Marine Fixed-Wing Aviation: First To Fight?
AUTHOR Major Michael F. Dolan, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The historical employment of Marine fixed-wing aviation in
amphibious assault operations has been limited. Although Marine
Corps doctrine for the employment of fixed-wing air acknowledges
the necessity for carrier based aircraft and for the early
seizure of airfields in close proximity to the amphibious
objective area, the actual record substantiates a limited
involvement in the initial stages of amphibious operations.
Throughout the history of Marine fixed-wing aviation only a
small percentage of Marine squadrons have deployed aboard Navy
carriers, and neither has any reguirement or agreement between
the services been implemented for routine employment of Marines
aboard carriers. Combined with few overseas bases, Marines have
been limited in their attempts to conduct initial amphibious
operations without first establishing a land base in or near the
objective area. The present Marine Air Ground Task Force
(MAGTF) force structure achieves only limited success in the
employment of Marine fixed-wing air. In the initial stages of
amphibious operations only the AV8 Harrier is routinely employed
aboard amphibious shipping and capable of meeting the initial
fixed-wing needs of the Marine Corps.
With the implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 and the imperative for joint
operations, the Marine Corps' air-ground team faces stiff
competition in fixed-wing employment from both the Navy in the
amphibious role and the Air Force in sustained land operations
ashore. In both these areas of employment Marine aviation does
not have a prominent position. With the current streamlining of
Marine fixed-wing air almost complete, only the Fl8 Hornet and
the EA6B Prowler will remain as carrier capable aircraft within
the Marine inventory. As the Marine Corps pursues strategy and
technology for an Advanced Vertical Takeoff and Landing (AVSTOL)
aircraft to meet its fixed-wing needs aboard amphibious
shipping, the current trend of limited fixed-wing involvement in
the amphibious role remains and will continue for the
foreseeable future.
MARINE FIXED-WING AVIATION: FIRST TO FIGHT?
Outline
THESIS STATEMENT. The combination of historical and doctrinal
employment as well as the current employment and deployment of
aviation assets will severely limit the use of Marine fixed-wing
aviation in the initial stages of amphibious assault operations.
I. Historical Employment of Marine Fixed-Wing Aviation
A. Amphibious operations in WWII
B. The Inchon invasion
C. Vietnam -- fixed-base operations
D. Southwest Asia
II. Doctrinal Employment of Marine Fixed-Wing Aviation
A. Expeditionary concept of Marine aviation doctrine
B. Carrier based employment
C. Land-based employment
III. Marine Fixed-Wing Aviation Deployment
A. Fixed-base operations
l. Conus bases
2. Overseas bases
B. Operations afloat
IV. Fixed-wing aviation operations
A. Fixed-wing aviation in the MAGTF force structure
B. MAGTF aviation in joint operations
C. Fixed-wing force reduction
"Send the Marines" is a common response to the continuous
crises in today's turbulent worldwide environment. Since the
Marine Corps' creation in 1775 it has honored that call with
blood, sacrifice, and unmatched determination. "First to fight"
has become a Marine Corps trademark gallantly embodied in the
amphibious operations of the Pacific campaign during World War
II. However, this record has not been sustained by the Corps'
fixed-wing aviation component. Repeatedly, since World War II
and continuing through the recent conflict in Southwest Asia, the
deployment and employment of Marine fixed-wing aviation has been
severely limited in the initial stages of amphibious assault
operations. Although doctrine has remained intact since World
War II, recent legislation has strained the Corps' ability to
employ its fixed-wing air arm as an active part in a Marine Air
Ground Task Force (MAGTF) in the amphibious role. With the combi-
nation of continued reduction in deployment aboard aircraft carri-
ers and the necessity for implementation of joint operations in
current and future conflicts, the Corps' ability to employ its
fixed-wing assets in the initial stages of amphibious assaults
will remain limited.
Marines achieved their high-water mark in amphibious opera-
tions during World War II. No period since then has seen the
intensity of the amphibious assault in such vast a scope as was
executed by Marines during the Pacific campaign beginning at
Tarawa and ending at Okinawa. Throughout every island campaign
aviation was an essential factor in both planning and execution.
Marine aviation, however, played a lesser role in the
initial stages of every amphibious assault being overshadowed by
naval carrier forces. Throughout World War II and continuing
until Inchon, and up to the present, Marine fixed-wing aviation
has not been predominate in the initial stages of any amphibious
operation. A few Marine carrier based squadrons have been em-
ployed in the initial stages of amphibious assaults. However, the
great preponderance of fixed-wing aviation in the initial stages
of amphibious assaults has come from naval aviation forces. The
necessity for airfields in or near the amphibious objective area
has complicated the rapid response sought by the doctrinal employ-
ment of the Marine air-ground team.
This fact has not been lost among the Marine leadership.
Early in the Pacific campaign this issue was addressed but was
left unresolved. Even after the massive preassault bombardment
and bombing of Betio at Tarawa, resistance to the assaulting
forces remained fierce with correspondingly high casualties. To
counter this deficiency General Holland Smith made a proposal as
recorded in Isely and Crowl's, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious
War:
The most obvious need was for pilots better
trained in close air support. Holland Smith, howev-
er, was never successful in getting the type of pi-
lots he wanted. "It is recommended," he urged after
Tarawa, "that consideration be given to the assign-
ment of at least one Marine Aircraft Wing specifical-
ly for direct air support in landing operations.
This wing would make direct air support a specialty
and would train specifically for this purpose. They
should be given a complete background of amphibious
operations and a thorough and considerable period of
training." The navy refused. Accepting such a
recommendation would withdraw pilots from the decks
of carriers who, in addition to air support were
needed for strictly navy functions, and possibly for
use in a fleet engagement. As long as the navy
judged its own flight personnel superior to marine
airmen in strictly navy duties, and as long as both
fast and escort aircraft carriers were scarce and the
enemy retained a strong fleet, the navy's position in
this regard was understandable. The decision howev-
er, prevented marine pilots from supporting their
comrades and army troops ashore in the Marshalls and
the Marianas. Marine pilots in the Central Pacific
before Tarawa served important defensive missions,
but after that battle, since their craft were of
short range, they watched the war leave them far
behind. Their principal function in that section of
the globe was bombing bypassed atolls. (5: 230-231)
By the time of the Iwo Jima assault, the Marines still did
not have a place in anything but the aviation planning. Even in
this area they met resistance when offering tactical guidance to
Navy planners. The Fourth Marine Division under General Cates
was assigned with the difficult task of assaulting some of the
most hazardous terrain on the island. During the preassault and
assault planning Marine officers urged their Navy counterparts to
carry heavier bombs. Unfortunately, the Navy did not do so. (5:
472)
Throughout the Pacific campaign Marine aviation continued to
press its case for inclusion in the initial phases of amphibious
assaults in order to best support ground forces. Again, however,
even at Okinawa the Navy remained firmly in control of employment
of aviation assets. In Okinawa: The Last Battle, Appleman puts
things in perspective. "Aircraft from Task Force 58 and from the
escort carriers flew 3,095 sorties in the Okinawa area prior to
L-Day." (l: 64) Naval aircraft flew the preponderance of air
support missions during the amphibious assault onto the island.
In fairness, however, it must be stated that once established
ashore on Okinawa, as was also the case in the Solomons and
Palau, Marine close air support enjoyed complete preeminence.
(5: 418-429)
Historically, the amphibious assault into Inchon came clos-
est to a textbook doctrinal employment of the Marine air-ground
team. The assault was orchestrated around three Marine battalions
making a surface attack directly supported by Navy and Marine
aircraft aboard two aircraft carriers. However, even at Inchon,
the majority of initial aviation support was provided by naval
forces. The Marine Corps was able to achieve its objective of
flying close air support missions during the initial assault only
by forcefully having made its case during the planning stage. As
Montross and Canzona have written in U.S. Marine Operations in
Korea:
Air support planning for Inchon was based on the
decision that the sky over the objective area was to
be divided between organic air units of JTF-7 and X
Corps.
JTF-7 counted on its fast carrier task force,
TF-77, to gain air supremacy and furnish deep support
and interdiction strikes. Close support for the
landing was to be provided by the two squadrons of
TG-90.5, on board the CVEs Sicily and Badoeng Strait,
which had been the main air components of MAG-33 in
support of the 1st Marine Provisional Brigade. In
addition, the Attack Force Commander could call upon
the aircraft of TF-77 for close [air) support. (8:
70)
The actual Marine squadrons supporting the assault from
carriers were VMFs-323 and -214 flying F4U Corsairs. These two
squadrons were integrated with three squadrons of Navy Skyraiders
which all conducted strikes continuously from H-l80 onward.
Additionally, Fast Carrier Task Force 77 kept another 12 aircraft
airborne for deep air missions. However, the bulk of aviation
support for the 1st Provisional Brigade would not come into play
until after the initial phase of the operation. (8: 102) Mon-
tross and Canzona further amplify Marine aviation's dependence
upon land-basing for combat employment:
MAG-33 was designated by General Harris from the
Forward Echelon, 1st MAW, to serve as TAC X Corps,
with VMFs-212 and -312 in addition to VMF(N)-542 and
the rear echelon of VMF(N)-513. These units were not
to be assigned, however, until X Corps assumed con-
trol of operations in the objective area, whereupon
they would be based at Kimpo Airfield. (8: 71)
The Vietnam War saw Marine aviation primarily land-based at
Da Nang and Chu Lai. Amphibiously, the few landings were unop-
posed and militarily insignificant. In March 1965, the 9th Ma-
rine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) went ashore uneventfully in the
vicinity of Da Nang supported by Marine Medium Helicopter (HMM)
Squadron 365 embarked aboard the USS Princeton. On April 13,
1965, VMFA-531 flying F4Bs from Da Nang conducted close air sup-
port missions for the 9th MEB which were the first Marine
fixed-wing sorties in Vietnam. The earliest fixed-wing opera-
tions were primarily navy actions flown from the carriers Ticon-
deroga and Constellation on Yankee Station in the Tonkin Gulf and
were directed against targets in North Vietnam. In December
1965, VMF(AW)-212 flying F8s, was the only Marine carrier based
squadron conducting strikes against North and South Vietnam. (4:
75,161) In both South and North Vietnam, however, the Marine air
contribution to initial aviation operations was small. The naval
aviation units of Task Force 77 on Yankee Station saw the majori-
ty of all early actions. Not until the establishment of the land
bases at Da Nang in 1965 and Chu Lai in 1966 did Marine aviation
coordinate and integrate the MAGTF concept into combat opera-
tions. Gurney, in his book,Vietnam: The War in the Air, gives
us the reason for establishing a southern counterpart to Yankee
Station in the north:
In April 1965, Task Force 77 pilots drew still
another role -- a role which for the nth time reflect-
ed their value -- flying regular close [air] support
missions against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. The
initial effort by aircraft from the Midway and the
Coral Sea, plus Marine F-8Es from VMF-212 flying from
the Oriskany with CVW-16, was so successful that
General Westmoreland requested the permanent assign-
ment of a carrier stationed off the northern half of
South Vietnam to support his ground forces.
Since land bases for tactical air were not available
and could not be produced quickly enough, CinCPacFlt
directed on 16 May the establishment of Dixie Station
about 100 miles southwest of Cam Ranh Bay. This
assignment would last for 15 months until land based
aviation had been established sufficiently so as to
be able to handle the bombing load within South Viet-
nam. (4: 168)
During the recent actions in Southwest Asia the 4th MEB was
employed in the northern Persian Gulf to fix Iraqi forces arrayed
along the Kuwaiti coast. Although an amphibious assault was not
conducted, the usefulness of this amphibious strategy was demon-
strated. The threat of an assault by 4th HEB tied down five
Iraqi divisions. In the larger scope of the war, however, the
role of Marine aviation was dwarfed by the massive naval and air
force air campaigns. Although Marine air was fully integrated
into the air campaign, its role was duplicative of its air force
counterparts - land-based air interdiction and deep support mis-
sions. Marine ground forces played the same role as Army units
in the land campaign. Marine air was integrated into the execu-
tion of Marine ground operations but not exclusively and not
independently. The Air Force also played a major role in the
Marine ground scheme of maneuver. Again, the Southwest Asia
conflict substantiated the historical record that Marine
fixed-wing aviation is limited in the initial stages of amphibi-
ous or any large scale operations. The initial days of the air
campaign in the gulf did not include the Marines in any major
offensive air operations. The beginning of the air campaign was
conducted by primarily air force and navy squadrons.
Amphibious doctrine is sound, combat proven, and constantly
undergoing refinement. The lessons learned by Marine aviation in
the Second World War were costly but have been fully integrated
into Marine aviation's part of amphibious doctrine. As Fleet
Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 5-1 states:
This expeditionary aspect sets Marine Corps
aviation apart from other aviation organizations.
Marine Corps doctrine envisions that Marine Corps
aviation will support the landing forces throughout
an assault landing and subsequent operations. Marine
Corps aviation must be prepared to provide this
support by operating tactical aircraft squadrons from
carriers as part of carrier air groups or from air-
fields within striking distance of an amphibious
objective area. (15: 2)
However, knowledge of doctrinal employment has not always been
forthcoming in practice. In crisis situations the forces current-
ly available are used, which in the majority of cases means the
employment of a naval carrier battle group with its organic carri-
er air wing. In the majority of these cases, these carrier air
wings are composed entirely of navy squadrons. When the need has
arisen for amphibious capacity and the introduction of Marine
forces into a potentially hostile area, such as the use of a
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the attendant Marine fixed-wing
counterparts, being shore-based and completely out of range from
the amphibious objective area, are almost always lacking. In
some minor operations involving limited or no fixed-wing capaci-
ty, such as non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), the need
for substantial preassault bombardment, air interdiction, and
close air support is usually nonexistent. On the non-crisis side
of the initial hostilities spectrum, naval air and air force
units are first deployed to the adjacent waters and airfields in
the potential conflict area to buildup the necessary combat pow-
er. In Vietnam and Southwest Asia, lengthy periods of buildup
relegated Marine aviation to deployment and employment similar to
its air force counterpart, supporting not only Marines on the
ground but an entire theater of ground forces. Gurney, in Viet-
nam: The War in the Air, describes the subordination to higher
commands which limited Marine aviation's involvement at the start
of the war:
Up to April 1966, ComUSMACV was not involved
in the air war in North Vietnam. That war was
conducted by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet
(CinCPACFLT), and Commander-in-Chief Pacific Air
Force (CinCPACAF). 1st MAW electronic EF-l0Bs
flew missions in the north before this, but they
did so in support of the Seventh Fleet or the
Seventh Air Force as subordinates of PacFlt and
PacAF. On 1 April 1966, ComUSMACV was authorized
by CinCPac to conduct air strikes in, and to the
north of, the DMZ in what was known as Route Package
One. By summer [1966), Marine aircraft were
assigned to strike against artillery and rocket
sites as well as other military targets. (4: 83)
The current deployment of Marine fixed-wing aviation units
limits the ability of the Marine Corps to employ its fixed-wing
air arm doctrinally in an amphibious role. Marine aviation is
spread throughout three major areas -- land-based in the states,
land-based overseas, and afloat. Far and away, the great majori-
ty of Marine fixed-wing aviation is land-based. Overseas and in
Conus, the Marine Corps' aviation strength is easily matched or
exceeded by USAF fixed-wing counterparts. Afloat, only a token
deployment of Marine fixed-wing detachments and squadrons can be
found at any one time aboard navy ships and carriers. The vast
majority of fixed-wing units afloat are navy squadrons. There is
no established requirement or continuing effort in the Navy or
Marine Corps to employ Marine aviation routinely aboard carriers
to ensure the doctrinal employment of Marine fixed-wing units in
amphibious operations. General Holland Smith's argument in World
War II is just as applicable today. (5: 230) If Marine
fixed-wing aviation is to be employed doctrinally, it must become
an integral part of the carrier air group, otherwise, it will be
limited in its amphibious role. Overseas, Marine air bases are
few -- one in Hawaii, one in Okinawa, and one in mainland Japan.
From these locations the ability of Marine aviation to impact
worldwide potential threats suffers from simple geography. The
combined effect of land-basing and lack of deployments on carri-
ers further limits any initial fixed-wing action in an amphibious
role.
MAGTF structure does not adequately address the incorpora-
tion of fixed-wing aviation into amphibious operations. Fundamen-
tally, the MAGTF is task organized around three core elements,
the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB), and the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The MEU
is formed around a Battalion Landing Team (BLT), the MEB around a
Regimental Landing Team (RLT), and the MEF around a Marine divi-
sion. Currently, in any one of these MAGTFs, Marine rotary-wing
aviation is thoroughly deployed and employed for use in the am-
phibious role. However, its fixed-wing counterpart is not em-
ployed until a suitable field is secured ashore which will sup-
port sustained land-based operations. Historically, this is in
the post-assault time frame or when it has been possible to fly
into a suitable and unopposed field. The record is clear that
the Marine Corps has not conducted any offensive amphibious opera-
tions with fixed-wing aircraft that have not been directly sup-
ported by naval forces. Current MAGTF planning and operating
procedures in all phases of amphibious operations are concentrat-
ed around the Navy's amphibious shipping (LHDs, LHAs, LSTs,
LPDs, etc.). These ships have no capacity for handling the
fixed-wing assets associated with anything larger than a MEU.
Even at the MEU level, the Marine Corps satisfies its need to
demonstrate the full spectrum of the air-ground team by rational-
izing that a small detachment of Harriers (AV-8s) fulfills the
requirements of fixed-wing aviation associated with amphibious
operations. It must be stated, however, that the employment of
the Harrier for primarily close air support substantiates not
only doctrine but the noteworthy historical achievement of close
air support by Marines in all conflicts. Realistically, the
Marine Corps must accept the fact that if Marine fixed-wing squad-
rons are not embarked aboard carrier battle groups that are in
direct support of a MAGTF, or if a suitable airfield is not avail-
able for a fly-in echelon, then the Marine Corps will not have
organic fixed-wing air to support the initial phases of any am-
phibious operation. This is a very weak link of MAGTF aviation
in the amphibious role.
Sister services are quick to note this fact and with the
implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization
Act of 1986 and the imperative towards joint operations, Marine
fixed-wing aviation has fought to keep the MAGTF commander's air
assets under his control. In most current conflict scenarios
joint operations have become the status quo. In 1986 the Omnibus
Agreement was written to underscore and retain the doctrinal
integrity of the MAGTF's fixed-wing aviation employment concept.
This agreement strongly illuminates the shortcomings of Marine
fixed-wing aviation in the initial stages of amphibious opera-
tions by what it does not say. The agreement is based on --
joint sustained operations ashore -- and states that the Joint
Force Commander (JFC) shall retain authority to exercise opera-
tional control of all air assets in the accomplishment of his
mission, including MAGTF organic air assets, although "normally"
MAGTF air assets will fly in support of the MAGTF mission. (14:
50) The entire controversy surrounding MAGTF aviation, the JFC,
and the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) stems from
the fact that the preponderance of fixed-wing aviation will be
employed in post-assault sustained land operations, not in the
initial assault of an amphibious operation. An excellent summari-
zation of this entire subject has been succinctly described by
William White in U.S. Tactical Air Power: Missions, Forces. and
Costs:
In fact, Marines have been only used once in an
opposed over the beach assault since World War II --
the Inchon landing of September 1950 -- and only six
battalions (two-thirds of a division) went ashore
then. Even if some future contingency should require
mounting a similar operation on a larger scale, short-
ages in appropriate sea lift would make it impossible
to employ more than half the present active force in
such a capacity. The bulk of whatever Marine forces
might be committed to a future conflict would proba-
bly serve as was the case in both Korea and Southeast
Asia, in much the same way as the Army's infantry
divisions. [This is exactly what happened in South-
west Asia.] It is not necessary, therefore, to chal-
lenge either the special requirement for air support
during amphibious assaults or the current level of
Marine surface forces to question whether the Marine
Corps needs to maintain all the tactical air forces
it now has. If one or more Marine divisions are
likely to be deployed alongside Army divisions in
Central Europe (as NATO planners assume ) or to oper-
ate once again as elite infantry somewhere in Asia, a
strong case can be made for a more efficient arrange-
ment that would consolidate the air support responsi-
bility for these divisions within the Air Force, the
Marine Corps retaining only enough airwings to sup-
port the surface forces that might actually be used
in amphibious assault operations. (12: 78,79)
Current Marine Corps long-range planning for fixed-wing
force structure is aimed at the objective of attaining an Ad-
vanced Vertical Short Takeoff and Landing (AVSTOL) aircraft capa-
ble of employment aboard amphibious shipping and fulfilling
fixed-wing carrier functions. As the turn of the century nears,
the Marine Corps will have reduced the types of tactical
fixed-wing carrier based aircraft it employs to two -- the Fl8
Hornet and the EA6B Prowler. The Corps will retain the AV8 Harri-
er for its deployment and employment aboard amphibious shipping.
As Marine Corps fixed-wing aviation shrinks in numbers and types
of aircraft, its ability to impact amphibious operations will be
further limited.
The historical record to date substantiates the limited
employment of Marine fixed-wing aviation in the initial stages of
amphibious assault operations. Exacerbating this trend is the
current deployment concept of fixed-wing aviation from limited
bases overseas and the minimal deployment of Marine air aboard
Navy carriers. These physical constraints hamper and restrict
the Marine Corps' ability to employ its air assets in a worldwide
amphibious capacity. With the fully implemented concept for
joint operations necessitated by the Defense Reorganization Act,
the Marine Corps' MAGTF doctrine remains under pressure in justi-
fying the need, use, and size of its fixed-wing force to support
amphibious operations. Furthermore, as overall force reduction
continues within the Department of Defense, and as Marine Corps
aviation planning remains focused on AVSTOL and away from carrier
deployments, the Marine Corps' fixed-wing air employment in the
amphibious role will further diminish. Together, the combination
of these factors will continue to limit severely the use of Ma-
rine fixed-wing aviation in the initial stages of amphibious
assaults.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Appleman, Roy E. Okinawa: The Last Battle. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948.
2. Golgberg, Alfred. Land-Based Versus Sea-Based Air:
The Role and Impact of the Carrier. Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation, 1970.
3. Gurney, Gene. Vietnam: The War in the Air. New York:
Crown Publishers, 1985.
4. Isely, Jeter A. and Philip A. Crowl. The U.S. Marines and
Amphibious War. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1951.
5. Langley, Michael. Inchon Landing. New York: Times Books,
1979.
6. Mersky, Peter B. and Norman Polmar. The Naval Air War in
Vietnam. Annapolis: Nautical and Aviation Publishing,
1981.
7. Montross, Lynn and Nicholas A. Canzona. U.S. Marine
Operations in Korea, II. Austin: Brandy Able 1, 1987.
8. Nichols, John B. and Barrett Tillman. On Yankee Station.
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987.
9. Skinner, Douglas W. Airland Battle Doctrine. Alexandria:
Center for Naval Analyses, 1988.
10. Tregaskis, Richard. Southeast Asia: Building the Bases.
Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1975.
11. White, William D. U.S. Tactical Air Power: Missions.
Forces. and Costs. Washington: Brookings Institution,
1974.
12. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education
Command. Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, LFM 01.
Washington, D.C., 1986.
13. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Combat Development Command.
Marine Air-Ground Training and Education Center. MAGTF
Command Relationships in Joint Operations, C(C)2225.
Quantico, 1990.
14. U.S. Marine Corps. Marine Corps Development and Education
Command. Marine Aviation, FMFM 5-1. Quantico, 1979.
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