Desert Shield/Desert Storm Employment Of The Maritime Prepositioned Force: Truimph Or Mixed Success?
AUTHOR Major Stephen P. Dodd, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Strategic Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM EMPLOYMENT OF THE MARITIME
PREPOSITIONED FORCE: TRIUMPH OR MIXED SUCCESS?
I. Theme: To review the concept and real-world employment of
the Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) in the arrival and
assembly area during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
II. Thesis: Initial results of the strategic employment of the
MPF unmistakably validated all conceptual thought, planning, and
doctrine. However, operations and employment during and after
offload offer some lessons for future doctrine, plans and
procedures.
III. Discussion: On August 2, 1990, an Iraqi ground, air, and
naval force of some 140,000 men launched a blitzkrieg-type attack
against Kuwait. This unprovoked invasion, occupation and
annexation, and threat posed to global energy supplies, shattered
the fragile stability in the region and created a worldwide
crisis. The response was an impressive diplomatic, economic, and
military reaction by the world community against Iraq. The
initial stages of Operation Desert Shield provided the
opportunity to validate the MPF concept with the rapid deployment
of MPF ships containing equipment and supplies for sustaining 30
days of combat supply for 30,000 Marines. With the concept,
doctrine, and planning of the arrival and assembly area (AAA)
established for the employment of the MPF during a crisis, a
critical look at events and observations that transpired during
the offload of MPF equipment and supplies in the AAA for
Operation Desert Shield is presented.
IV. Summary: The MPF doctrine had always planned on a specific
flow of personnel and equipment into a theater of operations. In
Desert Shield, the threat, and subsequent haste to get combat
units in-theater, caused the priority of flow to change resulting
in increased logistical demand earlier than expected or planned
for. Events that transpired during this critical phase offer
some lessons for future MPF employment.
V. Conclusion: Employment of the MPF for Operation Desert
Shield was heralded as an amazing success. However, once MPF
ships arrived in the AAA, offload and operations did not follow
the prescribed plans and procedures. Problems were encountered
in the AAA that can be attributed to non-compliance of activities
and functions deemed necessary for required throughput, orderly
offload, marriage of units and equipment, and assembly. Lessons
learned from this first real-world use of the MPF will stimulate
doctrinal and procedural change where necessary to further
enhance employment of the MPF.
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM EMPLOYMENT OF THE MARITIME
PREPOSITIONED FORCE: TRIUMPH OR MIXED SUCCESS?
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. Initial results of the strategic employment of
the MPF unmistakably validated all conceptual thought, planning,
and doctrine. However, operations and employment during and after
offload offer some lessons for future doctrine, plans and
procedures.
I. MARITIME PREPOSITIONED FORCE CONCEPT
II. MPF PHASES
A. Planning
B. Marshalling
C. Movement
D. Arrival and Assembly
III. ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY AREA ORGANIZATION
A. Offload Preparation Party
B. Arrival and Assembly Support Party
C. Port Operations Group
D. Beach Operations Group
E. Arrival Airfield Control Group
IV. RECEPTION IN THE AAA
A. Initial Preparation Subphase
B. Advance Party Subphase
C. Offload and Marriage Subphase
V. MPF EMPLOYMENT IN DESERT SHIELD
A. Offload Preparation Party
B. Containerized Cargo
C. Equipment Issue
D. Supply Issues
E. AACG Operations
F. Repair Parts
G. Training
VI. LESSONS LEARNED
DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM EXPLOYMENT OF
THE MARITIME PREPOSITIONED FORCE:
TRIUMPH OR MIXED SUCCESS?
MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE CONCEPT
On August 2, 1990, an Iraqi ground, air, and naval force of
some 140,000 men launched a blitzkrieg-type attack against
Kuwait. This unprovoked invasion, occupation and annexation, and
threat posed to global energy supplies, shattered the fragile
stability in the region and created a worldwide crisis. The
response was an impressive diplomatic, economic, and military
reaction by the world community against Iraq.
In response to this unprovoked aggression and blatant
violation of the United Nations Charter, and at the invitation of
the government of Saudia Arabia, the United Sates commenced
Operation Desert Shield. The initial stages of Operation Desert
Shield provided the opportunity to validate the Maritime
Prepositioned Force (MPF) concept with the rapid deployment of
MPF ships containing equipment and supplies for sustaining 30
days of combat supply for 30,000 Marines.1
The maritime prepositioning concept was conceived in 1979 by
the Secretary of Defense in response to the seizure of American
citizens in Iran. The basic plan called for the prepositioning
of equipment and supplies to permit a rapid response to a crisis
around the world with firepower, tactical mobility, and
sustainability. The MPF concept was designed to be a strategic
deployment option exercised by the National Command Authority.
The purpose of an MPF operation is to rapidly establish a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) ashore, marryup with equipment and
supplies, and conduct subsequent combat operations. After a
decade of planning, experimentation, and practice, the first MPF
strategic employment was ordered by the National Command
Authority for Operation Desert Shield. The employment of the MPF
was hailed as a success by the Marine Corps in its first real-
world test.2 Initial results of the strategic employment of the
MPF unmistakably validated all conceptual thought, planning, and
doctrine. However, operations and employment during and after
offload offer some lessons for future doctrine, plans,and
procedures.
MPF PHASES
There are four phases to an MPF operation: planning,
marshalling, movement, and arrival and assembly. Each phase is a
building block for the next phase and provides not only a
foundation, but also a framework for planning and execution.
Planning. MPF operations can be characterized by contingency and
execution planning. The planning phase begins with the issue of
a warning order and is continuous throughout the operation.
Contingency planning prepares for potential crisis and military
operations which may occur around the world. Execution planning
is conducted in preparation for actual commitment of the MPF in a
specific crisis, when deployment is imminent.
Marshalling. During this phase, units complete their final
preparations for movement to aerial ports of embarkation (APOE)
and board aircraft for the transit to the crisis theater of
operations. The marshalling phase begins with the arrival of the
first element at some predetermined marshalling place and ends
when the last unit has departed.
Movement. This phase consists of the actual movement of forces
by sea and air to a designated arrival and assembly area (AAA) in
the theater of operations. The movement phase begins upon
departure of the first aircraft or when the first MPF ship begins
transit to the AAA. This phase is completed when the last fly-in
echelon (FIE) aircraft arrives in the AAA and the last MPF ship
has arrived for offloading.
Arrival and Assembly. Arrival and assembly is the most crucial
phase of an MPF operation. This phase begins upon arrival of the
first MPF ship or the first aircraft in the designated AAA. This
phase is completed when adequate equipment and supplies have been
offloaded and issued to awaiting units; command and control
communications have been established; and the MPF MEB Commander
reports that all essential elements of the MEB have achieved
combat readiness.3 During this phase, the AAA will be organized
and prepared to receive offloaded equipment and supplies. Units
will marry together with their equipment and planning for
subsequent operations will be completed.
ARRIVAL AND ASSEMBLY AREA ORGANIZATION
Once the NCA has decided to employ the MPF in response to a
crisis situation, the MPF orders are executed and the program
transitions through the planned phases of execution. The final
and most crucial phase of employment of the MPF, is operations in
the arrival and assembly area of prepositioned equipment and
supplies. Arrival and assembly organizations are provided by the
MEB and the Navy Support Element (NSE) to conduct operations in
the AAA. An arrival and assembly operations group (AAOG) is
formed which plans, coordinates, and provides control for the
offload and subsequent association of equipment and supplies with
arriving units designated to marry-up with maritime prepositioned
equipment and supplies (MPE/S) .4 Figure l depicts a notional
AAA organization.
Click here to view image
During the arrival and assembly phase, the following tasks
are performed:5
Initial preparation of the AAA.
Coordinated arrival and offload of equipment and
supplies (in port, across the beach, or a combination
of both).
Issue of maritime prepositioned equipment and
supplies to arriving units.
Preparation for the operational missions for which
the forces were deployed.
This phase ends when adequate equipment and supplies have been
offloaded and issued to awaiting units.
The concept for arrival and assembly is dictated by the
mission, geography, topography, facilities available, and the
tactical concept for MPF MEB operations ashore. This concept
consists of the basic sequence for arrival and assembly,
selection of offload sites, and procedures for command and
control. Included is a concept for the offload of equipment and
supplies 6
The area required for arrival, offload, MPE/S distribution,
and preparation for employment is named the AAA. This area must
be sufficiently secure to permit arrival and assembly, and must
contain facilities for the complex tasks of arrival, off-load,
distribution, assembly, and preparation for employment.
Fortunately, the AAA in Saudia Arabia for operation Desert Shield
offered these capabilities which allowed for the rapid offloading
and assembly of the MPE/S. Figure 2 depicts the general
organization of an AAA.
Offload Preparation Party. The offload preparation party (OPP)
is a temporary task organization consisting of maintenance,
embarkation personnel, and equipment operators. Upon activation
the OPP is transported to the MPF ships prior to deployment,
during transit, or when it arrives in the AAA. The OPP is
responsible for preparing the ships offload systems, lighterage
(barges), and embarked MPE/S.7
Arrival and Assembly Support Party. The arrival and assembly
support party (AASP) is also a task organized unit composed of
units from the Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) to control
the throughput of personnel and MPE/S at the port, beach, and
airfield. There are three principal throughput groups within the
AASP:
l. Port Operations Group
2. Beach Operations Group
3. Arrival Airfield Control Group
Port Operations Group. The Port Operations Group (POG) is task
organized around a nucleus beach and terminal operations company
of the BSSG. The POG is responsible for preparation of the port
prior to arrival of the MPF ships and the throughput of supplies
and equipment as they are offloaded from the ships. The POG is
responsible for the following tasks:8
Establish overflow areas for supplies and equipment
adjacent to piers.
Clear piers and overflow areas of material.
Establish liaison with host nation port authorities for
employment of cargo and material handling equipment
operators.
Operate cargo/material handling equipment, including
shore-based cranes, forklifts, tractors, dollies, etc.
Provide direction to MEB drivers detailed to move
vehicles from the port to assembly areas.
Establish bulk fuel/water reception and transfer
facilities using local facilities.
Click here to view image
Beach Operations Group. The second organization under the AASP
is the Beach Operations Group (BOG). The BOG is task organized
around a landing support company of the BSSG. The functions of
the BOG are:9
Providing the beach area command and control necessary
to control and coordinate the throughput of the MPE/S,
to include designation and establishment of overflow
areas.
Coordinating the initial bulk fluid transfer.
Off-loading lighterage at the beach.
Providing direction to MEB drivers to move vehicles from
the lighterage.
Preparing to continue beach operations for continuous
resupply or reinforcement.
Arrival Airfield Control Group. The third organization under the
AASP is the arrival airfield control group (AACG). The AACG is
responsible for the control and coordination of the offload of
airlifted units and equipment. The AACG is task organized around
a nucleus provided by the landing support company of the BSSG.
The AACG will normally deploy as an element of the advance party
and will initiate operations at the arrival airfield. The AACG
reports the arrival of air movement serials which track the MEB's
air movement to the AASP, which can then coordinate and control
the arrival of all units and equipment at the port, beach, and
airfield.10
RECEPTION IN THE AAA
Reception in the arrival and assembly area is the most
important event during the employment of the MPF. The following
principles must be considered during reception:11
A MAGTF operational posture must be attained within
10 days.
Beach and port congestion must be held to a minimum by
expediting throughput of material.
Unit distribution of all classes of supplies will be
effected to the maximum extent possible.
Munitions will require special handling and expeditious
movement to ammunition dumps.
Security and safety are paramount considerations during
offload, marriage, and assembly operations.
The myriad of activities that occur during the assembly and
arrival phase have to start before the MPF ships arrive in the
theater of operations. These activities can be divided into
three subphases:12
I. Initial Preparation Subphase
II. Advance Party Arrival Subphase
III. Offload and Marriage Subphase
Initial Preparation Subphase. During the initial preparation
subphase, the MEB to be employed will designate the G-4 staff
section to collect and report information regarding the
suitability of port, beach, airfield, and road networks to
support reception of the MEB. The OPP is associated with this
subphase and will ideally be transported to the MPF ships to
ready the prepositioned equipment for offload. The OPP is
responsible to prepare the ships' offload systems, prepare
embarked equipment and supplies for offload, and if possible
predesignate vehicles and equipment for issue to units.13
Advance Party Subphase. The advance party arrives in the
objective area to begin making decisions and taking actions
necessary for the general offload. They initiate development and
utilization of staging facilities/areas and initiate issue of the
prepositioned equipment and supplies. The advance party builds
upon the functions and capabilities of the OPP and is then
absorbed into the main body of the MEB upon completion of the
assembly and arrival phase.14
Offload and Marriage Subphase. The offload and marriage subphase
begins when the first increment of the MEB's main body arrives
in-theater. One of the critical tasks during this subphase
pertains to the ability of the MEB commander and his staff to
assess the readiness of the equipment as it is being offloaded
and distributed. From this information, the MEB will be able to
determine the reception status of each element, logistical
buildup, and material readiness of the MEB.
Activities during reception and offload of the MPF in the
AAA are arranged by function and organization. Standing operating
procedures for each major event in the AAA should have
established according to doctrine for the course of events that
would transpire if the NCA issued an order to employ the MPF.
Training and exercises should have tested portions of these plans
and procedures, but no real-world situation could test total
employment of the MPF prior to Operation Desert Shield. How
doctrine, plans and procedures would actually unfold would be put
to the ultimate test starting in August, 1990.
MPF ENPLOYNENT IN OPERATION DESERT SHIELD
With the concept, doctrine, and planning of the AAA
established for the employment of the MPF during a crisis, a
critical look at events and observations that transpired during
the offload of MPF MPE/S in the AAA, Saudia Arabia, for Operation
Desert Shield is presented. The MPF doctrine had always planned
on a specific flow of personnel and equipment into a theater of
operations, which has generally been a security unit, and force
service support units having priority of deployment. In Desert
Shield, the threat, and subsequent haste to get combat units
in-theater, caused the priority of flow to change. In one case,
personnel assigned for the offload arrived after some of the
ships had already been offloaded.15 Additionally, the early
introduction of combat forces into the theater increased the
logistical demand earlier than expected or planned for. In this
regard, Desert Shield should not be considered unique, as the
early introduction of combat forces into a crisis area will
probably always be the preferred method of initial employment.
Offload Preparation Party. The OPP is designated to inspect and
prepare rolling stock on the ships before offload begins. In
Desert Shield, the OPP was directed to identify any equipment for
shortages, required repair parts, and any problems that could be
rectified prior to the arrival of the follow-on forces. However,
once this was accomplished on the MPF ships, the OPP could not
communicate with its parent unit to pass on information about the
status of equipment readiness. This caused a shortfall of parts
and operable equipment once the MPE/S was offloaded in the
AAA.16 Additionally, not all OPP functions were performed on
all the MPF ships. Some ships arrived in port before the OPP
could marry-up with them. This delayed the preparation,
separation, and offload of equipment in the AAA and subsequent
issue to awaiting units.
Containerized Cargo. During the offload in the AAA of
containerized cargo, delay, storage, and obsolescence were
encountered which caused chaotic situations. When Marines went
to the AASP to draw their equipment and supplies, the BSSG was
able to determine which containerized cargo box the equipment was
in, but they could not determine the location of the cargo box
due to the lack of a conex box locator. No map sheet was
available to show the location of boxes in the AAA.
Additionally, there were delays issuing containerized equipment
because of the lack of manpower at the supply issue points. This
created a need for units to send large working parties to unpack
containers, sort through supplies, and repack containers. This
put an increased burden on the already strained transportation
assets, moving personnel from their units to the supply issue
points within the AAA. Some containerized ammunition was found
to be outdated and although it could be used, it did not deliver
the maximum range capable in the newer weapon systems transported
to the theater of operations.17
Equipment Issue. Each ship in the MPF has a fixed set of
equipment and supplies embarked for issue to follow-on forces.
This set contains sufficient quantities of all items of supply to
last for thirty (30) days. Each set is generally consistent,
although there are adjustments made periodically. The load plan
of the MPE/S on each ship provides limited, if any, capability
for selective offload. The load plans facilitate rapid offload
of the entire set of MPE/S. Any effort to selectively offload
will increase the offload time, with marginal success in
acquiring the "selected" equipment or supplies.
In Desert Shield, the offload of equipment and supplies
became an issue as load plans did not provide for unit integrity.
Vehicles aboard the MPF ships are mobile loaded with a variety of
items. Items on each vehicle were not necessarily designated for
the same unit drawing the vehicle. This caused a delay in
issuing equipment and supplies as many hours were spent
unloading, staging, and reloading mobile loaded vehicles before
the vehicles could be driven to the storage/distribution area in
the AAA for issue to their respective units.
Another problem with equipment issue in Desert Shield was
that deploying units did not deploy with the requisite amount of
equipment. The Unit Equipment Report (UER) is a listing of each
unit's table of equipment quantities, the amount of assets each
unit had aboard MPF ships, the distribution of these assets, and
the quantity and type of assets that needed to be flown in with
each unit. In numerous cases, the units did not arrive with the
assets identified to be flown in. This caused some units to send
personnel back to the United states to pick-up additional
equipment, especially weapons. One of the factors that
contributed to this problem was that some units did not receive a
copy of their UER's in order to identify MPF assets in
advance. 18
Once equipment and supplies were issued to units, there were
numerous comments and recommendations about the mix of the MPF
equipment assigned to units. In some instances, the equipment
was perceived as not required. In other instances, units
commented on the lack of equipment. This problem can be directly
related to the UER, the timeliness it was received by a unit, and
the amount of attention given to it by each unit.
Supply Issues. The accounting procedures used during the offload
in the AAA, did not comply with standard Marine Corps supply
procedures. During Desert Shield shipping offload, equipment was
issued on first-come, first-served basis, vice issuing a block of
equipment to a specified unit. Equipment was issued without the
standard Department of Defense supply accounting forms, DD 1348.
The only apparent record of issue was a lined-out entry on the
ship's manifest. Customer service units could not tell whether
equipment was issued to a unit or if it was still located in a
storage area in the AAA.
Supply accounting procedures could not identify if an item
was issued or stored, even though an item was offloaded. Equally
important, was the method by which vehicles were distributed to
units. Some units were given 110% of their UER allowance,
causing other units to receive less than their requirement.
There was a demand for vehicles and equipment as soon as they
were offloaded by units arriving in the theater of operations.
Doctrinally, the equipment and vehicle distribution is supposed
to take place after the correct offload policies and procedures
have been conducted.19
AACG Operations. As discussed earlier, the AACG operates in the
AAA under the Arrival/Assembly Support party and is responsible
for the control and coordination of the offload of airfield units
and equipment. In Desert Shield, there was virtually no way to
control and coordinate any planned policies and procedures as
units and cargo arrived in theater. Once aircraft landed,
personnel were sent to warehouses to draw their equipment and
supplies. Cargo pallets arrived at either Jubail or Daharan
airports without the owning units receiving notification that
their equipment had arrived. These pallets of cargo then sat at
the airfields without any priority of movement being established.
Cargo was placed at a mixed lot on the port where units had to
hope to find their cargo pal lets before some other unit claimed
them.
One of the contributing factors to the lack of coordination
and control during the offloading of MPF ships was the MPF
Decision Support System (MDSS). This computer system was
designed to coordinate and control equipment as it was offloaded;
there was total reliance on this automated system with no manual
back-up. Confusion and chaos resulted when the MDSS did not work
as advertised and there was no other back-up. Containers did not
have inventory sheets attached to them and equipment could only
be identified by a bar scanner code, with no other markings
present for identification.
Repair Parts. The class IX repair parts and secondary
repairables were not inventoried or organized for issue in order
to support the early issue of MPF equipment. The repair parts
block onboard the ships, was not inventoried and segregated
before units began to draw parts from the BSSG. This made it
difficult to locate and issue parts stored in the containers.
There was a manual locator deck which indicated the serial
numbers of the containers storing the part(s) needed. However,
once the container was located, warehousemen had to search
through numerous wooden crates within the containers.
Additionally, part quantities were not indicated on the manual
locator deck, which meant that many containers had to be searched
to locate the sufficient quantity of parts needed to fill a
requisition.
Secondary repairables were treated as repair parts, as no
maintenance float was established to exchange these parts. This
situation raised questions as to whether or not a secondary
repairable parts block even existed on MPF shipping. Poor
accounting and control of these critical parts created a
situation where there was initially poor support for the
maintenance of vehicles and equipment after assets had been
issued to forces arriving in theater.20
Training. In operation Desert Shield, many personnel were
unfamiliar with MPF plans, procedures, and operations. Two basic
problems were encountered. First, Desert Shield occurred at the
peak of the summer rotation of personnel. This allowed for units
to have many new personnel aboard who had not been involved with
any MPF exercise or had any familiarity with MPF plans.
Secondly, the BSSG designated to support the MPF, is only a
nucleus staff. Many of the key billets are only staffed upon
activation of the BSSG. This allowed for personnel being assigned
without any knowledge or familiarity of MPF plans and
operations 21
LESSONS LEARNED
This paper has presented the concept and doctrine of the MPF
and employment in Operation Desert Shield. Operations in the AAA
phase of MPF employment laid out what seemed to be logical, well-
planned, and methodical policies and procedures. On the surface
it appeared that when the NCA issued an order to employ the MPF,
plans and procedures were in-place to effectively execute all
phases of an operation.
When actually employed for Operation Desert Shield, the MPF
concept was validated and heralded as an amazing success.
However, once MPF ships arrived in the AAA, offload and
operations did not follow the prescribed plans and procedures.
Problems were encountered in the AAA that can be attributed to
non-compliance of activities and functions deemed necessary for
required throughput, orderly offload, marriage of units and
equipment, and assembly.
The first critical function to be performed for employment
of the MPF was the job of the OPP. Arriving after some MPF ships
had offloaded was a basic doctrinal principle, upon which offload
was dependent. Containerized cargo problems, equipment issue,
supply procedures, AACG operations, repair parts issue, and
training were all critical functions that had to be executed well
in order for the MEB to be reconstituted and become combat ready.
Fortunately, time was an ally and allowed for the correction
of problems in the AAA. The subsequent logistics build-up and
employment was definitely a major factor in the success of
Operation Desert Storm. Lessons learned from this first real-
world use of the MPF will stimulate doctrinal and procedural
change where necessary to further enhance employment of the MPF.
Continued refinement will ensure that the MPF remains valid,
functional, and flexible, allowing the United States to react
quickly and forcefully in response to world crisis situations.
The employment of the MPF in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
can be summarily characterized as a phenomenal success. Future
use and success of this national asset will depend on forethought
and lessons learned.
ENDNOTES
l.Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the
ConGress, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January
1991), pp. 13-15.
2.Elizabeth P. Donovan, "It Worked! Prepositioned Practiced in
Theory Deemed Success in Fact," NavY Times, October 15, 1990, p.
29.
3.MCCDC, USMC, Maritime PrePositioning Force (MPF) Operations,
(Quantico, August 1990), pp. 1-6 to 1-7.
4.Ibid., p. ES-2.
5.Ibid., p. 1-7.
6.Ibid., p. 3-6.
7.Ibid., p. 8-4.
8.Ibid., p. 8-9.
9.Ibid., pp. 8-10 to 8-11.
10.Ibid., pp. 8-10 to 8-11.
11.LtCol David B. Brown, USMC (Ret.), "MPS: Combat Capability in
the Objective Area," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1985, p. 76.
12.Ibid., pp. 76-77.
13.1st MEB, USMC, Maritime Prepositioning Operations Standard
Operating Procedures, (Kaneohe Bay, 1988), p. D-5.
14.Ibid., p. 5-19.
15.1st MarDiv, AAR For Operation Desert Shield, dtd 21 Sep 90,
(MCLLS, Quantico), pp. 2-3.
16.Ibid., pp. 2-3.
17.Ibid., p. 5.
18.Ibid., pp. 4-8.
19.Ibid., pp. 3-4.
20.Ibid., pp. 14-19.
21.Ibid., pp. 5-9.
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