Military

Supporting Arms In Amphibious Operations, Past And Present

 

AUTHOR Major Samuel J. Head, USMC

 

CSC 1991

 

SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

 

 

                        EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

TITLE:  SUPPORTING ARMS IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, PAST AND

PRESENT

 

I.   Purpose:  To identify the lack of capability of supporting

arms in today's military fighting force when conducting

amphibious operations.

 

II.  Problem:  The capability of supporting arms, naval gunfire

artillery, and aviation, has been reduced to a level that puts

the mission of amphibious operations at risk.

 

III. Data:  During World War II the United States Navy had a

large number of fighting ships that could support an amphibious

operation.  These fighting ships were capable of providing both

naval gunfire and aviation assets.  The naval gunfire capability

was available in a multiple of calibers (16-,14-,12-,8-,6-and 5-

inch).  The number of aircraft carriers available in 1945 totaled

116.  Today the Navy can launch only 15 aircraft carriers and

provide 16 and 5-inch gunfire support.  The number of ships that

are capable of firing the 16-inch gun are four, two of these are

scheduled for deactivation, with the other two probably to

follow.  A solution to the naval gunfire shortfall might be the

lightweight 8-inch gunfire system, and the tomahawk cruise

missile.  The aircraft carrier problem might be a little harder

to solve.  One solution might be an increased number of LHD's

that are to be commissioned, which would position Marine Corps

AV-8B's as additional aircraft support.

 

IV.  Conclusion:  A shortfall in supporting arms capabilities has

placed the success of future amphibious operations in jeopardy.

 

V.   Recommendations:  The Navy has to develop new and improved

naval gunfire systems that will provide effective support to the

amphibious operation.  The Department of Defense should allow the

Navy to keep its 15 carriers and increase the number of LHD's for

amphibious operations.

 

 

 

SUPPORTING ARMS IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, PAST AND PRESENT

 

 

Thesis Statement:  The study of present day supporting arms

 

capabilities identifies several weak links that must be corrected

 

to ensure the successful execution of amphibious operations in

 

the future.

 

 

I.   Supporting Arms During WW II (Saipan)

 

     A.   Naval Gunfire

 

     B.   Artillery

 

     C.   Aviation

 

II.  Supporting Arms in Present Day Operations

 

     A.  Naval Gunfire

 

     B.   Artillery

 

     C.  Aviation

 

III. Future Requirements in Supporting Arms Capabilities

 

     A.  Naval Gunfire

 

          1.  Tomahawk Cruise Missile

 

          2.  Lightweight 8-inch Gunfire System

 

     B.   Lightweight 155mm Howitzer

 

     C.  Aviation

 

          1.  LHD

 

          2.  MV-22

 

 

         

SUPPORTING ARMS IN AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, PAST AND PRESENT

 

                         MAJOR SAMUEL J. HEAD  CG# 10

 

     The United States has long been a world leader, and

 

especially so, in this century.  The ability to project power

 

from the sea --to include amphibious operations-- has been a

 

capability that supported and enhanced this leadership role.  OH

 

1-1OO defines Amphibious Operation as:

 

     ...an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing

     forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing

     on a hostile shore.  It normally requires extensive air and

     naval gunfire support and is characterized by closely

     integrated efforts of forces trained, organized, and

     equipped for different combatant functions.  (11:I-1)

 

 

This definition outlines very specifically the requirements that

 

are needed to be successful in this type of operation.

 

Furthermore, the study of past operations will show the

 

interconnected reliance of supporting arms in accomplish-

 

ing this difficult mission.  The  studs of present day

 

supporting arms capabilities identifies several

 

weak links that must be strengthened to ensure the

 

successful execution of amphibious operations in the future.

 

     The nation's military history is replete with examples of

 

amphibious operations.  The Saipan operation is a classic case

 

and worth reviewing.  Clearly, the decisive use of supporting

 

arms during the battle of Saipan was a determining factor in the

 

success of the operation, and this was not an isolated case.  The

 

effective use of supporting arms was to prove effective in the

 

leapfrogging' strategy adopted by the military in the Central

 

 

Pacific Campaign during WWII.

 

     Admiral Nimitz had recommended launching a major amphibious

 

operation against either Truk or the Marianas in mid-June 1944,

 

to be followed by an assault on the Palaus about 1 October, --

 

Operation Granite.  However, the Army Air Force was pressing for

 

the early capture of the Marianas. (4:20)  The Marines would land

 

this time not primarily to seize advance naval bases or air bases

 

to support the fleet, but to capture something significantly

 

different:  bases for strategic air power.  (6:552)  The JCS had

 

issued a directive on 12 March ordering Admiral Nimitz to

 

"institute and intensify" aerial bombardment of the Carolines and

 

to conduct carrier attacks on the Marianas, Palaus, and other

 

profitable targets.  Consequently, the Southern Marianas were to

 

be seized, target date 15 June, and B-29 bases and secondary

 

naval facilities developed there. (4:20)

 

     Since the original GRANITE operation was no longer in

 

effect, GRANITE II was issued on 3 June.  With the change, the

 

Marianas were listed first as compared to last in the original

 

listing.

 

     Operation                      Target Date Tentative

Capture Saipan, Guam, Tinian        15 June 1944

Capture Palan                       8 September 1944

Occupation Mindanao                 15 November 1944

Capture Southern Formosa

     and Amoy or Luzon              15 February 1945  (4:22)

 

     Task Force 56's (Expeditionary Troops) mission was to

 

capture, occupy and defend Saipan, Tinian and Guam and be

 

prepared for further operations.  The mission pertaining to

 

Saipan and Tinian was assigned to the Northern Troops and Landing

 

 

Forces (NTLF) with the following major units:

 

     Corps Troops (Administrative and Services Elements).

     1st Battalion, 2d Marines.

     2d Marine Division (Rein) (Less 1st Battalion, 2d Marines)

           (plus 1st Battalion, 29th Marines).

     4th Marine Division (Rein).

     XXIV Corps Artillery.

     Saipan Garrison Forces (Task Group 10.13).

     Tinian Garrison Forces (Task Group 10.12).

     In Expeditionary Troops reserve, prepared for commitment on

           Saipan, Tinian, or Guam, was the United States Army's

           27th Infantry Division.  (4:27)

 

 

     The effective utilization of combined arms, naval gunfire

 

and artillery, was to be a determining factor in the swift

 

capture of Saipan by the NTLF.  The combined arms assets in Task

 

Force 58 employed by NTLF were:

 

Naval Gunfire

        Task Force 58 (TF58)

        (7)  Battleships

        (13) Cruisers

        (58) Destroyers  (4:35)

                                  

Artillery

        10th Marines (Rein).

        14th Marines.

        XXIV Corps Artillery.

        27th Division Artillery.  (4:27)

 

 

     Task Force 58 consisted of different types of ships armed

 

with different calibers and combinations of naval guns.  This

 

array of calibers provided for a devastating and highly effective

 

weapon system to punish the Japanese defenders.  To provide for

 

effective coverage of the entire island, Saipan was divided into

 

eight Fore Support Sectors (FSS) (Figure 1).  (4:39)    A closer

 

look reveals that FSS 2 and 3 were a subdivision of FSS 1, which

 

provided for the utilization of ships to support the

 

 

Click here to view image

 

 

 

 

landings over assigned beaches in that area.  Commencing on 13

 

June Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's TF58 initiated intense pre-

 

D-Day bombardments of Saipan.  For seven hours battleships fired

 

their main batteries (16" and 14") guns into the western shores

 

turning the island into a scene of desolation.  The heavy

 

bombardment caused severe problems for the defenders, as revealed

 

by these entries in captured Japanese diaries:

 

     ...I was horrified by the number of deaths on our side due

     to the naval gunfire which continued every day.

     ...We did not stay long in this fourth headquarters, caught

     in the concentration of naval gunfire the wounded and dead

     continued to increase.

     ...most feared...was the naval gunfire shelling which

     managed to reach the obscure mountain caves where CP's were

     located.

     ...The greatest single factor in the Americans success was

     naval gunfire.

     ...The feeling of everyone is `if they would only stop the

     naval gunfire.'

     ...The enemy naval gunfire, using mainly a shell with

     attacked instantaneous fuze (land shell) has great

     destructive power.  They also use a shrapnel shell.  The

     call for fire on land is extremely quick and accurate and

     until night attack units are some tens of meters away from

     the enemy, they continue to receive naval gunfire.

     ...The practical experiences of the defense forces in Saipan

     in the battle which lasted over half a month lay only in the

     power of the enemy naval gunfire bombardment.  (4:248)

 

 

     The bombardment continued and on D-minus 1 (14 June) ships

 

of the Joint Expeditionary Forces (JEF) arrived to assist TF58's

 

efforts.  With the arrival of the "old battleships," the quality

 

of gunfire support actually improved.  This was due largely in

 

part to the experience crews of the old battleships had gained

 

during earlier operations.  Pre-D-Day support was intensified as

 

the D-day assault loomed closer.  Throughout the operation naval

 

gunfire supported with speed and increasing effectiveness.  The

 

 

total number of rounds expended on troop support missions (not

 

including pre-D-Day bombardment) by battleships, cruisers, and

 

destroyers in the Saipan operation were 138,391, a weight of

 

8,500 tons.  In addition to this 5,882 starshells were fired.

 

(4:247)

 

     Once ashore, artillery was added its weight in support of

 

the operation.  To provide additional fire support at the

 

earliest opportunity, and to add to the naval gunfire support,

 

artillery was embarked on varying types of amphibious vehicles

 

for early landing.  Slightly behind the 2d and 4th Marine

 

Division's 34 LST's (landing ship, tank) were 8 LST's with the

 

division's artillery, and two LST's with the XXIV Corps

 

artillery.  At 1315 on D-Day, the 14th Marines started landing

 

and by dark had all of its units ashore.  The 10th Marines

 

commenced landing late in the day and by dark had its 1st and 2nd

 

Battalions ashore.  The following morning the 3d and 4th

 

Battalions of the 10th Marines were ashore by 1800.

 

     The requirement to get all artillery units ashore early in

 

the landing did cause some problems.  All units sustained damage

 

from enemy fire, but the 5th Battalion and 14th Marines took the

 

worst blow.  The following "box score" tells the story:

 

     By 1430 (16 June) all of Baker Battery's guns had been

     knocked out-0545:  Two guns in Able Battery knocked out-

     0630:  Other two guns Able Battery knocked out-0730:  One

     gun Charlie Battery knocked out.  This left us with two

     guns, We fired them.

     When I say `knocked out' I mean just that--trails blown off.

     sights blown off, recoil mechanisms damaged, etc.  By 1000,

     with the help of the divisions ordnance and by completely

     replacing one or two weapons, we were back in action--full

     strength--12 guns.   (4:82)

 

 

Personnel losses to the battalions during the period included

 

eight killed and over 50 WIA.  As the enemy was very active no

 

one had time to count the number of shells that landed in the

 

area of the units, but the nearest estimate was 300.  Even with

 

the heavy losses in artillery to the battalions, all weapons were

 

back in action by 1000, a great contribution to the ordnance and

 

maintenance personnel.

 

     The XXIV Corps Artillery had begun to land and was well

 

ashore on D-Plus 1.  These units now assumed an important role in

 

the fight.  Twenty-one of the twenty-four 155mm howitzers and

 

eleven of the twenty-four 155mm guns were in position and firing.

 

Long-range destruction, night harassing and interdiction fires

 

were begun in general support and reinforcement of the 10th and

 

14th Marines, and subsequently of the 27th Division Artillery.

 

Observers in liaison planes conducted registrations deep in enemy

 

territory, prevented movement and assembly by personnel during

 

daylight hours, placed destruction fires on enemy installations,

 

and provided important intelligence information for future

 

missions.  (4:109)

 

     Certainly the four major artillery units (one for each

 

division plus XXIV Corps Artillery) performed a vital function at

 

Saipan.  There were 291,459 rounds fired during the operation.

 

This figure can not tell the whole story:  time and time again

 

the 75's, 105's, and 155's brought timely, effective fire on the

 

enemy points of resistance.  All artillery units were

 

exceptionally well trained, well led, and when assigned a

 

 

mission, hit their targets.  (4:250)

 

     Naval aviation provided the air support for the Saipan

 

operation.  Commencing on 11 June, Vice Admiral Marc A.

 

Mitscher's Task Force 58 initiated three and one-half days'

 

intense bombardment.  Task Force 58 consisted of the following

 

aircraft carriers:

 

     Large carriers:  Hornet, Yorktown, Franklin, Bunker Hill,

           Wasp, Enterprise, Lexington and Essex

     Light carriers:  Bataan, Cabot, Belleau Wood, Monterey,

           Princeton, San Jacinto, Cowpens, and Langley (4:35)

 

 

From these eighteen carriers over 900 planes provided a

 

tremendous bombardment over the operational area.

 

     In support of the Saipan operation and while the carriers

 

were still over 200 miles east of the islands, a 225 plane sweep

 

surprised the Japanese in the Mariannas and destroyed 150 planes

 

in the air and on the ground.  This crippling blow depleted the

 

local air strength by about one-third and thereafter prevented

 

the enemy from reacting in strength.  The United States

 

advantage, once gained, was never lost.  "Control of the air,

 

reported Admiral Nimitz, "had been affected by the original

 

fighter sweep on 11 June." (4:35)

 

     On 12 June the serious bombardment began;  Saipan and sister

 

islands felt the impact of tons of bombs on airfields and

 

installations.  The 13th brought a resumption of the rain of

 

bombs.  With most of the planes destroyed on the ground or

 

missing in action, the Japanese responded only with sporadic dusk

 

and night attacks during this preliminary phase.

 

 

The following diary entry indicates the effect of the bombing as

 

seen by a Japanese tank noncommissioned officer, Tokuzo Matsuyo:

 

     11 June--At a little after 1300.  I was awakened by the air

     raid alarm and immediately led all men into the air raid

     trenches.  Scores of enemy Grumman fighters began strafing

     and bombing Aslito Airfield and Garapan.  For almost two

     hours. the enemy planes ran amuck and finally left leisurely

     amidst the unparalleledly inaccurate anti-aircraft fire

     All we could do was watch helplessly.

     12 June--The all day strafing and bombing was much heavier.

     It must have caused great damage to Garapan and Aslito

     Airfield.

     13 June--At 0930, enemy naval gunfire began firing in

     addition to the aerial bombing.  The enemy holds us in utter

     contempt.  If only we had a hundred planes or so.  (4:36)

 

 

     Aviation provided a preponderance of the support during the

 

initial phases of the operation.  Air spotters, in light

 

observation aircraft, directed the efforts of the pilots against

 

the enemy artillery and troop concentrations.  At times many

 

planes were stacked up waiting for directions to their targets.

 

Once the artillery was landed much of the air request for support

 

was handed over to the artillery.  The spotters continued to play

 

a crucial role in the adjustment and direction of fires on the

 

enemy.

 

     The effective, decisive and voluminous assets of naval

 

gunfire, artillery and aviation employed at Saipan paid great

 

dividends to the success of the operation.  At every opportunity

 

possible these weapons hurled shells and bombs at the enemy.

 

Every time the Japanese attempted to use their force they were

 

met with tons of ammunition and they were virtually destroyed at

 

every turn by our superior firepower.  As seen earlier in the

 

accounts of captured diaries, they paid dearly for their limited

 

 

gains.  The end was always the same, a large body count with no

 

tangible results to show for their efforts.  This story was told

 

after each and every operation during the Pacific Campaign.

 

     The history of the Saipan operation is a marvelous example

 

of the use of supporting arms in the amphibious role.  However,

 

amphibious operations and the capability for the United States to

 

conduct successful operations is now in question.  When compared

 

to the World War II example, Saipan, many problems become evident

 

in today's supporting arms capabilities.

 

     Let's start by looking at the naval gunfire capability and

 

limitations.  The capability of the Navy to provide naval gunfire

 

support to the amphibious operation in the 1944-1945 time frame

 

was tremendous.  The navy had the following number of ships with

 

a gunfire platform:

 

                        16"      14"      12"      8"      6"      5"

     

      Battleships:            13      9      1

      Battle Cruisers:                     3

      Heavy Cruisers:                           24

      Light Cruisers:                                 45

      Destroyers:                                           482

                                                      (5: 467-487)

 

This listing only covers the main armament.  All the ships had

 

the 5-inch gun as a secondary armament.  In the case of the

 

battleships, they had as many as twenty 5-inch guns.  Figure 2

 

has a detailed listing of the capability of each gunfire

 

platform.  (13:48)   The sheer power of the ships providing naval

 

gunfire support to the amphibious landing was evident in the

 

accounts of the aforementioned diaries captured during Saipan.

 

 

 

 

Click here to view image

 

 

 

     The naval gunfire capability that is avaIlable for an

 

amphibious operation today is drastically limited.  The number of

 

gunfire platforms that the Navy can provide are as follows:

 

 

                                          16"      5"

Battleships                         4

Cruisers/Destroyers/Frigates              127  (10: 131-143)

 

These ships are a far cry from the number and types of gunfire

 

platforms that were available during World War II.  Besides the

 

16-inch and 5-inch gun, the navy has the Tomahawk cruise missile

 

which can be used to provide a fire support help.  This weapon

 

comes in three types:

 

     Land attack, nuclear warhead, 1,500 nautical miles

     Land attack, conventional warhead (1,000 lb), 700 nautical

           miles

     Anti-ship, 250 nautical miles  (10:195)

 

 

As demonstrated in South West Asia, Desert Storm, the Tomahawk is

 

a very capable and highly accurate weapon.  The major drawback to

 

the employment of this weapon is the cost.  At an average cost of

 

1.4 million dollars the use of this weapon becomes highly

 

restrictive. (3:36)  Budget cuts limited production in FY 1990 to

 

only 400, down from 510 in FY 1989.  In FY 1991, the Navy sought

 

funding for 600, but Congress reduced that number to 400.  The

 

Navy has announced its requirement for 3,630 missiles to fill the

 

inventory needs.  (10:196)  With the deactivation of the

 

Battleships, naval gunfire support will be severely limited.

 

This shortfall will cause a major problem in supporting a hostile

 

landing by U.S. forces and may require the use of the Tomahawk to

 

 

fill the gap.

 

     Carrier-based aviation has long been a major player in

 

providing supporting fires to the amphibious operation.  With the

 

limited assets the Navy has to deliver naval gunfire support, and

 

the limited ranges that the ships can reach (Figure 2), carrier

 

aviation will play a much larger role in the future.  The United

 

States had 116 carriers by the end of 1945.  The following is a

 

list by class and number:

 

 

      CLASS                   NUMBER

 

      MIDWAY                        3

      ESSEX                              24

      INDEPENDENCE                  8

      ENTERPRISE                    1

RANGER                        1

SARATOGA                      1

COMMENCEMENT                  19

SANGAMON                      4

CASABLANCA                    45

BOGUE                         10  (5: 459-466)

 

 

 

In 1947 the United States had more than 450 overseas bases.  The

 

number has decreased to 120 today, with the majority in NATO.

 

United States access to overseas bases will continue to decline

 

in the future.  All these decreases limit United States options

 

in crises-response planning.  Overflight rights have also

 

diminished during the past 40 years, requiring United States

 

aircraft to use more circuitous routes when responding to crises.

 

(8:65)

 

     Today the navy has fifteen carriers in the active fleet.

 

CLASS                           TYPE

 

Nimitz                            5

Enterprise                        1

J. F. Kennedy                     1

Kitty Hawk                        3

Forrestal                         4

Midway                            1  (10:128)

 

 

This represents a drastic reduction in the capability of the Navy

 

to support the requirement for sea based aviation.  A further

 

dilemma is facing the Navy, and in the long run the Marine Corps,

 

in the reduction of carriers from fifteen to thirteen by the year

 

1995.  (1:67)  Part of the thirteen carriers includes one

 

training carrier.  This reduction in ships, aviation assets, will

 

further hamper the ability of the United States to conduct an

 

amphibious assault against a hostile shore.

 

     The last supporting arm in the amphibious operation is

 

artillery.  The fact remains that artillery can't support the

 

initial landing, unless land is available within range, and the

 

artillery can be pre-landed.  The best example for this is Tinian

 

when artillery was fired from Saipan to assist in the landing on

 

Tinian.  The chances for this to occur again are remote, however,

 

by and large the types and caliber of artillery support

 

available today are well suited to defeat the enemy.  There is a

 

problem in that the artillery of today is very heavy.  The M198

 

howitzer can only be lifted by the CH-53E helicopter.  (2:73)  In

 

amphibious operations the requirement for heavy helicopter assets

 

will be strapped because the weight of Marine Corps equipment

 

that can only be lifted by the CH-53E has risen.  The priorities

 

and available assets are going to be a continuing problem.

 

     The ability to assault across a hostile beach must be

 

 

maintained.  Clearly, there are several problem areas and we need

 

to focus our attention on these areas and find solutions that

 

will allow us to continue amphibious operations where required.

 

     The first area that must be addressed is naval gunfire.  The

 

Tomahawk cruise missile, as discussed before, may be the answer.

 

The Navy could resurrect the 8-inch major caliber lightweight gun

 

(MCLWG) that is fully developed and has been evaluated at sea.

 

That weapon could have been provided to all 31 Spruance

 

destroyers, replacing the ship's forward 5-inch gun, again with

 

no impact on the ship's other combat capabilities.  Eight-inch

 

guns with rocket-assisted projectiles on 31 ships could provided

 

more support than 4 (now 2) battleships.  (7:24)  The new class

 

of destroyer, Arleigh Burke, with its complement of Tomahawk

 

cruise missiles and 5-inch gun, add a new dimension to support.

 

If the 5-inch gun were replaced with the 8-inch, its power

 

obviously would be increased.

 

     The aviation problem is a little more complex.  If the

 

number of carriers can't be increased, or the number can't be

 

kept at 15, little can be done.  A possible solution to the

 

problem is Marine Corps aviation.  The new Wasp class of ship

 

(LHD), has a tremendous capability, being able to embark Marine

 

Harriers (AV-8B's), which means that the Marine Corps in essence

 

has created its own air support.  This could reduce some of the

 

loss of naval aviation and keep the balance of power somewhat

 

equal.  (12:123)

 

     Artillery in support of amphibious operations will always be

 

 

a matter of timing --can we get it ashore?  The weight of the

 

artillery system is also a handicap.  Currently only the CH-53E

 

helicopter is capable of moving the M198 from ship-to-shore.  The

 

procurement of the MV-22, Osprey, would increase the number of

 

platforms that can lift the howitzer, but the Osprey is

 

questionable.  (9:371)  The Marines are presently looking into a

 

lightweight 155mm howitzer to replace the M198, a step that would

 

alleviate the weight problem because more systems will be able to

 

lift it to the beach and move it around the battlefield.

 

     The United States leadership role is sure to continue;

 

therefore, assets must be maintained accordingly.  The option of

 

replacing all our eggs in one basket to support one operation, as

 

in Desert Storm, might not be available in the future.  We may be

 

required to support several hot spots at one time, a requirement

 

that must be attainable.  Clearly the amphibious operation, as

 

defined in OH 1-100, although it is a resource heavy endeavor

 

that requires many types of support, must be supportable.  Desert

 

Storm, just as Granite II in WW II, clearly demonstrates the

 

value of fire support in military operations.

 

 

                                 

                                 Bibliography

 

1.   Annual Report to the President and the Congress.  Report of

     the Secretarv of Defense to the President and the Congress.

     January 1991.

 

2.   Hardy, Phillips, B., Major. "Heavy Helicopters:  the Past,

     the Present, and the Future."  Marine Corps Gazette (May

     1989).

 

3.   Hessman, James D. "Major Navy/USMC Weapons Programs.

     Seapower (March 1990).

 

4.   Hoffman, Carl W.  Saipan:  The Beginning of the End.

     Headquarters United States Marine Corps:  United States

     Marine Corps, 1950.

 

5.   Jane's -Fighting Ships, 1944-1945.  New York:  The MacMillian

     Company.

 

6.   Moskin, Robert J.  The U. S. Marine Corps Story.  New York,

     N.Y.:  McGraw Hill Book Company, 1977.

 

7.   Polar, Norman. "Battleships and Naval Gunfire Support."

     Marine Corps Gazette (October 1990).

 

8.   Pugh, Paul F. and Linn, Thomas C.  Rediscovering the Force-

     in-Readiness.  Armed Forces Journal (August 1989).

 

9.   Taylor, John W. R. ed.  Jane's All the Worlds Aircraft. 1989-

     1990.

 

10.  Thomas, Vincent C. Jr. "Seapower, Facts and Figures.

     Seapower (January 1991).

 

11.  U. S. Marine Corps.  Marine Corps Combat Development

     Command.  Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations, OH 1-

     100.  Quantico, 1989.

 

12.  Walsh, Edward J. "LHD-1 Stands by to Join the Fleet."

     Seapower (April 1989).

 

13.  Wheeler, Donald M.  Naval Gunfire Support of Amphibious

Operations:   Past, Present, Future.  Defense Technical

Information Center.