile batteries and 1 LAAD/Stinger
missile battery. (See page 20) This battalion is notionally very
similar in organization to the MAD Battalion due to be activated in
the MAW in FY 95. (8)
MAD Battalion in this structural concept of organization would
be employed in general support of the MAGTF to provide both medium
and low altitude air defense. It would remain under command and
control of the ACE Commander and would be tied into MACCS along with
the other LAAD assets in the MAGTF for cueing, coordination/
reporting. The single LAAD battery organic to the battalion,
utilizing a mix of PMS/Avenger and man-portable Stingers with the
ADCPs and WDUs would provide better GS and DS low altitude air
defense to MAGTF command and control installations, combat service
support units and other vital areas.
The mobility of the PMS/Avenger and its night acquisition
capability would allow the MAD LAAD assets to concentrate along key
avenues of approach, and traverse large areas to reinforce weak spots
and build greater depth and density to the MATFG air defense. The
superior communication and remote EW/C provided via the ADCP and the
WDUs would enhance the battery's ability to engage enemy aircraft and
coordinate with GCE, RAD, and LAVAD units. (See page 21)
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To ensure adequacy of training far all MAGTF LAAD units, the Wing
Commander would continue to monitor and coordinate all LAAD combat
readiness training and evaluations. The Regimental Commander and LAI
Battalion Commander would be responsible for training their
RAD/LAVAD units. This would include individual and unit sustainment
training, as well as special operations training that LAAD units in
the current structure rarely receive.
The Division Commander would schedule LAAD proficiency training
and coordinate the use of Stinger Firing Ranges and Moving Target
Simulator (MTS II) facilities with the Wing Commander. Combat
Readiness Evaluations (CREs) in the areas of command and control,
communications, visual aircraft recognition, engagement of targets
and crew drills would be administered to both GCE LAAD units and ACE
LAAD units by the Wing Commander. This training arrangement would
ensure the integration of MAGTF LAAD assets in training as well as
operations and would enhance combat readiness.
Perhaps the most important change that would have to take place,
in concert with this proposed concept of reorganization, would be in
the area of officer professional education. Clearly air defense
consciousness would need to be raised in the Officer Corps,
particularly among ground officers. In order to do this, a package
of instruction on unit air defense planning would have to be
introduced at both TBS and AWS. This instruction would thoroughly
cover the ground commander's air defense responsibilities and
planning considerations.
This sorely needed professional education would make all Marine
Officers completely familiar with marine air defense organization,
weapons capabilities and LAAD tactical employment. Its implemenation
would go a long way to get everyone on board with the MAGTF's
integrated air defense concept and would give the ground commander
the training he needs to be a credible member of the air defense
team.
Making these changes in the Marine Corps' LAAD organization and
in training would cost very little in the form of personnel or
equipment and would dramatically improve MAGTF air defense. By
incorporating Stinger/LAAD Units in the GCE via the Marine Division,
the MAGTF Commander would be able to deal with the increased air
threat, maintain centralized control and coordination, achieve
greater integration, and gain more flexibility to maneuver and win on
the modern battlefield.
With the introduction of the LAVAD in the Division in the mid
1990s and the introduction of the new command, control and cueing
technology resident in the ADCP and WDU, the time has come to rethink
the employment of Stinger and solve the problems associated with the
current LAAD structural organization. This can be done by
incorporating organic LADD Units in the Ground Combat Element of the
MAGTF.
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