Will The Marine Corps Get The V-22?
AUTHOR Major John T. Enoch, Jr., USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: WILL THE MARINE CORPS GET THE V-22?
I. Theme: To state the factors that will determine whether the
Marine Corps will receive the V-22 and explain how those factors
are in favor of the Osprey's acquisition.
II. Thesis: The probability of the Marine Corps acquiring the
V-22 is favorable but not certain; several factors will
determine the aircraft's fate.
III. Discussion: The V-22 Osprey was the Marine Corps'
priority aviation acquisition item to execute its future
strategy of Over-The-Horizon amphibious assaults. Secretary of
Defense Cheney attempted to cancel the V-22 program in 1989 but
it has survived. Factors that will influence the Marine Corps'
acquisition of the V-22 are: congressional support versus OSD
opposition; the Marine Corps' position; sister service and
unified/specified command requirements; V-22 test results; and
lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm. Congress and OSD
have waged their battles armed with the defense budgets and the
expenditures of appropriated funds as their primary weapons.
The Marine Corps will not directly oppose Secretary Cheney's
position on the V-22. The Corps has, however, laid the onus of
finding a CH-46 replacement on OSD, with the stipulation that
the alternative aircraft has all the capabilities of the Osprey.
Meanwhile, the Marines will continue to allow their junior
Marines to state their opinion and focus Congress' attention on
the need for a medium lift replacement. Only one of the sister
services, the Air Force, can be expected to show any support for
the Osprey. The-regional CINCs and special operations forces
will give an additional impetus to the V-22 program. The
Osprey's test results will be the bottom line in acquiring the
aircraft. Any failures will kill the program. The lessons
learned from Operation Desert Storm are: the value of
technology, the importance of an amphibious assault threat,
special operations potential of the V-22, and military success
equates to increased political clout. All presently point to
the necessity and probability of the Marine Corps acquiring the
V-22.
IV. Summary: Osprey proponents have a right to be optimistic;
the deciding factors of its fate are in favor of the aircraft.
V. Conclusion: The Marines may not see the V-22 in the fleet
in the near future, but the odds are it will be there.
WILL THE MARINE CORPS GET THE V-22?
Thesis: The probability of the Marine Corps acquiring the V-22
is favorable but not certain; several factors will
determine the aircraft's fate.
I. Congressional support versus OSD opposition
A. Reasons for congressional support
B. Reasons for Secretary Cheney's opposition
C. Congressional and OSD political maneuvering
D. Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
II. The Marine Corps' position
A. No direct confrontation with OSD
B. Lay the onus on OSD
C. Medium lift replacement
III. Sister service and unified/specified command requirements
A. Army
B. Air Force
C. Navy
D. Unified/specified commands
IV. V-22 test results
A. Importance of success
B. Successful results
V. Lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm
A. The value of technology
B. Importance of an amphibious assault threat
C. Special operations potential of the V-22
D. Military success equates to increased political clout
WILL THE MARINE CORPS GET THE V-22?
The late 1980s were good years for the Marine Corps. The
memory of Vietnam was fading. The enlightened administrations
of two Republican presidents had brought about a renewed pride
in America and its armed forces. The Marines basked in the
center of that pride. The Corps' personnel and equipment were
of the highest quality in its history. Marine Corps leaders,
under General Gray's tutelage, felt once again involved and
prophetic in determining the future of their Corps. Their
strategy of Over-The-Horizon amphibious assaults was every bit
as farseeing as Major Earl Ellis's pre-World War II strategy of
offensive advanced base operations had been. A key element to
the Corps' future strategy was the acquisition of the V-22
Osprey, General Gray's number one aviation priority.(6:20)
On 25 April 1989, however, newly appointed Secretary of
Defense Dick Cheney struck a blow against that strategy while
testifying before Congress:
I think it's [V-22] probably a good aircraft, but
I could not justify spending the amount of money
that was proposed to be spent when we were just
getting ready to move into procurement on the V-22
to perform a very narrow mission that I think can
be performed in another fashion, specifically by
using helicopters instead of the V-22. . .this was
a capability that if we had to give someplace,
this was one we could do without.(2:8-9)
Many thought Secretary Cheney's statement was the death
knell for the Osprey. Yet almost two years after the Office of
the Secretary of Defense (OSD) attempted to terminate the V-22,
the program still survives. The probability of the Marine Corps
acquiring the V-22 is favorable but not certain: several factors
will determine the aircraft's fate. Those factors are listed in
Figure 1.
Click here to view image
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT VERSUS OSD OPPOSITION
Congressional and OSD actions since April 25, 1989, have
provided indications of how the battle for the V-22 will be
fought and the probable outcome. Congressional response to
Secretary Cheney's testimony was quick to follow. Congress's
interest in the Osprey had been high since its inception with
the Joint Services Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft Program in
1981.(5:42) Years of courting by the military and industry plus
numerous favorable studies of the V-22 had convinced Congressmen
of the military necessity for the Osprey.
Parochialism also played a part in congressional support.
The components for the V-22 were to be manufactured in 44 states
and a cancellation of the program would result in a loss of
jobs. Full scale production of the V-22 with its commmercial
versions and the development of vertiports, on the other hand,
would create the potential for more jobs and more votes.
OSD opposition to the Osprey was led by Doctor David Chu,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and
Evaluation. It was Dr. Chu who convinced Secretary Cheney,
within some thirty days after he had assumed office, to cancel
the V-22. OSD proposed a number of CH-53Es and H-60s as a
cheaper alternative to the Osprey. When studies proved this
mixture of helicopters would cost more than the V-22, Dr. Chu
quickly reduced the proposed quantity of helicopters saying they
could perform the same mission at a cheaper cost.
OSD criticized reports that favored the V-22 and began
stonewalling Congress' requests for information. One Under
Secretary of Defense memo dated 14 June 1989 stated that any
information on the Osprey going external to the Department would
go through the OSD for Legislative Affairs. The V-22 was the
only program treated in this manner and information channeled to
Congress was sparce.(17:6)
Congress, against the wishes of OSD, provided for Fiscal
Year (FY) 1990 Osprey research and development funding but no
production funds. Congress further indicated that remaining
1989 production funds were to be used for further flight
testing. Secretary Cheney was also directed to provide an
independent Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis (COEA)
on the V-22 and alternative aircraft.(17:6-7) President Bush
signed the FY 1990 Defense Appropriations Bill in November 1989
making Congress' demands legal. Both OSD and Congress awaited
the results of the COEA to buttress their stands.
On December 1, 1989, one day after Congress recessed and
without its prior knowledge, Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald
Atwood signed a memorandum ordering an immediate termination of
V-22 contracts funded by FY 1989 procurement funds. Some
members of Congress were angry over what they considered an
attempt by OSD to subvert the Congress.(14:180) OSD countered
that since Congress had not impounded or reprogrammed FY 1989
procurement funds, its action was legally correct.(3:5) The
administration later reversed OSD's action but the harm had been
done. Ironically, many cancelled V-22 contracts had to be
renegotiated which further increased the aircraft's cost.
The Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) was selected to
conduct the COEA. The IDA is a federally funded research and
development center which carries out studies and analyses for
OSD, the Joint Staff, unified commanders, and defense agencies.
The IDA project leader chosen for the COEA was a Dr. L. Simmons
who was known as having ". . .been previously and openly skeptical
of the Osprey."(17:7) A steering committee was provided to the
COEA by the Department of Defense. It met with the COEA team
five times and:
... included representatives from a number of OSD
staff elements, in particular those responsible
for program analysis and evaluation [Dr. Chu's
branch], for overseeing the development and acquisition
of tactical combat systems, for tests and evaluation,
and for estimating the costs of future military
systems.
... provided us [COEA team] with additional sources of
information, occasionally suggested alternative
approaches from the ones we had proposed and identified
a wide range of sensitivies to be examined.(19:8)
OSD clearly had input into the COEA while it was taking place.
Both Dr. Chu and Dr. Simmons agreed, however, that the steering
committee's guidance was only advisory and that the IDA study
team's conclusions were its own.(19:71)
The COEA's preliminary results were completed and briefed
in April 1990 to OSD, but they were not briefed to Congress
until July 19, 1990.(19:5) Some members of the Senate chaffed
at the delay in receiving the COEA's findings. Senator Arlen
Specter said:
... I would suggest that there is a very important
subsidiary question in terms of. . .the good faith of
the Department of Defense in terms of opening this
process to the Congress.
Last year, both houses of the Congress mandated
an independent study: a study to determine the facts.
As the process has gone forward, there have been
reports of a preliminary conclusion not made available
to the Congress. There were meetings on April 16
with no congressional participation. There was strong
insistence in the Congress on getting access to the
report which was finally made available under strong
pressure by this Senator, talking to Dr Chu and
finally to the Secretary of Defense, on Friday when
we left for the Fourth of July recess, which has the
unmistakable imprint of trying to delay it as long as
possible until 535 Members of Congress have left
town. (19:2)
Dr. Simmons testified that the COEA had examined the V-22
and seven alternative aircraft: CH-53E, CH-46E, CH-60(S), Boeing
Model 360, EH-101, CH-47M, and the Super Puma. Two different
twenty-year life-cycle cost fundings for all V-22 and
alternative fleets were also studied under various scenarios,
The results:
... clearly concluded that the V-22 is more cost
effective, more survivable, and, in the IDA proposed
lower rate production scenario, the lower cost (in
both the near and long terms) for medium-lift VTOL
missions over the OSD alternative.(20:8-5)
Dr. Chu, representing OSD, challenged the study before the
senate subcouittee stating that some of the COEA's basic
assumptions were incorrect. Dr. Chu went on to say that the
cost of the alternate helicopter fleet was too much and disputed
the findings that the Osprey fleets could outperform larger
alternative helicopter fleets.
Senate subcommittee members were skeptical of Dr. Chu's
challenges, particularly since the COEA's steering committee
included OSD membership and had met with the IDA study team five
times. Senator Inouye said:
To the best of my recollection, this is the first
time that the Office of the Secretary of Defense
has come out with full force to attack the assump-
tions, the creditability, the results, and the
recommendations of the IDA. (19:57)
Despite the COEA's findings, neither Congress nor OSD would
change their stands on the Osprey. The findings of the COEA,
though, did force OSD to confine its arguments more to the
V-22's costs. As one author aptly phrased it, "During last
summer's long, hot debate, DoD apparently became convinced that
it could not argue on purely technical grounds."(8:30)
The Defense Department's FY 1991 budget proposal contained
no monies for the Osprey. Congress countered DOD's desires by
funding research and development and long-lead procurement for
the V-22 in the FY 1991 budget to the tune of $238 million and
$365 million respectively. OSD to date, however, has released
no procurement funds and piecemealed out research and
development funds grudgingly.(13) OSD's strategy appears to be
to withold funds as long as possible, thereby increasing the
difficulties of managing the V-22 program and increasing its
costs to a prohibitive levels Representative Weldon described
OSD's actions as, "...a behind-the-door action to curtail this
program. "(9:8) Both houses of the Congress, in March 1991,
attempted to counter OSD's strategy by proposing legislation
requiring DOD to release FY 1991 funds for the Osprey within
thirty days.(9:8)
DOD's proposed FY 1992 budget once again has no funds
slated for the V-22. Secretary Cheney certainly had the Osprey
program in mind when he stated in hid 1991 Report of the
Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress:
But while many modernization technologies are
possible, only a select number can be brought to
fruition because of fiscal constraints.(18:64)
Both Congress and OSD can be expected to gather all their
forces to battle over the V-22 in the FY 1992 budget. Politics
will once again be their weapons. Which side is favored?
Congress seems to hold the stronger hand and presents a united
front. "There are no anti-V-22 coalitions in Congress...", said
one Representative.(9:8) The words of a prophetic Marine
Lieutenant Colonel also come to mind, "After everything is
weighed, it appears the Osprey will succeed due to enormous
legislative support."(17:12)
THE MARINE CORPS' POSITION
Secretary Cheney's cancellation of the V-22 presented the
Marine Corps with a genuine dilemma. How could the Marines
acquire the aircraft they needed to conduct their future
strategy without opposing the Secretary of Defense? Some
difficult decisions had to be made.
Those decisions soon became apparent in the rhetoric of
Marine Corps leaders. In early 1989, the Commandant had stated:
"The MV-22 program is the most important advance in military
aviation since the helicopter. It is my number one aviation
priority. "(6:20) One year after Secretary Cheney's testimony,
General Gray stated: "No Marine Corps requirement is more
pressing than the need to identify a solution for the
replacement of our medium lift assault capability, "(7:65) Other
statements by Marine Corps leaders made it evident they would
not directly oppose Secretary Cheney, but they would demand an
aircraft with the capabilities that could be found only in the
V-22. General Pitman said:
This program [medium lift assault] is our number
one priority... .There is a common perception, in
some circles, that inexpensive rotorcraft are avail-
able today and that these aircraft can fulfill the
the requirement for military applications. While
this perception may have been true in the past, it
is no longer the case.. The next generation of
medium assault rotorcraft must be capable of
operating in the same environment as our fixed-
wing aircraft, especially at night and in adverse
weather. (12:54)
Junior officers, in contrast to their leaders, were allowed to
state their opinions about the Osprey.
The Corps wisely decided to lay the onus on OSD to find an
alternative aircraft with the V-22's capabilities, knowing full
well it was an impossible task. The COEA later proved the
Corps' decision to be a wise one.
Worried that a replacement for the CH-46E might not come
about with all the political maneuvering, the Department of the
Navy (DON) and DOD set aside funds in FY 1991 and proposed funds
for FY 1992 for a Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) aircraft. The
Marine Corps did not consider this event as another threat to
the V-22. One knowledgeable Marine said "...that an improved
helicopter could not approach the V-22 Osprey's capabilities and
that the MLR was too poorly funded to succeed."(4) More than
one Marine has expressed the hope that the MLR funds could be
rolled into the V-22 program.
The Corps can be expected to continue to beat the drum for
OSD to choose a suitable medium lift aircraft with the Osprey's
capabilities. Although the Commandant and his senior officers
will not speak out against Secretary Cheney, junior officers
will be allowed to freely express their opinions. Using this
strategy, the Marines can still maneuver for the aircraft they
really want. The Marines are no ingenues in this game-the AV-8
Harrier is flying for the Marines after it was cancelled eight
times!
SISTER SERVICE AND UNIFIED/SPECIFIED COMMAND REQUIREMENTS
The desires of the Marine Corps' sister services and the
unified commands will also be a factor in acquiring the V-22.
Their opinions carry a great deal of weight with Congress. The
unified commands will be helpful in getting the Osprey, but the
sister services can be expected to be of little assistance.
The Army was originally the executive service for the V-22,
but later passed its leadership role to the Navy and withdrew
from the program. Although the Army continues to watch the
Osprey program closely, it will not come out in-support of the
aircraft. The Army's highest aviation priority is its Light
Helicopter program which it will not risk losing by supporting
the V-22.
The Air Force can be expected to show limited support for
the Osprey. It would like to possess the capabilities inherent
in the long-range special operations variant of the V-22 which
the Air Force was scheduled to receive. The Air Force's support
will not be very robust since it has higher aviation priorities
than the V-22 and a limited budget.
The Navy is the executive service for the Osprey. The
Navy, however, will not come out in support of the V-22. The
Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Garrett, will not oppose the desires
of the Secretary of Defense. When asked by Congressman Curt
Weldon why he had not requested long-lead funding for the V-22,
Secretary Garrett replied: "I conduct my business subject to
[Cheney]. . "(1:320)
The Navy is also the major spokesman within DON tasked with
representing the interests of both Marine and Navy aviation.
The Navy is required to assemble, prioritize, and submit
aviation funding requests for both the Navy and the Marine
Corps. The V-22, however, was not even on the Navy's top ten
list. DON's greatest concern for the future will continue to be
starting and funding another aircraft program to replace its
cancelled A-12. The Navy is also hesitant to support production
of the V-22 for the Marine Corps because the buy would consume
about 47% of DON's Total Obligation Authority (aviation funds).
The Marine Corps normally only receives 25% to 33% of these
funds and the Navy will naturally oppose the release of any
greater amount. (16)
The unified/specified commands will generally be helpful in
acquiring the Osprey. The Commander In Chiefs (CINCs) of the
unified commands have favored the program for years. The
capabilities the V-22 could give to forces in their theaters
would be very advantageous. The U.S. Space Command and the U.S.
Transportation Command are the only specified commands that have
no requirement for the services of the Osprey; therefore, they
have little interest in the aircraft. The U.S. Special
Operations Command (SOCOM), however, would very much like to
have an aircraft like the Osprey. General Stiner, the CINC for
SOCOM, expressed such an opinion in a question and answer
interview with Defense News:
Q. SOCOM's list of top priorities for weapon systems
includes long-range aircraft for covert operations
and reliable yet advanced communication systems.
Termination of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft
forces SOCOM to rely on two modified medium-range
helicopters to drop or take out commandos. Will the
MH-47E and MH-60K helicopters meet the needs of
special operations forces in the 1990s?
A. We will have sufficient lift capability to
satisfy our midrange infiltration requirements.
But we still have a requirement for a long-range
infiltration platform that can go out a distance
to exceed 1,000 miles in one night, insert teams or
pick up teams, and return the same night. It has to
be able to land on roadways or on approved strips.
So you're looking at some kind of technology
similar to the V-22. That is a requirement.
Q. Is SOCOM evaluating the V-22 specifically?
A. We're looking at all options, and we are looking
at all types of technology. We can get them
(commandos] in right now with the Combat Talon
[aircraft], but getting them out is the
challenge. (10:22)
Congress is well aware of SOCOM's desires. The generous
funding and high regard Congress has given to the special forces
units should be expected to continue. The result would be an
additional impetus to the V-22 program.
One thing, however, must be kept in mind when talking about
the stated opinions of the service chiefs and unified/specified
commanders. None can be expected to openly oppose Secretary
Cheney's stand on the V-22. Such an action would be considered
unprofessional and possibly detrimental to their services or
commands when all are in keen competition for a tight defense
budget. But, when the overall tally is taken, the influence of
the sister services and unified/specified commands should favor
the V-22.
V-22 TEST RESULTS
Perhaps the strongest factor in determining the fate of the
V-22 will be the results of its flight tests. Any show stopper
could kill the program. On the other hand, the achievement or
surpassing of the original Joint Service Operational
Requirements [operational requirements] on the aircraft would be
one of the strongest arguments for the aircraft. Clearly, the
V-22 must test successfully to be approved. Congressional
proponents of the Osprey are of the same opinion:
While the conferees [congressmen] continue to support
the V-22, their support is not unqualified. The V-22
will have to prove successful in operational testing
before the conferees make any final decisions
on procurement. (11:1)
The manufacturers of the Osprey are aware of the need for
the V-22 to show positive test results. Its flight testing
program was accelerated soon after Secretary Cheney first
attempted to terminate the program. Major testing milestones
have been successfully achieved since then: flight in the
helicopter and fixed wing modes, initial shipboard compatibility
and initial external load testing. The four aircraft flight
tested so far have exceeded many expectations. The V-22 had
achieved as of 19 February 1991: forward flight up to 349 knots,
an altitude of 21,500 feet, angle of bank of 60 degrees, 50 knot
taxi speeds, and load factors of 0.5 to 2.3 G's.(15:1)
DOD's General Accounting Office (GAO) has frequently
leveled criticism at the program citing discrepancies and
describing the program as "behind schedule." The
"discrepancies," however, have been rectified or can be
corrected when the production models are manufactured. The
delays that had occurred were "...a direct result of actions
taken by DOD. "(11:1) Despite DOD's criticisms, there have been
no show stoppers and the aircraft remains its own best
advertisement.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION DESERT STORM
The lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm will
support acquisition of the V-22. The most apparent of these
lessons was the value of modern technology in the hands of well
trained troops. Helicopter technology is limited. It has
journeyed almost as far as science can take it. The Osprey's
technology, however, has ample room to grow and is a generation
ahead of any helicopters proposed as V-22 alternatives.
Critics of the V-22 will argue that the Marines have failed
to conduct a large scale amphibious assault against an armed foe
since the Korean War, which they will contend proves the Marines
don't have a requirement for the aircraft. Their argument,
however, ignores certain facts.
The fear of an American amphibious assault caused several
Iraqi divisions to focus their defensive efforts solely on the
Kuwaiti shoreline. Secondly, although a large scale amphibious
assault has not occurred in about forty years, this does not
mean one will not take place in the future. The military
drawdown may also result in the Navy and Marines with their
amphibious shipping to be the only armed services that can
quickly be brought to bear on an enemy. Lastly, the argument
ignores the fact that the V-22 can be used in many other
missions. Dr. Chu himself acknowledged that there were 26
missions the V-22 could fulfill in addition to the six for which
it was developed.(19:88)
Special operation forces (SOF) and Combat Search and Rescue
(CSAR) operations for coalition pilots were largely successful
during the conflict. Although obscured in secrecy, the scant
information revealed about their operations captivated America's
attention. The V-22 variants were purposely designed for these
missions and could perform them better than any helicopter.
Osprey proponents will certainly argue that the V-22 could have
reached downed pilots much faster, thereby increasing the number
of successful rescues. Osprey proponents will also argue that
SOF would have made very effective use of the V-22 in the manner
General Stiner alluded to in his interview.
The success of Operation Desert Storm will go a long way in
increasing the military's clout in acquiring the equipment it
desires. Secretary Cheney's clout, however, has also increased
commensurately. One Marine commented, "No one wants to fight
the Secretary of Defense because he's just won the world's
biggest war."(13) Secretary Cheney's popularity will not last
long though. Congressmen are already growing increasingly
disgruntled over his reluctance to release appropriated V-22
funds. In March, the House attached a rider to the Dire
Emergency Supplemental Funding Bill which requires DOD to
release the appropriated V-22 funds. The Senate has an
amendment before it which also requires DOD to release those
same funds!(9:8)
SUMMARY
When all the factors are weighed, the battle for the V-22,
though far from over, is leaning in favor of the Osprey. The
opposing forces of Congress and the Department of Defense are
strong factors in determining whether the Marine Corps will
receive the Osprey. Congress should carry the day if it remains
steadfast in its resolve. It has done so on numerous
occasions.
The Marine Corps' leadership cannot actively oppose
Secretary Cheney. It has, however, wisely laid the problem of
finding an aircraft that fulfills Marine requirements on the lap
of OSD. Those requirements cannot be met by any other aircraft
than the V-22. The Marines have also allowed their junior
personnel to speak their minds to the members of industry, the
media, and Congress about the type of aircraft they need. This
strategy allows the Corps to continue to bang the drum for a
replacement for the CH-46 while Congress listens. The Marine
Corps' experience in reversing terminated aircraft programs and
their strong desire for the V-22 are promising combat
multipliers in the battle for the Osprey.
How the sister services and the unified/specified commands
will affect the V-22 program as a whole is harder to discern.
The services rank as one neutral (Army), two pro (Marine and Air
Force), and one against (Navy). The unified/specified commands,
however, will swing the emphasis to the V-22. The special
regard Congress has for the special operations forces should
have the greatest effect in that regards.
The outcome of the V-22's flight testing will kill or save
the program. Everything else hinges on it. The manufacturers
of the aircraft have conducted a very successful accelerated
flight testing program thus far, and there are no show stoppers
in sight. A successful test program will make the aircraft its
own most influential advocate
Osprey proponents have a right to be optimistic; the
deciding factors of its fate are in favor of the aircraft.
Although the Marines may not see the aircraft in the fleet in
the near future, the odds are it's coming. The Marine Corps'
amphibious capabilities, at that time, will be assured well into
the next century.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1.Aerospace Daily, February 22, 1991.
2.Cheney, Dick. "Where We Must Cut the Defense Budget. . .and
Why." Defense 89, July/August 1989, 2-11.
3.Cooper, Bert. V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft (Weapons Facts).
Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, October 26,
1990.
4.Gisolo, Gary, Maj, USMC, Program sponsor (APW-52). Personal
interview about V-22. Washington, D.C., 26 February, 1991.
5.Flanagan, Robert, Col, USMC. "The V-22 Is Slipping Away." U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings (August 1990), 39-43.
6.Gray, A.M., Gen, USMC. "The Annual Report of the Marine Corps
to Congress." Marine Corps Gazette, 73 (April 1989), 15-22.
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All Black." Rotor & Wing International, February 1991,
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1991, 21-23.
11.Osprey FAX. A Bell-Boeing Publication, issue no. 29 (22
October, 1990), 1-2.
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13.Schaefer, J.H., Col, USMC. Lecture at The Command and Staff
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17.Stoops, C. "To Kill An Osprey." (Research paper, National
War College, 1990).
18.U.S. Department of Defense. Report of the Secretary of
Defense to the President and the Congress, January 1991.
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on S. Hrg. 101-934. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 1990.
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