From Over-The-Horizon Comes The Osprey
AUTHOR Major Charles A. Hodges, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: FROM OVER-THE-HORIZON COMES THE OSPREY
I. PURPOSE: To validate the military worth of the MV-22
Osprey.
II. PROBLEM: Navy and Marine Corps amphibious doctrine is
changing, requiring better tactics and assault craft.
Changes are in order.
III. DATA: Less than thirty days after taking office, the
new Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Mr. Dick Cheney
canceled the MV-22 Osprey program because of budgetary
constraints. The Marine Corps desperately needs the Osprey
to replace its aging fleet of CH-46 helicopters. Replacing
the CH-46 with another helicopter is not the answer.
Because of advanced anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles, a
faster, more survivable aircraft that can fly long distances
quickly is needed. Independent studies have been conducted,
and have proven that the Osprey is the best aircraft for the
Marines in terms of cost and lift. 356 Ospreys will lift
more and cost less than any mix of the alternative
helicopters that were evaluated.
IV. CONCLUSIONS: The Osprey is a state of the art aircraft
that has an extremely expensive price tag. Even so, this
aircraft is the best choice for the over-the-horizon and
maneuver warfare missions that Marines will have to face in
the future.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: The CH-46 helicopter fleet should be
replaced immediately with the MV-22 Osprey.
From Over-the-Horizon Comes the Osprey
Outline
Thesis statement: The helicopter is not capable of
supporting the over-the-horizon amphibious assault from
distances much greater than 50 miles at sea; however, the
V-22 Osprey can support our changing doctrine.
I. The 1946 Atomic Threat
A. USMC post-WW II doctrine change
B. Helicopter supports doctrine change
C. Evolution of the helicopter
II. The 1990 Threat
A. Navy/Marine doctrine change
1. Over-the-horizon
2. Maneuver warfare
B. Helicopters can not support doctrine change
C. Evolution of the tiltrotor
1. History of the tiltrotor
2. Performance
D. V-22 Supports doctrine change
1. Combat effectiveness analysis, V-22 vs
helicopters
2. Cancellation of V-22 program
3. Cost Analysis, V-22 vs helicopters
III. Conjecture
A. The V-22 is the aircraft of the future.
B. Our future enemy will possess the tiltrotor.
From Over-the-Horizon Comes the Osprey
Soon after observing the atomic bomb test on Bikini
Island in 1946, General Geiger sent a report to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General A. A. Vandegrift,
saying, "...Since our probable future enemy will be in
possession of this weapon, it is my opinion that a complete
review and study of our concept of amphibious operations
will have to be made." General Geiger was concerned that
the atomic bomb could easily destroy an expeditionary force,
meaning the Marine Corps of 1946. He said, "...I cannot
visualize another landing such as was executed at Normandy
or Okinawa." (4:11)
General Geiger's report prompted the Commandant to form
a board to determine if Marine Corps amphibious doctrine was
viable in the atomic age. This panel clearly concluded that
some new method of assault support was needed to supplement
landing craft. Members realized that Marines would have to
be dispersed at sea to avoid atomic destruction. However,
they would have to concentrate at a decisive moment to
destroy the enemy. The panel came up with several options,
and recommended the vertical assault capabilities of the
helicopter as an alternative to the World War II frontal
assault tactic. Two years after its conception, the
vertical assault was born on May 23, 1948 when five Marine
HO3S-1 helicopters made the first ship-to-shore movement
with Marines aboard. (1:40)
Since that first vertical assault, the helicopter has
been steadily improved. The HO3S-l was underpowered and
slow, but its successor, the CH-34, was an improvement. It
could carry a heavier payload and had a faster cruise speed.
Next came the CH-53 and CH-46 helicopters, the workhorses of
the Corps. They came on the scene during the Vietnam War,
and because of their versatility they became the
cornerstones upon which current amphibious doctrine is
based. The CH-53 and CH-46 fleets have served admirably
for nearly three decades. The "lives" of these helicopters
have been extended beyond their intended life cycles, and
they are slowly becoming obsolete. As they wear out, parts
are becoming scarce, and maintenance departments find it
very challenging to keep the transports in the air.
Slowly but surely, the CH-53D Sea Stallion is being
replaced by the newer CH-53E Super Stallion. With twice the
lift capacity as the Sea Stallion, the Super Stallion
promises to provide the Corps with a sufficient heavy lift
capability for the time being.
Meanwhile, our medium lift assets are aging. Where
does the Marine Corps stand with the CH-46, and how long can
we safely employ this trusted steed? Because of the
Survivability, Reliability and Maintainability (SR&M)
program, the CH-46 is considered by many as our safest and
most reliable helicopter. However, a thirty-year-old
aircraft is still a thirty-year-old aircraft, and some say
that the last "frog" pilot has yet to be born. The CH-46 is
a good medium-lift helicopter that could prove its worth
well beyond the year 2000--if technology would just stand
still. With the CH-46/CH-53E mix, Marines could continue to
assault hostile shores from now until the second coming of
Christ if technology would just stand still. However, the
technology of today is much like the technology of 1946; it
is not standing still. Our medium lift prime mover, the CH-
46, along with our current amphibious assault tactics are
clearly obsolescent.
Marines of today face the same problem that General
Vandegrift and Geiger faced in 1946. Advanced weapons
systems are once again causing Marines to rewrite amphibious
doctrine. In 1946, the threat was nuclear arms
proliferation which caused the Marine Corps to develop the
vertical assault concept. The helicopter made this concept
a reality. Today, anti-ship weapons require the Navy-Marine
team to stand offshore, over-the-horizon, in order to
survive. The helicopter is not capable of supporting the
over-the-horizon amphibious assault from distances much
greater than 50 miles at sea; however the MV-22 Osprey can
support our changing doctrine.
To conduct over-the-horizon amphibious assaults, the
Marine Corps will need both surface and air vehicles that
can quickly transport Marines from ship to shore. Other
elements are involved, of course, but only the aviation
issue will be addressed in this paper.
Like it or not, the over-the-horizon concept has been
developed, and amphibious assaults launching from 50 to 200
miles at sea will soon become a requirement. Gone are the
days of launching the Landing Force at the ten fathom mark.
The over-the-horizon concept will be the way the Navy-Marine
team will fight in the future. Why? Because enemy anti-
ship weapons such as the Styx, the Exocet, and the Silkworm
are becoming a reality for many unstable third world
nations. If these weapons systems cannot be neutralized
before D-day, the amphibious assault must be launched from
over-the-horizon--out of the range of these deadly missiles.
Clearly, since the Navy cannot afford to expose its fleet to
such a threat, the Marines deployed on these ships will
either use over-the-horizon tactics, or be incapable of
fighting in the battle at all.
General Thomas R. Morgan states:
Today's situations require the full array of
modern military force--Navy-Marine Corps, air-
ground, combined arms, tactical imagination, and
strategic focus. U.S. forces must hold a clear
technical superiority over their opponents.
Superior material, tactical methods, and effective
training will give these forces a decided
advantage when out-numbered. ... With the LCAC and
the Osprey, the Corps will be able to conduct
amphibious assaults from over-the-horizon,
yielding surprise with increased survivability for
the amphibious task force. Over-the-horizon
operations will challenge our technology to
provide solutions in the areas of naval surface
fire support, precise navigation, secure long
distance communications for C3I, enhanced night
and all-weather capabilities, airborne early
warning, mine countermeasures on land as well as
at sea, and also CSS systems that will furnish a
rapid logistics flow.... We must be able to
deploy rapidly, project power at a point of our
choosing, and win. Nothing else is acceptable.
(2:30-31)
The Marine Corps Combat Development Center in Quantico,
Virginia, provides this analysis:
Development of an over-the-horizon assault
capability... is becoming increasingly imperative
given a dynamic world situation, the expeditionary
characteristics of our Corps, and the
proliferation of relatively low-cost, precision
guided munitions, and other advanced weapons among
the world's nations. Such weapons will play a key
role in low and mid-intensity conflicts, as shown
by the use of anti-ship missiles in the Falklands
War, and the light anti-aircraft missiles in
Afghanistan. While these obstacles are not
insurmountable, they compel modification and
enhancement of current amphibious doctrine and
training. The Marine Corps has already adopted
maneuver warfare as a means of achieving victory
on the battlefields of the future. (10:1)
The over-the-horizon concept isn't a new goal of the
Marine Corps. An unclassified USMC paper states:
The over-the-horizon concept builds on cur-
rent amphibious doctrine and advances in technolo-
gy. ... It is a seaward extension of the Marine
Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver war-
fare. ... It emphasizes the principles of mobility,
speed, and flexibility. It counters the enemy's
anti-landing defense and high technology
weaponry. ... There are two reasons why we would
conduct OTH operations: to achieve a tactical
advantage and/or a threat that compels us to
launch our assault from further out to sea. ...
(10:2) The over-the-horizon assault is a further
refinement and expansion of amphibious doctrine.
It combines the concepts of maneuver warfare with
modern technology and equipment to enhance combat
power.... (10:4)
As surely as the vertical assault changed the Marine
Corps tactics of yesterday, over-the-horizon tactics coupled
with maneuver warfare will also change how we operate in the
future years.
Although the helicopter is tried and proven, it is
nonetheless at the outer edge of its technological envelope.
Very little can be done to make it fly faster or further, or
carry more. It is limited by aerodynamics, and its perfor-
mance has virtually reached its full potential. The amphib-
ious assault from over-the-horizon will be extremely limited
if helicopters remain as our vehicle of choice. For
example, the helicopter is so slow that a single assault
wave launched from 100 nautical miles offshore would take at
least two hours to complete. Furthermore, with most of
their fuel already spent, the pilots would be faced with
either refueling ashore or flying back to the ship on empty.
Given the above situation, how can the Marine Corps
conduct over-the-horizon operations? The answer is in tilt-
rotor technology. As far back as 1956, some forward
thinkers recognized the limitations of the helicopter and
began developing requirements for a replacement. Believe it
or not, "The Department of Defense directed the Navy in 1958
to conduct a study on the feasibility of a vertical takeoff
and landing (VTOL) aircraft that would satisfy the
requirements of all the armed services." (1:40) Almost
every conceivable rendition of the helicopter and airplane
was investigated: lift fans, compound helicopter, X wings,
improved helicopters, tilt wings, and finally the tiltrotor.
The tiltrotor has proven to be the best of both the
helicopter and the airplane worlds. The XV-3 was the first
tiltrotor and was soon followed by the XV-15. The designs
proved to have potential and led to the development and
production of the MV-22 Osprey--which first flew in 1989.
(7:1) As indicated by Figure 1, the Osprey operates as a
helicopter when taking off and landing, but it can convert
to a turboprop airplane once airborne. It can hover like a
helicopter or accelerate to 300 knots like a turboprop
aircraft.
Click here to view image
The Osprey is constructed primarily of lightweight
composites and is considered an all weather, day or night,
low-level, nap of the earth aircraft. It can fly in
moderate icing, which helicopters cannot do, and aerial
refueling extends its range dramatically. When compared to
a helicopter, it performs similar to the CH-53D. It can
lift approximately 10,000 pounds in the helicopter mode, but
short, rolling takeoffs allow it to double its payload. It
differs from the helicopter in that it can fly up to 300
knots and to an altitude of 28,000 feet. While in the
helicopter mode, it burns fuel at about the same rate as the
CH-53D. However, as shown in Figure 2, by converting to the
airplane mode, the Osprey can carry twice as many troops as
a CH-60 and can cover over four times the distance without
refueling. (9)
Click here to view image
The Osprey is the perfect CH-46 replacement. Its
speed, tactical radius, maneuverability, and ability to
carry 24 Marines into combat make it the perfect over-the-
horizon choice. It is also a great aircraft for maneuver
warfare. "Marine Corps doctrine today is based on warfare
by maneuver." (8:30)
The importance of maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps
is best summarized by General Gray. On March 6, 1989, he
stated, "It (FMFM-1) is the Marine Corps' doctrine and, as
such, provides the authoritative basis for how we fight and
how we prepare to fight." (8:1)
Although all warfare uses both fire and move-
ment, these components provide the foundation for
two distinct styles of warfare: an attrition
style, based on firepower, and a maneuver style,
based on movement. (8:28)
Warfare by maneuver stems from a desire to
circumvent a problem and attack it from a position
of advantage rather than meet it straight on. The
goal is the application of strength against
selected enemy weakness. By definition, maneuver
relies on speed and surprise, for without either
we cannot concentrate strength against enemy
weakness. Tempo is itself a weapon--often the
most important. (8:29)
Two principles of maneuver warfare are concentration
and speed. Concentration is developing superiority at the
decisive time and place. It applies to time as well as to
space. War is fluid and opportunities fleeting. We must
concentrate not only at the decisive location but also at
the decisive moment. Speed is rapidity of action. Like
concentration, speed applies to both time and space. Speed
over time is tempo--the ability to operate consistently at a
faster rate than our opponent. Speed over distance is
velocity--the ability to move fast. Speed can be a weapon,
and its use will allow us to seize the initiative and
dictate the terms of combat. (8:31) Sun Tzu stated, "Speed
is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy's
unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him
where he has taken no precautions." (6:134)
Surprise is striking the enemy quickly at a time or
place, or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Surprise
is based on speed. Without surprise, superiority at the
decisive point is hardly conceivable. The military that best
uses concentration, speed, tempo, velocity, and surprise
will be able to generate the momentum. "Surprise, often of
decisive importance... Is difficult to achieve and easy to
lose." (8:34)
The Navy's over-the-horizon concept and the Marine
Corps' current doctrine of maneuver warfare fit together
like hand to glove. While the Navy wants to launch the
landing force from over-the-horizon for self preservation,
this tactic actually enhances the maneuver warfare concept
of surprise. When the amphibious task force (ATF) is 50 to
200 miles offshore, the enemy can only guess as to where the
Marines will land. Hopefully, this will make him to spread
his forces thinly over a broad coastline. However, if the
same ATF is only two to five miles offshore, the element of
surprise is missing. The Osprey has the speed for maneuver
warfare and the ability to fly the long distances required
in over-the-horizon operations of the future.
The Joint Services Operation Requirement (JSOR) for
advanced vertical lift aircraft was developed by the four
Armed Services in 1982. The JSOR specified that the
aircraft of the future had to be capable of carrying 24
troops or an external load of 10,000 pounds. The perfect
aircraft had to be capable of 250-275 knots and a radius of
200 miles. It had to be night operations capable (flir),
ship board compatible, have environmental control (NBC), be
able to fly in icing conditions, and air-to-air refuelable.
Also, it had to be crashworthy, resistant to small arms
weapons, and be flotation capable. Apparently, cost was not
a factor. (3:4)
There is only one aircraft that is capable of all these
missions--the Osprey. Four alternative helicopters have
been scrutinized by the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA).
The CH-53E and CH-60 helicopters were considered the best of
the helicopters evaluated, but they met only 45 percent of
the JSOR. The V-22 was the only aircraft that met 100
percent of the JSOR. (3:4)
The performance of the V-22 is superior to any helicop-
ter alternative. The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)
states that the V-22 consistently outperforms every helicop-
ter alternative of equal-cost that has been proposed. (3:1)
The following ten paragraphs are a summary taken from
the Bell-Boeing V-22 Executive Summary, September, 1990, and
are used to illustrate how much more effective a force can
be when the Osprey is present.
In 1987, an analysis of the combat effectiveness of the
V-22 was conducted by BDM International, Inc. based on a
Marine Corps approved mid-intensity vertical assault
scenario in which three battalions of Marines were landed
ashore from over-the-horizon (70 miles at sea). Two equal-
deck spot aircraft fleets were sized to fit the amphibious
ships supporting the operation. A fleet of 45 V-22's and 32
CH-53E's (77 aircraft) was compared to a fleet of 60 H-60's
and 48 CH-53E's (108 aircraft). The aircraft were sized to
provide an equal-lift mix.
A Marine Corps criterion used in this study was that 70
percent of the vertical assault aircraft had to be available
after delivery of the Assault Element to support subsequent
operations. In this scenario, only the V-22/CH-53E force
met this survival standard.
As depicted in Figure 3, BDM's analysis of combat
effectiveness concluded that the V-22/CH-53E fleet delivers
more than twice the Combat Power in the first 60-90 minutes
of the assault as the all-helicopter fleet.
Click here to view image
The first 60 to 90 minutes of the assault are deemed
critical by the Marine Corps since this is the nominal
reaction time for the buildup of responding enemy forces.
Here, the V-22/CH-53E force delivered twice as much of each
payload type as the all-helicopter force in 90 minutes (half
the time). This gave the Marines on the ground a potential
decisive advantage against the defending enemy forces.
When carrying troops, V-22 survivability exceeded that of
the H-60 by 7:1. Losses of troops, aircraft, and HMMWVs to
enemy defenses for the V-22/Ch-53E force were one-third of
those for the H-60/CH-53E mix. A note of interest is that
when the all-helicopter mix used double-sling CH-53E loads,
only 4 of 32 HMMWVs reached the landing zones.
Also, the all-helicopter fleet did not maintain unit
integrity, and resulted in significantly higher casualties.
One interesting note was that a large percentage of CH-53E's
survive the operation only when they are in the V-22 force,
because they do not have to fly medium lift missions. It
appears that the CH-53E needs the V-22 to survive. Finally,
the V-22/CH-53E mix suffered only 1/7th as many losses than
the all-helicopter fleet.
The second phase of the BDM study called for a
battalion sized blocking force to move 170 miles inland.
BDM reduced the fleet to 30 V-22s and 16 CH-53Es (46
aircraft), and compared it to the all-helicopter mix of 60
H-60s and 48 CH-53Es (108 aircraft). Unbelievably, the V-22
mix delivered over 1.5 times the combat power in the
critical 60-90 minutes with less than half as many aircraft.
The H-60 could not perform this mission without enroute
refueling. This required establishing a Forward Arming and
Refueling Point (FARP) and transporting an additional 314
tons of payload in 30 CH-53 sorties to support the FARP.
About one-third of the sorties flown by the CH-53E's in the
all-helicopter mix were to support the refueling of the H-
60s.
BDM's last scenario of their combat effectiveness study
required Marine forces to seize an objective in Southwest
Asia (SWA) 370 miles from their launching point. The
limited payload and range of the H-60 did not permit it to
perform this mission. Therefore, the performance of 60 V-
22s was compared to 60 CH-53Es.
The V-22 flew the round trip without refueling. The
CH-53 had to refuel from a FARP. In less than 2.5 hours
after take off, the V-22 fleet delivered the entire combat
force of 930 Marines to the objective. It was not until 4
hours after take off that the CH-53E fleet completed the
troop delivery. The speed and range of the V-22 also
reduced the time available for enemy reaction, thereby
lowering the number of casualties of friendly troops.
The 1987 Combat Effectiveness Analysis led BDM to con-
clude that with the V-22 to move troops and equipment, the
ground commander can maneuver his forces in rapid dagger-
like thrusts, taking advantage of surprise, mobility, and
evasion. Before the enemy can react to counter the threat,
the V-22 can transport the forces elsewhere, massing a new
attack from a different position on the battlefield. (11:2-
5) This sounds a lot like what General Gray and FMFM-1 need
to support maneuver warfare, doesn't it?
In April, 1989, the Secretary of Defense was apparently
not concerned with combat effectiveness when he decided to
cancel the Osprey program less than 30 days after taking
office. He then directed the Institute for Defense
Analyses (IDA) to conduct a cost and operations
effectiveness analysis (COEA) and report its results in the
Spring of 1990. What Mr. Cheney was concerned about was the
cost of the Osprey. His decision to cancel the V-22 must
have been based on the belief that 602 V-22's for the Navy
and Marine Corps would cost $3.4 billion more than an equal
lift capability helicopter alternative of H-60/H-53E
aircraft. (3:1-2)
IDA downsized the V-22 fleet to 356 aircraft to produce
a V-22 fleet with an equivalent cost of an all-helicopter
fleet (equal-cost). The study concluded that the V-22's
speed, range, and survivability advantages could enable the
356 V-22's to be more effective than the proposed helicopter
alternatives in all four Marine Corps missions. The V-22
was superior to all the equal-cost helicopter alternatives.
The speed and built-in survivability features of the V-22
made it the most survivable aircraft considered in this
study. Also, IDA stated that the 356 V-22's will yield a
substantial improvement over the Marines's current
capabilities for all missions. (11:8-3)
The IDA study clearly concluded that the V-22 is more
cost effective, more survivable, and the lower cost choice
for medium-lift VTOL missions. (11:8-5)
In conclusion, the Osprey is a unique aircraft that
will certainly change the way Marines fight in the future.
It will enhance maneuver warfare, but more importantly,
over-the-horizon assaults will never become a reality
without it. If we are fortunate enough to acquire the
Osprey, the Marine Corps will be in the cat-bird seat. If
we don't buy the aircraft, whether it be lack of vision or
out of budgetary constraints, Marines will lose a great
advantage that will be needed to counter the enemy of the
future.
The tiltrotor is more than a pipe-dream; it is a proven
concept, and tiltrotor aircraft have logged thousands of
hours of actual flight. While America lingers by debating
the potential of the Osprey, Europe and Japan already have
recognized its practicality. Europe has formed a coalition
to build it, and Japan has already broken ground in Ft.
Worth, Texas for a tiltwing factory. (12:1) It would be a
tragedy for America to develop the Osprey, only to reject it
for a cheaper helicopter substitute that is less capable and
less survivable. Europe and Japan will build either the
tiltrotor or tiltwing, and I am sure that it will find a
place on some "third world" battlefield of the future.
Ironically, we will compete against our own technology!
It makes sense that the nation that developed the
Osprey should also incorporate it into our military
infrastructure. Truly, the Osprey can literally fly circles
around a helicopter, so the battlefield of tomorrow surely
will include the tiltrotor. Will Americans fly them or
fight them? What General Geiger said about the atomic bomb
could easily apply to the Osprey. "...Our probable future
enemy will be in possession of this weapon...." (4:11) Will
Marines fly the Osprey or fight it?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Flanagan, LtCol. Robert M. "The V-22 is Slipping Away,"
Proceedings, August, 1990.
2. Morgan, General Thomas R. "A Look to the Future,"
Marine Corps Gazette, December, 1987.
3. "Placing V-22 Costs in Perspective," Bell-Boeing
Executive Summary, September, 1990.
4. Rawlins, LtCol. E. W., Marines and Helicopters 1946-
1962. (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps History and
Museums Division, 1976).
5. Shaffer, Col. Jim, USMC V-22 Project Manager. Guest
lecturer, Command and Staff College, "Over-the-Horizon
Symposium," February 28, 1991.
6. Sun Tzu, The Art of War. Oxford University Press,
1963.
7. "The Case for the V-22 Osprey Program," Bell-Boeing
Working Paper.
8. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM l, FMFM-1. Warfighting.
Washington D.C. March, 1989.
9. U.S. Marine Corps. FMFM 5-1. Marine Aviation. Washington
D.C. 1978.
10. U.S. Marine Corps. MCCDC. "Over-the-Horizon Amphibious
Operations Concept." Unclassified Draft Paper. July,
1990.
11. "V-22 Military Studies and Analyses, Executive Summary."
Bell-Boeing, September, 1990.
12. "V-22 Technology Transfer." Bell-Boeing Newsletter.
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