HMLA Aircraft: Present To 2010
AUTHOR Major Robert G. Davis, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: HMLA AIRCRAFT: PRESENT TO 2010
THESIS STATEMENT: The need exists for a multi-mission aircraft
to perform all required missions of the Marine Light Attack
(HMLA) and Marine Fixed Wing Observation (VMO) communities. This
aircraft must be compatible with Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) tactics and concepts of operation in conjunction with the
development of the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP). The aircraft
selected must be a major step forward in technology and
performance in order to counter a wide variety of future threats.
ISSUE: The Marine Corps was the service to create the impetus
for the V-22 (Osprey). Coupled with this tiltrotor technology,
the Marine Corps is also attempting to apply technology from
XV-15 Tiltrotor Demonstrator to meet the anticipated requirements
of the next generation of tactical air assets. This techno-
logical advanced aircraft will suit the future needs of the HMLA
and VMO communities well beyond the year 2010.
This paper briefly examines the current aircraft of the HMLA
squadron; the AH-lW and UH-lN, stating their capabilities and
future. Most of the upgraded systems in each type aircraft will
reach their growth capacity and age limit before the end of the
century. The aircraft will soon become extremely limited in
supporting a MAGTF with its expanding capabilities.
The Marine Corps has scheduled an aircraft reduction program
to consolidate several type, model, series, aircraft in a
"Neckdown Program" to replace three aircraft (AH-l, UH-l and
OV-l0) with a single advanced Marine Attack Observation tactical
tiltrotor (VMAO). This aircraft will be configured and equipped
to perform the attack, utility and observation missions in
support of a rapidly changing MAGTF.
En route to funding an advanced tactical tiltrotor gunship,
the political and funding obstacles the Marine Corps must
overcome are varied and have no clear solutions. The current
Defense Budget is facing zero or negative growth. The Marine
Corps must develop a strategy to obtain its fair share in order
to continue to modernize the Corps aging fleet.
Additional tiltrotor and tiltwing concepts are being
developed by other nations at a rapid rate. Despite tremendous
technological advancements, the Marine Corps may be forced to use
rotary wing technology well beyond the year 2000.
CONCLUSION: The conclusion provides my own long-term prediction
of which type of technology the Marine Corps will utilize to
support the MAGTF in the year 2010. Based on my research of this
subject, the issues discussed, as well as the most current
conflict the U.S. has been engaged in (Operation Desert Storm)
should raise additional questions which suggest that many tech-
nological and budgetary variables will influence the final
outcome.
HMLA AIRCRAFT: PRESENT TO 2010
Outline
THESIS: The need exists for a multi-mission aircraft to
perform all required missions of the Marine Light Attack
Helicopter (HMLA) and Marine Observation (VMO) communities.
This aircraft must be compatible with MAGTF tactics and
concepts of operation in conjunction with the development of
the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP). The aircraft selected
must be a major step forward in technology and performance
in order to counter a wide variety of future threats
I. HMLA Aircraft
A. AH-lW
l. Capabilities
2. Future
B. UH-lN
l. Capabilities
2. Future
II. MAGTF Aviation Master Plan
A. Neck Down Program
B. VMAO
l. Locust Tactical Tiltrotor (TTR)
2. Future
III. DoD Budget
A. Funding
B. Future Funding
IV. Future Outlook
A. Tiltrotor/Tiltwing Concept
B. Helicopter Concept
INTRODUCTION
The United States Marine Corps has never been afraid of
innovation, especially when the circumstances established
the need for a fast, flexible and hard hitting force. The
Corps has exhibited a capacity for forward thinking with the
acquisition and deployment of the AV-8A and AV-8B
(Harriers), at a time when the benefits of Vertical Short
Takeoff and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft were even more
controversial than they are today. (8:1)
The capability to conduct successful tactical air
operations is essential to the execution of an amphibious
operation. This requires a flexible, responsive Aviation
Combat Element (ACE) specifically tailored to meet the
anticipated tactical situation. To this end, the Marine
Corps has pioneered an effective aviation combat arm capable
of meeting those requirements.
By the year 2000, the global security environment is
expected to include increased Third World population,
urbanization and debt. Both drug trafficking and political
terrorism are likely to continue to be significant threats
to the United States. As it has since World War II, the
Third World will remain the location of nearly all future
conflicts. The U.S. military service components are faced
with diminishing defense resources and reduced access to
overseas bases. These circumstances will put a premium on
strategic naval power projection forces.
Combining the Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP)
establishes the operational foundation for the manning,
equipping, training, developing of doctrine and operational
techniques for MAGTFs through the year 2000. The Master
Plan helps to bridge the gap between planning and
programming, by providing an integral set of actions to
obtain prioritized MAGTF capabilities. (13:2)
As the MCMP continues to be developed, the need for a
multi-mission aircraft to perform all required missions of
the Marine Light Attack Helicopter (HMLA) and Fixed Wing
Observation (VMO) missions still exists. The final product
must be a major step forward in technology and performance.
In order to counteract a wide variety of future threats,
this aircraft must be compatible with MAGTF tactics and
operations.
A single advanced tactical tiltrotor aircraft
configured and equipped to perform the attack, utility and
observation missions has been scheduled to replace three
aircraft in a "Neckdown Program". This aircraft has been
referred to as the Marine Attack and Observation Aircraft
(VMAO) or Advanced Tactical Tiltrotor Gunship (ATTG).
However, the political and funding obstacles that must
be overcome by the Marine Corps en route to fielding an ATTG
are real and many have no clear solutions.
Other tiltrotor and tiltwing concepts are being
developed by foreign nations at a rapid rate. Despite
tremendous technological advancements, the helicopter may
still be the airframe of choice beyond the year 2000.
The current defense budget is facing zero of negative
growth. It's fair to say that depending on what the current
administration does, we might possibly expect a further
reduction in defense spending. (14:4)
This paper will briefly examine the current aircraft of
the HMLA squadron with their capabilities and future
posture. Each machine's future will be looked at as well as
the existing systems that are being updated, to keep pace
with threat developments and technological advances. Most
of these systems will reach their growth capacity and age
limits before the end of this century, as well as their
ability to support new and expanding MAGTF capabilities. In
the conclusion, I will provide my own long term prediction
of how and why the events will unfold the way they have.
Based on my research of this subject, the issues discussed
in this paper should raise additional questions which
suggest that many technical variables will influence the
final outcome.
Aviation is still so much of an infant that
only those who possess that brand of
imagination commonly generated by a pipe
and a pill are competent to prophesy its
final development. (4)
A. A. Cunningham
HMLA AIRCRAFT: PRESENT TO 2010
AH-1W
The primary attack helicopter of the Marine Light
Attack Helicopter Squadron is the AH-l Cobra. The AH-lW
(Super Cobra), the latest version of the attack helicopter,
provides 63% more lift capability over the rapidly aging and
underpowered AH-1T (Tow Cobra). The new re-engined aircraft
features a new gross weight of 15,000 pounds which is a
1,000 pound increase over the AH-lT and a 5,000 pound
increase over the original AH-1J (Twin Sea Cobra). This
additional gross weight capacity allows for increased
payload, utilizing more fuel, ordnance or a combination of
both. An increase in fuel extends the aircraft's range,
while increased ordnance increases the aircraft's capability
to support the Ground Combat Element (GCE). The Rockwell
laser-guided "Hellfire" missile system is another major step
forward in making the a AH-lW one of the best anti-tank
weapons on the modern battlefield. The AH-lW's increased
speed, maneuverability, larger payload capacity and night
targeting system puts the aircraft in a class of its own
within the current confines of modern helicopter technology.
AH-l Cobra helicopters have provided superb Close-In-
Fire-Suppression (CIFS) in numerous armed conflicts for more
than twenty years. Nevertheless, since their inception
helicopters have always been vulnerable targets on the
battlefield. Today, with the introduction of techno-
logically advanced Soviet attack helicopters like the Hokum
and Havoc, the Cobras' vulnerability has increased. The
AH-lW lacks the capability for precision navigation and is
not self-deployable. The aircraft has limited range with no
aerial refueling capability. In addition, it will also
require its own separate logistics and personnel channels to
support the missions required by an expanding MAGTF.(10:14)
Existing systems have been updated to keep pace with
threat developments and advances in technology. They will
reach their growth capacity and age limits before the end of
this century. (10:15)
Aircraft and system specifications will be driven by
projected capabilities of the MAGTF and the threat it faces
during the 21st century. (10:16) To counter this increasing
threat, the rotary wing communities throughout the Marine
Corps will have to continually examine measures necessary to
make Marine helicopters survivable on future battlefields.
A major emphasis will be given to improved reliability,
supportability and maintainability. (9:3)
The Cobra airframe, as an attack helicopter, has
provided the Marines on the ground superb support for over
two decades, but will fall short in supporting future MAGTF
capabilities.
UH-IN
The UH-l Huey helicopter has also been serving the
Marine Corps faithfully for over twenty years. The latest
version, the UH-lN, has been in service since 1972. The
UH-lN brought a marked improvement over the earlier models
but has reached the point where it can no longer accomplish
its assigned tasks. This is due to several factors. While
CH-46, CH-53 and AH-lW aircraft have all undergone several
upgrades and new models in recent years, nothing has been
done to modernize or incorporate new technology in the
UH-lN. All other assault support helicopters are capable of
airspeeds in excess of 140 knots at maximum gross weight.
The UH-lN at its maximum gross weight can only achieve 110
knots. As more mission essential equipment has been added
over the years, the weight of the aircraft steadily
increased, yet the maximum gross weight of the aircraft did
not change. The result was a loss in useful payload
capacity. This also means that the aircraft has flown at or
near maximum gross weights with the attendant loss of
airspeed.
The result of these limitations is an aircraft that
cannot be fully integrated into tactical assault formations
with other assault support helicopters. This is a serious
shortcoming in light of the Huey's primary tasks of Command
and Control (C&C) and Supporting Arms Coordination (SAC).
The ability to keep the Helicopterborne Unit Commander (HUC)
and the Airborne Helicopter Coordinator (HC(A)) in direct
contact with their respective assault elements can directly
influence the outcome of MAGTF missions. (3:48)
The missions assigned to the Huey are still viable and
important on today's battlefield. Unfortunately, the UH-IN
has reached its performance limits. The need for an
improved upgraded model or new aircraft design to perform
its missions are clearly apparent.
Developing a new UH-lN variant is the cheapest
alternative in terms of Research and Development (R&D)
costs, avoiding acquisition of additional airframes, and
other associated costs.
A replacement aircraft could be quickly procured at a
low technological risk. This concept maximizes the use of
existing assets.
There are some disadvantages to this concept:
Developing technologies are not taken advantage of and
existing airframes provide a limited growth capability.
Some fielding delays can be expected due to problems
normally associated with a new or modified aircraft. In a
time where budget constraints appear to be the dominant
factor in selecting a viable cost effective course of
action, upgrading the UH-lN becomes the most attractive
option. The Marine Corps has had considerable success with
such an approach in the past. (3:46)
The current fleet of CH-53, CH-46 and AH-lW aircraft
are all success stories. The methods used in the AH-lW
program could be applied to a UH-IN program with equally
impressive results. (3:50)
Improvements incorporated in a program to produce a new
UH-lN variant would provide the Marine Corps with a first
rate combat utility helicopter at a very reasonable cost.
Many contest there is no need for a replacement for the
UH-lN when such a simple, sensible cost effective program
would enable the aircraft to continue its proud service for
another twenty years.
MAGTF Aviation Master Plan
Over the last few years the MAGTF Aviation Master Plan
and most recently, the newly named MAGTF Aviation Combat
Plan (AVPLAN) have depicted a plan to reduce the numbers of
different types, models and series of aircraft. To
accomplish this objective, one plausible concept is to
replace the AH-l, UH-l and OV-10 with a Marine Attack and
Observation (VMAO) aircraft called Locust. Locust is an
ATTG planned for fleet introduction near the turn of the
century.
A new era in Marine Corps assault support capabilities
begins with the "Over-The-Horizon" (0TH) concept. In the
1992 time frame, the V-22 was to begin replacing the aging
CH-46 helicopter as the primary assault transport aircraft.
The combat radius of the V-22 would provide Marines an 0TH
capability across the entire spectrum of conflict. Clearly,
the V-22 offers an unprecedented capability for conducting
wider and deeper amphibious assaults. However, the 250 knot
cruise speed and extended range of the V-22 will far exceed
the speed and range capabilities of other Marine rotary wing
assault support aircraft. As the V-22 is employed close to
its maximum capability, en route airborne protection and
immediate assault support for the GCE in the landing zone
(LZ) become difficult challenges.
Mission capabilities such as anti-tank, anti-helicopter
operations, close-in-fire-suppression (CIFS), C&C, medevac
and SAC (A) and additional follow-on support for the GCE
will be as vital following fleet introduction of the V-22
as they are today. Some have argued AV-8 Harriers and
F/A-18 Hornets will escort the V-22 and provide subsequent
support to the GCE ashore. It would be prudent to admit
these aircraft may not be available because they are
otherwise committed for close air support (CAS) and combat
air patrol (CAP) missions. These aircraft also will be
severely limited in escorting a tiltrotor type aircraft
which is capable of very low and slow flight much like a
helicopter. Once in the LZ, the capability to immediately
suppress enemy fire in close proximity to friendly troops
will be required to gain the initiative to ensure success in
the assault. It is doubtful aircraft flying in excess of
400 knots can effectively locate and maneuver to engage
enemy positions to provide immediate close-in-fire-
suppression. (9:17)
Today the Soviets and many Third World countries have
extremely capable attack helicopters; specifically the new
advanced Hokum and Havoc. The firepower and flexibility
offered by these helicopters represent a serious threat to
future amphibious assault operations. A capability in
anti-helicopter operations in support of the tiltrotorborne
GCE will be imperative. (12:3) Future assault support
requirements encompasses all mission capabilities currently
provided by three aircraft (AH-l, UH-l and OV-10) must
maintain parity with future threat capabilities. (9:9) Until
established ashore, assault support aircraft will operate
from amphibious ships which may still be 0TH. In fact, the
requirements for the type assault support provided by the
AH-l, UH-l and OV-10 will clearly place growing demands on
these aircraft and eventually will require increasingly more
sophisticated and capable aircraft. The current AH-l, UH-l
and OV-10 do not have the speed, range, night systems and
avionics capabilities to do the job in the year 2000.
A possible solution is to replace these assault support
aircraft with a single advanced aircraft configured and
equipped to perform the attack, utility and observation
missions. (10:1) At present this follow-on aircraft is a
tiltrotor variant.
The political and funding obstacles that must be
overcome by the Marine Corps are enormous en route to
fielding the VMAO.(14:4) The current defense budget is
facing a period of zero or negative growth. It might even
be fair to say that, depending on what the administration
does, we might possibly expect a further reduction in
defense spending. How would this affect VMAO? If this type
of aircraft is to be fielded soon after the year 2000, the
acquisition process will have to commence with funding in
Program Objective Memorandum (POM) 92 or 94 at the latest.
At present, and into at least Fiscal Year 92, a number of
expensive R&D efforts are underway in the other services to
develop follow-on aircraft. (14:5) Unfortunately, these
efforts focus to build the B-2 Stealth Bomber, advanced
fighter and the Army's Experimental Light Attack Helicopter
Program, (LHX) but do not include the V-22 or the follow-on
VMAO aircraft. Fortunately, like many things in America,
the political winds may shift. Once demonstrated, the
V-22's capabilities may change the thinking of our political
and military leadership. Helicopters, as we know them
today, may become obsolete as war machines. (14:7) To
achieve the maximum warfighting capabilities from our
limited funds and manpower, the Marine Corps may be forced
to abandon the concept of multiple airframes and concentrate
on a single concept.
DoD Budget
No defense program in recent years has been more
challenged, scrutinized, abused, evaluated, debated, abused,
analyzed, cost benefitted, test flown, prototyped and abused
again than the tiltrotor concept. (7:27) It all started in
December 1981, when Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank
Carlucci, formally established a Joint Rotorcraft Project
called the JVX Program. The Army became the first executive
service for the program in early 1982 and assumed the lead
in formulating the Joint Services Operational Requirement
(JSOR). A Marine Colonel, Jimmie Creech, became the first
program manager.
The Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force signed
a memorandum of understanding in June 1982 that established
the JVX project as a priority program and defined the
individual funding requirements. Not long afterward, the
Army began to have second thoughts. First, planners sought
a two year delay in the program, but this proved unaccept-
able for the other services. Further distancing itself from
the program, the Army relinquished its executive status to
the Navy. Nevertheless, the Army continued to express
official support for the JVX program. (6:40) A December 1982
memorandum from Deputy Secretary Carlucci, stated in part,
"I am pleased to note that the services have agreed to a
joint development strategy for the Joint Services Advanced
Vertical Lift Aircraft.. "(6:42)
In January 1983 the Navy released the original request
for proposals to industry, and the team of Bell Helicopter
Textron and Boeing Vertol responded with its concept. In
order to meet the specifications of the Army's original JSOR
and a subsequent Navy revision, the Bell Boeing candidate
had to provide a wide range of capabilities, far beyond
those of any system in existence at the time. The corporate
team proposed an advanced concept based on a tiltrotor
propulsion system and received the go-ahead in April, 1983.
(6:41)
The Army failed to include the JVX Program in its 1985
POM, which it was then developing. The Army's failure to
fund the program in the subsequent years was a de facto
cancellation of its portion of the project and subsequently,
the Army driven design requirements were removed.
In 1986, the Air Force dropped its requirements from 80
aircraft to 55 in response to a Secretary of Defense
agreement reducing the number of aircraft needed for its
Special Operations Forces. This event brought the total buy
down to 657 aircraft: 552 for the Marine Corps which include
11 VH-22s intended for presidential support as a replacement
for the aging VH-3D helicopters. The Air Force would buy 55
and the Navy would buy 50. As the procurement numbers came
down, the cost per airframe went up.
The cost of an individual aircraft might seem easy to
compute, only those involved in the procurement process
realize that there are many viables. For the layman, the
cost of the V-22 is often stated at 32 million dollars per
aircraft. This figure is misleading, since the figure
actually represents the procurement unit cost, which
includes the aircraft, initial spares and advanced procure-
ment over the life of the entire program.
When Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney cancelled
the V-22 program in April 1989, he acted largely on the
advice of his Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation,
Dr. David S. Chu. Dr. Chu recommended that the Marines
substitute a mix of 950 CH-53E and UH-60B helicopters
instead of the 552 V-22 tiltrotor aircraft. When the Marine
Corps pointed out that such a strategy would be more
expensive, Dr. Chu revised his estimate downward to a mix of
650 CH-53 and UH-60 aircraft. This adjustment brought the
cost below the V-22 package cost, but did not meet the goal
of replacing the aging CH-46 with a more capable aircraft.
Dr. Chu finally recommended a one year slip in the program
during deliberations on the Fiscal Year 1990 budget.
Secretary Cheney made the final decision to cancel the
program.
The research and development effort to date has
validated the tiltrotor concept. Four V-22 development
aircraft are flying, and two more aircraft are nearing
completion at the Bell Plant in Fort Worth, Texas. The
Department of the Navy and the U.S. Government have already
invested 2.5 billion in the V-22 tiltrotor concept and are
on the verge of reaping the benefits. (6:42)
Secretary of Defense Cheney has made it quite clear
that his interest in the majority of future military
programs favors the Air Force with the modernization of
ICBMs and bomber forces. He recently stated, "We expect
both standoff and penetrating bombers to continue to serve
crucial roles. A bomber force (alluding to the B-2 Stealth
bomber), capable of penetrating Soviet airspace, deprives
the Soviets of the opportunity to focus on far-forward air
defense against cruise missile carriers."(6:10)
If production funding of the V-22 is not secured within
the next two years, the follow-on development of a VMAO
aircraft to suit the HMLA missions could be delayed up to 20
years.
Technology is the key to keeping
casualties low. There is a direct link to
the number of lives we lose in combat and how
much money we spend before the war starts on
our capabilities and the quality of
equipment. (6:10)
Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense
We are clearly at the high end of
technology in a conflict with a so called
Third World nation. We require sufficient
capability to move substantial quantities of
men, material, and equipment through the air
and over the sea. The success of Operation
Desert Storm has proved this beyond a shadow
of a doubt. (6:10)
General Colin Powell
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Future Outlook
Many studies continually compare tiltrotor technology
to helicopter technology. This section will introduce
additional Japanese technology that is being tested and
eventually marketed from the United States. Some
differences will be identified and compared with both
tiltrotor and helicopter concepts.
A new tiltwing transport aircraft is being developed in
the United States by the Ishida Group of Nagoya, Japan. The
Japanese Conglomerate, through its use of a U.S. subsidiary,
has plans to build an initial order of about 100 aircraft to
serve a network of planned short-takeoff and landing (STOL)
and vertiports in Japan. The aircraft, designated the
Tiltwing-68 (TW-68), is based largely on technology
developed in the U.S. and Canada in the 1960s. The aircraft
is currently designed as a twin-turboprop passenger and
light cargo transport designed for city center operation and
such specialized uses as long range offshore oil rig
support. Construction on the first flight prototype is
scheduled for mid-1993 and the first production aircraft is
planned for mid-1996. The design itself will also have
military applications, although Japanese law prohibits
Japanese companies from taking part in the development of
any weaponry. This is the reason for a U.S. subsidiary
company to introduce this aircraft.
The TW-68 is superficially similar to current tiltrotor
aircraft. Tiltrotor aircraft are essentially helicopters
with all of the advantages and disadvantages of a
helicopter. They have helicopter like rotors, helicopter
controls and similar vibrations.
The TW-68 is a turboprop aircraft with Beta (reverse
pitch) controls on the propellers and a wing tilt system.
It can hover like a helicopter but not as efficiently and
with slightly less controllability. Once the aircraft
transitions into forward flight and with its wing tilted
like a normal airplane, the aircraft will be able to fly
like a turboprop.
In this profile the TW-68 is much more efficient than a
tiltrotor in forward flight. In addition to the tiltwing
system, the TW-68 will require a small horizontal ducted fan
in the tail section to provide pitch stability augmentation
while hovering. Previous tiltwing aircraft required
complicated gearing and shifting from the engines to drive
this fan. The TW-68 will not need either gears or a drive
shaft to the tail.
The basic design concept of the TW-68 is aimed at
producing a reliable, conventional, and cost effective
aircraft that will be able to meet civil transport economic
requirements. It does not incorporate a nonmetallic
structure, high-cost avionics and embodies proven vertical
lift flight technology that is both simpler than that of a
true helicopter and more efficient at forward flight speeds.
The initial cost of the tiltwing aircraft will be more
than twice that of a pure helicopter of the same size and
more than one half the cost of a comparably sized tiltrotor.
(2:83)
In the helicopter arena, ten years of research and more
than 600 hours of in-flight testing has produced one of the
most significant technological advancements in rotor craft
history. This recent innovation is called the Bell
Textron/McDonnell Douglas 680 main rotor for the Army's
experimental Light Attack Helicopter (LHX) program. The
rotor's bearingless, hingeless, all composite design
contains just half the parts of advanced conventional
designs. This means very low vibration along with faster
and simpler maintenance. The rotor system has also demon-
strated excellent ballistic tolerance and low acoustic
signature.
Bell Helicopter Textron Company and Boeing Aircraft
Company have teamed up to produce the V-22 Osprey for the
Marine Corps. Oddly enough, in the LHX arena, McDonnell
Douglas and Bell Helicopter, have teamed together while
Sikorsky and Boeing Aircraft Company have joined together
as a team in an effort to produce a Light Attack Helicopter
(LH) for the Army. For years the Army has been committed in
the development of pure helicopter technology as opposed to
the Marine Corps' advanced tiltrotor concept.
At stake with the LHX program is nearly 40 billion
dollars in helicopter development and production work. This
Spring the Army plans to select one team of U.S. helicopter
manufacturers to produce the LH aircraft. The Army plans to
produce a total of 1,292 futuristic helicopters between 1997
and 2005. The team that loses may be forced out of the
helicopter business in the 1990s.(l:3) The losing team will
say good-bye to nearly 15 years of research and development
effort and investment. The winners will advance in one of
the U.S. military's highest of high tech helicopter
undertakings.
CONCLUSION
The Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) has
initiated a Mission Area Analysis (MAA) of future assault
support requirements. Results of this study will establish
the basis for assault support capability requirements for a
follow-on aircraft to replace the AH-l, UH-l and OV-10. In
conjunction with this study, Marines in the Aviation Weapons
Systems Requirements Branch, Department of Aviation,
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps have written the first draft
of a Tentative Operational Requirement (TOR) for the VMAO.
Coupled with the findings of the MAA, this document will be
refined this summer and forwarded to the force commanders
for review and feedback.
The refined TOR will be the basis for the Marine Corps'
stated requirements and request for funding. At this point,
the real process begins. The Marine Corps must clearly
define its position with regard to the issues and commit to
a strategy for obtaining what is required to execute the
mission. (10:7)
The previous success enjoyed by the Marine Corps in
obtaining Congressional support and funding is attributed to
a straight forward approach in stating the Corps' require-
ments. Currently, the production money for the V-22 has not
been put into the Department of Defense Fiscal Year 91
Budget. The V-22 program has two more years to be funded
before the program is entirely scrapped. The program has
experienced many setbacks, however, the procurement strategy
of this aircraft has been nothing but superb.
Recently, a "win" for the Marine Corps occurred as
appropriations were approved to include 82.5 million for
procurement of long lead items. (7:30) This strategic
victory will continue to keep the door open at least for the
next two years.
Once the aircraft is finally produced, the V-22's
expeditionary capability will provide strong impetus for
fielding a complementary attack, utility and observation
aircraft for the GCE. Comprehensive future requirements
studies as well as the MCMP must clearly define a qualified
statement of future requirements. At some point in the near
future, when a statement does become public, all Marines
must work toward Congressional and public support.
Issues discussed in this paper and the technological
disclosure of U.S. capabilities during Operation Desert
Storm should raise additional questions. The U.S. must
continue to stay one step ahead of foreign technology.
Based on this assumption, new and advanced technologies will
eventually be selected. However, to ensure the Marine Corps
maintains its expeditionary capability in assault support,
the Marine Corps must continue to have a backup plan quietly
working in the budget process. As the Marine Corps
approaches the hurdles to procure the VMAO and assess their
magnitude, the Corps must continue to fight for funding to
enhance capabilities of existing aircraft. The current
fleet of aircraft may have to remain in service five to ten
years beyond the year 2000, depending on commencement of
start-up funding for VMAO or a decision to procure the
Army's LH aircraft.
Based on my research, I believe the GCE will eventually
be flown into battle by the V-22 escorted by the VMAO. As
the V-22 pilots look out their side window they will see the
VMAO escorting them to the landing zone ready to support the
Marines on the ground and perform any task currently
provided by the AH-l, UH-l and OV-10 aircraft.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Baker, Caleb, "U.S. Army Puts Restraints on LH Bidders,"
Defense News, Vol. 6, No. 5, 4 February 1991, p. 3.
2. Brown, David A. "Japans Ishida Group May Build Tiltwing
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