The MAGTF'S Decisive Blow: An ACE-Drawn Reserve
AUTHOR Major Jack R. Harkins, Jr., USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE MAGTF'S DECISIVE BLOW: AN ACE-DRAWN
RESERVE
I. Purpose: To survey the conceptual framework for the Aviation
Combat Element (ACE) to provide all or a portion of the MAGTF
reserve.
II. Problem: The ACE has capabilities that characterize maneuver
elements, but is not truly viewed as such by most Marines, nor
considered suited to perform the reserve role as the decisive force
in battle. MAGTF doctrine as a whole is evolving toward
formalization and the potential to expand or restrict the practice
and thought of MAGTF leaders is embodied in the case for developing
the ACE-drawn reserve concept.
III. Position: The ACE has combat power, mobility, the capability to
execute mission-type orders, command and control, ability to survey
and control terrain and other characteristic of maneuver elements
central to Maneuver Warfare. The imperative for a potent reserve to
drastically change the balance in warfare should cause Marines to
consider all the power resident in the MAGTF that might compromise
part or all of the reserve. Although doctrine does not provide for the
ACE performing the reserve role, it has capabilities that can
enhance employing the reserve in a bid to seal victory. At both the
operational and tactical levels the ACE can fulfill the reserve role.
The MAGTF commander establishes the criteria for selecting an ACE-
drawn reserve by applying METT-TSL and by stating: the probable
missions of the reserve, the requirements for mission success, and
the tasks to the elements forming the reserve. Principles of the
reserve engaging decisively only on the commander's order and
committing the reserve in mass are applied to the method of
constituting the reserve from the ACE. The reserve may be the
aircraft and crews that are in a re-arm, refuel, rest cycle or it may
be forces which are sequestered out of action until their
commitment as the reserve is ordered.
IV. Conclusion: The MAGTF commander can select the ACE to
constitute all or part of his reserve. Recognizing this potential and
developing it should become a priority of doctrine-makers and
MAGTF planners, and Marines should be taught that the potential
exists.
The MAGTF's Decisive Blow: An ACE-Drawn Reserve
The battles at the landing beaches and the helicopter landing
zones had been violent and brief. That is, except for Task Force
Heavy's day-long running duel with enemy anti-armor companies
while the tanks had moved inland from the air-cushion craft landing
zones and had taken Landing Force Objectives 2 and 3. Now the
Marine Expeditionary Brigade's ground combat power was completely
ashore and the amphibious assault had gained the beachhead the
commander wanted to protect the airfield and port during the
landing of the 3rd and 1st Marine Divisions and the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing, in follow-on order. Marines and Sailors who had made
the landings were now grateful for the decision to come in under
overcast and through rain clouds. Since their opponent's air forces
had never showed up during the assault and the Marine A-6 air
attacks had been so devastating to what enemy artillery and armor
had tried to stop them (and only two helos had missed their LZs and
aborted), quick success and light casualties had given a bright cast
to the gray clouds.
But the general wasn't showing elation as he finished passing
his orders for D+3 to D+6: "While all those regiments and helo
squadrons are coming inland and we push the beachhead line out, I'm
sure the enemy pressure will increase. They may concentrate enough
at the foothills that we could destroy their presence in the western
peninsula, if we hit fast. I'm giving the MEB mechanized reserve
back to the 5th Marines CO. He'll need everybody to keep the
beachhead secure while guiding the arriving battalions and handing
off battle areas. What we need now is a reserve that can strike out
and destroy the enemy division and their artillery when our
reconnaissance finds them massing. I'm having the Air Group
Commander put a third of all units into a reserve task force that
will be fully read-in to all engagements and enemy situations and be
able to strike at a massed force, as well as defeat its air support,
within an hour of the signal. To keep air superiority and still fly all
the ongoing close air support we need will give MAG-50's committed
two-thirds a tough chunk to chew; but, as always, our success will
hinge on the aircrews and I know they can do this. Questions?"
Since this CG's trademark was 'no such thing as business as
usual,' the latest innovation caused only a few moist frowns and
then the commanders and staff officers moved back through the dark
and mist to get the word to their own people.
The foregoing fictional scenario portrays an action that draws
immediate criticism and correction by a preponderance of Marine
aviators posed with the concept of placing aircraft and aircrews in
reserve. Responses primarily approximate "airplanes aren't put in
reserve, just like artillery isn't put in reserve and "no, the ACE can
surge to meet the critical time/place opportunity but fly everything
in a normal tasking schedule in the meanwhile." Little other
attention is afforded the issue even in academic and decision-game
venues. This may evidence that the common reaction is right and the
concept of the reserve must not encompass Marine aviation, or it
may mean that the concept has been neglected and merits
development. This essay is an attempt to determine if one case can
be proven.
The commander of the modern Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) brings into an operational theater a force of such
versatility and capability that its range of employment is
practically limited only by the talent and imagination of its
leadership. The balanced and complementing Ground Combat Element
(GCE) and Aviation Combat Element (ACE) are able to tailor their
sizes and make-up according to mission and enemy threat variables,
and the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) task organizes to
become as much "tail" as the "teeth" need. So a MAGTF can be called
upon to conduct a massive amphibious assault against opposed
shores in a high-intensity conflict or to perform a hostage rescue in
isolated counter-terrorist actions, or to do any and all in between.
The most compelling aspect of the MAGTF in relation to the
range of roles and enemy situations it must address is that it
includes a powerful air arm. As expeditionary combat aviation the
MAGTF ACE is the most unique force in the world. Combat aviation
has a deserved high status in modern warfare that is long standing.
The United States' most recent war against the armed forces of Iraq
in the Persian Gulf brilliantly recalls the words of German General
Erwin Rommell: "The future battle on the ground will be preceded by
battle in the air. This will determine which of the contestants has
to suffer operational and tactical disadvantages and be forced
throughout the battle into adopting compromise solutions. "(13:39)
Still the Marine Corps professional community has tended to
undervalue the significance of the ACE and demonstrated more
concern to division elements. During a 1991 formal Marine Corps
school's two-day practical exercise, for example, the Decision
Game's written reference to the 6th MEB contained only the
identification of three infantry battalions. A bias to consider
Marine Aviation merely a fire support arm--the aerial corps
artillery--and to espouse that it isn't decisive, degrades progress of
doctrine and practice to maximize the utility of all the MAGTF's
power.
As Marines discourse on maneuver warfare, recognition should
be accorded to the ACE's ability to execute Mission-Type orders, to
move against and engage enemy forces on the surface, and to survey
and control terrain, characteristic abilities of maneuver elements.
Army Air-Land Battle Future already speaks eloquently to the
employment of aviation in massed attack formations as a maneuver
asset that can have operational level influence for decisive
actions.(7:28) The MAGTF ACE employed with imagination and verve
could surely take at least as crucial a place. The potential for the
ACE to fulfill the vital role of the MAGTF reserve, just as well as
being the MAGTF focus of effort, certainly merits recognition and
doctrinal development.
A question likely vital to pursuing the subject further at all is
whether any argument may persuade aviators to devote more
consideration to this issue. If so, it surely must emerge from a
voice in the air. In his excellent book of operational-level art, The
Air Campaign, Colonel John A. Warden III, USAF, makes very
compelling arguments for air forces to employ reserves. Describing
the shock value of reserves, he emphasizes the mental shock to
enemy troops and commanders from the appearance of reserves, and
that a physical shock effect can also be achieved. Since momentum
is a product of mass and velocity, a force's momentum, assuming a
constant velocity, will be in direct proportion to its mass. Thus air
forces massed by committing reserves could overwhelm by
momentum and shock.(12:118) Colonel Warden contends that a sortie
not flown is not a sortie lost, despite the general feeling that
aircraft are to fly as much as possible, and that some target will
appear for every sortie.(12:119) He instructs that not every day of
battle has equal importance for either opponent:
In fact, effort in war comes in spurts and surges, rather
than some inexorable pressure like a flowing river. Lulls
between enemy offensive or defensive surges offer
opportunities that can be exploited if force is available
to do so.
The theater commander would like to be able
concentrate ground and air power to take advantage of
these opportunities, but he can't if close air has been
expended in some mechanical way. Thus a sortie may be
more valuable on one day than on another. And a sortie
that is available on a later day because an aircraft was
not previously lost in combat or is not down for needed
maintenance may not be a wasted sortie by any means.
Indeed, a sortie saved is worth more than a sortie rashly
used.(12:126)
Doctrine for the employment of a MAGTF is both in place and
emerging. Within Marine Corps, Navy, and joint orders and
handbooks, the material for guidance, restriction, or license, is
prevalent. Dictums and principles laid down by authoritative
strategists, tacticians, and just plain warriors describing the use of
a combat reserve are well summed by William S. Lind in Maneuver
Warfare Handbook:
In both the offense and the defense a strong
reserve provides the key to retaining the initiative and
achieving victory. It is a tool with which you widen gaps
and create breakthroughs by reinforcing local successes.
It also comprises the counterattack forces. Without a
strong reserve, even the most promising opportunities
will be wasted, for you will be unable to exploit them.
Indeed a strong reserve offers such potential advantages
that it should reflect a sort of inverse proportionality--
the weaker the main force with respect to the enemy, the
stronger the reserve. Also the more uncertain or
confusing the situation is, the stronger the reserve
should be.(6:22)
The MAGTF commander in concurrence with a strong reserve may
then seek the doctrinal guidelines for constituting the MAGTF
reserve. He will find that the topic is not treated exhaustively in
Marine Corps manuals and handbooks. In joint landing force doctrine
only the complexity of reserve commitment is expressed, in the
ground combat operations realm only fundamental precepts and the
suitability of tanks and mechanized units for the reserve are
covered, and aviation doctrine omits the reserve. This fortunately
affords the commander the comfortable latitude enjoyed when
interpreting generalizations and the declarations of Clausewitz, et
al, to his own universe.
Considerable implications for a commander's methodologies
descend from whether his role is at the Operational level of war or
at the Tactical level. A simple determinant test of this resides in
FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. Operations, the discipline of campaigning,
uses tactical actions to realize a strategic aim. It governs force
deployments, commitments to or withdrawal from combat and
tactical action sequencing to achieve strategic objectives. Tactics
is the discipline of fighting and winning in combat. Tactics
maneuvers forces, applies and coordinates fires, sustains forces for
combat, and collects and passes combat information.(4:5-7) The
distinction as to which level of war a MAGTF commander is
performing, operational or tactical, is important for the
consideration of the reserve as a concept, since reserves can have
very different origin and content at each level.
MAGTFs, including MEFs, are most likely to be tactical
elements, performing missions assigned by a higher level such as a
unified command or joint task force. Still, in a limited theater or a
low to mid-intensity conflict occurrence, a MAGTF could be the lead
command for planning and completing a campaign to achieve a
national strategy objective. A MAGTF commander could even
experience entering a theater of war as a tactical commander--to
land a MEF and achieve an assigned objective, for example--then
become an operational commander required to develop and execute a
campaign of pacification or nation-building.
Since the MAGTF could perform at either level, the differences
of tactical and operational reserves should be clarified. Tactical
reserves are forces designated to be in readiness to engage an enemy
force, begin an advance through a penetration, gain a decisive
objective, etc., in a battle that is actually joined. An example is the
tank battalion of the division made the reserve for a MEF in the
defense. All MAGTFs, of course, have forces and thus all (MEUs, MEBs
and MEFs) are capable of establishing and employing a tactical
reserve. Just what force(s) should become the MAGTF tactical
reserve, and how it is controlled will be considered further on.
The operational reserve is combat power which the commander
can calculate use of at a future time or place (not for "today's
battle"). Therefore, operational reserves can be massed
conventional fires (including air strikes), theater unconventional
weapons, or even various forms of logistic support, as well as
forces. Whatever the commander introduces that substantially
changes the combat power equation or denies the enemy options can
be operational reserves. The operational commander may be able to
generate reserves as a campaign progresses from one battle to the
next --unlike the tactical commander who must have a reserve
readily available to the battle he is fighting. A MEF, then, may be
able to employ operational reserves (and even a MEB or a MEU in very
precisely drawn circumstances); and in theory it should be able to
constitute the reserve from any or all of its elements, including the
ACE.
The MAGTF commander or air planner may feel in need of an
example of a successful air reserve on which to found his choice to
constitute an operational reserve from the ACE. One case is that air
reserves won the Battle of Britain: British Air Marshall Dowding in
August-September 1940, having kept a third of the RAF fighters out
of the battle zone and out of the fighting (even through what
Churchill called the darkest hour!) put operational and strategic
reserves into the air in complete mass on 15 September against
Germany's attempted knock-out bombing raid on London. The RAF
thereby made approximately twice the opposition the Luftwaffe
thought possible and broke the daylight bombing effort.(11:99, 151-
165) In that case the RAF was in the defense and was outnumbered.
So, a commander might begin to make those conditions two criteria
for holding an aviation reserve, but he shouldn't assume that Air
Marshall Dowding would! If it is valid on the offensive or when
favorably matched to an enemy's strength, to hold ground forces in
reserve, why shouldn't air forces be so used as well? Dowding's
courage to hold a reserve through the darkest hour would surely have
supported holding some squadrons out of an offensive air schedule.
The lesson, perhaps, is that the only criteria for the operational
reserve is the capability to achieve the desired result.
Armed with some history to support constituting his
operational reserve from the ACE, the MAGTF commander then
considers the method he will apply and the correct description.
Tenets of reserve employment require that the reserve not engage
decisively until the commander so orders, and that the commander
commit the reserve as a whole entity--not piecemeal. Appropriate
terminology for the holding of some squadrons, or some numbers of
aircraft and aircrew, out of action to form a reserve is to sequester
those forces. When a force is sequestered as the reserve, two
tenets are fulfilled and, at least briefly, some warriors experience
frustration.
The ACE commander who receives the mission to sequester a
reserve for the MAGTF could have some squadrons concentrate solely
on the known, scheduled missions and have other formations wait in
readiness, focused upon the possibilities for tomorrow's unfoldings.
The MAGTF commander who is phasing a force ashore and is
supported with carrier-based or out-of-country based aviation
might select the ACE's shore-based units, as they locate within the
beachhead, to be in reserve and concealed, while air superiority and
close air support goals are maintained with carrier and remotely
sited elements. This ACE-ashore reserve protects its strength and
disposition from the enemy, builds up munitions and fuel stocks,
closely monitors the ground and air campaign developments, and
plans routes and tactics for maximum effectiveness when
committed. The local security and defense requirements this would
entail are significant, but should be considerably less difficult to
meet than if the ACE-ashore was mounting regular flight schedules.
At the operational level the ACE might provide part of a
reserve whose mission to open a new front at the right moment
would involve lifting forces and combat stocks far across the
theater. This would require extensive preparation to move by
strategic lift and theater transport assets. For example, a MEF that
air lifted a MEB with its GCE, ACE and CSSE behind an enemy's
borders, would demand sequestering that entire MEB for the airlift
preparation some days in advance of commitment, if the maneuver
had to be executed instantly on order.
Were the commander to decide that the operational reserve
could reside within the ACE without sequestering any elements,
there may be a feature employed in the air schedule to ensure
certain numbers of aircraft were in Alert status. On a cyclical basis
then, the reserve would actually appear on the Air Tasking Order
(ATO) as alert missions. As previously cited, the operational
commander may be able to generate reserves from one battle to the
next. For example, the sections/divisions returning from deep air
strikes may be turned into Alert formations in reserve for the
events emerging as tomorrow's battle.
If a case for drawing the MAGTF reserve from the ACE at the
operational level is somewhat well-based by now, the issue of the
tactical MAGTF's reserve is surely still very problematic for most.
The tactical commander, though aware of his senior's intent, would
more likely carry concern for the craftsmanship in the attack (or
defense) his MAGTF is building than for the artistry of the overall
operation. That concern will lead him to seek criteria for the
method of constituting a tactical MAGTF reserve, especially one
drawn, or partially drawn, from his ACE.
METT-TSL (consideration of: Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops
and fire support available - Time/Space, and Logistics) will
obviously be the starting and concluding reference on setting
criteria for reserve constitution. Mission capability will be the
most vital determinant in force selection, so the commander
endeavors to foresee the mission his reserve must perform and
evaluate the ability of the ACE to accomplish it. At this juncture
the practices of the higher level commander are pertinent: the joint
task force or unified commander's taskings for Marine air and the
potential use of a Joint ATO can profoundly impact the MAGTF
commander's employment of the ACE in a Joint Theater of
Operations. In concert with the higher commander and the air
component commander, if one is appointed, the MAGTF commander
must validate the missions and profile he expects to assign to the
ACE. With the joint issue addressed, the specifics of the ACE
reserve role capability can be examined.
An ACE-drawn reserve can: Seize air superiority in a highly
contested situation, conduct an attack to destroy or neutralize an
enemy force, pursue a retreat or withdrawal, interdict an attacking
formation, deny use of an avenue of approach or movement corridor,
control vital terrain or routes, and more. Aviation alone is not the
choice to seize terrain objectives that must be occupied, capture
enemy ground elements, or gain ground. [Of course, the GCE
commander may well add that ground forces alone aren't the best
choice for these latter missions either.] Determining the probable
mission of the reserve and the ACE's matching capabilities has
commenced the criteria for constituting the ACE-drawn reserve.
Attention is drawn then to the size and content of the reserved force
and the technique to designate and employ it, although in the
application of METT-TSL the consideration of forces available has
been ongoing and overlapping.
The tactical commander should express the reserve
requirement in terms of the mission(s) the reserve is to perform.
Projecting the battle conditions, the enemy actions, and his own
achievements may be the most trying of all the commander's
functions, and is probably an art; but it deserves effort, for by this
the reserve mission is focused. The requirement for success of the
mission should be stated next. Will gaining air superiority for one
day seal a victory? Is destruction of an enemy force or weapon
system required? Will neutralization be sufficient? By setting out
the reserve mission and requirements for success, the commander
serves the future performance of his reserve while supporting his
force selection decision. A force in reserve positions and prepares
itself and plans its actions, just as a committed attacking or
defending force, and it must rely on the commander assigning it as
the reserve for crucial orientation through mission and success
requirement statements. Tasking is then laid upon the subordinate
commander who controls the forces selected for the reserve to
effect its constitution.
The tasking must clarify if the reserve is sequestered or able
to participate in some action(s) concurrent with preparedness for
commitment to the MAGTF commander's bid for victory. Recalling
the principle that the reserve avoids decisive engagement until the
commander so orders, or until a triggering event the commander has
identified (in stating his intent or the reserve mission), lends
weight to sequestering. While the paper chart of scheduled,
committed and returned aircraft and crews may portray, say, 40%
strength always available on deck in some condition of
preparedness; that assumes that all sorties end by returning in
condition to fly again rapidly. Once launched, a flight that would
theoretically be part of the reserve in a few hours--upon return, re-
arm, refuel, rest--could be lost or damaged; and the commander
can't preclude the decisive engagement of the reserve in piecemeal
order. This is not to forbid a pact between the ACE and MAGTF
commanders employing a cyclical alert reserve / scheduled sortie
pattern to rotate aircrews and craft while sustaining the reserve by
some feature, such as bonus scheduled sorties that could be
cancelled. Trust and a thorough grasp of the commander's intent can
usually part the waters of limitations.
Command and control of the reserve is a major concern of the
commander and he will verify with the controlling subordinate
commander the procedures and communication links necessary to
employ his selected reserve both prior to and during commitment of
the force. The desire to commit the reserve in mass, at once, may
dictate that airborne command and control assets support the
reserve, just as it may dictate that the reserve have cohesive units,
such as squadrons, in the force to enhance simultaneous, coordinated
maneuver/attack. The Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) that
launches the ACE-drawn reserve by the commander's order or
guidance must be as prepared as the reserve formation itself to
respond in consonance with the requirements for success. So the
TACC shall know and rehearse its tasks along with the reserve force.
The procedures and capabilities described above may be better
illustrated with the following possible example: A robust MEB's ACE
tasked with providing the reserve in sufficient strength to
neutralize enemy armored flank formations of regimental size, and
to maintain momentum by regaining any air superiority lapses
against a significant fixed-wing and helo threat, has designated
two-fifths of the total command to be in reserve. The air group
operations officer has all units to divide into fourths and makes up
three task forces. Every squadron and detachment is tasked to
maintain a 25% level in Task Force A, 25% in Task Force B and 50% in
Task Force C. The aircraft and aircrews of Task Forces A and B are
used in the daily schedules to fulfill ATO missions; Task Force C is
sequestered as the MAGTF/ACE reserve. Since every squadron
remains involved in all operations, the squadron COs exercise
responsibility to keep the reserve force crews situationally aware
and involved in the reserve mission planning. Task Forces A and B
divide the day's missions by twelve hour blocks for each, to
facilitate setting tempo and coordination with supported units. As
the GCE and CSSE request increases to the current ATO, the ACE
commander employs his reserve, the extra aircraft and crews in
Task Force C above the mandated strength of the MAGTF reserve, to
add sorties. Squadrons retain latitude to rotate aircraft and
personnel among the Task Forces, keeping the aircrews briefed on
missions and requirements as they take their place in reserve.
While the MEB commander uses the GCE's maneuver and ACE's long-
range impact to shape the battlefield and put the enemy into a
dangerous dilemma, the reserve is yearning to deliver a decisive
blow.
The MAGTF's multi-dimensional nature should be maximized,
rather than limited, by the practices and proclamations of Marines.
Drawing a MAGTF reserve from the ACE is a capability that promotes
that maximization, if Marines of the ground and air realms alike will
acknowledge and develop it. Sufficient potential is revealed by this
initial survey to demonstrate that guidelines for the formation and
employment of a MAGTF reserve drawn from the ACE can be crafted
with the flexibility and coherence to support a commander's
establishing his criteria and methods to make his bid for victory
with Marine Corps aviation.
Bibliography
1. Blunt, V.E.R. The Use of Air Power. Harrisburg, PA: The Military
Service Publishing Company, 1943.
2. Dunnigan, James F. How To Make War: A Comprehensive Guide To
Modern Warfare. New York: William Morrow, 1988.
3. Frommelt, Jr., W. Todd. An Analysis of the Command and Control
and Integration of Marine Air-Ground Task Force Tactical Fixed
Wing Aviation In Sustained Joint Force Operations Ashore.
Quantico, VA: Student Research and Writing AY: 1984-85,
1985.
4. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. Washington, DC: Headquarters U.S. Marine
Corps, 1990.
5. Gaines, R. Stockton, Willard E. Naslund,.and Ralph Strauch.
Combat Operations Decisionmaking In Tactical Air Command
and Control. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1980.
6. Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder and London:
Westview Press, 1985.
7. Mets, David R. Land-Based Air Power In Third World Crises.
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1986.
8. Ostovich III, Major General Rudolph. "Army Aviation in AirLand
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9. Record, Jeffrey. "Why the Air War Worked. " Armed Forces Journal
International April 91: 44-5.
10. Strategy and Tactics of Air Warfare. Will Fowler, ed.
Seacaucus, NJ: Chartwell Books, Inc., 1979.
11. Taylor, Telford. The Breaking Wave. New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1967.
12. Warden III, John A. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat.
Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1988.
13. Westenhoff, Lt. Col. Charles M. Military Air Power. Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1990.
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