Operational Airpower: A Common Sense Approach
AUTHOR Major Stephen L. Hoog, USAF
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: OPERATIONAL AIRPOWER: A COMMON SENSE APPROACH
I. Purpose: To provide a common sense approach for air
commanders to determine the most effective use of airpower
at the operational level of war.
II. Discussion: The instrument of war was forever changed
with man's first flight in 1903. Since that time early
theorists like "Billy" Mitchell and Giulio Douhet offered
their approach to the employment of airpower. They focused
on strategic bombing as a means for airpower to win wars
independently of land or naval forces. World War II, Korea,
and Vietnam showed that effective employment of airpower
must go beyond strategic bombing developing the missions of
superiority, interdiction, and close air support.
Military analysts soon began studying war at its three
different levels: strategic, operational and tactical. This
breakdown allowed analysts to better understand the cause
and effect relationships of war. Airpower is primarily an
operational level "tool" of war that must be tailored to
meet the requirements of given mission. There are many
factors the air commander must consider in developing his
gameplan for the employment of airpower. My interpretation
of these factors are as follows: Analysis of Mission,
Campaign Integration, Enemy, Combat Capability, Geography,
Time to Influence, Space for Operations, and Logistics &
Basing. Factors are not taken sequentially but rather each
must be viewed constantly with the overall big picture in
mind. Each factor is discussed to illustrate their
importance and interrelationships.
III. Conclusion: These factors together form the acronym
ACE-CG-TSL and provide the commander a framework to approach
the operational employment of airpower. This framework is a
common sense approach in determining the most effective use
of airpower at the operational level of war.
OPERATIONAL AIRPOWER: A COMMON SENSE APPROACH
Thesis Statement: The acronym ACE-CG-TSL provides the air
commander with a framework to approach the operational
employment of airpower. This common sense approach will
help air commanders in determining the most effective use of
airpower at the operational level of war.
I. Brief History on the Evolution of Modern Airpower
A. Douhet's and Mitchell's Position
B. Effectiveness of Strategic Bombing
II. A Common Sense Analytical Process
A. Three Levels of War
B. Importance of the Operational Level
III. Factors and discussion of their effects on Operational
Airpower Employment
A. Analysis of Mission
B. Campaign Integration
C. Enemy
D. Combat Capability
E. Geography
F. Time to Influence
G. Space for Operations
H. Logistics & Basing
IV. Conclusion
A. Tactical framework acronym METT-TSL
B. Operational Airpower framework acronym ACE-CG-TSL
C. A common sense approach to Airpower Employment
OPERATIONAL AIRPOWER: A COMMON SENSE APPROACH
The instrument of war was forever changed with man's
first flight in 1903. Early theorists such as Giulio Douhet
and William "Billy" Mitchell argued that airpower would
become the most decisive element of war. They thought that
by applying airpower directly at an enemy's warmaking
capability rather than its deployed forces, airpower could
destroy not only the enemy's ability to wage war but also
his will to fight. (3:2) World War II provided the
opportunity to test these and other theories concerning
airpower.
During the course of the war classic missions of
airpower were refined and developed. Strategic bombing,
interdiction, and close air support were used extensively in
both theaters of operations. Strategic bombing, however,
became the theorists' main focus in their effort to show the
decisive nature of airpower. Both Germany and Japan were
subjected to massive allied strategic bombing raids designed
to break the enemy's will to resist. Even today military
historians debate the effectiveness of strategic bombing not
only in WW-II, but also in Korea and Vietnam as well.
One way to determine the effectiveness of strategic
bombing is to study its impact on the three different levels
of war. These three levels: strategic, operational, and
tactical, allow us to understand better the cause and effect
relationships in war. (8:2) The strategic level of war is
normally the concern of both national command authorities
and the highest military commanders. War at the operational
level is conducted by theater level commanders. Finally,
tactical level warfare is practiced by individual units and
their commanders. The relationship between each level of
war seems clear. At the tactical level engagements may be
either won or lost, but the campaigns that make up wars must
be won at the operational level. Finally, political victory
must not be lost at the strategic level.
At the operational level strategic bombing during World
War II proved to be effective within certain limitations.
What most historians failed to realize is that airpower is
just a tool, a hammer, in the theater commander's war-chest.
(8:69) A craftsman will choose exactly which type of hammer
to use in various situations. A sledgehammer is good for
breaking up foundations while a finishing hammer is best for
delicate woodwork. He might chose a ballpeen hammer to
reshape damaged sheetmetal. Like a hammer in a craftsman's
hand, airpower should be tailored by the commander to suit
each mission.
The question now becomes, "what factors must the
operational commander consider in tailoring airpower to
accomplish his mission? " At the tactical level of war there
are many step-by-step checklists on how to plan air attacks
against specific targets. Yet, at the operational level
detailed checklists simply become unwieldy and overly
concerned with statistics. In addition, at the operational
level of war parallel and concurrent planning goes on
continuously. Factors are not taken sequentially but rather
each must be viewed constantly with the overall big picture
in mind. The factors listed below in Table 1 must be
considered when working with airpower at the operational
level.
Click here to view image
Taken together, these factors represent a common sense
approach in determining the most effective use of airpower
at the operational level of war. In the following sections
each factor will be discussed to illustrate their importance
and interrelationships.
Analysis of Mission
Failure of airpower at the operational level is usually
the result of not having a clear understanding of the
mission. As a result, understanding the mission and
deciding which type of airpower "hammer" should be employed
is the most important problem the air commander must solve.
A craftsman who decides to try and drive a woods crew with a
hammer has a similar problem. When he is finished, the
screw will not hold properly, the surrounding wood will be
needlessly damaged, and it will take five times as many
blows as a nail to drive home. Likewise, even the most
powerful air force can fail if the commander chooses the
wrong tool to accomplish the mission.
Operation Rolling Thunder flown during the Vietnam War
is a classic example of the problems associated with first
defining and then deciding how best to accomplish the
mission. During the course of the three year operation, the
mission objective shifted constantly. Its stated mission
varied from showing support for the South Vietnamese
government to inducing North Vietnam to cease combat
operations in the South. In between, Rolling Thunder
focused on interdicting supplies from the North and as a
means to support the expanding combat role of American
ground forces. (3:63-67) As a result of mission objective
confusion and additional limitations placed on the use of
airpower, Operation Rolling Thunder met with only limited
success
Air commander's must thoroughly understand each
assigned mission. Then, they must analyze airpower's
ability to accomplish the mission and tailor their forces
accordingly. As each factor is considered it will become
apparent which "hammer" in airpower's toolbox in suited to
the mission.
Campaign Integration
As General Dwight D. Eisenhower once said, "One of the
most important and least understood factors in modern war is
that it is essentially a matter of teamwork . . there is
no such thing as a separate land, sea, or air war." (6:363)
This does not mean there is never a separate air campaign
plan, but rather that each campaign plan must be integrated
into a single theater-wide effort. Normally, gaining and
maintaining air superiority is the primary focus of the air
commander. JCS Pub 1-02 defines air superiority as "that
degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over the
other which permits the conduct of operations . . . at a
given time and place without prohibitive interference by the
opposing force." (8:237)
It is hard to overstate the importance of first
obtaining air superiority. Since 1939, no nation has ever
lost a war while it maintained air superiority. (10:10)
Campaign integration begins with the battle to control the
skies. The air commander should use all available assets to
accomplish this goal. For example, during the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war, Israeli gunboats attacked Egyptian surface-to-
air missile sites to open a corridor for Israeli aircraft.
(10:15) In addition, Desert Storm opened with "Apache" AH-64
attack helicopters destroying several key radar sites in the
Iraqi air defense network. Once air superiority has been
obtained the air commander can bring the full weight of
airpower to bear on the enemy.
The historical interdiction mission provides an
excellent case study on campaign integration. Those who
discount airpower's ability to interdict forces tend to rely
on a numerical "attrition" model. Effectiveness of
airpower's interdiction is based solely on the number and
types of vehicles and supplies destroyed. This tactical
level approach fails to measure the effect interdiction can
have at the operational level of war. (1:1)
Operation Strangle conducted in Italy during World War
II is a good example of interdiction. For over a month
allied airman tried to starve out the German forces in
central Italy with a massive interdiction campaign. The
Germans were forced to move at only night because of the
heavy losses during daylight hours. When it became apparent
that interdiction alone was not enough to force the Germans
out, the allies launched an integrated air and ground
offensive called "Diadem." (1:13) The commander of the
German defense, General Von Senger, described his defeat
against the allied offensive in these terms:
The enemy's mastery of the air . . . was a major
source of worry for the defender, for it prevented
all daylight movements. We were accustomed to
making all necessary movements by night, but in
the event of a real breakthrough this was not good
enough. In a battle of movement a commander who
can only make the tactically essential moves by
night resembles a chess player who for three of
his opponent's moves has the right to only one.
(5:224)
Campaign integration at the operational level is more
than just combined arms operations. Both seek to force the
enemy into an unfavorable dilemma. Combined arms, however,
is focused more at the tactical level such as the defense of
a specific hill. At the operational level, the enemy must
be forced to choose which mountain range to defend in the
first place. Integration of airpower into the theater
campaign plan will help ensure that the enemy's options are
few and far between.
Enemy
Behind analysis of the mission, understanding the enemy
is the next most important task for the air commander. As
Sun Tzu said some 2,500 years ago, "know the enemy, know
yourself: in a hundred battles you will never be in peril."
(7:2) But what does knowing the enemy entail? It is more
than simple knowledge of enemy equipment capabilities and
tactics. Specific intelligence such as speed, payload, and
weapons of enemy tactical forces should be a given. Your
forces must possess the information required to successfully
meet and defeat the enemy at the tactical level. The key to
victory, however, lies in understanding the enemy on the
operational and strategic level.
The first step in developing operational level
knowledge of the enemy is to understand the nature of the
conflict itself. What is the enemy's political objective?
What are the enemy's sources of national power? Where does
the conflict fall on the spectrum of war? What is the
enemy's intent in conducting operational level warfare?
Generally, airpower is more effective as a tool of war
against more industrialized opponents who are conducting
conventional warfare. As the air commander, one must address
these questions as a minimum to determine the overall nature
of the conflict. The enemy's center of gravity should
become apparent from this examination.
Center of gravity is defined by JCS Pub 1-02 as "that
characteristic, capability, or locality from which a force
derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to
fight." (8:241) Too often we project our own centers of
gravity as those of the enemy. The bombing of the POL
storage sites in North Vietnam is just one example. Some
analysts thought the destruction of North Vietnam's POL
would disrupt their entire war machine. Although the
bombing by U.S. Forces caused heavy POL losses and hardships
in the North, it had minimal impact on the war being waged
in South Vietnam. (3:93) A commander must be able to look
at the war through his enemy's eyes. Then both the enemy's
center of gravity and his critical vulnerabilities will
become obvious.
Combat Capability
Each air commander must know the combat capability of the
tools of war he controls. To some this seems as simple
as counting the number of assets in terms of aircraft,
bullets, and bombs, This easily quantifiable number would
then represent the total combat "force" a commander should
expect to generate. However, combat capability equates
better to a measurement of work rather than one of force.
Work is the product of a force (F) applied over a specific
distance (D) or Work=FxD. But just what does the "D" stand
for to the air commander?
The "D" in the combat capability equation is a
combination of many variables. At the top of the list is
personnel training and readiness. The best equipment in the
world is only as good as the men and women who employ it.
In addition, command and control are essential in getting
the most out of each and every asset. Efficient command and
control allows the commander to make the combat capability
of the whole greater than the sum of each individual part.
Additionally, technology has the ability to be a combat
multiplier in certain situations. A good example is the
smart bombs" first employed in Vietnam and more recently in
operation Desert Storm. (3:159) Finally, the commander
needs accurate and timely intelligence so he can employ his
combat capability where and when it is required.
Combat capability, therefore, is an assessment made by
the commander based on knowledge, experience, and
understanding of his people and assets. The commander must
then be able to relate this knowledge to his understanding
of the enemy's capabilities and intentions. Only then will
Sun Tzu's maxim of "know the enemy, know yourself: in a
hundred battles you will never be in peril" apply. (7:2)
Geoaraphy
Geography can be broken down into two components for
analysis. The first is the actual topography present in the
theater of operations. Certain airpower missions such as
interdiction and close air support are significantly
affected by terrain, vegetation, and natural obstacles.
Normally, natural barriers such as rivers and mountains
provide excellent choke points to interdict enemy supplies.
These choke points make airpower more effective by providing
a natural opportunity to concentrate assets at a critical
point. Again, close integration with the land campaign
is required to ensure our own interdiction effort will not
interfere with future ground operations.
Weather is the second consideration the air commander
must include in his planning. Despite many advances in
technology, airpower is still most effective when airman can
"see" the target. Night vision devices can now turn night
into day for round the clock air operations. Despite these
advances in technology ordinary cloud cover is still the
single biggest cause of aborted missions. According to
General Horner, the air component commander of Operation
Desert Storm, the air campaign was extended several days
because of the sorties lost due to exceptionally poor
weather. In comparison, the weather in Western Europe is
normally three times as bad when compared with the Middle
East. (3:121) Therefore, air commanders must carefully
consider the impact of weather on his ability to bring
combat capability to bear on the enemy.
Time to Influence
As the commander begins to formulate a plan that combines
all the factors listed above, he must consider the time
available to accomplish the mission. At the operational
level of war the air commander normally has weeks or months
available to shape the combat theater. History has shown,
however, that no matter how much time or combat capability
the air commander has he will always have to establish
priorities. Once the first priority of air superiority is
accomplished, airpower's combat capability is usually split
between strategic bombing, interdiction and close air
support missions.
Strategic missions usually have the potential for the
greatest overall effect on the enemy, however, it usually
takes the longest time to be effective. Again, the air
commander must know the enemy to determine their centers of
gravity. In certain limited war situations strategic
bombing may have a very limited impact on the enemy. (3:62)
Interdiction also has the potential to cause the enemy
significant problems but may take from days to weeks to be
effective. Finally, close air support provides the most
immediate effort on the battlefield but is generally limited
to a specific tactical situation. The air commander must
recommend to the theater commander the allocation for each
of these missions in both combat assets and time required to
influence the situation.
Space for Operations
The amount of space available for air operations is
normally defined by the political situation. In many
limited wars these political limitations can significantly
affect airpower's ability to influence the battlefield. For
example, during the Korean War the United States limited its
air forces to operations.south of the Yalu River. This
allowed the Chinese a sanctuary from which they launched
combat operations into Korea. (10:16) Air commanders must
take these potential limitations into consideration when
developing an air campaign plan.
In addition, friendly forces may sometimes be forced to
compete for the same airspace. In joint or combined
operations, such as Desert Storm, the air commander must
integrate Air Force, Navy and Marine air assets into a
single air campaign plan. Separate operating areas may be
established to help facilitate the employment of airpower to
shape the battlefield. However, the air commander must not
let the situation degenerate into several separate air
forces fighting their own war within each sector.
Logistics and Basing
The availability of suitable bases may be the dominant
factor in airpower's campaign planning and execution.
(8:194) In areas where few suitable bases are available, the
air commander may be severely limited in employing his
airpower. Likewise, more available bases translates into
greater combat power and flexibility for the commander.
Naval air forces, because of their deployable nature, may
often provide the nearest means of aviation support.
Sustained employment of airpower requires vast amounts
of logistical support. Besides the large volumes of fuel
and ordnance required, airpower by its nature is complex and
time consuming to maintain. For example, during World War
II it took 85 personnel to keep a single B-29 bomber flying
in combat. (8:194) Although modern aircraft of today are
designed with lower maintenance as a primary consideration,
it still takes large numbers of highly trained personnel and
expensive parts to keep them flying. In all cases, the air
commander must continuously analyze available basing and
logistics factors to determine their potential effect on
employment of airpower.
At the operational level of war there are few hard and
fast standards the air commander can apply in all
situations. However, at the tactical level of war there are
numerous battle drills and standard operating procedures
that may prove useful. Although there are still many
variables that must be considered, a tactical commander's
focus is by necessity on a much smaller scale. One method
the tactical commander has in approaching his problem is
known as METT-TSL. This acronym stands for: mission, enemy,
troops, terrain, time, space, and logistics. (9:50-1-50-7)
It provides a framework to break a mission down into
separate considerations that must be addressed.
The factors an air commander should consider when
analyzing the use of airpower as a tool of war also can be
formed into an acronym as shown in Table 2.
Click here to view image
It has been often said that the operational level of
war is more like an "art" rather than a "science." Each
potential conflict must be analyzed in depth to determine
cause and effect relationships. Lessons of past wars and
knowledge of today's capabilities should both go into the
commanders thought process. The acronym ACE-CG-TSL provides
the air commander with a framework to approach the
operational employment of airpower. This common sense
approach will help air commanders in determining the most
effective use of airpower at the operational level of war.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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5. Frido von Senger und Etterlin. Neither Fear Nor Hope. New
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