Military

Planning Considerations For Small Boat Over-The-Horizon Raids

 

AUTHOR Major Harold Heath Fox II, USMC

 

CSC 1991

 

SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting

 

 

 

                                         EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

 

TITLE:  PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR SMALL BOAT OVER-THE-HORIZON RAIDS

 

 

I.  Purpose:  In 1989 the Commandant of the Marine Corps published the MAGTF Master Plan

to set forth the operational foundation for Marine Air-Ground Tasks Forces through the year

2000. A priority established by the MAGTF Master Plan is the capability to conduct over-the-

horizon amphibious raids by both air and surface means. To help fulfill this capability, Rigid

Raiding Craft and Combat Rubber Raiding Craft were fielded to Special Operations Capable Fleet

Marine Force units. The over-the-horizon raid capability with small boats has generated a

unique set of planning considerations for MAGTF commanders and their staffs which must be

understood and addressed for the successful execution of this evolutionary concept.

 

 

II.  Scope:  This paper examines a variety of considerations which must be addressed during the

planning and execution of an over-the-horizon amphibious raid with small boats. The mission

profile is defined and operational employment parameters are examined. The characteristics of

the two types of raiding craft are analyzed relative to the tactical advantages offered by each.

Command and control issues are addressed vis-a'-vis traditional amphibious doctrine.

Organizational responsibilities and contingency issues are outlined. Specific planning factors

are also addressed. These include sea states, over-the-horizon distances, navigational issues,

stealth and electromagnetic spectrum issues, the surf zone, advance force operations, and safety

support. Subjects undergoing evolution relative to the small boat over-the-horizon raid

capability are also discussed.

 

 

III.  Conclusion:  A thorough understanding of the unique planning factors involved in Rigid

Raiding Craft and Combat Rubber Raiding Craft operations provides MAGTF commanders the

capability to safely and successfully conduct amphibious raids from over-the-horizon by

surface means, thus fulfilling the requirement set forth in the MAGTF Master Plan.

 

 

 

                               PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR

                            SMALL BOAT OVER-THE-HORIZON RAIDS

 

 

Thesis: The evolution of over-the-horizon raid operations has generated a unique set of

planning considerations for MAGTF commanders and their staffs who employ Rigid Raiding Craft

(RRC) and Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC) forces.

 

 

I. Employment and organizational considerations

    A. Mission profile

    B. Operational employment

    C. Tactical employment

        1. Raiding craft characteristics considerations

        2. RRC tactical employment

        3. CRRC tactical employment

    D. Command relationships and amphibious doctrine

        1. Doctrinal basis for command relationships

        2. Independent raid command relationship example

        3. Supporting raid command relationship example

    E. Planning responsibilities

    F. Contingency planning

 

 

II. Important planning factors

    A. Sea states

    B. Distance

    C. Navigation

    D. Stealth

         1. Radio communication considerations

         2. Enemy electronic detection capabilities

    E. Thesurfzone

         1. Critical considerations for raiding craft

         2. Surf evaluation

    F. Employment of SEALS, reconnaissance teams, and scout swimmers

    G. Safety support

         1. Safety boat

         2. Personnel requirements

         3. Equipment requirements

 

 

III. Unresolved issues

       A. Amphibious doctrine

       B. Logistics support

       C. Mindset

 

 

                               PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR

                            SMALL BOAT OVER-THE-HORIZON RAIDS

 

                                 by Major Heath Fox USMC

                                   Conference Group 8

 

 

       In 1989 the Commandant of the Marine Corps published a document entitled the MAGTF

 

Master Plan (MMP) This document set forth the operational foundation for the organization,

 

manning, equipping, training, and development of doctrine and operational techniques for

 

Marine Air-Ground Task Forces through the year 2000. (4:ES-1 Section 6 of the MMP

 

entitled MAGTF CAPABILITIES TO BE EMPHASIZED, "prioritizes 49 MAGTF capabilities that

 

will be emphasized over the next ten years. "The number one priority on the list is the

 

"capability to conduct amphibious raids on short notice at night in adverse weather conditions

 

under EMCON [emissions control] from over-the-horizon via air or surface means against

 

distant inland targets." (4:6-1) To help fulfill this capability, Rigid Raiding Craft (18-foot

 

fiberglass hull Boston Whaler boats with dual 70-horsepower outboard engines) and Combat

 

Rubber Raiding Craft (Zodiac F470 inflatable rubber boats with a single 55-horsepower

 

outboard engine) have been fielded to Special Operations Capable (SOC) units. Specialized skill

 

training is required for members of Marine infantry units designated to employ these craft in

 

long-range amphibious raids; this includes raiding craft coxswain skills, maritime navigation

 

skills, and scout swimmer skills for select personnell as well as water survival and boat teams

 

skills for all members of the raiding force. Additionally, the evolution of over-the-horizon

 

raid operations has generated a unique set of planning considerations for MAGTF commanders and

 

their staffs who employ Rigid Raiding Craft (RRC) and Combat Rubber Raiding craft (CRRC)

 

     The Mission Profile.  The operational capability of the raiding craft (RRC/CRRC)

 

clandestine amphibious raid is defined by the following parameters:

 

       1. Launched from over-the-horizon (OTH)

 

       2. Conducted under EMCON conditions preceding enemy contact, excepting emergencies

 

          and the necessity of communicating mission critical information

 

       3. Conducted at night

 

       4. Conducted in varying sea states, up to and including Sea State 3/Beaufort Force 4

 

       5. Incorporating a clandestine landing and withdrawal

 

       6. Incorporating accurate navigation to a specific Beach Landing Site (BLS) by

 

          non-electronic means

 

       7. Executed within six hours of mission receipt, meaning that the time from receipt of

 

          the execute order to the beginning of the boat launching phase is no longer than six

 

          hours in duration

 

 

       Operational Employment.  RC and CRRC are employed to land small, lightly armed and

 

lightly equipped forces at undefended or lightly defended locations for the purpose of executing

 

an amphibious raid. This operation targets a limited objective, for a limited duration, and

 

includes a planned withdrawal. The raid may be an independent operation or conducted to

 

support an amphibious assault, a land campaign, or an air or naval campaign.

 

       Tactical Employment.  When planning the tactical utilization of RRC's and CRRC's, the

 

characteristics of each type of craft must be considered. The RRC has several characteristics

 

superior to the CRRC: it can maintain greater speed, it is more survivable because of its more

 

durable hull and dual engines, and it is capable of being employed as a machinegun platform.

 

Conversely, the CRRC has characteristics superior to the RRC. It's biggest advantage is that it is

 

more practical for conducting insertion and extraction operations across surf zones. The CRRC

 

can be driven into shallow water, picked up by its boat team, and carried onto the beach or into a

 

hinterland cache site. Once the operation ashore is complete, it is easily launched from the

 

beach by its boat team. There are methods for landing Marines ashore through a surf zone with

 

RRC's, but these methods are inherently dangerous, difficult, and tactically unsound. RRC's may

 

be employed directly on a coastline, but should only be done when relatively benign surf

 

conditions are encountered. The CRRC has an additional advantage in that it can be launched and

 

recovered by an LCU (Landing Craft, Utility), thus allowing for the employment of an LCU as an

 

intermediate vessel.

 

       Based on craft characteristics, RRC are best employed against targets accessible by

 

inland waterways such as harbors, bays, or rivers. It is here, where the raid force becomes

 

vulnerable to enemy fire from the land surrounding or adjacent to the inland waterway, that the

 

RRC's advantages of speed, survivability, and machinegun capability can be exploited.

 

Considering the large percentage of targets of military value located in protected waterways

 

(vice adjacent to a beach), the capability offered by the employment of RRC's is significant.

 

CRRC are best employed when surf zone negotiation is required or the situation warrants the use

 

of an LCU as an intermediate vessel.

 

       Command Relationships and Amphibious Doctrine.  The Joint Doctrine for Amphibious

 

Operations, JCS PUB 3-02, is applicable to the RRC/CRRC over-the-horizon amphibious raid.

 

Overall command authority rests with the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF). The

 

CATF, in consultation with the Commander, Landing Force (CLF), must define the organizational

 

relationships to be established between himself and the raid force company commander which is

 

most conducive to the exercise of effective command and control; doctrine allows for flexibility

 

in doing so to facilitate the exploitation of situational uniqueness. Chapter 19, Amphibious

 

Raids, of JCS PUB 3-02 states: "The principles of organization and command relationships,

 

stated in Chapter 2 [Organization and Command for Amphibious Operations], are applicable for

 

amphibious raids. However, the wide variation in the purpose of raiding operations and the

 

consequent variation in the composition of the raiding force and associated naval forces, require

 

a full description of the precise command arrangements which apply in each case." (1:19-3)

 

For example, the Amphibious Task Force is tasked with the mission of conducting an independent

 

raid operation The CATF may define command relationships as follows: CATF will exercise

 

command and control of the launch and recovery phases of the operation through his LPD captain

 

(on whose ship the raid company is embarked), and all other phases of the operation through the

 

CLF chain of command, with the LPD captain standing by to receive on-order missions in

 

support of the ship-to-shore and/or shore-to-ship phases. The LPD captain is responsible to

 

CATF for launch, recovery, and on-order taskings. The CLF is responsible to CATF for all other

 

phases of the operation, and exercises command and control of the raid force directly, or

 

through the battalion commander.

 

       As a contrasting example, the Amphibious Task Force is tasked to conduct an amphibious

 

assault, and is given authority to conduct a supporting raid operation against a diversionary

 

target which is a considerable distance away from the amphibious assault objective area. The

 

CATF may define command relationships as follows:  CATF will exercise command and control

 

through his LPD captain to the raid force commander for all phases of the operation. In this

 

case, staff planning cells, incorporating both Navy and Marine expertise, would be organized to

 

assist in the planning sequence for the raid operation. This would be necessary to ensure

 

thorough staff planning was accomplished for the raid, but not divert the attention of the entire

 

staff away from planning the amphibious assault.

 

       In defining command relationships, CATF and CLF are not limited to these two examples;

 

quite the contrary, these examples are meant to convey the idea that CATF, in consultation with

 

CLF, has the flexibility to tailor command relationships for an amphibious raid which make the

 

best tactical sense and which best exploit the unique circumstances of a given situation. The

 

command relationships can be defined which best facilitate effective command and control and

 

provide the greatest probability of success.

 

       Planning Responsibilities.  When planning an RRC/CRRC over-the-horizon amphibious

 

raid, the Raid Force Commander (RFC) must be the focal point from the outset. The planning

 

sequence must be characterized by continuous parallel, concurrent, and detailed planning as set

 

forth in amphibious doctrine. The RFC will need support, especially in terms of planning

 

information, from the staff expertise available in both the Navy and Marine command

 

organizations. Additionally, planning must be characterized by close cooperation and teamwork

 

between Navy and Marine staffs. As the plan develops and is completed, all aspects should be

 

briefed, reviewed, and understood by the planners and decision-makers at every echelon of

 

command, with final approval from CATF. Thorough and careful planning cannot be

 

overemphasized; it takes on added importance in an operation characterized by long-range,

 

low-visibility, EMCON considerations when the time available after receipt of the execute order

 

is limited, and where positive control of the raid force is vested in the RFC for execution.

 

       Contingency Planning.  As with the planning of any tactical operation, provisions must

 

be made to deal with uncertainty. The enemy's capability to respond with reinforcements,

 

either ashore or at sea or both, will be of paramount importance. Plans should be developed to

 

address contingencies and emergencies during the ship-to-shore insertion phase, the conduct of

 

operations ashore, and the shore- to-ship extraction phase. Contingency planning should include

 

reinforcement or extraction of the raid force, fire support or electronic warfare measures to

 

support the raid force, and emergency medical evacuation procedures.

 

       Sea States.  The reference for understanding and judging sea conditions is the American

 

Practical Navigator (Bowditch), Volume 1. The mission profile calls for raiding craft

 

operations to be conducted in sea conditions up to and including Sea State 3/Beaufort Force 4.

 

The Beaufort Force represents the estimated wind conditions. Sea State 3 and Beaufort Force 4

 

represent the same conditions on the Bowditch scale--namely, a moderate breeze 11-16 knots

 

or 13-18 miles per hour and a slight swell, with waves 0.5-1.25 meters (approximately 1.5-

 

4.0 feet). (2:1312,1313)

 

       The seakeeping characteristics of both types of raiding craft permit operations in Sea

 

State 3, to include both launch and recovery operations and open-ocean transits. Higher sea

 

states create greater risks during ship launch and recovery, and more caution must be

 

exercised. Further, the high winds associated with higher sea states adversely affect the

 

maneuverability of both types of raiding craft, resulting in slower speeds and longer transit

 

times. The advantage offered by operating in higher sea states is a reduced vulnerability to

 

detection by enemy electronic sensors. Higher sea states will degrade the ranges at which

 

electronic sensors are effective, thus facilitating the clandestine nature of the operation and

 

contributing to tactical surprise. Sea conditions can fluctuate rapidly; during the planning

 

phase, consideration must be given to forecasted metrological factors which could adversely

 

affect the sea state during the entire duration of the operation. Additionally, sea state conditions

 

are not necessarily related to surf zone conditions, and the two must be considered independent

 

of one another.

 

       Distance.  The Insertion Point (IP) at which the raiding craft are launched from the

 

amphibious ship in over-the-horizon operations is generally considered to be approximately

 

twenty nautical miles from shore. In determining the actual distance from shore for the IP, the

 

sea state, weather, transit times, and enemy situation (particularily his detection capabilities)

 

should be evaluated. The objective is to keep the ship protected and far enough away to prevent

 

operational compromise, while minimizing the distance the raid force must travel in order to

 

reduce the physical demands caused by long open-ocean transits.

 

       Navigation.  In keeping with the EMCON mission profile parameter, the navigation used

 

by the raid force is a manual, or non-electronic, method. Dead Reckoning and Coastal Piloting

 

are the primary methods used. The raid force launches from its amphibious ship at a known

 

latitude/longitude and follows a pre-planned course(magnetic bearing), maintaining a steady

 

speed, and monitoring the time traveled, thus enabling the raiders to calculate the distance

 

traveled along their known course( Distance=Speed x Time). As the raid force reaches coastal

 

piloting waters and is able to identify lights, man-made objects, and/or terrain features

 

ashore, the navigators will shoot Lines of Position (LOPs): magnetic back-azimuths which allow

 

them to accurately fix their location along their track. This process is similar to a resection in

 

land navigation. The nautical chart on which navigational information is kept is on

 

a plotting board, which serves as a parallel ruler. Keeping location on this plotting board is

 

similar to keeping location on a plotting board in a Fire Direction Center (FDC). The set

 

(direction) and drift (speed) of ocean, tidal, and wind currents must be accounted for during the

 

process of planning and executing the navigation. This explanation of raid force navigation is

 

very basic and oversimplistic; good nautical navigation requires trained navigators, specialized

 

equipment, and a great deal of attention to detail in planning and execution. Hand-held, non-

 

emitting satellite navigation systems are a complementary and very accurate navigational aid.

 

       Stealth.  A basic premise of the OTH raid is its clandestine nature: the capability of the

 

raid force to remain undetected or unidentified for a sufficient period of time necessary to

 

achieve tactical surprise. This is the basis for the EMCON mission parameter Radio

 

communications are used only by exception, minimized to the greatest extent possible. The

 

exceptions are emergencies or the necessity of communicating critical information which has a

 

direct impact upon the successful outcome of the mission. This parameter does not negate the

 

necessity for establishing a radio communications net; there must be a link between the RFC and

 

the CATF's controlling agency. The CATF must have the ability to pass new information or

 

orders to the RFC; the RFC must have the ability to contact the CATF's controlling agency upon

 

enemy contact, to execute a contingency plan, in the event of an emergency, or to pass some

 

other piece of mission critical information. Internal signalling by the raid force is

 

accomplished with the aid of night vision devices, infared lights, and directional lights, with an

 

intra-company radio net serving as an alternate communications means.

 

       A thorough analysis and detailed planning of raid target areas with respect to the type

 

and manner of employment of enemy electronic surveillance and detection capabilities is

 

essential. This analysis should address radar, acoustic, infared, ambient light, and thermal

 

imagery sensors. Studies have shown that the raid force can be detected by a variety of sensors

 

at tactically significant ranges which provide the enemy both the time and opportunity to

 

respond prior to the arrival of the raid force at its objective. A careful analysis of enemy

 

electronic sensors, relative to the ambient environment, is critical. The tactics employed by

 

the raid force must be adopted to reduce vulnerability to enemy detection capabilities and

 

counter enemy reactions to early detection. Raid force transit and beach approach formations

 

should be made with the knowledge that tightly bunched raiding craft increases vulnerability to

 

detection. Employment of dispersed formations during vulnerability periods will decrease

 

detection probability. Additionally, operations in adverse weather and higher sea states will

 

degrade the ranges at which electronic sensors are effective.

 

       The Surf Zone.  A key planning consideration for coastline raiding craft

 

operations is the conditions of the surf zone at the Beach Landing Site (BLS). Detailed

 

information on surf zone characteristics can be found in the United States Navy's Joint Surf

 

Manual.(3:Chapts 4,5,9) Surf zone conditions are reported by an eight line Surf Observation

 

Report (SUROB). (3:10-2)

 

       The critical considerations for raiding craft surf zone operations are SIGNIFICANT

 

WAVE HEIGHT (average height of the highest one-third of the breakers observed), the PERIOD

 

(time interval between waves measured to the nearest half-second), and the BREAKER TYPE

 

(spilling, plunging, or surging). The higher the Significant Wave Height, the shorter the

 

Period, the greater the percentage of plunging or surging waves, the greater the danger to

 

raiding craft surf zone operations. These critical factors must be considered in combination and

 

their effect on raiding craft operations carefully and prudently evaluated. For example, a surf

 

zone characterized by predominantly spilling breakers with a Significant Wave Height of six

 

feet and a period of 17 seconds is negotiable for trained coxswains. A contrasting example is a

 

surf zone characterized by predominantly plunging breakers with a Significant Wave Height of

 

three feet and a period of seven seconds; this surf zone is very hazardous to raiding craft

 

operations due to the large percentage of plunging waves combined with short Period, even

 

though the Significant Wave Height is only three feet. Surf zone evaluation should be conducted

 

by personnel trained and experienced in raiding craft operations, and in consideration of

 

boat/engine maintenance conditions and coxswain/boat team experience level.

 

       SUROB collection should begin 72-96 hours in advance of the anticipated time of receipt

 

of the raid execute order. One should be collected every twelve hours, corresponding to the tidal

 

conditions at the planned time of landing. U.S. Navy SEAL teams or USMC reconnaissance teams

 

are trained and qualified to collect SUROBS. Surf conditions should be a critical consideration

 

for CATF, or his designated subordinate commander, in making the final determination to launch

 

or not launch the raid force from the amphibious ship. Once the raid force is launched and

 

arrives outside the surf zone at the BLS, the RFC must make the final beaching decision. If pre-

 

launch SUROBs, visual sightings, or mission necessity warrant further evaluation, the RFC may

 

employ his own Scout Swimmers for that purpose. He must consider the surf conditions as they

 

exist at the time, his mission and command guidance, boat/engine maintenance conditions, and

 

coxswain/boat team training and experience level. As the Commanding Officer of the raid

 

company, and the on-scene commander trained in this capability, he is the one best qualified to

 

make the final beaching decision.

 

       Employment of SEALS, Reconnaissance Teams, and Raid Company Scout Swimmers.  U.S.

 

Navy SEALS and USMC reconnaissance teams are most efficiently employed in advance operations

 

supporting the amphibious raid. They can collect advance SUROB's, conduct initial BLS

 

reconnaissance, conduct route reconnaissance between the BLS and the target, and act as eyes-on-

 

target, collecting intelligence data in the objective area. Depending on the situation, the RFC

 

may choose to employ the raid company's own Scout Swimmers to facilitate the clandestine

 

movement of the raid force ashore. They validate the correct location of the BLS, conduct BLS

 

reconnaissance and establish initial security, conduct final SUROB if required, and mark the

 

BLS with directional lighting to signal the raiding craft ashore. The raid compampany's Scout

 

Swimmers are the ones best qualified to perform these functions; they have trained extensively

 

with their company, have a clear appreciation of their company's experience level and

 

capabilities, and are well versed in the company's standard operating procedures. The inherent

 

capability of the raid company to transition ashore and establish itself on the BLS frees the

 

SEALs and reconnaissance teams for their traditional roles, and increases the probability of

 

success because of procedural familiarity.

 

       Safety Support.   Operations involving long, open-ocean transits of personnel in raiding

 

craft should include support from a dedicated safety boat manned and equipped to provide medical

 

support, mechanical repair, and rescue swimmer support. The craft used could be a Seafox,

 

RRC, or CRRC. Of the three craft, the RRC is the best choice as a safety boat; it can comfortably

 

carry the personnel, supplies, and equipment required, and, in the event of a surf zone rescue,

 

is easier and safer to handle than a Seafox. Due to the CRRC's limited space and towing

 

capability, it should only be used as a safety boat when the raid force is employing CRRC's

 

exclusively. Safety boat personnel should include an Emergency Medical Technician (EMT)

 

qualified corpsman, a boat engine mechanic, and a rescue swimmer. Supplies and equipment

 

include specialized medical gear for water training (Oxygen resuscitator, backboard, etc.),

 

rescue equipment (ring/pull bouys, towing lines, etc.), and engine repair parts and tools.

 

Additionally, in the training environment, a dedicated safety radio net should be established to

 

provide a communications link between the safety boat and the exercise control ship.

 

       Unresolved Issues.

 

       1.  Amphibious Doctrine.  Although doctrine was addressed earlier, the fact is that many

 

Navy and Marine officers are uncomfortable with over-the-horizon operations in the context of

 

traditional amphibious doctrine. This concern is not unjustified; launching a rifle company in

 

raiding craft twenty miles out at sea in the middle of the night in Sea State 3 and not expecting to

 

hear from them again until they are ashore and on the objective is a considerably different

 

undertaking than amphibious operations of the past, where the Primary Control Officer stood on

 

the wing of the bridge, had positive control of the landing via his guide boat, and watched, in

 

broad daylight, the movement of landing craft ashore from 4000 yards. The Joint Doctrine for

 

Amphibious Operations, JCS PUB 3-02, was written for large scale amphibious operations

 

based on World War Two and Korean War experience, long before the dream of over-the-

 

horizon operations became a reality. There is no question that amphibious doctrine needs to be

 

reviewed and updated in light of current operational needs and capabilities.

 

       2.  Logistics Support.  Because of the identified operational need and the urgency with

 

which raiding craft were fielded, the in-system logisitics base to support RRC/CRRC

 

maintenance is not yet fully in place. Although there has been some progress in this area,

 

maintenance of raiding craft depends mostly on the efforts of using units and parts, tools,

 

equipment, and mechanic training from commercial vendors.

 

       3.  Mindset.  Many observers, when hearing about raiding craft operations for the first

 

time, are quick to note the complexities, difficulties, and dangers, and become skeptical of their

 

feasibility. But compare the concerns of raiding craft commanders, as outlined in this article,

 

to the concerns of, for example, a helicopter squadron commander preparing to participate in

 

amphibious operations:

 

            a. The training and proficiency of pilots and aircrews

 

            b. The maintenance of aircraft

 

            c. The planning and management of the mechanical functions involved in

 

               helicopter operations, such as deck spotting procedures, refueling

 

               capabilities, time-space planning, navigation planning, etc.

 

            d. The weather factors which could have an impact on flight operations

 

            e. The enemy situation; especially air early warning systems and air

 

               defense systems

 

            f. Safety support in the form of a search and rescue helicopter

 

 

       The similarities between the concerns of the raiding craft commander and the concerns

 

of the helicopter commander are readily apparent.  All amphibious operations involve some

 

degree of complexity, difficulty, and danger. Success is a matter of understanding the

 

capabilities and limitations of the tools used, what factors have an impact on operations, and how

 

those factors impact on operations, so that feasible plans can be developed. People can get hurt

 

doing things they are not trained to do; properly trained coxswains, navigators, scout

 

swimmers, boat team members, and leaders can safely and successfully conduct over-the-

 

horizon night raiding craft operations. Raiding craft operations, like helicopter operations,

 

require well-trained Marines and thorough operational planning. Together, their

 

complementary capabilities enable us to execute missions in accordance with the MAGTF Master

 

Plan's first priority.

 

 

 

                                      BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

1. U.S. Department of Defense. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Operations for Amphibious Doctrine.

       JCS PUB 3-02. Washington D.C. 1986.

 

2. U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Mapping Agency. American Practical Navigator

       (Bowditch), Volume 1. Washington D.C. 1981.

 

3. U.S. Department of the Navy. Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet and

       Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Joint Surf Manual.

       COMNAVSURFPAC/LANT INSTRUCTION 3840.1B with Change 1. Norfolk, VA. 1987.

 

4. U.S. Marine Corps. Commandant of the Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Master

       Plan (MAGTF MASTER PLAN). Washington D.C. 1989.