Military

Arms For Access:  Success Or Failure

 

AUTHOR LCDR James R. Gilbert II, USN

 

CSC 1991

 

SUBJECT AREA - National Security

 

 

            EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

      ARMS FOR ACCESS: SUCCESS OR FAILURE

 

 

      Presidents Carter and Reagan each established a policy

to govern sales or transfers of conventional arms to foreign

nations.  President Carter called for stricter controls and

an overall reduction in arms transfers to foreign nations.

President Reagan believed that arms transfers to friends and

allies strengthened the United States position in the world.

This essay analyzes the success of both arms transfer

policies in the Persian Gulf by comparing the dollar amount

and type of equipment actually transferred against the

formal Congressional Notifications (Arms Export Control Act

section 36b).  Further, it examines proposed arms sales and

transfers with respect to strategic access of the Persian

Gulf during each administration.

      Next the essay examines how the arms sales policies of

both the Carter and Reagan administrations helped the

coalition military forces and, in particular, the Bush

Administration in the recent Gulf War.  Past arms sales to

Middle East and Persian Gulf countries provided an arsenal

of American weaponry for use against Iraq and was critical

to the success of the War.

      Now that the Gulf War is over, critics state that

further military sales to some coalition members will lead

to further instability and more conflict in the Persian

Gulf.  The Bush Administration does not agree with this

analysis.  It sees the many political and economic benefits

of a carefully controlled arms sales program.  These

benefits are strategic access without the presence of

American forces, more influence in determining a solution to

Arab and Israeli differences, and denying those countries

hard currency, trade with and exploitation of those Persian

Gulf countries.

 

 

                     

      ARMS FOR ACCESS: SUCCESS OR FAILURE

 

                   OUTLINE

 

Thesis Statement.  Using arms sales to gain strategic access

to vital areas of the world is a critical and successful

element of U. S. foreign policy.

 

I.    Rise of Military Arms Sales and Transfers

 

      A.    Diminishing threat of nuclear weapons employment

 

      B.    Motivation to sell military arms

 

            1.    Political

 

            2.    Economic

 

            3.    Combination of both

 

      C.    Strategic Access

 

            1.    Changes since World War II

 

            2.    Chokepoints added to the geographic sea lines

                  of communication

 

II.   Carter Administration

 

      A.    Arms Sales Policy Objectives

 

            1.    Ceiling on all foreign arms sales and related

                  services

 

            2.    Reduce transfer of U. S. weaponry to Third

                  World countries

 

            3.    Removal of incentive to pass down costs to

                  foreign buyers

 

            4.    Embassies forbidden to promote arms sales

 

 

            5.    Establishment of precise sales review process

 

            6     Linking Human Rights issues to arms sales

 

      B.    Successes and Failures of the Carter Policy

 

            1.    Political

 

            2.    Economic

 

            3.    Strategic Access

 

III.  Reagan Administration

 

      A.    Arms Sales Policy Objectives

 

            1.    Enhanced preparedness of friends and allies

                  through arms sales

 

            2.    Allied deployment and military exercises

 

            3.    Fostering peaceful resolutions to disputes

 

            4.    Enhanced U. S. weapons production

                  capabilities

 

      B.    Successes and Failures of the Reagan Policy

 

            1.    Political

 

            2.    Economic

 

            3.    Strategic Access

 

IV.   Bush Administration

 

      A.    Influence of Past Arms Sales Policies

 

            1.    Success in the Gulf War against Iraq

 

            2.    Strategic Access to Persian Gulf

 

      B.    Current Proposed Armed Sales to Coalition

            Countries

 

            1.    Critics view of current arms sales proposals

 

            2.    Benefits of future arms sales to coalition

                  countries

 

 

                     

      ARMS FOR ACCESS: SUCCESS OR FAILURE

 

 

      An analysis of armed confrontations over the past 20

 

years demonstrates that the threat of nuclear weapons

 

employment is diminishing as an influence on government

 

stability and political ideology.  Two examples are the

 

Soviet Union's invasion and later withdrawal from

 

Afghanistan and American involvement in Vietnam.  In both

 

instances there was an unstated commitment not to use

 

nuclear weapons, though each had the capability.  Both

 

superpowers committed troops, conventional arms, and

 

organizational skills in an attempt to sway the outcome.

 

This is not to downplay the political importance or the

 

technical credibility that a nation receives when it attains

 

a nuclear weapon capability.  However, neither superpower

 

was successful in these armed conflicts shows the

 

diminishing deterrence capability of nuclear weapons.

 

      Countries that recognize this trend have developed

 

industries to accommodate a strategy of using conventional

 

arms and technology for influence as well as profit.  The

 

motivations for these industrialized countries to sell arms

 

can be grouped into a political sphere, an economic sphere

 

or a combination of both.

 

      Politically, the struggle for dominance between East

 

and West plays the major role.  The two major arms

 

 

competitors, the Soviet Union and United States, seek

 

expansion of their ideology and realize that if they do not

 

offer arms for sale, other nations will do so.  Third World

 

recipients are most vulnerable if they lack funds or have to

 

barter with raw materials as payment for weapons.  If a

 

country making a buy has the cash assets, oil-rich Middle

 

East states for example, it can turn to willing suppliers

 

that offer weapons without any political strings.  Also, the

 

transfer of arms to friendly or regionally dominant states

 

can preclude a more direct form of military involvement.

 

This strategy was designed to influence the recipients'

 

military elite, thus gaining strategic access for transit

 

rights, base facilities and staging areas for the military

 

suppliers.1

 

      Strategic access concepts have changed since the pre-

 

and post-World War II periods.  Initially, the lifelines of

 

Europe and the West were divided into three major

 

geographical commercial trade zones.  These zones

 

encompassed waterborne passages to the Middle East, the

 

Mediterranean Sea and the European coastline to the English

 

Channel.  They were the foundation for NATO's offensive and

 

defensive strategies for keeping commercial sea lanes open

 

and provided the basis of a freedom of navigation

 

philosophy.2  Since 1970, this philosophy has changed

 

dramatically.  Some of the factors that began this change

 

 

were instantaneous world-wide communications, the formation

 

of Organization of the Oil Producing Economic Countries

 

(OPEC) and the later rise in crude oil prices, Soviet Naval

 

expansion into a blue-water power and the rise of

 

nationalism in the Third World.  The three original zones

 

have not decreased in their importance, but a modern theory

 

of strategic access has added navigational choke points to

 

the existing sea lines of communication (SLOC).  These sea

 

lines and choke points extend to South America, Africa, the

 

Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap (GIUK) and Australia.

 

This combined theory has redefined strategic deterrence as

 

the curtailment of Soviet Union expansion, the spreading of

 

Communist ideology and the dominance of a regional military

 

power.  Strategic deterrence cannot be achieved without

 

attaining strategic access.

 

      Economically, for the United States and other Western

 

nations, the sale of arms means money.  Middle Eastern OPEC

 

members pay cash for goods and ask for nothing in return.

 

Cash plays an important role in lessening economic deficit

 

and in equalizing the international balance of trade

 

payments.  Additional economic benefits are many.  For

 

example, the greater the number of weapons made and sold

 

overseas, the greater the benefit from amortization of the

 

research, development and production set-up costs.  Further,

 

foreign arms sales provide a market to reduce older weapon

 

 

inventories.  Since the demand for newer technology drives

 

suppliers to invest more money and expertise in the

 

development of modern weapons, a self-perpetuating cycle is

 

generated.  Thus, arms sales provide stable employment in

 

the short term and keep the military industry operating at a

 

wartime level in case a long term need should arise.

 

Finally, the sale of weapons opens the door for an inflow of

 

raw materials and helps develop civilian non-military

 

markets for other goods and services.3

 

      Presidents Carter and Reagan each had a personal agenda

 

for dealing with these motivations.  Within the

 

Congressional confines of the 36b notification process,

 

these administrations sold and shipped arms to Third World

 

countries.  The following is a comparison of the two

 

Presidents and their conventional arms sales policies.

 

      On May 19, 1977, President Carter announced a new

 

American policy regarding arms sales to foreign countries.

 

His policy was, in effect, a continuation of the

 

Congressional initiatives of the previous two

 

administrations. "Henceforth, the use of conventional arms

 

transfers would be viewed as an exceptional foreign policy

 

implement, to be used only in instances where it can be

 

clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our

 

national security interests."4 The policy established a set

 

of controls and checks on all foreign arms sales except NATO

 

 

members, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.  A new political

 

perspective for controlling arms sales with an overt effort

 

to cooperate with Congress was a significant departure from

 

previous administrations.

 

      President Carter's first objective was to provide a

 

self-imposed ceiling on all foreign sales and related

 

services.  It was intended to reduce the amount of arms

 

sales agreements in fiscal year (FY) 1978 to a level below

 

FY 1977.  The FY 1977 and FY 1978 figures for arms sales

 

transfer agreements with Third World recipients, published

 

by a House Subcommittee, was $9.96 billion and $10.31

 

billion respectively 5 (These figures exclude Military

 

Assistance Program [MAP] and MAP Merger funds).  A similar

 

review of figures supplied by the Defense Security

 

Assistance Agency (DSAA) in Table 1 shows world-wide FY 1978

 

arms agreements of $6.7 billion and an actual cash arms sale

 

figure of $4.6 billion.  The President reported a decrease

 

in arms sales between FY 1977 and FY 1978, but the previous

 

figures do not support that statement.  Analysts believe

 

that any decrease perceived was due to canceled Iranian

 

contracts.

 

      A comparison of follow-on data from the DSAA report for

 

fiscal years 1979 and 1980 in Table 1 shows a large increase

 

in world-wide sales, not a defined ceiling or a reduction.

 

Table 1

World-Wide Foreign Military Sales Agreements

Fiscal Years 1978 to 1981

($$ rounded nearest Billion)

 

            Totals      MAP         MAP Merger            Cash

Year        Sales       Funds       Funds             Sales

1978        6.7         2.1           0               4.6

1979        11.2        5.7           0               5.5

1980        12.6        2.0           0              10.6

1981        6.6         3.0           0               3.6

 

 

     Data from the Congressional Notifications (36b) in

 

Table 2 show an increase of proposed sales during the Carte

 

Administration.  Therefore, the objective of establishing a:

 

arms sales ceiling was never realized.

 

Table 2

Yearly Totals for Congressional Notifications  (36b)

Fiscal Years 1977 to 1981

($$ rounded to nearest Billion)

President               Fiscal Year              Dollar Amount

Carter                        1977 (9 months)          .054

Carter                        1978                    12.006

Carter                        1979                    5.653

Carter                        1980                    17.407

Carter                        1981 3 months)             .245

                                          Total:  $     35.365

Source: Senate Congressional Record 1977 to 1981.

        Compiled by author.

 

 

 

      The second objective of the Carter policy was to reduce

 

transfer of sophisticated and costly weaponry to Third World

 

countries.  Yet, sales to some allies were exempted from the

 

qualitative constraint provision.  A controversy developed

 

surrounding this particular objective because of the special

 

privileges some Third World countries received in acquiring

 

modern U.S. military equipment.  Several examples illustrate

 

this.  Egypt, before the Camp David Accords, received

 

42 F-5E jet aircraft and 35 F-4E jet aircraft valued at

 

$1.19 billion.  After the Camp David Accords, Egypt received

 

40 newer F-16 jet aircraft valued at $961.1 million.  Iran

 

received support agreements for continued support of their

 

F-14 and the Phoenix missile systems valued at $191.1

 

million.  Jordan received 6 F-5E jet aircraft and an

 

improved Hawk Air Defense Missile System valued at $65.2

 

million.  Saudi Arabia received 60 F-15 jet aircraft and

 

military construction valued at more than $5.0 billion.

 

Considering the strong ties and commitment the United States

 

has had with NATO and Israel since 1948, many national and

 

international leaders, as well as the Israeli lobby, were

 

concerned with supplying Israel's enemies and neighbors with

 

weapons.  Some analysts argue these sales were made for

 

political (Camp David) and economic (oil concessions)

 

reasons, thus are to be considered isolated.  Yet, the 36b

 

Notification records show that the Carter administration

 

 

proposed almost $40 billion in arms sales.  This type of

 

arms sales commitment does not support an isolated incident

 

argument.

 

      Objective three was an attempt, at the expense of sales

 

to Third World countries, to remove the incentive of

 

lowering costs to DOD.  It was intended to make DOD

 

prioritize what equipment and services it could afford to

 

buy and what it could maintain under given budget

 

constraints.  This objective was beneficial because it

 

caused more scrubbing of the military budget and cut excess

 

fat.  An added benefit was that it made DOD take a closer

 

and more critical look at commercial contracts and

 

associated costs.

 

      The fourth objective was divided into two parts.  Part

 

one forbade embassies and military representatives from

 

promoting U.S. arms sales, but was ineffective because it

 

lacked proper support.  Part two required commercial agents

 

to receive permission from the State Department before

 

signing a sales contact with any foreign buyer.  It

 

established a more precise and systematic review process for

 

selling weapons abroad.  This review process slowed

 

proliferation of unauthorized weapons and technology

 

transfers by creating a chokepoint, thus slowing the export

 

of illegal arms.

 

      Multilateral restraint initiatives, called the

 

 

Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) talks, were the biggest

 

disappointment in Carter's arms control policy.  He thought

 

the U.S. still had enough political power, credibility and

 

world influence to persuade other nations to reduce the flow

 

of military arms.  The disappointing truth was that other

 

nations, in particular the Soviet Union, needed arms sales

 

to stimulate their own economies and establish individual

 

relationships with oil rich Middle East countries for crude

 

oil, hard currency and other consumer goods.  This self-

 

imposed restraint on American arms sales enabled other

 

smaller industrialized nations to expand production

 

capabilities and enter the arms sales competitive market.

 

Table 3 shows the arms sales vacuum created by Carter's

 

unilateral restraint approach and the countries that

 

profited from this political void.

 

 

Table 3

Arms Transfers to the Third World, by Supplier

($$ rounded to nearest Billion)

Country           1976        1977        1978        1979        1980

France            1.398       2.147       2.406       3.264       2.536

United Kingdom     .834        1.641       1.200       .773       .703

West Germany      .166       .204       .258       .162       .283

Italy             .163       .294       .323       .975       .653

Soviet Union      4.875       7.231       9.035      10.480            9.085

Statistics shown are based upon estimated selling prices.

Source: SIPRI: Exports of major weapons to the Third World

        Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85.

 

      The last objective of the arms sales philosophy,

 

linking arms sales to the Human Rights issues, was perhaps

 

the most controversial of the Carter Presidency.  The Human

 

Rights issue haunted the administration for the same reason

 

that the reduction in qualitative weaponry objective failed.

 

The Carter Administration overlooked human rights violations

 

if the buying nation was politically aligned with the United

 

States.  Early in Carter's Presidency, Iran and Nicaragua

 

were the Administration's most vocal supporters.  Their

 

dictatorial form of government and blatant human rights

 

violations against domestic and political enemies made them

 

a prime target of international media attention.  Human

 

rights violations did not stop either economic aid or arms

 

transfers from the United States.  President Carter made the

 

rest of the world aware of human rights issues, but

 

overlooked these two countries because of their regional

 

political support.  This oversight lessened his credibility

 

and his policy.

 

      In retrospect, the Carter arms sales policy as an

 

exceptional implement of foreign policy did not produce any

 

credible results.  His policy raised expectations that were

 

unrealistic and never fulfilled.  President Carter realized

 

this at the beginning of his last year in office.  On April

 

29, 1980, he forwarded a letter to the Senate rescinding his

 

ceiling program.6  As a presidential candidate, Carter

 

 

stressed the need to restrict the worldwide flow of arms.

 

He did reach the self-imposed ceiling in 1979 but it was

 

because of the Shah's fall and Iran's cancellation of many

 

arms orders.  Another significant change in Carter's arms

 

sales policy was made when U.S. aerospace firms were

 

permitted to design the "FX" fighter specifically for

 

foreign countries.  This was an exception to the prohibition

 

of developing weapons for export.

 

      The only real success in President Carter's policy was

 

the development of guidelines for commercial sales in the

 

arms market.  This institutional framework established a

 

rigorous review of significant proposed sales before formal

 

letters of agreement with a foreign country.

 

      From a strategic viewpoint the Carter Administration

 

made some positive moves toward peace in the Middle East.

 

The Camp David Accords and the modernization of Saudi

 

Arabian armed forces in exchange for strategic access are

 

two examples.  In the other areas of strategic access there

 

were no improvements.

 

      36b Notifications reveal there was a lack of U.S.

 

support in Central and South America, the GIUK Gap and

 

Africa.  For example, giving up American claims to the

 

Panama Canal and allowing the fall of the Somoza government

 

to the Marxist forces under Daniel Ortega were two serious

 

mistakes in strategic deterrence.  President Carter's focus

 

 

was not on international issues but on the Middle East.  In

 

the end, what was presented to the international community

 

as American foreign policy did not match the policy put

 

before Congress.  Finally, linking the arms sales policy to

 

the human rights issue produced negative results.  U.S.

 

allies could not and would not give Carter the support he

 

needed to make this policy a reality.  Thus, President

 

Carter did not fail.  The concept was doomed from the

 

beginning.

 

      On July 8, 1981, President Reagan signed a directive

 

that linked American foreign policy with an arms sales

 

policy.  The Reagan directive emphasized a significant

 

growth in recent years of "challenges and hostility toward

 

fundamental United States interests, and the interests of

 

its friends and allies."7  Such trends "threaten stability

 

in many regions" and "progress toward greater political and

 

economic development."8  The directive also pointed out that

 

the United States must be prepared to help its friends and

 

allies through arms transfer and other forms of security

 

assistance.  The focus was to promote arms transfers that

 

complement and serve American security interests.

 

      The Reagan arms transfer policy resurrected the status

 

quo of the Nixon and Ford Administrations.  Reagan's tone

 

stated that weapons transfers "will strengthen the security

 

of the United States and promote world peace."9  A return to

 

 

the free-wheeling character of massive arms sales distressed

 

some Congressional leaders.  In the first Reagan

 

Administration, the Republicans enjoyed a majority in the

 

Senate and easily gained arms sales notifications.

 

      The first objective, helping deter aggression by

 

enhancing the preparedness of friends and allies, was the

 

core of the Reagan arms sales policy.  Table 4 shows an

 

increase of sales agreements valued at $53 billion during

 

Reagan's first administration.  This represents a total

 

dollar value of defense articles, construction and services

 

purchased by foreign governments.  Arms sales of this

 

magnitude express Reagan's intent to arm friends and allies.

 

Table 4

World-Wide Foreign Military Sales Agreements

Fiscal Years 1981 to 1987

($$ rounded nearest Billion)

            Total       MAP         MAP Merger            Cash

Year        Sales       Funds       Funds             Sales

1981        6.6         3.0         0                3.6

1982        17.7        3.9         .13              13.8

1983        15.0        5.1         .33               9.6

1984        13.7        5.7         .64               7.4

1985        11.4        5.0         .76               5.6

1986        7.0         5.0         .76               1.2

1987        7.0         4.0         .9                2.1

Note: Total dollar value of defense articles, construction

      and defense services purchases.

Source: DSAA Report September 30, 1987

 

 

     Table 5 shows the 36b Congressional Notifications for

 

both Reagan Administrations.

 

Table 5

Yearly Totals for Congressional Notifications (36b)

Fiscal Years 1981 to 1988

($$ rounded to nearest Billion)

President               Fiscal Year              Dollar Amount

Reagan I                1981 (9 months)        22.220

Reagan I                1982                    18.301

Reagan I                1983                    13.998

Reagan I                1984                    10.530

Reagan I                1985 (3 months)          .068

                                                      > 5.184

Reagan II               1985 (9 months)        5.116     

Reagan II               1986                    6.251

Reagan II               1987                    1.500

Reagan II               1988                    3.504

Totals: Reagan I          65.118

        Reagan II         16.371

GRAND TOTAL:          $      81.489

 

Source: Senate congressional Record 1981 to 1988

        Compiled by author.

 

    The proposed arms sales total during Reagan's first

 

administration (Reagan I) was $65.1 billion.  Egypt received

 

M60A3 tank upgrades, 40 F-16 jet aircraft with associated

 

weapons and TOW missile systems and missiles, valued at $3.2

 

billion.  Israel received 75 F-16 jet aircraft, 11 F-15 jet

 

 

aircraft and associated weaponry valued at $3.4 billion.

 

Saudi Arabia received the majority of their $17 billion

 

proposal in construction, AWACS aircraft and F-15 jet

 

aircraft.  Pakistan received 40 F-16 jet aircraft and

 

associated weaponry valued at $1.35 billion.  Turkey

 

received 160 F-16 jet aircraft valued at $4.17 billion.  The

 

United Kingdom received $5.1 billion of NATO related

 

weapons, fire control systems and weapons.  This list of

 

major recipients shows the offensive vice the traditional

 

defensive nature of arms being sold to foreign countries.

 

      During the second Reagan administration (Reagan II),

 

arms sales took a dramatic downward turn from a record high

 

of $65 billion to a total of $15 billion.  None of the major

 

recipients were dropped off the friends and allies list, but

 

the types of equipment listed in the 36b Notifications

 

changed.  In this Administration, arms transfers consisted

 

of related maintenance and upkeep, improvement modifications

 

and replenishment of ammunition stocks.  The dramatic fall

 

could also be linked to Reagan's waning influence on

 

Congress.  The Republican party lost the majority in the

 

Senate and this eroded Reagan's personal influence.  This

 

also resulted in less sales of military hardware but the

 

original policy objective was still in effect.

 

      The next objective of the Reagan arms policy worked

 

hand-in-hand with the first objective.  Scheduled

 

 

deployments and military exercises demonstrated that the

 

United States had the security interests of its friends and

 

partners in mind.  From 1981 to 1989, United States armed

 

forces were involved with every major ally and political

 

friend in operational military exercises.  For example, the

 

Army worked with Columbia, Honduras and the Philippines.

 

The Marines worked with Korea, Norway and the United

 

Kingdom.  The Navy worked with Saudi Arabia, The Peoples

 

Republic of China, Australia and Israel, all the NATO

 

nations and every country in the Mediterranean except

 

Cyprus, Libya, Syria and Yugoslavia.  Finally, the Air Force

 

worked with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Germany and the United

 

Kingdom.  During both terms, the Reagan policy promoted

 

goodwill and harmony while executing very intensive military

 

exercises.  This solidified a universal mind-set of United

 

States superiority in weaponry and organizational skills.

 

      Another objective, fostering regional and internal

 

stability through peaceful resolutions of disputes, is an

 

area that is open to question.  It is hard to portray

 

President Reagan as an international peacemaker while

 

carrying so many big sticks and passing them out to friends.

 

Yet, those who benefited from arms sales and transfers will

 

readily agree that Reagan's policy did promote peace through

 

military strength.

 

      The last objective, to enhance U.S. defense production

 

 

capabilities and efficiency, was welcomed by the military

 

and industrial complexes.  With the massive arms transfer

 

contracts signed during Reagan I, the U.S. economy enjoyed

 

an immediate growth, coupled with an increase in employment.

 

The U.S. military during Reagan I also derived benefits from

 

the policy of passing along the cost of research and

 

development to the transfer recipients.

 

      In conclusion, the Reagan arms transfer policy of

 

"complementing American security commitments and serving

 

important United States objectives"10 was a success.  The

 

image of the American military as a strong and effective

 

armed force was at an all time high.  The reason for the

 

success was not only that good, highly technical weaponry

 

was on the market, but that the program itself was well-

 

written and presented.  The basic underlying theme of the

 

Reagan policy was "in the perception of where U.S. interests

 

lie, how and by whom they are challenged, and how best to

 

advance them."11 The Reagan Administration perceived a

 

pervasive global threat from the Soviet Union, requiring the

 

effective rebuilding not only of the United States armed

 

forces, but those of its friends and allies throughout the

 

world as well.  Therefore, arms transfers were perceived as

 

a mutual benefit for both the supplier and the recipient.

 

They were not considered a moral issue or a matter of

 

principle.

 

 

      Strategically, both Reagan administrations scored very

 

high.  Attaining and then maintaining more positive control

 

of strategic access through many major navigational

 

chokepoints was achieved during both Administrations.  The

 

sale of F-16 jet aircraft to Venezuela and continued support

 

of the Colombian armed forces ensured access to the Panama

 

Canal.  Perhaps the biggest coup was in opening the door to

 

China.  Although President Carter made the initial

 

offerings, the Reagan administration made the biggest

 

strides in restoring mutual respect and opening up new trade

 

agreements.

 

      President Reagan's emphasis on preserving peace and

 

freedom by supporting friends and allies is being further by

 

the Bush administration as well.  Some of the success in the

 

recent Gulf War can be directly attributed to the arms sales

 

policies and emphasis of both the Carter and Reagan

 

administrations.  Pentagon officials are convinced that past

 

arms sales to friendly Middle East and Persian Gulf states

 

made the victory over Iraq possible.12 Now that the war is

 

over, should the United States curtail arms sales to

 

friendly Third World countries, particularly Middle East and

 

Persian Gulf countries?

 

      The figures in Table 6 show the dollar amount of modern

 

U.S. weaponry sold to those countries during the Carter and

 

Reagan administrations.

 

Table 6

Congressional Notification (36b) Totals

of Five Gulf War Participants (by President)

Fiscal Years 1977 to 1988

($$ rounded to nearest Billion)

                        CARTER            REAGAN I           REAGAN II

BAHRAIN                 $      0.000       $      .114        $      .182

EGYPT                         3.628            3.649             .467

ISRAEL                        3.525            3.412             .100

JORDAN                        .427             .472             1.955

KUWAIT                        .189             .407             1.970

OMAN                          .040             .062              .022

PAKISTAN                      .020            2.830             .356

SAUDI ARABIA                 16.900                22.045                 4.315

TURKEY                        .156            5.655             .548

UAE                           0.000             .828              .061

YEMEN                         .399             .014             0.000

Source: Senate Congressional Record 1977 to 1988.

        Compiled by author.

 

 

      When American troops deployed to Saudi Arabia in

 

preparation for the war, large arsenals of military arms and

 

supporting materials were on hand because of past foreign

 

military sales.  Various fighter and attack aircraft,

 

missile defense systems, tanks and other armored vehicles

 

were sold to coalition members during the Carter and Reagan

 

administrations.  The material support in theater gave the

 

United States and its coalition partners time to build up an

 

 

ample reserve.  In addition, the presence of existing U.S.

 

military arms and materials made training of Arab coalition

 

troops easier.  There was only a necessity to familiarize

 

these forces with recent upgrades that had not been sold

 

through foreign military sales.  Past administration arms

 

sales policies set the stage for success against Iraq.

 

      Critics of current proposed military sales to some

 

coalition members take the position that additional sales to

 

that volatile region of the world will lead to further

 

instability and an eventual conflicts.  They contend that

 

further military arms sales contradict President Bush's

 

stated policy of restricting further arms sales to shape a

 

less militarized Middle East.  Currently, there is a

 

proposed arms sale of $18 billion of military weaponry and

 

technology to Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the

 

United Arab Emirates.  This proposed arms sale includes 46

 

F-16 fighter jets, 1,528 bombs and 80 air-to-ground missiles

 

for Egypt, as the final condition of the 10 year program

 

delineated in the Camp David accords.13 Israel has an

 

interest in seeing a reduction of arms sales to Middle East

 

countries because of their rising inflation and the cost of

 

resettling the Soviet Jews.  In addition, Israel views the

 

sale of U.S. military weaponry to Arab countries as another

 

threat to their security.

 

      A belief that military arms sales do not give an

 

 

impression of peace for the Middle Eastern area and do not

 

show restraint in the flow of military arms is not valid.

 

This opinion does not acknowledge the many benefits of a

 

carefully controlled arms sales program.  For example, the

 

United States would achieve greater strategic access to the

 

Persian Gulf, without the actual presence of troops.  It

 

also gives the Bush administration a greater voice in the

 

area, as well as more influence in reaching a possible

 

solution between Arab countries and Israel.

 

      Individually the Persian Gulf states are not as strong

 

as Iraq, but collectively they can be militarily superior.

 

This preeminence comes with the faith gained in the

 

performance of American military weaponry.  Another

 

important aspect is, President Bush has the credibility with

 

Arab leaders that his promises of support are authentic.

 

The Bush Administration's efforts to push the sale of modern

 

military weapons and technology through Congress for their

 

self-defense carry a lot of weight in an arms for access

 

ideology.

 

      It is wise to remember what happened in the past,

 

particularly the hard lessons learned by the Carter

 

administration.  There are many other countries that will

 

sell modern weaponry if the United States chooses to

 

abstain.  For example, with the total defeat of Iraq, the

 

Soviet Union lost one of its major arms purchasing

 

 

customers.  Current pro-military movements and inadequate

 

economic solutions in the Soviet Union accentuate the need

 

for hard currency by the Soviet government.  Arms sales to

 

oil rich Third World countries is a simple way to obtain

 

assets in a hurry.  Another potential arms sales nation is

 

Brazil.  The Brazilian military develops and sells their

 

weaponry independently from the government.  Currency from

 

military sales to outside countries goes to the individual

 

Brazilian military department responsible, with a percentage

 

of the profit to the government.  This military arms sales

 

policy has established Brazil as the world's eighth leading

 

producer and seller of military weaponry.  With current

 

instability in the world economy, all countries can use the

 

hard currency offered by those coalition partners that

 

expended their military stockpiles against Iraq.  Therefore,

 

those countries that have a military product to sell on the

 

world arms market will sell to those who have the need and

 

the cash to pay.

 

      The foreign military arms sales policy the Bush

 

Administration has chosen to pursue is the best course of

 

action.  It is the foremost political position within the

 

context of a new world order, and provides continuity to the

 

foreign military sales of the past two administrations.  It

 

gives the American government the option of supporting those

 

countries that align their military policies with the

 

 

political views of U.S. foreign policy.  By supplying

 

military arms and technology to those who supported the

 

American ideals in Southwest Asia, the United States rewards

 

those supporters.  This will strengthen American foreign and

 

economic policies in the future.

 

      Although it is not a popular concept, the manufacture

 

and sale of military weaponry will strengthen the national

 

economy.  Military arms sales can take trade and hard

 

currency away from those countries that would exploit the

 

military needs of Middle East and Persian Gulf States in a

 

post-Gulf War world.  Using arms sales to gain strategic

 

access to vital areas of the world is a critical and

 

successful element of U.S. foreign policy.  While the peace

 

dividend of the post Cold War world has yet to come to

 

fruition, the carefully controlled foreign military sales

 

policy being pursued by the Bush administration has

 

substance and will work.

 

 

 

 

1.Brzoska and Ohlson,  Arms Transfers to the Third World,  1971-

1985, SIPRI, Chapter 4, p. 125.

 

2.McCloughry, E.J.K., Global Strategy.  Chapter III, pp. 45-101.

 

3.Papp, Contemporary  International  Relations:  Frameworks for

Understanding., p.414.

 

 

4.United States.   Committee  on  Foreign Affairs  U.S. House  of

Representatives.    Changing  Perspective  on  U.S. Arms  Transfer

Policy., p. 10., GPO: 1981.

 

5.United States, p. 13.

 

6.Senate Proceedings, April 29, 1980., p. 9364.

 

7.United States., p. 32.

 

8.Ibid.

 

9.United States., p. 33.

 

10.Ibid.

 

11.Buckley,  James  L., Speech  before  the  Aerospace Industries

Association,   entitled   "Arms   Transfers   and   the  National

Interest"., May 21, 1981.

 

12.Don   Oberdorfer  and   R.   Jeffrey  Smith,   "U.  S.  Faces

Contradiction on Mideast Arms Control," The Washington Post,

07 March 1991, p. A31.

 

13.Don Oberdorfer and R. Jeffrey Smith, p. A32.

 

 

 

 

                 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

Buckley, James L., Speech before the Aerospace Industries

      Association, entitled "Arms Transfers and the National

      Interest"., May 21, 1981.

 

Brzoska, Michael and Thomas Ohlson., Arms Transfers to the

      Third World, 1971-1985, SIPRI (Oxford: Oxford Uni-

      versity Press, 1987), p. 125.

 

DSSA:  Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency.,

      Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction

      Sales and Military Assistance Facts (Washington D.C.:

      Data Management Division, 1987)

 

McCloughry, E.J.K., Global Strategy.,  (New York: Publishers,

      1957),  Chapter III, pp. 45-101.

 

Oberdorfer, Don and R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Faces

      Contradiction on Mideast Arms Control," The Washington

      Post, March 7, 1991, p. A31-A32.

 

Papp, Daniel S., Contemporary International Relations

      Frameworks for Understanding (New York: MacMillan,

      1988), pp. 410-425.

 

SIPRI:   Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.,

      SIPRI Yearbook 1987 (New York: Oxford University Press,

      1987)

 

United States, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of

      Representatives, Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms

      Transfer Policy (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1981).

 

United States, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of

      Representatives, U.S. Military Sales and Assistance

      Programs:  Laws, Regulations, and Procedures

      (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1985).

 

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, ed.

      Daniel Gallik., World Military Expenditures and Arms

      Transfers 1987 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1988).

 

United States, Report to Committee on Foreign Relations,

      United States Senate, Arms Transfer Policy (Washington

      D.C. : GPO, 1977)

 

United States, Senate Proceedings, Congressional Records:

      1977 to 1988 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1977-88)

 

United States, Senate Proceedings, Congressional Records:

      April 29, 1980 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1980), p. 9364.