Preparing For Future Sophisticated Warfare: Special Operations
AUTHOR Major Jimmy J. Elliott, USAF
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: PREPARING FOR FUTURE SOPHISTICATED WARFARE:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
I. PURPOSE: To edify readers of the U.S. interpretation of
future threats that will challenge our nation's policies, security,
and economy. Special operations offers an initiative that can act
as a force multiplier in countering the future threat.
II. PROBLEM: This nation will be forced to guarantee its security
by relying on a military force that is credible, responsive, and
effectively decisive, based on a significantly reduced budget.
III. DATA: In these times, when the world is becoming more
volatile, the U.S. needs to institute new policies that provide the
flexibility to address the full spectrum of threats. We must
develop new innovations that contribute to a more secure and robust
force projection. The United States faces a crucial the challenge
-of surviving the consequences of Congress significantly reducing
defense spending. Assuming the cold war is over and the threat of
nuclear war no longer exists, Congress has mandated a reduction in
the defense budget. It is the "peace dividend" philosophy that
presents potential contradictions to the posture of our national
security. Congress should attempt to preserve the eminence of our
nation through an equal balance of this country's power projections
(political, economic, and military).
IV. CONCLUSIONS: Without a complete analysis of the repercussions
of cutting the defense budget, Congress are all too willing and
eager to wholesale our military potency. Today, our military
strength is the only projection of power that gives our country any
credibility and prestige.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: While our country will need to address the
full spectrum of future threats to insure security of this nation's
economic and political endeavors, it will have to do so with a
reduced budget. The nature and doctrine of special operations
offers an answer to the current and future needs of our nation, at
a reduced overall cost. The stigma of such clandestine and
surreptitious organizations must be overcome with an understanding
that the contributions of these type operations outweigh the
apprehensions of our nations leaders. We must continue to explore
how special operations can contribute in every aspect of conflict
we face in the future.
Preparing for Future Sophisticated Warfare:
Special Operations
Thesis Statement: Lingering world instability requires U.S.
forces to be responsive, flexible, and credible. U.S. Special
Operations Forces (SOF) are uniquely established to contemplate the
nature of tomorrow's wars. While future U.S. policy mandates a
decrease in defense spending SOF will continue to meet the force
projection and security needs of this nation.
I. The Character of Future War
A. The Nature of the Threat
B. Paradigms of Conflict
C. Financing the Future
II. Special Operations Capabilities
A. Characteristics of Forces
B. Special Operations Forces
C. Future Conflict and Special Operations Forces
III. Future Challenges for Special Operations
A. Paradigms of Strategy
B. Paradigms of Concepts in Special Operations
C. The Nature of Warfare and Society
PREPARING FOR FUTURE SOPHISTICATED WARFARE:
SPECIAL OPERATIONS
War of all things proceeds least upon definite
rules, but draws principally upon itself for
contrivances to meet an emergency; and in such
cases the party who faces the struggle and keeps
his temper best meets with most security, and he
who loses his temper about it with corresponding
disaster.
Thucydides
The world is changing under the influence of forces no
government can control. The world's population is experiencing a
political awakening on a scale without precedent in its history.
The' global system is undergoing a significant redistribution of
political and economic power. And, it may be only a slight
miscalculation of those forces that will ignite the global
temperament and send us into our next hostile conflict.
Warfare, for all centuries, has been one of the most
persistent but most legitimate of abhorrent human activities. The
horrors of war have even intensified as we have transitioned into
a modern and civilized society. While the United States anxiously
awaits for signs of security and stability in the world, the urge
for human violence, organized or otherwise, continues to run out of
control. Today, as in the future, the American public will demand
that our military forces be prepared to counter any form of
hostility that compromises our security.
The American political system and its military have always
been uneasy with unconventional or "special" organizations. The
fact of life, however, is that there is an urgent and critical need
for a mechanism that combines military and civilian capabilities
whose primary mission is to conduct special activities or
operations in the full spectrum of future conflicts.
The Character of Future War
Today, it would be prudent to state and document national
security objectives; however, it is quite another thing to define
credible threats to those objectives. No strategic analyst can say
with a high degree of certainty what those threats will be. It is
possible only to make an informed speculation. The first
observation which can be made is that potential threats tend to be
diffuse, rather than specific. The threats will also depend upon
location and circumstances: local or regional conflicts could pose
tangible threats to the U.S. military bases, access to important
resources, a friendly government, American business investments, or
lives of U.S. citizens abroad. Yet, after decades of extensive and
intensive debate in the United States, there is no consensus as to
the definition of the threat and how to counter it.
In making a list of national security priorities, we typically
begin with the need to deter nuclear war, defend Nato, and prevent
the Soviets from ambushing us with technological surprise.1 Few
can doubt that the Pentagon is justified in expending large amounts
of resources to avert "worst case scenarios" that could paralyze or
terminate Western civilization. Yet, the most terrible danger may
be least likely to materialize. Hence, while we constantly strive
to ward off Armaggeddon, we also cannot ignore lesser threats that
recur with disturbing frequency--terrorism, subversion, insurgency,
guerrilla war, and the like.
Based on superpower rivalry and the threat of appalling
devastation from nuclear war, we have so far continued to avert
major conflicts. We are beginning to suspect that nations have
come to understand the consequences of holocaust and will be more
sensitive to actions leading to such destruction. Proliferation of
nuclear capabilities has necessitated that vulnerable nations align
themselves with East or West.
For many years, American reliance on nuclear weapons or their
deterrent effect, was an easy way of assuring swift and complete
victory and a semblance of world peace. But today's strategy of
deterrence is not the answer to American society's dream of full
and final insurance of its security. While they have increased our
potential for shock effect, nuclear weapons have also sharpened our
anxiety and deepened our sense of insecurity. The end result is
that nuclear deterrence strategy should not be applied totally to
deter aggressions, in a multiplicity of forms, that persist against
the democracies of the West.
Our leadership has assumed too quickly that "the threat has
gone away," even though the Soviet Union has been weakened
critically. Let there be no question about it, the Soviet threat
continues to be a large and sophisticated challenge today, much as
it was during the cold war period.
Even though, we have managed the spectrum of threats of the
superpowers, through our policy of deterrence, the adversarial
world powers have managed to channel conflicts to other global
arenas. The Soviet Union still tries to deliver its "message" to
other countries, both economically and politically, and has failed
terribly. It still tries to impose its philosophies on regional
and ethnic problems, with some success, encouraging these third
world countries that detest the United States to act against us.
The Soviets also have taken advantage of dissension and conflicts
to acquire surrogates. So even as the Soviet Union's empire is
collapsing, it has opened a "Pandora's Box" of emerging third world
countries.
While the question of irrational leaders could be applied to
a world power, my insinuation is more toward third world countries.
In some cases, these are nations that strive, live, and exist on
fanaticism. Many of these nations firmly believe they have a
divine right to operate, expand, and die in ways that are
appalling. Nonetheless, these nations are essential, because we
are, or can be, dependent on them for economic necessities.
A decade ago, the world experienced an average of ten
incidents of terrorist violence per week: assassinations,
bombings, air hijackings, kidnappings, maimings, or attacks on
facilities. The average now is nearly ten a day.2 The stark
reality of the death and destruction committed by terrorist groups
makes headline news all too often. The ease with which these
atrocities are committed instills fear in our citizens and
enterprises and frustrates attempts by governments to eliminate
this crime. Ironically, the United States policies and strategies,
to some extent, have cultivated the strategy of the terrorist.
In the coming years, power and peace will be in marked
contrast with the old world political arrangement. Rather than a
world dominated by two superpowers, there will be five somewhat
evenly matched centers of power: the United States, the Soviet
Union, Japan, China, and a confederation of Western European
states. At least four of these powers will have the ability to
destroy one another. The five great powers will probably have
rough parity in economic and technological strengths, but the
Soviet Union could become the preeminent military power if it
somehow solves it's ethnic, economic, and alliance problems, and if
the West fails to maintain credible military strength.3 The
bipolar world of the late 26th Century will be merely a subject for
historical study as we approach a pluralistic world.
There will be a number of obvious issues shaping relationships
between the five powers: rivalry for disappearing oil reserves,
cooperation or competition in a growing of Third World conflicts,
fears raised by continued strength of the Soviet armed force, and
the periodic joining of the West in the face of various threats.
Consequently, no issue will be as important as the continuing
destabilization of the Soviet empire.
The relentless separation of Moscow from its artificial
shield, the Western members of the Warsaw Pact, coupled with the
rise of Soviet irredentism and internal ethnic nationalism, could
result in a gradual and peaceful diminution of this mighty military
power. Or, it still could spill over into a violent global
conflagration.
Whatever the case, the incidence of continued world conflict
is increasing in every level of the spectrum, and the world's
special operations forces will consequently see much service. How
these conflicts are fought and how special operations forces are
employed will depend on the commitment of our nation.
In order to finance our nation's security, our leadership has
gone through great pains trying to classify and define types of
threats and wars we will fight in the future. Promulgating the
spectrum of threats and conflicts by the level of intensity (high,
medium, and low), is the current trend governing all service
planning and preparation.
Individual military services, driven by self preservation
motives, have scrambled for an even bigger portion of the budget
pie so they can challenge each level of conflict and threat on
their own The bottom line is, however, that the entire spectrum
of threat and conflict comes in all forms and proportions, and we
must be prepared to counter it decisively and successfully.
Tragically, as Congress attempts to meet this nation's security
objectives by building a credible military infrastructure, it is
faced with a significantly reduced budget.
As the gulf crisis winds down, our congressional leadership
still insists that deep defense cuts should begin because of the
diminished threat of a global war with the Soviet Union. However,
eradicating one-fourth of the military by 1995 -- a goal still in
effect as a new budget cycle begins-- makes no sense in light of
Operation Desert Shield, the growing strength of regional powers
such as Iraq, and the disquieting turmoil in Moscow. Paramount
among concerns is fear that forces will be hollowed out, that is
cut so precipitously and deeply so as to damage training,
leadership, and other factors critical to combat effectiveness.
Today, our nation's leadership is having difficulty grappling with
a defense budget that will significantly reduce our military arms.
Rather than reflecting the current and potential world situation,
the budget focuses on the reduced threat of war with the Soviet
Union.
Unless we can increase overall defense spending, assuming we
want to maintain current readiness and economic production rates,
we will have to cancel a number of programs outright at
considerable cost. Jobs and money will be lost. Contractors,
service bureaucracies, congressional districts, and states will all
suffer. The alternative, a large increase in the defense budget,
might be better if the nation could afford it. But with the
deficit already hovering around $200 billion annually, it cannot.
There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that facing up to harsh
reality in defense budgeting will result in a nasty economic shock.
A ray of hope, however. After that one-time shock, perhaps we will
have a better chance of matching plans and realities.4
Our nation's leadership has a number of opportunities to
influence the course of future events. Whatever the actions taken,
the policies, programs, and budgeting plans of the l990s will have
an impact on the course of the West into the next century.
Planning for the future is not risk free, but neither is an attempt
to maintain the status quo. Opportunities may be exploited by
taking new initiatives; successful initiatives could be the tools
to determine our own fate. Special operations capabilities may be
just such an initiative that will provide us the flexibility, at a
low cost, and force potency (force multiplier) to meet the entire
spectrum of threats or conflicts.
America's society and system have always been skeptical of
secrecy, intelligence agencies, and undercover activities.
Activities involving small groups of men operating without
publicity or proper monitoring by elected officials appear to be
undemocratic.
Historically, our heritage of self-sufficiency and insulation
from foreign threats made intervention abroad seem unnecessary and
dangerous. Even the Army's attitude toward irregular warfare and
clandestine operations has been an ambiguous one. Americans are
proud that their own ragtag Revolutionary army defeated the highly
disciplined, spit-and-polish British by the use of guerrilla
warfare.5 Since then, however, and for understandable reasons, the
U.S. Army has come to resemble the Redcoats far more than the
Minutemen of the Revolutionary war era. The exigencies of a
superpower's fighting force, together with certain core military
values, have produced a large measure of inflexibility and a
massive bureaucracy, both of which detract from effectiveness on
the field.
A modern military force must be prepared to operate well in
extremely large and organized formations. It needs to master the
use of tanks, artillery, aircraft, naval vessels, missiles and
other heavy, complex weapons. Men and formations must be trained
to obey orders in a reliable, predictable manner.6 However, there
is also a need for a unit with a different and radical kind of
personality and operation. A unit with specialized skills that, in
many cases, differs significantly from the proper characteristics
of the traditional forces. A small unit of special operations
forces (SOF) that can wreak havoc, as a force multiplier, and
multiply the intensity of violence that focuses on Centers of
Gravity warfare.
Since special operations are so diverse, it is better to
describe them by their characteristics rather than by precise
definitions. They:
- Are principally offensive, usually of high physical and
political risk, and directed at high value, critical and
often perishable targets. They offer the potential for
high returns, but rarely a second chance should a first
mission fail.
- Often are principally politico-military in nature and
subject to oversight at national level. Frequently
demand operator-level detailed planning and rapid
coordination with other commands, services, and
government agencies.
- Often require responsive joint ground, air, and maritime
operations and the C2 architecture permanently resident
in existing SOF structure.
- May frequently be covert, clandestine, or low visibility
in nature.
- Are frequently prosecuted when the use of conventional
non-SOF is either inappropriate or infeasible, for either
military or political reasons.
- Rely on surprise, security, and audacity and frequently
employ deception to achieve success.
- Are often conducted at great distances from established
bases, requiring sophisticated communications and means
of infiltration, exfiltration, and support to penetrate
and recover hostile, denied, or politically sensitive
areas.
- May require patient long term commitment in a given
operational area to achieve national goals through
security assistance/ nation building activities or
extended unconventional warfare operations. Often
training indigenous forces are required to attain these
obj ectives.
- Frequently require discriminate and precise use of force;
a mix of high and low technology weapons and equipment;
and often require rapid development, acquisition, and
employment of weapons and equipment not standard for
other DoD forces
- Are primarily conducted by specially trained, often
specially recruited and selected personnel, organized
into small unit tailored for specific missions or
environments. Missions often require detailed knowledge
of the culture and language of the country where
employed.
- Require detailed intelligence, thorough planning,
decentralized execution, and rigorous detailed
rehearsal .7
To accomplish these varied functions, U.S. special operations
forces are spread across three services. The U.S. Army, Navy, and
Air Force have an overall special operations strength of about
40,000 men and women in both active and reserve components.
Click here to view image
The Command's Organizational Structure
Long-range penetration aircraft, both fixed wing and rotary
wing, are provided by Air Force special operations elements. There
are currently about forty such airframes in active service.
The Navy supplies thirty-seven SEAL (Sea Air Land) platoons, each
composed of two seven-man squads. In order to infiltrate hostile
coastal areas, the SEAL units have mini-subs, 14-man boats capable
of 30 knots and having a 200 nautical-mile range, as well as dry
dock devices for submerged launch of teams from submarines.
The largest contingent of U.S. special operations forces is
assigned to the U.S. Army. A Ranger Regiment of three 550-man
battalions specializes in raids, seizures of key facilities, and
recovery missions. There is also an active-duty psychological
operations group composed of four battalions. The group is capable
of broadcast, leaflet, and other uses of media in support of
military operations. A number of other psychological operations
groups are in a reserve status. In addition, almost all of the
Army's civil-affairs capability is in the reserve structure. There
is only one small, active-duty civil affairs battalion, a unit
that, like its companion reserve units, mainly specializes in
orchestrating local resources and manpower to support conventional
forces.
A final element in the U.S. special operations mix of forces
is Delta Force. This unit is patterned on the model of the British
22nd Special Air Service Regiment. It is the only U.S. force that
follows the European special operations pattern--it is a commando-
type force.
In addition to assigned operational headquarters and forces,
the Army, Navy, and Air Force have special operations schools and
training centers.
The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School has a
twofold mission of developing doctrine and providing training.
Based at Ft. Bragg, N.C., since 1952, this organization conducts
training courses for Army Special Forces, civil affairs,
psychological operations, foreign area officers, and survival,
evasion, resistance, and escape. It is also responsible for
developing doctrine and new equipment for Army Special Operations
Forces.
In November 1985, the Naval Special Warfare Center was
established at Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado, Calif. Its mission
is to provide instruction and training for personnel of the U.S.
Navy and other U.S. armed forces and allied military personnel in
Naval special warfare operations and to be the principal authority
for Naval special warfare doctrine in support of the maritime
strategy.
The U.S. Air Force Special Operations School, located at
Hurlburt Field, Florida, has the mission of educating selected U.S.
personnel for security assistance assignments to technical
assistance field teams, mobile training teams, and other specified
overseas activities, and assisting in preparing selected
individuals for unconventional warfare and special operations
missions.
It is certain that the U.S. special operations structure will
undergo substantial change during the l990s, change stimulated by
the U.S. Congress. The U.S. legislative body is acting with the
general belief that these units are apt to be neglected by the
American military services and because of dissatisfaction over the
performance of special operations mission performance of the l980s.
Thus far, the U.S, Department of Defense and the American armed
services have reluctantly implemented congressionally sponsored
special operations initiatives, but there is little question that
improvements have been made and little doubt that the U.S. Congress
will continue to insist on further progress and use of this vital
force package.
The nature of conflict, whether that conflict is low, mid, or
high intensity, shapes the character df forces that conduct
military operations. But conflict also is shaped. It is shaped by
politics. Politics, in turn, is influenced by a number of factors,
factors that include demography, economics, ideology, and the
desire and expectations of people. Although it is not possible to
determine with any degree of precision what the politics of the
future will be, it is possible to define trends that are working to
effect political change. And to that end, special operations will
play a significant role.
Since U.S. special operations forces are varied and complex,
their technological needs range far. Albeit, technology trends are
favoring the terrorist, the special operations unit, and the
insurgents of the future. This is particularly true in the realm
of state-supported terrorism and the externally assisted insurgent.
In some respects, change is the result of the increased
effectiveness of new items that a human can carry or wear--
shoulder-fired weapons, rations, communications equipment, devices
for assassination and mass terror, and body armor. It is, perhaps,
a logical and predictable technological reaction to the age of
mechanized warfare. That era began with man using machines to
transport himself and his weapons to battle. It developed into a
contest between manned machines and is moving into an age where man
dismounts his machines and sends them into battle. In part, man
must divorce himself from the machine because it is increasingly
vulnerable to his opponent's weapons. But, man's safety is not the
only consideration.
Competitive manned war machines are rapidly becoming
prohibitively expensive. There are steadily increasing costs of
sophisticated manufacturing facilities, training time, complex
supply systems, maintenance, and the ever-present necessity to
support a continuous technological development process that
hopefully counters obsolescence. In the future, the cost of
first-line manned war machines has become so great that the list of
nations that can afford them is diminishing.
There are, therefore, many reasons and many trends that are
pointing to a new era of warfare. The technologically oriented
observer readily points to more expensive and more sophisticated
weapons, so the new age will be one of robotics and force
multiplier warfare. But, others indicate a somewhat less
complicated but just as revolutionary new age, an age where men who
stand on the ground with weapons in their hands defeat mechanized
armies. This view has obvious implications for the future of low
intensity conflict and even greater implications for the higher end
of the conflict spectrum and the use of special operations forces.
For the future, we must decide what kind of peace we want,
what the consequences of that peace will be to our nation, and the
price we will be willing to pay for that peace. However, if we
must go to war, it should be quick and decisive so that it will be
humane and less costly.
The United States remains a strong world power, but its
resources are no longer commensurate with the maintenance of the
exalted position it has long held. This country will be required
to conduct foreign policy for which there is no precedent, with
limited resources, and in an increasingly competitive world in
which the threat that held together the various communist alliances
will have vanished.
Today we are not trying to rid the world of a diabolical evil
or an adversary that occupies one of our national homelands. The
United States does not seek a territorial empire or a hegemony.
Instead, we look to stimulate the nation's economy and strategic
partnerships to balance the Soviets and the economic world powers.
We must also maintain close alliance with those nations that
contribute to our national welfare.
Our leadership should not use past wars, especially this last
conflict, as the blueprint for all future wars. If there is
certainty in the profession of arms, it is that the next war will
be different. There is an old saying in military circles:
"Preparing for the last war ensures losing the next one."8 While
the military profession is always in a dilemma, attempting to hold
on to the old while striving to foretell the new, change does come
eventually.
Along with changes, there are some constants. History
(experience) tells us that from time immemorial nations have sought
security, influence, and wealth. History also tells us that some
nations will resort to war to obtain what they seek, while others
may arm to deter war. And some nations may create military
alliances with nations with similar interests. History gives no
indication of an end to war, end to military forces, or even a
successful and inexpensive method or model of avoiding war.
Experience also teaches that warfare changes, and that it is best
to be the progenitor of change rather than its victim.
The United States is now the world's sole remaining
superpower and we must have the military strength to oppose acts of
aggression wherever and whenever they occur. We, afterall, cannot
rely on sharing the responsibility of global peace making and peace
keeping, for there is no one else. Furthermore, we must not
compromise, in any respect, when it comes to security, freedom, and
prestige.
Our track record for predicting the forces needed to counter
the threat in the past has been less than perfect. And, we must
avoid basking in the euphoria of our recent victory in the Persian
Gulf. Because as this war in the gulf made clear, there are more
dangers to American security than merely those posed by the Soviet
Union. Our past, but most recent, conflicts (Grenada, Panama, and
Kuwait) have all been unpredictable. But, the U.S. forces were
still relied upon to quickly and decisively resolve those issues.
The euphoria induced by improving relations with the Soviet
Union and the accompanying reduced risk of nuclear warfare should
not obscure our view of future conflicts. The United States must
be able to apply appropriate military force to a variety of
scenarios. Special operations forces constitute a low-cost but
extraordinarily, robust (force multiplier) and effective force that
promises a decisive initiative in the full spectrum of conflicts
(centers of gravity).
FOOTNOTES
l. Rod Paschall, LIC 2010: Special Operations & Unconventional
Warfare in the Next Century (US:Brasseys,Inc.,1990, p.l29.
2. U.S. Army. U.S. Army Field Circular. Low Intensity Conflict
(U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1986),
p.9.
3. Rod Paschall, LIC 2010: Special Operations & Unconventional
Warfare in the Next Century (US:Brasseys, Inc.,1990), p.36.
4. Gary Hart with William Lind, America Can Win, The case for
Military Reform (Bethesda, Maryland: Adler and Adler, 1986),
p. 156.
5. Steven Emerson, Secret Warriors (New York: G.P. Putnam's
Sons, l988),p.31.
6. Rod Paschall, LIC 2010: Special Operations & Unconventional
Warfare in the Next Century (US: Brasseys, Inc.,l990),p.l34.
7. Joint Chief of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations
(Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, Pentagon,1990),
p.I-4.
8. Rod Paschall, LIC 20 10: Special Operations & Unconventional
Warfare in the Next Century (US: Brasseys, Inc.,1990),p.l44.
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