Underlying Causes For The Iraqi Debacle
AUTHOR Major Larry D. Huffman, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Foreign Policy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
UNDERLYING CAUSES FOR THE IRAQI DEBACLE
A thorough discussion of the events which resulted
in the recent Iraqi invasion of Kuwait must go beyond
those found in current periodical literature or
reported by the Cable News Network. Underlying reasons
date back to the emergence of Iraq as a sovereign state
in 1958 when the monarchy was overthrown and a series
of unsuccessful governments attempted to find the key
element which would unite a backward country.
The history of Iraq from 1958, and its struggle to
establish a socialist state among a populace influenced
by the Muslim religion, is one of turmoil. Discord
which developed with the West furthered the chaos which
could not be controlled except by a strong central
governing body. One man, Saddam Hussein, tempered by
influences in his younger years, would govern only
after years of struggle. The factors which influenced
his personality development and leadership style are
key elements in the underlying causes of the Kuwatti
invasion.
His successful attempts at economic reform,
following the socialist model, required sacrifice
generally accepted by the Muslim nation in their belief
that whatever happened was the will of God. The Arab
way of thinking and its distrust for Western values
would strongly influence Iraq as Saddam ascended to the
Presidency.
Under Saddam the people of Iraq would at least
enjoy stability that was unprecedented in recent Iraqi
history. Their standard of living would rise to new
found heights only to be severely degraded in the
recent encounter. An understanding of the history of
Iraq and the influences which shaped it, when combined
with an appreciation for the religious and economic
structure of that nation, will provide insight into the
less understood causes for the Iraqi debacle.
UNDERLYING CAUSES FOR THE IRAQI DEBACLE
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. An understanding of Iraq's political
history, and its economic and religious structure, beginning
just prior to the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and
ending with Saddam Hussein's ascendance to the Presidency in
1979. will provide insight into the background which
contributed to the recent invasion of Kuwait.
I. Iraq's emergence as a sovereign Arab state in 1958
A. Turmoil prior to 1955
B. The Baghdad Pact
C. The rise of Abid al-Karim Qasim
1. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in l961
2. Isolation and withdrawal
II. Saddam Hussein's rise to power
A. As a youth
B. Underground after his failed 1964 coup attempt
C. The successful l968 coup
D. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1973
E. Saddam's developing leadership style
F. Changes under the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC)
G. Saddam's rising influence
H. Saddam comes to power
III. Economic and religious development
A. Development as a socialist society
l. Land and agrarian reform
2. Industrialization
B. Religious influences
The 1991 debacle for Iraq was not the first time Iraq
had been severely penalized for attempting to exert it's
territorial claim on its Arab neighbor, Kuwait. An
understanding of the country's political history, and its
economic and religious structure, beginning just prior to
the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and ending with
Saddam's ascendance in 1979, will provide insight into the
circumstances which contributed to the recent invasion of
Kuwait.
This paper will not pursue more recent events which
influenced Saddam's decision to strike out against another
Arab state. Those events include the Iraqi military build-
up, the economic consequences of the war with Iran,
influence from the Russians.and the validity of the
Palestinian question. By accepting that the Iraqi invasion
was caused solely by these reasons would ignore some of the
basic, chaotic underpinnings of what influenced Iraq's most
recent attempt to annex Kuwait in August, 1990.
The period preceding 1955 was one of political unrest,
strikes, and police repression within Iraq. These
destabilizing events continued, in part, due to
dissatisfaction with Arab national borders. These borders
had been arbitrarily dictated by European powers between the
world wars. The country was then headed by Nuri al-Sa id,
the regent, serving under what was to be the last Iraqi
Hashimite king.
The feelings of insecurity resulting from years of
turmoil within the nation resulted in its entering into a
fateful alliance, the Baghdad Pact of 1955. To foster
internal stability, Iraq was determined that it must develop
closer ties with the West. Eventually that Baghdad Pact
included Turkey, Iran, Pakistan as well as Britain. The
Nuri government did not feel comfortable allied with only
Arab states as the unrest in other Arab countries paralleled
those in Iraq. Although the United States did not become a
signatory, they did serve on several of the Pact's
committees. Iraq's association with Western powers was to
cause severe consequences for the Iraqi monarchy. That
opposition was led by the Egyptian government.
President Nasser of Egypt was the most powerful and
popular Arab leader of the time. He vehemently and publicly
opposed the Pact because of its formal ties with the West.
His opposition would doom the existing Iraqi government and
monarchy. Nasser distanced himself from the Western
alliance and claimed to have been taken by surprise by
Iraq's actions. However, Nuri had discussed the plan with
him in Nasser's Cairo office before entering into the Pact.
The depth of the split with Egypt was profound. As a
result, Egypt broadcast a speech over the Voice of the Arabs
radio station in Cairo which was intended to oust the Iraqi
government.
Today ... the peoples and states of the Arab
League are witnessing a new barefaced treason, the
hero of which is Nuri al-Sa id. His insistence on
this alliance, his challenge to the Arab peoples,
and his trifling with their most sacred rights is
an act of treachery against Arabism far more
damaging to the Arab League than anything done by
Israel or Zionism. (8:119)
This broadcast, heard throughout Iraq, incited more
demonstrations, strikes, and newspaper articles than Nuri
could handle with his police. He knew the officer corps,
the only group that could overthrow him, was listening to
the Voice of Cairo. However, he determined their loyalty
was secure as he had carefully provided them and their
families with special compensations.
The growing opposition within Iraq exploded when
Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt in 1956. Massive
protests were then held against the Western attack and
Iraq's membership in the Baghdad Pact. Iraq was left in a
no-win situation. They were allied with a Western nation
which was now at war with a brother Arab state. Martial law
was declared when the common tactic of controlling
opposition with the police failed. The government had to
close all colleges and universities after 5O police officers
were wounded in Baghdad; secondary schools were also closed
and strikes spread.
Meanwhile the Nuri government continued it's attempts
at developing the backward country to include the
improvement of it's infrastructure; new dams, roads, and
hospitals. These changes would prove to be inadequate to
salvage the regime's image. (8:120)
The time for change was obvious. Nuri offered his
resignation and it came as no surprise when it was accepted.
He would, however, return to assume leadership of Iraq.
A disjointed effort to form another cabinet only
demonstrated the disarray that had become pervasive. The
monarchy's attempts at forming a new government resulted in
the appointment of two prime ministers in quick succession.
The first, Ali Jawdat, leaned away from the Baghdad Pact but
the second, Abol al-Wahhab Mirjan, a Baghdad Law College
graduate and supporter of Nuri, endorsed the Pact. (8:121)
The cabinet selected by Abol indicated that the power again
rested with Nuri. On 2 March 1958 Nuri once again assumed
control after Abol resigned. This time his government was
to last but 25 days.
At about this time Jordan proposed an Iraqi-Jordanian
federation to counter the recent alignment between Syria and
Egypt. Iraq asked Kuwait, still under British influence, to
join but Kuwait shunned the idea. Kuwait did not want to
risk having its territory and natural resources consumed by
Iraq and Jordan. Kuwait, even 3O years ago, feared
aggression from Iraq.
The opposition was uniting within Iraq. Now forced
underground, it was feeding on the resentment brought on by
the repression of demonstrators, an unpopular foreign
policy, and the return of Nuri.
The end of the Iraqi regent and monarchy came abruptly.
Civil war broke out in Lebanon in May of 1958. King Hussein
of Jordan asked for Iraqi troops to be sent to Jordan to
protect its frontiers against incursion. Now mobilized, the
army instead marched to Baghdad and ended the Iraqi monarchy
in a bloody coup on 14 July. With the new government,
relations with the West cooled, then deteriorated, never to
recover.
The rapid overthrow of the government would not go un-
noticed by the weak but growing Ba'athist party. The
military would not be allowed a say in the political destiny
of Iraq when the Ba'athists later firmly established their
government.
The coup that overthrew Nuri and brought Abid al-Karim
Qasim to power did not enjoy wide support. The coup had
been spontaneous and executed by only a few officers. One
event in Qasim's tenure stands out. Under his leadership
Iraq first attempted to conquer Kuwait.
The legitimacy of the Arab borders as established by
Britain continued to serve as a catalyst for conflict. In
June 1961 Kuwait and Britain agreed that Kuwait should no
longer be subject to the protectorate of Britain. In
essence, Kuwait was now a free state. Many countries sent
notes of congratulations to tiny Kuwait but Iraq's response
did not acknowledge Kuwait's independence. Kuwait, always
suspicious of Iraq, asked for and received assurances that
Britain would come to their aid if attacked. Qasim soon
declared that Kuwait belonged to Iraq just as it had when
the Ottomans ruled the region.
British forces quickly responded to Quasim's
declaration. Britain entered Kuwait on Kuwaiti invitation
after Quasim would not rule out the use of military force in
accomplishing his goal of taking Kuwait. The intrusion of
the Western forces into Kuwait once again incited the Arab
world. They could not bear the thought of anything that
reminded them of colonialism or endangered the strength of
Islam. This time Arabs united against Iraq and through the
Arab League, sent a peace keeping force to replace the
British in September 1961. The League's forces were removed
the next year.
The resulting failure and isolation in the diplomatic
arena served to damage Iraq both at home and abroad. When
Kuwait was quickly admitted to the Arab League, Iraq ceased
to cooperate with that Arab body. Further, Iraq recalled
their ambassadors from every country that recognized Kuwait
as a sovereign state. The list of recalled ambassadors was
extensive.
This fiasco brought about the downfall of Qasim by a
Ba'athist coup. His claims on Kuwait had isolated him
within the Arab world, as well as from the West. As the
Arab League forces were leaving Kuwait, Qasim had only the
weak Communist Party in Iraq and a few army officers to
count as his supporters. His attempt at domestic economic
and social reform had also failed. Even his strongest
supporters knew that Qasim's days were numbered. In 1963 no
one would have guessed the catastrophe that lay ahead for
Iraq as the Ba'ath party came to power. Of course, the
Ba'ath party would eventually be fully controlled by one
man, Saddam Hussein.
Saddam was born a Sunni Moslem in a village near the
Iraqi town of Tikrit. He was raised by his maternal uncle,
Khayr Allah Talfah, who held a deep hatred for the existing
regime that had ousted him from his post as an army officer
and had him imprisoned. That hatred undoubtedly influenced
Saddam during the impressionistic years of youth. This
hatred for the Qasim government and its accompanying need
for power, to overcome in order to obtain control, would
influence Saddam throughout his life.
Saddam's years as a secondary school student in Baghdad
can be characterized as ones of activism. As a teenager, he
joined the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party and dedicated most of
his time to working for party goals. As a militant
nationalist he plunged into activities against the regime,
was expelled from school and sentenced to six months in
jail. He became enamored with socialism and the writings of
Stalin.
At age 22 Saddam was wounded in an assassination
attempt against Qasim and began what might be determined as
the legend of Hussein, a legend of courage and coolness.
(8:218) After the aborted assassination attempt, Saddam
fled to a safe house where he hid from the authorities.
Unable to risk obtaining aid from a doctor, Saddam directed
his friend as he cut the bullet from his leg. This anecdote
would be included with others that portrayed Saddam as a
tough, fearless contender and a revered leader dedicated to
his beliefs.
Saddam fled to Syria and later travelled to Egypt where
he finished college and entered law school. When the Ba'ath
party overthrew Quasim in 1963, Saddam returned to Baghdad
where he continued his diligent efforts to further the
socialist Ba'ath party cause. His marriage to his cousin.
Sajidah Talfah, from an elite Tikrit family would further
his influence as he rose to a commanding position in the
Ba'ath party.
Unfortunately, Saddam's education did not include study
abroad, so prevalent in todays Arab world. This lack of
contact outside his limited sphere of interest deprived
Saddam of a basis for understanding Iraq's place in the
world order. The absence of an understanding of world
relationships would later contribute to grave
miscalculations in his dealings with Western powers.
His activism continued with a coup attempt in 1964.
The plot was discovered and Saddam was again sent to jail.
He diligently recruited members into the Ba'ath party during
this 2 year period of incarceration.
Eventually Saddam escaped and was forced to go
underground where he took charge of the forces that would
become the party's militia. During these years, as a hunted
man, Saddam developed a propensity towards secretiveness,
cautiousness and a distinct distrust of outsiders. He would
come to trust only in himself and disregard the advice of
others on any subject. His disregard for military advice
would prove disastrous.
The first Ba'ath regime was ousted from power as a
result of their excesses but they were brought back to power
by a July 1968 coup. Lessons regarding the sharing of power
which had brought about the downfall of the first Ba'ath
Iraqi government were well learned. A period of stability
ensued aided by booming 1973 oil prices and the rapid,
draconian suppression of outward displays of unrest.
It was during this period, 1969 to 1973, referred to as
the Radical Phase of Ba'th foreign policy, that Iraq again
confronted Kuwait. The contested Kuwaiti islands, Warbah
and Bubiyan, controlled the entrance to the southern Iraqi
port of Umm Qasr. When Iraq occupied a border section of
Kuwait during March 1973, Saudi Arabia and the Arab League
quickly came again to the aid of Kuwait. Iraq was forced to
withdraw and tension between Kuwait and Iraq remained high
until the end of the 197O's.(8:221)
By 1969 Saddam's growing influence was evident within
the Ba'athist Party hierarchy. His personality and
leadership style were coming into focus as he became vice-
chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). Phebe
Marr described his growing reputation in her book, The
Modern History of Iraq:
In the offices of both men (Saddam and Aziz) there
were submachine guns. Even at that stage, many
features of Saddam's character were clearly
evident, features that were preserved and
developed further when he became leader of Iraq.
He possessed a firmness that often turned into
cruelty, a strong will bordering on implacable
stubbornest, a readiness to go charging toward his
goal, regardless of obstacles and the price, and
an overblown understanding of such concepts as
honor and dignity. Saddam was quite rational, but
he had a penchant for making unexpected about
turns. (8:41)
On 9 November, 1969 the RCC broadened its power base
within the state by expanding it's membership from 5 to 13.
All new members of the Ba'thist party had outstanding party
credentials and were all civilians except one.
Saddam was determined that the military would not have
the opportunity to overthrow him. This determination and
the subsequent reorganization of the government would
prevent disgruntled officers from seriously challenging him,
even when two devastating wars with Iran and the United
States led coalition forces tasked the military beyond it's
capability.
The new RCC dedicated themselves to improving the life
of Iraqis through a new interim constitution. Iraq was to
be a People's Democratic Republic with socialism as it's
economic system. All natural resources would belong to the
state who could better manage them for the good of the
people. Each Iraqi would have the right to a free
university education, medical care and the right to be
employed. Power was centralized within the RCC and its
president was given broad powers to appoint, promote, and
dismiss judiciary, civil and military personnel.(8:214)
A series of trials removed many in the leadership who
were felt to be opposed to the Ba'athists. They were
charged with spying, usually for the United States or
Israel. Trials were held by secret military court resulting
in executions or imprisonment. At least eighty six people
were executed. (8: 13)
The Army was expanded and developed an imposing
regional military capability. By the end of 1977 the Iraqi
Army was two and one half times the size of Algeria's, a
comparable country in many ways. (1:33) Iraq's goal was to
form an armed militia in every municipality and to increase
its military strength to 200,000. Saddam, as the former
leader of the militia, was exerting his influence.
Saddam's power as a party lieutenant was reaching it's
zenith in 1974 and President Hasan al Bakr was reduced to
sharing power with him. Saddam's rise can be attributed to
dedication, an ability to persevere, and the aid of the
family name of Talfah.
In 1970 Hasan Al-Bakr was retired in a ploy engineered
by Saddam in his impatience to assume control of the party
as well as the country. Saddam then declared himself
President of the Republic, Secretary-general of the Ba'ath
party regional command, chairman of the RCC, and commander-
in-chief of the armed forces. (1:229)
Another cruel purge ensued. Under the previous
President, Al-Bakr, enemies of the state were executed,
imprisoned, beaten, tortured, or exiled. Under Saddam there
became but one punishment, execution. No one would Survive
to challenge his rule.
The first 22 arrested were executed for an alleged
coup attempt against Saddam. Hostages were taken from the
families of about one-third of the members of the RCC.
Taking hostages allowed Saddam to control the RCC while
maintaining all the outward appearances of legitimacy. The
members of the RCC continued to execute the responsibilities
of their offices and make official appearances; however,
they were merely puppets. The tactic of using hostages for
political purposes would be used by Saddam again.
He eventually purged hundreds of his former colleagues
and had them all killed including entire families. By 1
August 1979 there were reports that around five hundred
high-ranking Ba'athists had been executed. (1:70)
On the other hand, Saddam was also exercising his
powers in a paternal manner. He kept hours in his office
each week during which citizens could telephone and have
their problems summarily addressed by the President. His
picture was displayed in every manner of place, babies were
given his name. .. .his virtue became part of the party
legend.. (8:229) He was becoming a cult figure as described
by Phebe Marr.
... and young party members emulated his walk, his
dress, and even his manner of speech ... Typical
of this adulation was an advertisement in the New
York Times in July 1980 that asked whether Iraq
would repeat her former glories and the name of
Saddam Hussein would link up with that of
Hammurabi, Asurbanipol, al-Mansur, and Harun al-
Rashid? (8:229)
But there was a difference in Iraq obviously not
observed by the New York Times. During the change of power
in 1969, the people were willing, active participants. In
July 1979 they were spectators .. . . " (1:71)
A comparatively stabilized political environment
followed for Iraq. The government could, for the first
time, follow a consistent policy correlating political,
economic and social affairs and take steps to carry them
out. - (6:112) The government's goal was to develop a
socialist society, with social justice for all which would
wipe out the injustices of the past. Improving the economic
sector was seen as the key.
The established Planning Board developed a five year
plan as the basic building block for economic development.
The President of the Republic, cabinet level political
appointees and outside government experts were included.
Young Arab managers trained in the West were to carry out
the specifics of the plan, all under the Ministry of
Planning.
Prior government's attempts at land reform under the
monarchy had failed. Landlords were disgruntled by having
to give up their lands for redistribution to peasants and
the peasants themselves had no experience in farming outside
of the old feudal system. Two-thirds of the nation lived in
the country as peasants forming 70 percent of the populace.
(6:121)
The Ba'athists seized farmland from landowners and
established farm cooperatives in order to prevent the
failures which occurred when unskilled peasants were given
land under the prior regime. Within a cooperative, workers
could share profits in accordance with their labors and the
unskilled could be taught. The government's sincerity in
agrarian reform was demonstrated by the doubling of
expenditures for agriculture development in fiscal years
1974-75.
The government was unable to pay the landlords for
seized land that was distributed to the peasants. The
Ba'athists rationalized this inequity by declaring that the
landowners had received the land illegally as gifts from
previous, corrupt regimes. Thus, there was no obligation to
compensate them. This circuitous logic is typical of the
Ba'athists in general and Saddam in particular. Peasants,
in turn were forced to farm their land within the rules
established for the cooperatives. They were provided with
such facilities as needed to cultivate their land. (6:119)
The Ba'athists improved the life of the peasant and
increased production, even if not to the levels planned.
The biggest problem became one of keeping workers on the
farm when successful industrialization efforts of the
Ba'athist's produced an increasing demand for workers in the
city.
The ultimate objective of industrialization was to
achieve self-sufficiency and insure the country's economic
independence. (6:133) The Ba'athists expanded the plans for
industrial growth of former regimes and developed plans for
expansion in new areas. Foreign oil interests were
nationalized, providing the capital for the development of
an industrial sector. Industries developed or expanded
after 1968 included agricultural machinery, a paper mill,
chemical, fertilizer, petrochemical, rayon textiles, steel.
sulfur and sugar production.
During 1970-71 the government provided job security by
enacting a series of laws designed to protect the worker.
Freedom from discrimination, a limited work week and a
System to ensure equitable pay scales were adopted. These
new laws were adopted because they reflected Ba'thist
socialist teachings. Women were allowed to work and
children were protected from work place exploitation. Trade
unions were authorized and a process to settle disputes
using union representatives was instituted. Strikes were
allowed and procedures were enacted through which injured
workers were paid during their recovery. Workers, employers
and the government would jointly contribute to insurance and
retirement plans.
Strict adherence to the Socialist/nationalist Ba'thist
ideology meant that Iraq would become a secular state.
Freedom of religion was necessary in Iraq due to the
diversity of Islamic beliefs found there. The majority of
Muslims in Iraq were Shi'ites but the political power
remained with the Sunni's.(3:27). The Kurds in the
mountains of the Northeast, the Arabs of the northern plain
and those living along the rivers of Baghdad were staunchly
Shi 'ite.
The Muslim belief in predestination contributed to
their acceptance of Saddam's ruthless reform attempts.
Muslims knew that true believers were inwardly protected by
God. God determined how one's life would be cast and
because of the predetermined plan there was no need to
attempt to influence one's own course. No matter the
sacrifices imposed upon them, Muslims would respond that it
was God's will. It would appear to Westerners that
contradictions in this philosophy abound; however, a Muslim
would be very Surprised if this were pointed out to him.
Planning ahead is even considered somehow sinful. To
talk about one's own plan may be contrary to God's plan;
thus, it is infrequently done. Further, to guard against
just such an occurrence, the Iraqi Muslim will include with
any statement such as , "Tomorrow I will go to the market,"
with "if it be the will of God." The inability to plan
ahead has been ongoing for centuries.
A typical example of the average Muslim's disdain for
planning is demonstrated by the farmer who consumes grain
which should have remained for seed. He must then borrow
from a wealthy farmer in order to plant his next crop.
Repayment with substantial interest makes him poorer and
poorer. (8:151) One proverb further demonstrates by stating,
"The provision for tomorrow belongs to tomorrow." The Iraqi
Muslim feels he is released from the responsibilities of his
life because one's fate is determined at birth. Thus, to
plan is not part of Iraqi society as it relates to the
average man. (9:153)
Iraq's tumultuous political history resulted in the
rise to power of one man, Saddam Hussein, who established
order where chaos was the prevalent force of a weak and
repeatedly humiliated nation. Socialism, supported by rich
natural resources, was showing impressive improvements in
the Iraqi agrarian and industrial sectors. Sacrifices by
the people resulting from an inward looking, secretive Iraq
reflected the personality of Saddam and were generally
accepted by the nation under strict Muslim religious
influences. These deeply imbedded factors were the genesis
of more recent events that with hindsight, can be viewed as
the great Iraqi debacle.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. al-Khali, Samir Republic of Fear. Pantheon Books, New
York, N. Y., 1989.
2. al-Marayati, Abid. A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq.
Robert Speller & Sons, New York, N. Y., 1961.
3. Axelgard, Frederick W., ed. Iraq in Transition. Center
for Strategic & International Studies, Georgetown
University, 1986.
4. Harris, George L. Iraq. New Haven: Araf Press, 1958.
5. Helms, Christine Moss. Iraq: Eastern Flank of the Arab
World. The Brookings Institution Washington,
D.C. , 1984.
6. Khadduri, Majid. Socialist Iraq. The Middle East
Institute, Washington, D. C., 1978.
7. Kimball, Lorenzo Kent. The Changing Pattern of
Political Power in Iraq. Robert Speller & Sons,
Publishers, Inc. New York, N. Y., 1972.
8. Marr, Phebe. The Modern History of Iraq. Westview
Press, Boulder Colorado, 1985.
9. Patai, Raphael. The Arab Mind. Charles Scribner's and
Sons, New York, N.Y., 1983.
10. Penrose, Edith and E.F. Iraq: International Relations
and National Development. Westview Press, Boulder,
Colorado, 1978.
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