Air As A Maneuver Element: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?
AUTHOR Major Thomas X. Hammes, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: AIR AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME?
I. Theme: Marines have been discussing using air as a maneuver element
for several years. Yet we have not explored the requirements inherent
in such an approach to determine if the idea is feasible.
II. Thesis: To determine if air can be used as a maneuver element, we
must answer the following questions.
First, what do we want air to accomplish?
Second, is it necessary to use air as a maneuver element to accom-
plish those tasks?
Third, if air is to be used as a maneuver element, what doctrinal,
educational, organizational, training and equipment changes must be
made?
Finally, if those changes are feasible, who should control air
when it is used as a maneuver element?
III. Discussion: FMFM 1 and FMFM 1-1 define clearly what air should
accomplish on the battlefield. These manuals direct all elements of the
MAGTF, including air, to focus on "shattering the enemy's cohesion"
through "attacking weaknesses" that cause the greatest damage to the
"enemy's ability to fight."
Examining the possible command and control arrangements for using
air assets in battle, it is clear that, theoretically, air can make the
greatest contribution to the MAGTF's fight as a maneuver element.
Current doctrine, organization, training and equipment can, with
very minor changes, accommodate air as a maneuver element. Education
and the Corps' traditional relationship between air and ground are the
primary stumbling blocks.
Air can be used as a maneuver element, the question is who should
control it? The key to this question lies in the current state of
professional education and the current institutional bias of the
Corps.
IV. Summary: The idea of using air as a maneuver element is valid.
There are no doctrinal, organizational, training or equipment limita-
tions which preclude using air as a maneuver element. There are educa-
tional and institutional reasons why the ACE is not capable of executing
this role.
V. Conclusions: Air should be used as a maneuver element. For the
immediate future, the MAGTF commander should directly control air when
it is used as such. This is a feasible, logical solution today and a
natural step to the full use of the ACE as a maneuver element.
AIR AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT:
AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME?
OUTLINE
Thesis: To determine if air can be used as a maneuver
element, we must answer the following questions
First, what do we want air to accomplish?
Second, is it necessary to use air as a maneuver ele-
ment to accomplish those tasks?
Third, if air is to be used as a maneuver element, what
doctrinal, educational, organizational, training and equip-
ment changes must be made?
Finally, if those changes are feasible, who should
control air when it is used as a maneuver element?
I. Background discussion
A. Previous arguments in favor
B. Previous arguments opposing
II. What do we want air to do
A. Doctrine
1. FMFM 1
2. FMFM 1-1
B. South West Asia example
C. Define role of air in maneuver war
III. To be or not to be a maneuver element
A. Maneuver war and the OODA loop
B. Possible organizations
IV. Changes needed
A. Doctrine
1. Marine Corps
2. Joint
3. Amphibious
B. Education
1. Deficiencies
2. Corrections
C. Organization
1. Command and control requirements
2. MAGTF versus ACE
D. Training
E. Equipment
V. Control of air as maneuver element
A. MAGTF
B. ACE
VI. Summary
AIR AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT:
AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME?
During the past few years, Marines have been discussing
the concept of using air as a maneuver element. While some
have bogged down in obscure semantics about what constitutes
a maneuver element, others have pushed the idea that the
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) has unique capabilities
which maximize the effect of airpower.
Mr. Bill Lind initiated the current version of this
discussion in the May 1989 Marine Corps Gazette. He ignited
a number of responses with his statement:
. . .when we speak of air focus of efforts, we
are not saying that air is the focus for the
MAGTF. There has been some misunderstanding on
this point. Because in almost all situations it
is the ground battle that is decisive, all efforts
of the MAGTF are focused on the ground battle. As
noted above, the air focus of efforts is the
answer to the question, "What can air do that no
other arm can do that will have a decisive effect
on the ground battle?" . . .Once ground combat is
joined, history suggests air will seldom, if ever,
be the MAGTF's focus of effort. The history of
attempts to achieve decisions by air alone is one
of repeated failure.1
In August, 1989, several authors took exception to Mr.
Lind's statement. Major J. B. Saxman wrote:
In order to truly employ the tenets of maneu-
ver warfare, the ACE must operate as an independ-
ent maneuver unit, synchronized with, not subju-
gated to, the operations of the GCE.2
Later in the same issue, S. B. Donnell expanded on
this concept, suggesting that Ground Combat Element (GCE)
units could be assigned to the Air Combat Element (ACE).
The ACE could become the focus of
effort. . . responsible for securing the airfield
and, no doubt, would need ground forces assigned
to his operational control.3
Finally, Captain R. A. Menton stated that not only
could the ACE require the assignment of GCE assets, it might
also require units from the Combat Service Support Element
(CSSE) and even the MAGTF Command Element (CE).
It is clear from these and other articles that the
concept of using air as a maneuver element is being actively
discussed throughout the Marine Corps.
It is equally evident that some Marines are adamantly
against using air as a maneuver element. In contrast,
others are virtual crusaders for making the ACE commander a
maneuver commander co-equal with the GCE.
What neither side has done is analyze what they want
air to accomplish and then explored the practical aspects
of how that can be accomplished.
To determine if air can be used as a maneuver element.
we must answer the following questions.
First, what do we want air to accomplish?
Second, is it necessary to use air as a maneuver ele-
ment to accomplish those tasks?
Third, if air is to be used as a maneuver element, what
doctrinal, educational, organizational, training and equip-
ment changes must be made?
Finally, if those changes are feasible, who should
control air when it is used as a maneuver element?
WHAT WE WANT AIR TO DO
In determining what we want air to accomplish, we must
turn to our capstone manuals, FMFM 1 and FMFM 1-1. Accord-
ing to FMFM 1,
the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the
enemy's cohesion, the immediate object toward
that end is to create a situation in which he
cannot function. By our actions, we seek to pose
menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpect-
edly and faster than the enemy can keep up with
them.4
FMFM 1 goes on to state the best way to achieve this
dislocation is to seek the enemy "gaps".
Toward this end, we concentrate our strength
against critical enemy vulnerabilities, striking
quickly and boldly where, when, and how it will
cause the greatest damage to the enemy's ability
to fight. Once gained or found, any advantage
must be pressed relentlessly and unhesitatingly.
We must be ruthlessly opportunistic, actively
seeking out signs of weakness, against which we
will direct all available combat power.5
The Commandant has stated that FMFM 1 is how the Marine
Corps will fight. Based on this very clear guidance, we can
state we want air to "shatter an enemy's cohesion." We want
to employ its unique capabilities to find and exploit gaps
that can "create a situation in which he cannot function."
South West Asia provides an obvious example of how this
can be done. The air campaign quickly destroyed Iraq's
ability to contest Allied use of the air, thus creating a
vulnerability (gap) which we proceeded to exploit. Build-
ing upon this success, the CINC employed his ground forces
to place the Iraqis on the horns of a dilemma. If they
moved to fight our ground forces, their ground forces were
exposed to our air power. If they remained dispersed to
avoid our air power, they became vulnerable to our ground
forces. The Iraqis faced "a menacing dilemma", they could
not counter.
While it can be argued that SWA was a unique case not
likely to be repeated, one basic condition of that conflict
will apply to many future conflicts.
Third world nations cannot afford the technology neces-
sary to provide a successful defense against an air and
naval campaign.
While the vulnerabilities created by the inability to
defend against an air and naval campaign will vary from
insignificant to decisive, recent events indicate US forces
are capable of creating these gaps.
This points to the role air should play in maneuver
warfare. Air, like all other forces, must be focused on
finding and then exploiting key enemy weaknesses.
Air is capable of creating either local or general
"gaps" through the destruction of enemy air defenses. Then
it can carry the attack through these gaps.
In addition, air's inherent range, speed, and firepower
make it an ideal weapon to exploit opportunities created by
other forces anywhere in the MAGTF's area of operations.
In answer to "what do we want air to do?", we want it
to provide a flexible, powerful weapon the MAGTF commander
can commit at the critical time and place. In some cases,
it will directly assist the GCE. In others, it will operate
independently. In all cases, air should focus on shattering
the enemy's cohesion.
Now that we know what we want air to do, how should we
organize to accomplish that? Simply put, is it necessary to
use air as a maneuver element to achieve the desired re-
sults?
TO BE OR NOT TO BE A MANEUVER ELEMENT
The very basis of maneuver warfare, as discussed in
FMFM 1, is to educate, organize, train and equip your forces
to execute the OODA* loop faster than your opponent. The
keys to executing successfully are a short chain of command
and flexible, decisive commanders who rapidly exploit oppor-
tunities presented by the changing situation.
The inherent range, speed, flexibility and firepower of
air make it an exceptional weapon in this type of war. Yet
if we tie air to the GCE scheme of maneuver, we severely
restrict those capabilities.
To maximize air's effect on the MAGTF battle, we must
be willing to use it as a maneuver element. Air must be
free to exploit opportunities presented in executing the
missions assigned by the MAGTF commander. It must be inde-
pendent of the GCE. The increased decision making time
resulting from checking with the GCE HQs and the shortened
area of interest of the GCE commander are antithetical to
the concepts of maneuver warfare.
*Col. Boyd's famous decision cycle--orientation,
observation, decision, and action.
Therefore, it is clear that airpower should be employed
as a maneuver element. Any lesser role reduces the effect
air can have on the MAGTF fight.
While it is clear that air should be used as a maneuver
element, it is not yet clear how that should be accom-
plished. As previously stated, the focus of our study must
be how to employ airpower most effectively to destroy the
enemy's cohesiveness. The key to effectiveness lies in the
command and control arrangements used to bring airpower to
bear.*
The MAGTF can employ its airpower, to include rein-
forcements from joint task force, theater and national level
assets, through a number of different command arrangements.
First, the ACE can be employed in its traditional role
as a supporting element of the GCE. While in this role, the
ACE provides the six functions of aviation for the MAGTF and
its entire concept of operations is tied directly to the
GCE. Previous discussion in this paper discounts this
approach.
Second, airpower can be employed directly by the MAGTF
commander. In this arrangement, the MAGTF commander will
make the tactical decisions concerning employment of air and
*There is a key difference between employing air efficiently
and effectively. Centralized control leads to the most
efficient use of air as represented in number of sorties
generated per aircraft, tons of bombs delivered, etc.
However, this is not a measure of effectiveness. Effective-
ness is measure by how well air assists in accomplishing the
mission. This may be accomplished by flying far fewer
missions but having those missions more responsive to the
commander executing the mission.
and the ACE commander will execute those decisions. This
arrangement elevates air from being simply a supporting arm
to the GCE to being a supporting agency for the MAGTF scheme
of maneuver. Yet when considering the requirements placed
on the ACE staff, this role is very similar to that of
responding directly to the GCE. The organization and train-
ing of the ACE staff changes only in the level and depth of
its focus.
Third, the ACE can be treated as a maneuver element,
task organized with the CE, GCE and CSSE elements necessary
for successful execution of its mission. Under this ar-
rangement, the ACE commander is responsible for developing
his own concept of operations in support of the MAGTF con-
cept, then implementing that concept for the duration of the
fight. This implies taking over the five functions of
command--gathering information, analyzing that information,
planning a response, disseminating information/orders and
supervising their execution. In short, the ACE must contin-
ually execute its own OODA loop as it relates to the MAGTF
battle.
Fourth, the ACE can be employed in a combination of the
above roles. Some elements of the ACE can support the GCE.
Some fight directly for the MAGTF commander. Some execute a
specific ACE mission.
While each of these methods of employing airpower have
been touched on in either the Command and Staff curriculum
or in the Gazette, none of the discussions have considered
the practical details which must be resolved before the last
three can be implemented.
The impact of five major areas needs to be considered
before we conclude how to use airpower most effectively.
These areas are:
(1) Doctrine--Joint and Service
(2) Education
(3) Organization
(4) Training
(5) Equipment
DOCTRINE
Joint and service doctrine seem to part company in a
number of areas regarding the use and control of air power.
FMFM 1 Warfighting stresses decision making at the lowest
possible level. In contrast, the air control doctrine and
systems of both the US Air Force and the US Marine Corps are
based on centralized control of all air sorties via the Air
Tasking Order.
The divergence between our capstone manuals and execu-
tion gets even wider when one reads FMFM 1-1 Campaigning.
This Marine manual virtually proposes the ACE operating as
a maneuver element.
The MAGTF's organic aviation allows the
commander to project power well in advance of
close combat, to shape events in time and space.
The headquarters organization, with separate
headquarters for the tactical control of ground
and air actions, can free the MAGTF command ele-
ment to focus on the operational conduct of
war....
While the tactician looks at the immediate
tactical problem and the conditions directly
preceding and following, the operational commander
must take a broader view. He must not become so
involved in tactical activities that he loses his
proper perspective.6
These paragraphs imply the ACE commander is fighting as
a maneuver element to shape the battlefield for the MAGTF
commander. It further implies the MAGTF commander is not
fighting this battle himself because the purpose of the
separate air HQs is to free the MAGTF commander from that
burden so he can concentrate on the operational level of
war.
In short, the Marine Corps' capstone manuals come down
firmly on the side of those who wish to use the ACE as a
maneuver element.
While Marine doctrine proposes using the ACE as a
maneuver element, the question remains, can air be used that
way?
Since virtually all future conflicts will be joint
rather than purely naval, we must examine how this approach
lines up with Joint Doctrine as it applies to employing
aviation.
According to Joint Doctrine, the key factor determining
how the MAGTF commander will use his organic air power is
the Joint Task Force (JTF) commander's concept of the use of
air.
This has been a source of great concern to the Marine
Corps and has resulted in a both the OMNIBUS AGREEMENT of
1986 and a carefully crafted definition of the Joint Force
Air Component Commander (JFACC).
In his address to Command and Staff College students on
15 March 1991, LtGen D. A. Wills, Deputy Chief of Staff Air,
US Marine Corps explained the Omnibus Agreement as follows:
(1) The MAGTF commander always retains OPCON of
Marine air assets.
(2) The JTF can take either excess sorties or up
front sorties from those the MAGTF can generate. The JTF
can NOT take the aircraft, only the sorties.
(3) JTF retains OPCON authority over the MAGTF
air assets via the MAGTF commander.
(4) JTF may designate the JFACC as his coordina-
tor of air.
This interpretation of the Omnibus Agreement supports
the use of Marine Aviation as a part of the MAGTF. There-
fore, the MAGTF commander is free to employ his air in any
fashion he sees fit.
However, the Omnibus agreement goes on to say "nothing
herein shall infringe on the authority of the theater joint
force commander, in the exercise of operational control..."7
Thus, despite the fact the Omnibus strongly endorses the
idea the MAGTF should fight as a unit, the JTF commander is
still free to organize as he sees fit.
The JCS definition of the JFACC supports the JTF's
authority to reorganize as he sees fit.
joint force air component commander-(DOD)
The joint force air component commander
derives his authority from the joint force com-
mander who has the authority to exercise opera-
tional control, assign missions, direct coordina-
tion among his subordinate commanders, redirect
and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of his overall mission.
The joint force commander will normally designate
a joint force air component commander. The joint
force air component commander's responsibilities
will be assigned by the joint force commander
(normally these would include, but not be limited
to, planning, coordination, allocation and tasking
based on the joint force commander's apportionment
decision). Using the joint force commander's
guidance and authority, and in coordination with
other service component commanders and other
assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force
air component commander will recommend to the
joint force commander apportionment of air sorties
to various missions or geographic areeas. (Empha-
sis added.)8
Based on the Omnibus Agreement and the JCS definition
of the JFACC, it is obvious that the JTF is free to employ
air in any manner he wishes. While both documents guide him
toward leaving Marine Air as an integral part of the MAGTF,
he will make his decision based on what he feels is the most
effective employment of air power in support of his opera-
tional plan.
Thus the Marine officers assigned to the JTF staff
become key players. They must present logical, coherent
arguments for keeping Marine Air as an integral part of the
MAGTF. The JTF must be convinced that Marine Air can sup-
port his plan most effectively by remaining under the com-
mand and control of the MAGTF commander.
Failure to convince the JTF to leave Marine air under
the MAGTF commander renders any discussion about how to
employ Marine Air as a maneuver element academic. Quite
simply, the MAGTF commander won't have to worry about it
because he won't have any air.
The next doctrinal factor which influences how a MAGTF
commander employs his air is joint amphibious doctrine.
According to JCS Pub 3.02 Joint Doctrine for Amphibious
Operations, when an amphibious operation is being conducted,
the Initiating Directive will define an Amphibious Opera-
tions Area. All air space within this AOA belongs to the
Commander, Amphibious Task Force. He will execute control
through his Tactical Air Officer using the Tactical Air
Control Center (TACC).9
Marine Air and its embarked assets will be hard pressed
to execute a mission as a maneuver element during the open-
ing phase of an amphibious operation. First, the ACE com-
mander owns no airspace. Second, in the opening phase of
the operation, he does not have any control agencies func-
tioning. Third, the ACE commander does not have any assets
ashore. His aircraft are either aboard CATF shipping or
flying into the AOA from an airfield outside it. In either
case, the ACE is not in a position to execute a mission type
order.
JCS 3.02 further states:
At the termination of the amphibious assault,
the amphibious task force will be dissolved, the
assigned airspace will be disestablished, and the
responsibility for "airspace control," defined as
coordination, integration and regulation of air-
space, normally will be exercised by the Air Force
component commander through a joint air operations
arrangement for the joint force commander.10
This paragraph simply means that at the end of an
amphibious operation, the MAGTF is right back in the previ-
ous situation where he has to negotiate use of his airpower
with the JTF.
Further limiting the employment of air as a maneuver
element by the MAGTF is JCS Pub 3. 02. 1 Joint Doctrine for
Landing Force Operations. While discussing air planning for
the amphibious campaign, this manual clearly never considers
air as a maneuver element 11. The process for employing air
described in Section VIII, page 31 is the epitome of using
the ACE as a sortie generator rather than an independent
element.
Obviously there are numerous contradictions between
Joint and Marine doctrine. Further, Joint Doctrine is often
vague--the result of compromises necessary to get doctrine
signed by all services. Thus while doctrine presents some
problems for the MAGTF commander in the employment of air as
a maneuver element, it does not preclude it. Doctrine is
essentially neutral.
If the MAGTF commander wishes to employ his air as a
maneuver element, he can. To do so, he must convince his
superiors, JTF and CATF, that in doing so he can make the
strongest contribution to their success. To be able to make
that argument convincingly, the MAGTF commander must have a
very clear understanding of both Marine and Joint air
control doctrine and procedures.
This bring us to the second key consideration in any
discussion of using air as a maneuver element.
EDUCATION
All doctrine, organization, training and equipment
decisions made by military forces are based on their percep-
tion of war. This perception is shaped to a large degree by
the education they have received.
Education is the most critical element in any consider-
ation of how the Corps can use air as a maneuver element.
Unfortunately, our current formal education process clearly
fails to address the issue of using air as a maneuver
element.
For instance, in Command and Staff College, the subject
is discussed formally only as a segment of other aviation
instruction and peripherally in several other packages.
While it is discussed vigorously within the conference
groups, the failure of the school to frame and guide the
discussion leads to widely divergent results based on the
individual background of the faculty advisors/students in
each group. Given that the graduates of this college will
man the joint, MAGTF and ACE billets responsible for the
employment of Marine Air, this is a very significant defi-
ciency.
If we want to employ air as a maneuver element in
accordance with FMFM 1, two major changes must be made to
our educational process.
First, we must teach our officers about the employment
of airpower rather than the techniques and processes of
employing air assets. The difference may sound trivial but
is in fact a major problem.
In teaching the employment of airpower, we must embark
on an honest evaluation of the historical success of airpower
in support of campaign plans. We cannot accept either the
Douhet (old Air Force) approach of airpower as a separate
element capable of winning on its own nor the limiting
concept of using air only as another supporting arm (old
Marine Corps). Rather we must try to determine what condi-
tions, organizations and approaches have maximized the value
of airpower to the complete campaign. Throughout the course
of this study, we must focus on the use of airpower in the
joint/combined environment.
Based on this study, we should consider how to best
organize, train and equip the MAGTF to successfully employ
airpower. As part of this educational process, our officers
must think through the employment of airpower in the joint
arena from the operational level of war down to the nuts and
bolts of execution.
The second major area that must be dealt with through
education is a clear understanding of the MAGTF's unique
capability to employ airpower. While Marines consider it
gospel that air is best used in conjunction with ground
forces, few can give specific examples of what benefits are
derived from this arrangement. Our education program must
examine this subject in detail and present students with
concrete examples of why it works best.
For example, we can examine the single mission of air
interdiction. In a detailed study of the problem, officers
at the Air War College determined that four separate tasks
must be accomplished to effectively interdict a target. The
target must be located, identified, prioritized and at-
tacked.12
The key point of the study was the fact that of the
four tasks required to successfully interdict a target, air
alone could only effectively execute the last--the attack.
To locate, identify, and prioritize the target, air needed
the assistance of other organizations.
It is in exactly these areas that the unique organi-
zation of the MAGTF has its greatest strength. Under a
single commander, we have the reconnaissance (air and
ground), the analytical, and the C2 (command and control)
assets to execute the first three requirements or air inter-
diction. Our assets can perform these functions in all
weather and with a degree of accuracy unmatched by either
national or airborne-systems. Further, the MAGTF ground
assets can assisting in the fourth step of air interdiction,
attack, by marking the target with lasers, indirect fire, or
beacons. The MAGTF can provide all these services without
exposing aircraft or personnel to enemy air defenses.
This is only one example of one type of air mission
that the MAGTF, due to its very organization, is better
suited to execute than any other fighting force. The use of
air in close air support, reconnaissance, and anti-air
warfare, all provide further examples of the unique capabil-
ities of the MAGTF.
It is vital our officers understand these unique
capabilities prior to their assignment to joint billets.
The Corps must have people capable of clearly articulating
these benefits. If we do not, JTF might well take our air in
the honest belief the assets can better be employed under
central command and control.
Our educational system must make an aggressive top to
bottom effort to rigorously explore the use of airpower in
modern war. Our officers are a product of their education
and will organize, train and equip our forces in consonance
with their beliefs.
The challenge for education is to expose our officers
to all the possibilities for employing air in a campaign
plan. Failure to do so means air will never be employed as
a maneuver element by Marines. If we do not think about and
discuss the concept, we certainly cannot execute it.
ORGANIZATION
Using air as a maneuver element places some very spe-
cific organizational requirements on the MAGTF. Regardless
of whether the MAGTF or the ACE controls aviation, the
headquarters must be able to complete the OODA loop as it
applies to the deep battle. This clearly implies a rela-
tively sophisticated Combat Operations Center (COC).
In fact, executi.ng the OODA loop quickly and effective-
ly is much more complex when air is used as a maneuver
element. Four major C2 requirements increase dramatically
when air is used as a maneuver element.
First, the inherent mobility and flexibility of
aviation vastly increase the area of influence and area of
interest of the commander.
Second, intelligence requirements increase both in
quantity and type. Quantity due to the increase in the area
of interest. Type because the controlling headquarters must
be able to employ real time information as well as collect
and process intelligence for a comprehensive picture of the
battlefield.
This ability is necessary because air power must fight
the immediate battle while anticipating and shaping the
battle 24-96 hours out. Further, the MAGTF, functioning at
the operational level of war, also needs a broader, deeper
picture. While these, tasks may seem to require the same
abilities and organization, in fact they drive an organiza-
tion in fundamentally-different directions.
In the March 1991 Gazette, Major Moore addressed exact-
ly this point.
The relative value of timeliness varies with
the level of combat. MAGTF warfare, it should be
remembered, is fought at both the tactical and
operational levels. Tactically, intelligence
timeliness can be measure in a few hours, if not
minutes....Tactical intelligence relies on hastily
developed, fragmented images, and timeliness
depends on a rapid sequence of reporting, analy-
sis, recommendation and dissemination. For this
reason, intelligence organization at the tactical
level must be decentralized, the overriding con-
cern being rapid transmittal of information
Tactical intelligence focuses on exploiting fleet-
ing opportunities, and, thus, timeliness depends
on rapid reporting.
Operational level intelligence, on the other
hand, demands more careful scrutiny of informa-
tion: timeliness is more a function of accuracy
than speed. Identifying the enemy's center of
gravity or his point of main effort requires
piecing together widely disparate reports and
painstaking analysis. Conclusion and recommenda-
tions encompass the entire MAGTF area of interest,
whereas the chaos of the immediate battle assumes
secondary importance. Operation intelligence,
therefore, must be centralized.13
Third, the increased area of influence. the speed of
air assets and their limited endurance mean the commander
will be forced to make more, faster decisions. In addition,
the range of airpower insures the headquarters controlling
it must also be able to plan, coordinate and execute in the
joint arena. The days of aircraft attacking the target
supported only by other aircraft are over. Strike planners
must be able to integrate ground designators (laser and
beacon), long range artillery (out to 60 KM), rocket systems
(ATACMS), naval gunfire and TLAM as well as electronic and
other support rrom Army, Navy and Air Force aircraft.
Fourth, the controlling headquarters must be able to
translate the commander's decisions into clear, concise
orders and rapidly disseminate them.
Given these four requirements, which headquarters is
best suited to employ air as a maneuver element?
The MAGTF headquarters is currently organized and
trained to execute exactly these functions. Thus the
changes necessary for the MAGTF to use air as a maneuver
element will be a matter of increasing current capabilities
rather than creating new ones.
The primary disadvantage of making the MAGTF commander
directly responsible for fighting the ACE is the fact that
he and his staff must now function on two different levels
of war--closely directing the ACE's battle and planning the
overall MAGTF fight.
There is always a tendency for staffs and commanders to
focus on the immediate fight (in this case, the air-ground
battle) to the detriment of their other responsibilities.
This is particularly dangerous given the current MAGTF
organization which consolidates all intelligence gathering
and processing at the MAGTF level. If the MAGTF commander
is fighting the ACE's battle, there will be a natural tend-
ency for his intelligence gathering organizations to focus
on that battle to the detriment of the ground battle and
future operations.
Conversely, the ACE fighting as an independent maneu-
ver element has its own strengths and weaknesses. It pri-
mary strength is that the commander who trained, deployed
and leads the ACE also fights it. Theoretically, the indi-
vidual best qualified to employ air is the man who leads it.
Unfortunately, the traditional role of the ACE staff is
that of a supporting arm responding to a maneuver element.
Only with the recent rewrite of FMFM 3-1 Command and Staff
Action in 1989 has the Marine Corps officially accepted the
ACE focusing on supporting the MAGTF commander's battle and
not just on supporting the GCE's scheme of maneuver. (Indi-
vidually, many Marines resist even this modest step.)
Thus to fight as a independent maneuver unit, the ACE
must create entirely new capabilities rather than expand on
existing ones.
Second, the ACE will have even more difficulty than the
MAGTF in focusing both on his battle and on the traditional
support role for the GCE. For while the ACE may well be
given a maneuver mission, this will not relieve him of all
responsibility for supporting the GCE.
Finally, the ACE will require major augmentation of its
intelligence section before it can execute the OODA loop
effectively.
TRAINING
Regardless of the concept used, training will be based
on the education and beliefs of the officer commanding the
organization. Either the MAGTF or the ACE is capable of
fighting air as a maneuver element once the commander ac-
cepts the concept of employing air as a maneuver unit.
The key to training is education. If a commander can
be educated to evaluate how air as a maneuver element can
best support his mission, he can develop a training program
to achieve those ends.
The actual type, level and frequency of training re-
quired to use air as a maneuver element is tied directly to
the concept of employment.
If air is to be employed directly by the MAGTF, the
necessary training will be limited to the planning and
functioning of the MAGTF staff.
In sharp contrast, if the ACE is to function as a
maneuver element in its own right, significant training will
have to take place. The ACE will have to transition from a
organization that focuses on the air battle and supporting
the GCE to a maneuver element focusing on executing the
MAGTF commander's intent.
EQUIPMENT
The equipment required to use air as a maneuver element
largely exists within the current Tables of Equipment for
the MAGTF CE and ACE. The primary task will be determining
how the current equipment will be used to support a combat
operations center capable of using air as a maneuver ele-
ment.
In addition, careful attention must be given to equip-
ment requirements necessary to tie each headquarters into
the joint command and control system that will dominate
future war.
CONTROL OF AIR AS A MANEUVER ELEMENT
The final question is "who should control air when it
is being used as a maneuver element?" In examining doc-
trine, organization, training and equipment, we found these
factors to be essentially neutral on the subject of who
should control air. While each presents some challenges,
none is a war stopper.
The key factor in determining how airpower should be
employed lies with the commanders and staffs at all levels
from ACE to JTF. The outlook of these individuals has been
shaped largely by their education. (Remember, understanding
the new doctrine is only one aspect of education.)
Further, Marine Corps schools are just beginning to
grapple with the subject of air as a maneuver element. Thus
very few commanders or staff officers in the fleet have had
the opportunity to thoroughly consider, discuss and develop
their own positions on this question.
The question of who should control air when it is used
as a maneuver element essentially comes down to the issue of
how senior commanders feel about it.
Following his address to the Command and Staff College,
LtGen. D. A. Wills, Deputy Chief of Staff Air, USMC, was
asked who he thought should control aviation assets when
they are used as a maneuver element. His unequivocal answer
was "the MAGTF".
Given General Will's position, experience and educa-
tion- his opinion reflects not only the official position of
Marine aviation but most likely the opinion of his contempo-
raries.
Thus while there are no practical limitation to using
the ACE as a maneuver element, the Corps' institutional bias
combined with the background of our senior officers effec-
tively precludes that option. Until such time as opinions
change, the ACE as a maneuver element is not feasible.
Therefore, by default, air employed as a maneuver element
will have to be controlled by the MAGTF commander and his
staff.
SUMMARY
What we want air to accomplish is clearly delineated in
FMFM-1 and FMFM 1-1. Air must contribute to the MAGTF
commander's ability to identify, locate and attack key enemy
vulnerabilities. These attacks must focus on disrupting his
command and control to the point he cannot function.
Given this role for air, it is clear that airpower
will, at times, be used as a maneuver element with the
mission of striking directly at those key enemy vulnerabili-
ties.
While there are no doctrinal, organizational, training
or equipment issues precluding the use of air as a maneuver
element, the Corps current educational system and doctrine
have traditionally opposed this view. The recent changes in
doctrine and progress, within the educational systems have
not been in place lone enough to overcome the inertia inher-
ent in a large organization. As a direct result, the FMF
has not developed the latent capability of the ACE as a
maneuver element.
Based on this realistic appraisal of where we are, the
MAGTF commander should not attempt to use his ACE as a
maneuver element without making a long term commitment to
preparing it for that role. For the immediate future, the
MAGTF commander should directly control air when it is used
as a maneuver element. This is a feasible, logical solution
today and a natural step to the full use of the ACE as a
maneuver element in ohe future.
FOOTNOTES
1 William Lind, "Maneuver Warfare and Marine Aviation,"
Marine Corps Gazette (May 1989), 59.
2 J. B. Saxman,"The Role of Marine Aviation in Maneuver
Warfare, "Marine Corps Gazette (August 1989), 89.
3 S. B. Donnell, "The ACE as a Maneuver Element, "Marine
Corps Gazette (August 1989), 64.
4 FMFM 1 Warfighting (March 1989), 60.
5 Ibid, 60.
6 FMFM 1-1 Campaigning (January 1990), 28 and 62.
7 White Letter No. 4-86, Commandant of the Marine Corps,
(18 March 1986), 3.
8 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 1-02 The DOD Dic-
tionary of Military and Associated Terms (1 December
1989), 197.
9 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3.O2 Joint Doctrine
for Amphibious Operations (1 November 1986, Change 5), 7-9.
10 OPCIT, JCS 1-02, 7-10.
11 Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 3.02.1 Joint Doc-
trine for Landing Force Operations, (December 1989), VIII 26-
30.
12 P. T. Bingham, Air Power and the Defeat of the Warsaw
Pact Offensive: Taking a Different Approach to Air inter-
diction, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1987.
13 R. S. Moore, "Finding the Gaps: Intelligence and
MAGTF Warfare' "Marine Corps Gazette, 64-65.
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