The Impending Gap In Naval Aviation
AUTHOR LCDR John P. Gilchrist, USN
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
THE IMPENDING GAP IN NAVAL AVIATION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On January 7, 1991, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney
cancelled the Navy's highest-priority aircraft program, the A-12
Avenger "stealth" bomber. Like the A-6 it was designed to
replace, the A-12 was to have the capability to navigate,
identify and attack targets in "zero-zero" weather, but in a low-
observable "stealth" airframe. It's range, payload, navigation
and weapons delivery accuracy would have given the Navy's carrier
fleet a formidable all-weather power projection capability well
into the next century
At the same time he cancelled the program, Secretary Cheney
reiterated the need to develop a next generation strike airplane
for our aircraft carrier task force to replace the aging A-6E
Intruder bomber
Designated the "AX" aircraft, at least 12 years will be
required for program research and development alone. Initial
production, flight testing and transition to full scale
production will take another 3-4 years. Assuming everything goes
well (a big assumption), we should see the AX aircraft deployed
on carrier decks around the year 2008.
The Navy is now forced to turn to a modified, upgraded
version of existing naval aircraft to fill the gap until that
time-either the A-6 Intruder, the F-14 Tomcat or the F/A-18
Hornet, or possibly some combination of these.
With both the A-6 and F-14 production lines closed down, new
production airframes of those aircraft have been ruled out.
Existing airframes of both type can be modified in order to
enhance their capability, but modification and/or remanufacture
does not zero-time the airframe. And modification alone will not
overcome limitations inherent in either airframe. Many of the A-
6's problems are due simply to the fact that the design is 30
years old. While the F-14 does not share all the A-6's problems,
it too is relatively old technology, and even after modification
it will not have the all-weather capability, range or payload of
the current A-6 design.
In current Defense Department planning, the F/A-18 is as
secure as any weapons system; with production lines still open,
the Hornet program will likely continue to grow. The Hornet
upgrade, while falling short of current A-6 attack capabilities,
initially appears to be a relatively affordable stopgap measure
to keep the carrier's decks filled with attack-capable platforms.
Like the upgraded F-14, however, the Hornet will not possess the
all-weather capability, range or payload of the A-6 aircraft.
Regardless of the fact that neither the Hornet nor the
Tomcat upgrades will allow them to fly the A-6 mission, the A-6
inventory will continue to decline. By the year 2000, serious
inventory shortfalls may occur in the Navy's carrier-based strike
capability. As U.S. presence around the world is reduced in the
post-Cold War era, naval aviation's role in deterring or quickly
winning regional conflicts will become more and more critical.
Will the Navy have the offensive punch to execute such a mission?
OUTLINE
I. Introduction
II. A-12 aircraft program
A. Design Specifications
B. Technical Problems
C. Program Cancellation
D. Proposed Replacement: The "AX"
III. Existing medium attack platform
A. A-6E Intruder
B. Strengths
C. Weaknesses
IV. Options available to overcome the forecast gap in medium
attack capability
A. A-6 upgrade
B. F-14 upgrade
C. F-18 upgrade
V. Recommendation
VI. Conclusion
Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, on January 7, 1991,
cancel led the Navy's highest-priority aircraft program, the A-12
"stealth" bomber. The decision, which surprised military
analysts, was announced in a statement that said the builders of
the $57 billion A-12 Avenger had defaulted on the program by
failing to "design, develop, fabricate, assemble and test the A-
12 aircraf t within the contract schedule."1
The Navy had originally planned to purchase 620 A-12
aircraft to replace the medium attack, all-weather capable A-6
Intruder aircraft which has been the backbone of the Navy's
carrier-based power projection capability for the last 25 years.
The first A-12's were to have been delivered to the Navy in
February 1992, and the plane would have completely replaced the
A-6 by the late 1990's. 2 The A-12 Avenger, like the A-6 it
was designed to replace, was to have the capability to navigate,
identify and attack targets in "zero-zero" weather (i.e., zero
visibility, zero horizon). Unlike current Navy aircraft,
however, it was to use advanced "low-observable" shapes and
materials that would have allowed it to slip into enemy territory
with less chance of radar detection than more conventional
planes. This "stealth" capability, coupled with its large,
internally carried weapons payload, precise all-weather
navigation capability and unusually large amount of fuel would
have allowed the A-12 to penetrate sophisticated anti-aircraft
missile networks and, without refueling, surgically strike
targets deep within enemy territory. 3 It was to be one of an
entire new generation of aircraft, which includes the B-2,
created to counter increasingly sophisticated Soviet air defense
systems.
The high-tech A-12 was supposed to fill the Navy's need for
carrier-based bombers well into the next century. But the
contractors had major problems with some of the high-technology
aspects of the airplane, particularly its skin, which was to have
been made of non-metallic composite material. After repeated
delays, the first flight of the plane had been scheduled for
November 1991. Meanwhile, the program costs had skyrocketed; the
latest estimate was $91 million per aircraft for the 620 aircraft
buy. The plane was 19 months behind schedule, 10 percent
overweight and neither the contractors nor Navy officials could
estimate final program costs and time schedule. Aggravating the
situation was the fact that not all problems were of a technical
nature- there was evidence of fraud and deception in the
program's operations. 4
Unable to determine whether the aircraft could be
successfully developed and built at any cost, Defense Secretary
Cheney made the decision to cancel the program.
While Congress has frequently ordered the Pentagon to
reinstate some programs cancelled in the past, such a move is
unlikely in the case of the Avenger. Until recently a secret
program, the A-12 has had no major constituency support outside
the Fort Worth and St. Louis areas. Senior congressional
leaders, in ordering major defense budget cuts coinciding with
the end of the Cold War, had previously asked the Pentagon to
reconsider some of its expensive aircraft programs such as the A-
12. 5 There is little effort underway in Congress to reinstate
the program.
Secretary Cheney also said, in announcing his decision, "My
decision against a bailout [of the McDonnell Douglas Corporation
and the General Dynamics Corporation] is solely in response to
the problems with the current program," his statement said. "We
will still need to develop a next generation strike airplane for
our aircraft carrier task force to replace the aging A-6
Intruder."6
With termination of the A-12 program, Congress and the
Pentagon must now rethink earlier decisions and fund a modifi-
cation/modernization program for a current aircraft design which
will suitably bridge the gap until the next generation carrier-
based medium attack aircraft (designated the "AX") comes on line.
Since January 9th, the Navy has studied several possible
alternatives to the cancel led A-12 program, but each of them
falls short of desired capabilities. There is nothing currently
available in the Navy's inventory or even on the chalkboard that
can meet A-12 standards. Indeed, one reason A-12 program
development was proceeding in such a slow, costly manner was that
much of the technology involved had to be "invented" as the
program progressed.
At least 12 years will be required for research and
development alone for the AX program, according to Rear Admiral
Jeremy Taylor, director of naval aviation plans. 7 Initial
production, flight testing and the transition to full scale
production will take another 3-4 years minimum. Assuming
everything goes well, we will see the AX aircraft deployed on
carrier decks around the year 2008. What to do until then?
The Navy must now turn to a modified, upgraded version of
the 29 year-old Intruder, the 19 year-old F-14 Tomcat or the 13
year-old F/A-18 Hornet to maintain, during the next 15 years or
so, a viable power projection capability from the decks of its
aircraft carriers. While the Navy has ruled out a reopening of
the A-6 production line, modification and upgrade of existing A-6
airframes may prove to be the logical choice to find an interim
fix until the Navy's newly proposed AX attack aircraft will be
ready. Neither the proposed F/A-18E nor the F-14D Quickstrike
can perform the all-weather mission, carry the payload or possess
the range of the A-6E Intruder.
By looking at the options immediately available to the Navy
and the Pentagon, it will become obvious that while the decision
will not be popular fiscally or politically, the A-6 is the only
choice that will allow the Navy to maintain an all-weather, deep-
strike, medium attack capability. If the Navy, Pentagon and
Congress are willing to accept a degradation in the carrier's
all-weather power-projection capability until the AX program is
fully deployed, then other options can be considered.
Let's begin at the heart of the problem: the 28 year old A-6
Intruder series aircraft.
The venerable Intruder first flew in the early 1960's and
was a workhorse in Vietnam. It was the only plane in the war
that could navigate, identify and attack targets at night and in
inclement weather. While numerous avionics and airframe changes
have been incorporated into the A-6 since the Vietnam era, it's
age, analog avionics suite, airframe limitations, poor R&M
(reliability and maintenance) and relatively slow speed make it
something less than the ideal weapons platform.
Three years ago, the Pentagon decided against buying a
modernized version of the A-6 because of these limitations
inherent to the existing aircraft. 8 Another stumbling block to
building a modernized version was the Grumman Corporation, which
builds the plane, said it would take at least three years to gear
up its production line and network of suppliers. 9 The decision
was made instead to go ahead full speed with the A-12 program.
With its cancellation, the Navy must completely reassess the
situation.
Some of the Intruder's shortcomings can be fixed with money,
some can't. It's age, for instance, continues to demand ever
higher levels of maintenance man-hours per flight hour. The fact
that many of the aircraft in the inventory have reached or are
approaching the end of their designed service life has resulted
in many aircraft being grounded while others have been restricted
from certain flight regimes which would place additional
undesired stress on an already fatigued airframe. The current
rewing program using composite wings will alleviate these G-
restrictions, but inventory will continue to decline as airframes
are retired due to reaching other structural fatigue-life limits.
The limitations inherent in an analog data base could be
fixed with money, but not cheaply. Reliability and maintenance
levels would improve, thus Improving aircraft availability. Much
of the initial RDT&E (research, development, test and evaluation)
has already been done as part of the A-6F and A-6G upgrades
proposed several years ago. An upgrade to a digital data base
would not only improve R&M and aircraft availability, more
importantly it would increase weapons delivery accuracy. 10 This
would translate to fewer aircraft/fewer reattacks over the same
target, resulting in less aircraft lost, fewer POW's and a
lessened requirement for supporting arms (HARM, Shrike, ECM,
etc).
Current airframe limitations are largely a function of
physics and cannot be fixed with money. Weight growth limits
have been reached as more and more equipment and weight has been
added over the years. Any additional weight will further stress
landing gear and fuselage during carrier landings; it limits
recoverable payloads; it would also mean that much less fuel
aboard for the nugget pilot returning for a night trap on a
pitching deck. This growth-weight limit doesn't just limit an
increase in numbers of boxes, it actually limits upgrading of
existing boxes. 11 Though a new, faster and more powerful
computer may fit in the same space as the old computer, it is
heavier because of its higher density.
Radar cross-section is another limitation of the current
airframe, a problem shared with all existing navy aircraft. It
has been estimated that the A-12 was designed so it wouldn't be
spotted by radar until it was just 10 miles away, and possibly
even closer. By comparison, the A-6, F-14 and F/A-18 can be
detected at a distance of 50 miles. 12
Poor R&M has many deleterious consequences, and short of a
huge inflow of cash and engineering effort, is not something that
can be totally remedied. While current A-6 reliability exceeds
CNO requirements, it still falls far short of more modern
aircraft like the F/A-18.
Slow speed will likewise be difficult to fix by simply
throwing money at the problem. However, the vulnerability
inherent in medium sub-sonic speeds can be offset, by improved
ECM and RHAW gear, more effective expendables (chaff, flares,
decoys), and stand-off weapons.
Current OP-501 and Naval Air Systems Command programs and
proposals to upgrade/modernize the A-6 will minimize some of the
limitations discussed above as well as enhance existing
capabilities. Many of these improvements will be realized with
the upgrade of current A-6E's to SWIP (System Weapons Improvement
Program) Block 1 and eventually to the proposed SWIP Block 1A.
R&M improvements include new CSD/S units (constant speed
drive/starter units: provide engine start capabilities as well as
drive the generators for electrical power); original CSD/S units
are a maintenance nightmare in the A-6 community as well as a
prime detractor in weapons system accuracy due to frequent,
sudden and unanticipated power fluctuations/failures which
degrade navigation and weapons delivery system accuracy.
Old, brittle wiring suffering from corrosion and with
thousands of splices from many years of operation is also a major
contributor to poor R&M figures. ECP's (engineering change
proposals) have been funded to begin correcting this problem.
Survivability/vulnerability shortcomings are being minimized
with the SWIP upgrade. This package provides a more formidable
array of standoff weapons (to include HARM, Maverick, Walleye,
SLAM and Harpoon 1C) as well as enhanced RHAW gear, expanded ECM
capability and more effective expendables as well as a towed
decoy.
Navigation and weapons delivery accuracy would improve with
the integration of an expanded digital avionics suite and a ring
laser gyro inertial navigation system coupled with GPS {global
positioning system} navigation capability. These improvements
will also increase survivability and decrease vulnerability by
allowing for passive navigation and ingress.
SWIP Block 1A also increases by 25% the carrier recoverable
payload weight, enhancing weapons recovery and increasing the
amount of recovery fuel and the consequent safety margin. 13
The upgrades discussed above in no way make the A-6 an A-12.
They will increase current A-6 R&M, aircraft availability,
survivability and weapons delivery accuracy.
Another potential carrier-based attack platform to help
bridge the gap over the next 16 or so years as increasing numbers
of A-6's are retired is the F/A-14 "Quickstrike" option.
The F-14 was originally designed to carry air-to-ground
weapons and serve as a strike fighter. But budget constraints
and the Navy's push for the F/A-18 in the early to mid-1970's
relegated the Tomcat to the air superiority role. 14 As the
number of carriers has been reduced and operating costs have
risen, more stress has been placed on the importance of dual-role
platforms vice single-role platforms taking up precious deck
space. At the same time, the inability of F-14 aircrews to lead
strike missions because of the aircraft's mission limitations has
led F-14 proponents to push for the expansion of the Tomcat's
role in carrier aviation.
The "Quickstrike" version is not without merit. The F-14D
provides full growth capability for "smart" as well as "dumb"
bombs, and the F-14D "Quickstrike" would incorporate (in an
already Impressive air superiority fighter) not only this ground
attack capability but air-to-surface missiles as well as ground
radar modes, navflir and targetflir, and increased survivability
by incorporating the same improved ECM/RHAW gear as the A-6E SWIP
Block 1 package. The F-14D will have an expanded digital
avionics suite as well as new wiring for increased R&M and
aircraft availability. Some structural modifications are also
made. Increased survivability will be achieved through an
onboard inert gas generating system, self-sealing fuel tanks and
foam in critical dry bay areas. It would enjoy commonality with
the F/A-18C in computers, displays, software and weapons, making
the Navy's sea-going logistics system easier to manage. 15
While the F-14D "Quickstrike" modification could be
incorporated into remanufactured F-14A airframes, that is not the
desired means. A major concern with remanufacturing existing
airframes (A-6 and F-14 alike) is the amount of service life left
in the airframe. The remanufacturing process does not zero-time
the airframe (F-14 aircraft currently have a service life of
6,000 hours). 16 Consequently the logical means to produce the
Quickstrike is via new production. The F-14 production line,
however, is no longer operating, and Grumman would experience
many of the same start-up difficulties as it would with the A-6
line. The fact that for two years now Secretary of Defense
Cheney has been trying to kill the F-14 program 17 will certainly
be an impediment to this program getting off the ground.
The F-14D Quickstrike would be comparable to the F-15E
Strike Eagle. What it will not be is an all-weather attack
platform-it will not be able to navigate, identify and attack
targets in zero/zero weather, nor will it have an all-weather
terrain masking capability for increased survivability like the
A-6E. Neither will it enjoy the weapons payload available to the
A-6E. Nor will it possess a laser designator for on-board
guidance of precision-guided munitions; this is a serious flaw to
the potential effectiveness of the F-14D Quickstrike in the
ground attack role. Desert Storm showed us that even in the age
of increased navigation and weapons systems accuracy, 70% of
unguided bombs still miss their targets;18 and while precision-
guided munitions were far from perfect, one or two well-guided
bombs were usually more effective than huge strings of unguided
bombs.
Another major flaw that the F-14 series shares with the A-6
series is relatively poor reliability and high maintenance man-
hours required per flight hour. The F-14D upgrade will minimize
some of these problems, and while the F-14 may not have problems
to the extent the A-6 does, neither can compare in any way with
the high R&M enjoyed by the F/A-18. Indeed, the R&M numbers
enjoyed by the F/A-18 were used as the minimum standard for the
high-tech, super-sophisticated and very expensive A-12. 19
The F/A-18E/F is the other option available to help fill
carrier decks until the AX aircraft is deployed.
The Hornet upgrade is not a response to the projected
shortfall in medium attack inventory. It grew out of a SECDEF
directed study to explore advanced versions of the Hornet for
operations in the late 1990's and beyond. Without a structural
upgrade program, the F/A-18C/D will reach its weight growth limit
in FY 94 and will be unable to support continued modernization.
F/A-18A/B airframe retirement will increase rapidly starting in
FY-98, exacerbating the problem of A-6 and F-14 retirement which
will be occurring at the same time.
In current Defense Department planning, the F/A-18 is as
secure as any weapons system and will most likely continue to
grow. The Hornet upgrade to the E/F configuration, at least to
its proponents, is a relatively affordable option to continue the
modernization of carrier air wings.
The E/F upgrade is primarily a structural upgrade program.
It increases internal fuel capacity by 28%/3,000 lbs (improving
mission radius/time-on-station perhaps 25%), increases CV
recovery payload (and payload flexibility), increases engine
thrust, enhances survivability (by reducing vulnerable area) and,
not incidentally, will allow carriage of an Airborne Refueling
Store. This "buddy store" capability, combined with the 480
gallon external fuel tank capability on three stations, will
allow the Hornet to contribute to the air wing's organic tanking
requirements. Maximum catapult gross weight would be greater
than the Intruder's.
This "stretched" Hornet will also provide additional weight
growth capability as well as additional onboard space for new
hardware, allowing for further modernization. It will have an
onboard laser designator for the accurate guidance of precision
weapons.
It will still not possess the legs to give it a deep
strike/interdiction capability, nor the payload to fulfill the
medium attack mission. While it will have formidable night VFR
navigation/attack capability, it will not be an all-weather
platform.
With American presence around the world being reduced, the
ability of the United States to project sea-based air power onto
hostile shores will become more and more important.
Unfortunately, Naval aviation's capabilities are becoming
limited at a time when their importance is increasing. We will
not always have six months to prepare for an air war as we did in
Desert Storm-there are many military contingencies where the only
air power we will have available is what is sitting offshore on
the carrier decks. The Congress, the Department of Defense and
the Navy need to act quickly, decisively and intelligently if
that power is to be a credible one.
The continued absence of a coherent aviation strategy is
hobbling the Navy's ability to effectively plan for the future.
Following the termination of a number of high-priority aircraft
programs over the past year and the reality of declining defense
budgets, the Navy is struggling to draft a new long-range
modernization plan. According to Rear Admiral Jeremy Taylor,
director of naval aviation plans and requirements," with the
newest budget, 46% of the reductions in the 14 major programs
(that have been cancelled) comes out of naval aviation." 20 Navy
funding devoted to aviation will decline to just $4 billion in
the FY92 budget, a decrease of 60% from the FY91 budget. 21
Part of naval aviation's current difficulties can be
attributed to poor planning in having so many different aircraft
programs competing for funding in an austere budget environment.
The shutdown of the A-6 and F-14 production lines and the
cancellation of the A-12 program have only exacerbated current
funding predicaments. Even if we see the successful production
of the F/A-18E and the AX aircraft, these programs will not begin
production until after the year 2000. As a result, when combined
with the need to still procure dedicated replacements for the F-
14, EA-6B Prowler and E-2C Hawkeye aircraft, these programs will
all be competing for funding again in the late 1990's. 22 If
future defense budgets continue to decline as forecast, naval
aviation will continue to face profound funding dilemmas.
Politics, parochialism, and budget considerations aside,
there is only one realistic option, only one platform, that will
be able to perform deep strike interdiction, regardless of
weather, and carry a weapons payload over twice that of the B-17
Flying Fortress and, with its laser designator, guide those
weapons with deadly accuracy: the A-6 Intruder. Whatever the
capabilities/limitations of the F-14D Quickstrike or the F/A-
18E/F, neither is designed to perform the all-weather medium
attack mission.
Unfortunately, as the 1990's draw to a close there will be
fewer and fewer modernized, upgraded and unrestricted A-6's to
perform that all-weather medium attack mission, either. The Navy,
Pentagon and Congress, over the past fifteen years, have been
remarkably lacking in management foresight and funding support
towards naval aviation in general and the medium attack mission
particularly, and the time has come to pay the piper. There is
very little potential for even ten carrier decks to be adequately
manned with unrestricted, SWIP Block 1A modified A-6's at the
turn of the century, and the Navy simply has nothing else that
can carry out that mission. For the next fifteen years, or
however long it takes the Ax aircraft to be deployed in
meaningful numbers, there may occur a real limit to the carrier's
all-weather, deep-strike power projection capability.
NOTES
1. Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Scraps $57 Billion Order For Attack
Plane." New York Times, January 8, 1991.
2. Interview with Capt. D. B. McKinney, A-6 Program Manager (PMA
234), COMNAVAIRSYSCOM, March 7, 1991.
3. JOC Jim Richeson, "Coming Soon To A Carrier Near You." Naval
Aviation News, November-December 1990.
4. John Isaacs, "Death To The Avenger." Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March 1991.
5. Molly Moore, "Stealth Jet For Navy Is Cancelled." The
Washington Post, January 8, 1991.
6. "Back To Square One." Aviation Week and Space Technology,
January 21, 1991, p.17.
7. "AX R&D May Last 12 Years." Defense News, February 18, 1991.
8. Thomas G. Donlan, "Victory Bandwagon: Will The Defense
Industry Get A War Dividend?" Barron's, March 18, 1991, p.10.
9. Molly Moore, op. cit.
10. Capt. D. B. McKinney, op. cit.
11. Capt. D. B. McKinney, ibid.
12. Everett Pyatt, "Failure Of A-12 Threatens Carrier Force
Size." Defense News, March 4, 1991.
13. Unless otherwise noted, all information regarding the A-6 SWIP
modernization program was provided by Mr. Andy Workala, A-6 Program
desk, COMNAVAIRSYSCOM in a March 7, 1991 interview with author.
14. D.M. North, "New Engines, Sensors, Avionics Give F-14D Broader
Combat Role." Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 17,
1991.
15. Unless otherwise noted, all information regarding the F-14D
and F-14 Quickstrike were provided by Mr. Dan Alexander, Assistant
F-14 Program Manager,COMNAVAIRSYSCOM, in a March 7, 1991 interview
with author.
16. Stanley W. Kandebo, "F-14D Flight Evaluation." Aviation Week
and Space Technology, December 17, 1991.
17. James Bernstein, "F-14 A Long Shot As A-12 Stand-in." Long
Island Newsday, January 9, 1991.
18. Air Force Chief of Staff General Merril A. McPeak as quoted
by Barton Gellman, "U.S. Bombs Missed 70% Of Time. "The Washington
Post, March 14, 1991.
19. Unless otherwise noted, all information concerning the F/A-18
program was provided by Ms. Pam O'Dell, F/A-18 Program desk,
COMNAVAIRSYSCOM.
20. Robert Holzer, "Navy Struggles To Find Funding For Ailing
Aviation." Defense News, March 21, 1991.
21. Robert Holzer, Ibid.
22. Thomas G. Donlan, op. cit., p. 10.
Bibliograpy
1. Alexander, Dan, Assistant F-14 Program Manager. Personal
interview about F-14D Quickstrike. Crystal City, Virginia.
March 7, 1991.
2. "AX R&D May Last 12 Years." Defense News, February 18, 1991.
3. "Back To Square One." Aviation Week and Space Technology.
January 21, 1991.
4. Bernstein, James, "F-14 A Long Shot As A-12 Stand-in." Long
Island Newsday, January 9, 1991.
5. Donlan, Thomas. "Victory Bandwagon: Will The Defense Industry
Get A War Dividend?" Barron's, March 18, 1991.
6. Gellman, Barton. "U.S. Bombs Missed 70% Of Time." The
Washington Post, March 14, 1991.
7. Holzer, Robert. "Navy Struggles To Find Funding For Ailing
Aviation." Defense News, March 21, 1991.
8. Isaacs, John. "Death To The Avenger." Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, March 1991.
9. Kandebo, Stanley. "F-14D Flight Evaluation." Aviation Week
and Space Technology, December 17, 1991.
10. McKinney, D. B., A-6 Program Manager. Personal interview
about A-6E upgrade program. Crystal City, Virginia. March
7, 1991.
11. Moore, Molly. "Stealth Jet For Navy Is Cancelled." The
Washington Post, January 8, 1991.
12. North, D. M., "New Engines, Sensors, Avionics Give F-14D
Broader Combat Role." Aviation Week and Space Technology,
December 17, 1990.
13. O'Dell, Pam, Assistant F/A-18 Program Manager. Personal
interview about F/A-18 program. Crystal City, Virginia.
March 7, 1991.
14. Pyatt, Everett. "Failure Of A-12 Threatens Future Carrier
Force Size." Defense News, March 4, 1991.
15. Richeson, Jim. "Coming Soon To A Carrier Near You." Naval
Aviation News, November-December 1990.
16. Schmitt, Eric. "Pentagon Scraps $57 Billion Order For Attack
Plane." The New York Times, January 8, 1991.
17. Workala, Andy, Assistant A-6 Program Manager. Personal
interview about future A-6E upgrades. Crystal City, Virginia.
March 7, 1991.
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