LAV-AD: Mobile Air Defense For The Ground Maneuver Force
AUTHOR Major Charles R. Dickerson
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
LAV-AD: MOBILE AIR DEFENSE FOR THE GROUND MANEUVER FORCE
The Marine Corps has an operational deficiency. The Marine
Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) needs a low-altitude air defense
capability for rapidly maneuvering forces of the Ground Combat
Element (GCE). The air defense variant of the LAV, known as the
LAV-AD, is currently being developed to-fulfill this requirement.
The primary mission of the LAV-AD organization will be to
provide effective, close-in air defense to the LAV battalion
against low-flying, subsonic aircraft. A secondary mission will
include engaging ground targets, when required.
The current threat environment dictates the numerous oper-
ational requirements in which the LAV-AD role is modeled. These
operational requirements drive the prescribed capabilities of the
system. LAV-AD prescribed capabilities include: mobility,
transportability, hybrid weapons mix, turret configuration and
other design/performance criteria. These LAV-AD capabilities are
discussed in detail before proceeding to specific issues of LAV-AD
employment and C-3 (command/control and communications).
The LAV-AD battery will be employed during all phases of
MAGTF operations and at all levels of conflict. The doctrinal
concept of employment envisions LAV-AD operating in defense of LAI
units as much as 200 km in front of the FEBA. This paper
addresses several LAV-AD tactical employment scenarios within this
doctrinal concept.
To optimize the LAV-AD's full potential, an effective C-3
system is required to provide for an efficient exchange of target
cueing and assignment information with other air defense organiza-
tions within the MACCS. Presently, the plan for C-3 of LAV-AD
units is very similar to that of a highly mobile stinger team. By
using LAAD Battalion operational procedures as a guide, the issue
of LAV-AD command and control is examined in further detail.
Air defense for rapidly maneuvering, independent mechanized
forces is a critical concern. Nothing in the Marine Corps
inventory can adequately fulfill the mission requirements. The
Marine Corps needs the LAV-AD and needs it now. Without it, our
mechanized forces are unbalanced and vulnerable.
LAV-AD: MOBILE AIR DEFENSE FOR THE GROUND MANEUVER FORCE
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement. The LAV-AD is being developed to provide
the LAV battalion with a highly effective air defense system
capable of supporting rapidly maneuvering, independent
mechanized operations.
I. Mission of LAV-AD
A. A U.S. Marine Corps Operational Deficiency
B. System Concept behind LAV-AD
C. Mission and Threat Analysis
II. Performance Requirements and Capabilities
A. Operational Requirements
B. Capabilities of the LAV-AD System
i. Mobility
2. Transportability
3. Passive Acquisition
4. Hybrid Weapons Mix
5. Turret Configuration
6. Individual Weapons Systems
7. System Interfaces
8. Communications
III. Organization and Employment of the LAV-AD
A. Organization of the LAV-AD Battery/Platoon/Section and
Associated MOS's.
B. Employment of LAV-AD
1. Primary Considerations of Threat, Terrain, and Size
of the Force to be protected.
2. Operations in Unrestricted Terrain
3. Operations in Restricted Terrain
4. Operations by Larger Maneuvering Forces
IV. Command and Control of LAV-AD
A. Interface with the MACCS
B. Early Warning and Cueing Considerations
C. Operational Procedures
V. Final Development of LAV-AD
A. The Two Candidate Prototypes
B. The Critical Need for the LAV-AD
LAV-AD: MOBILE AIR DEFENSE FOR THE GROUND MANEUVER ELEMENTS
The Marine Corps has an operational deficiency. An urgent
requirement exists to improve its short range/low altitude air
defenses. The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) needs a low
altitude air defense capability for rapidly maneuvering forces of
the Ground Combat Element (GCE). The air defense variant of the
LAV (Light Armored Vehicle) is currently being developed to fulfill
this requirement. The system concept behind the LAV-AD is to
provide the LAV battalion, now known as light armored infantry
battalions (LAI battalion), with a highly effective air defense
system capable of supporting rapidly maneuvering, independent
mechanized operations.
The concept of employment for the LAV-AD is derived from the
missions of the LAI Bn. The LAI Bn currently is tasked with the
following missions: screening force, deep reconnaissance force,
highly mobile raiding force, integrated part of a larger mechanized
combined arms task force, and rear area security. With the
exception of rear area security, all the aforementioned employment
scenarios have the LAI battalion operating outside the coverage of
Marine Hawk and Stinger units. Consequently, the LAI battalion is
left extremely susceptible to attack by enemy aircraft and attack
helicopters. The LAV-AD would solve this dilemma by extending the
Marine air defense umbrella to include forward positioned LAI
units.
Mission and Threat Analysis
The primary mission of the LAV-AD organization is to provide
close-in air defense to LAV equipped forces and other rapidly
moving ground units of the MAGTF against low flying, subsonic
aircraft. The LAV-AD will provide increased mobility, better
acquisition capability, and more firepower than current Stinger
teams or even Pedestal Mounted Stinger (PMS). Although, optimally
employed for mobile air defense, the LAV-AD can also provide low-
altitude air defense for fixed, high value targets (such as CSS
facilities, C-2 nodes, airfields, etc.) as designated by the MAGTF
commander. A secondary mission for LAV-AD units is to engage and
defeat ground targets when required.
The LAV-AD is expected to operate in those same environments
as the LAV battalion of the GCE. This includes the mid-to-high air
threat environment. The anticipated threat to the LAV-AD and the
protected force will include rotary wing aircraft, RPV's, and fixed-
wing attack aircraft as well as the full spectrum of ground weapons
which threaten the LAV Battalion.
Performance Requirements and Capabilities
This anticipated threat environment dictates the numerous
operational requirements (e.g. mobility, transportability, weapon
systems, etc.) for which the LAV-AD role is modeled. These
operational requirements are translated into various design char-
acteristics and performance criteria that ultimately drive the
eventual capabilities of the system (see Figure 1). Before
specific issues pertaining to LAV-AD employment, C-2 (command and
control), and future concerns can be addressed, an extensive
assessment of the LAV-AD's capabilities is in order. These
capabilities include mobility, tranportability, passive
acquisition, hybrid weapons mix, turret configuration,
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individual weapon systems (guns, stingers, and missiles), system
interfaces, and communications.
Mobility: The LAI battalion derives its effectiveness from the
factors of mobility, firepower, and protection which are inherent
in the LAV. The LAV possesses a significant mobility advantage
over other equipment in the Marine Corps inventory. With a road
speed of 50 mph and a range of 400 miles, the LAV is well suited
for security force missions. The LAV can also cross obstacles up
to 1.5 ft. high, climb 60 degree slopes, operate on 30 degree cross-
slopes, and pass through medium vegetation. Equally important, the
LAV is capable of swimming at a minimum of six miles per hour in
floods, tidal areas, streams, and rivers. Ultimately, the LAV-AD
variant must be capable of moving with the LAI battalion. This
requires that the air defense system (e.g. turret, gun, missiles,
etc.) fit into the LAV chassis without compromising its inherent
speed, mobility, and swim capabilities.
Deployability/Transportability: The LAV-AD must conform to the
expeditionary nature of the U.S. Marine Corps. This requirement
can not be compromised. Consequently, the LAV-AD is required to
be transportable by surface craft, amphibious/MPS ships, transport
aircraft, and the CH-53E helicopter. Hence, the gross weight of a
mission ready LAV-AD, to include combat load and crew, must not
exceed 29,000 pounds. Also, the height of the LAV-AD must be
reducible to 102 inches for C-130 transport.
Passive Acquistion System: The LAV-AD must be able to detect
and acquire hostile targets. An impressive assortment of active
radars exist that can be mounted on the system (at considerable
expense). However, an active search radar (with its inherent
electromagnetic signature) might compromise the mission and
location of the LAV-AD's, as well as other vehicles in the LAI
battalion. Therefore, a passive acquisition system is better
suited for both employment considerations and the tactical
environment. This passive acquisition capability consists of a
daylight television/forward-looking radar infrared system
(TV/FLIR). The TV/FLIR provides both day and night tactical
engagement capability. (4: 11)
Hybrid Weapons Mix: The weapons mix was selected based on certain
operational requirements. A key operational requirement dealt
with the various types of terrain. In analyzing the types of
terrain in which the system might be deployed, there were
variations from flat deserts (Mideast), to forests (Europe), and to
mountains (Norway and Korea). Each of these conditions presented
different target detection ranges, varying from over ten miles to
less than two miles (9:47). The varying detection ranges
correlated to different allowable reaction times. For example, the
appearance of a pop-up target at short ranges required a system
that could be brought to bear quickly through light brush or
vegetation. The spin-up and cool-down time of the Stinger missile
system was excessive. Stinger could not react quick enough. Also,
inside 2000 meters, conventional attack aircraft moving at speeds
from 400 to 500 knots required lead angles that exceeded Stinger's
seeker limits.(9:47)
Consequently, there existed a definitive requirement for a
quick, short range kill capability. The search for a short range
kill capability was resolved by selecting a combination of
hypervelocity missiles (HVR) and a 25mm gun system. The 25mm gun
was chosen because it effectively complements the Stinger missile
and will defeat lightly armored ground vehicles/targets. The gun
defends against the low flying, close-in threat and the stinger
missile defends against high fliers and longer range threats. The
superiority of the combined Pk (Probability of Kill) levels of the
hybrid system is immediately apparent (see Figure 2).
Air Defense Turret: Mobility considerations dictate that the
turret must not degrade the demonstrated performance character-
istics of the LAV-25 chassis. Additional design specifications
prescribe that the air defense turret consists of the following: a
two-man armored structure with large panoramic windows, a rapid
fire 25mm gun system, a Standard Vehicle Mounted Launcher (SVML)
for Stinger missiles, a multiple use weapon station for 2.75 inch
Hydra-70 rockets (and future air defense missiles), a combined
daytime television and thermal sight with integrated laser range
finder and auto-tracker, a digital fire control system, C-2
communications, and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment.
Furthermore, the turret must be capable of being operated by either
the commander or the gunner in a stationary or moving vehicle. The
gunner must have all controls to set-up the system, search,
acquire, track, and fire the missiles, rockets, and gun. The
commander's station should possess the same capability. In
addition, the commander's controls should have an override priority
over the gunner's system. (4: 7)
Individual Weapon Systems: Analysis of the individual weapon
systems (e.g. 25mm gun, Stinger missile pod,and Hydra-70 rockets)
deserve special attention, since their performance requirements
were the result of extensive studies and are closely interwoven
with the LAV-AD mission accomplishment. The LAV-AD gun system is a
prime example. The selection criteria for the LAV-AD gun was based
on lethality of the ammunition, maximum range, weight, and
supportability. Initially, there was a wide range of choices: the
50 caliber M2HB, McDonald Douglas M242 25mm chain gun, GAU-12 25mm
Gatling, GAU-13 30mm Gatling, and the 35mm Orliken.
The 50 caliber gun did not perform well against air targets
beyond a range of 1,000 meters. Probability of hitting an air
target decreased significantly in the area between 1,200 and 1,800
meters. (9:48)
The 30/35mm guns met the lethality requirement, but were
considered too heavy in terms of ammunition and gun weight. As
demonstrated in Figure 3, both 25mm and 35mm will defeat light
armor (e.g. BTR's, BMP's,and MT-LB's). Neither will defeat heavy
armor. No particular advantage is gained with the 30/35mm guns as
regards lethality. However, system and ammunition resupply weight
grows significantly with the 30/35mm guns. (2: 3) Hence, based on
LAV-AD weight restrictions, the 30/35mm guns were ruled out.
In the final analysis, the 25mm guns were chosen for the LAV-
AD. With a wide range of high explosive and armor-piercing
incendiary ammunition, they provided a high level of kill
probability against all threat aircraft without the increased
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weight, and reduced ammunition storage volume. The 25mm guns also
provided the required probability of hit and kill out to a range of
4,000 meters. (9:48) They use the same type of ammunition in the
LAV-25, thereby simplifying logistics. Both 25mm guns were already
in production for the Marine Corps, consequently maintenance and
training facilities were already in place.
The second weapon system to be mounted on the LAV-AD is the
Stinger missile. Combat proven in Afghanistan, the Stinger is an
infrared homing (fire and forget) missile that has a range in
excess of 5,000 meters and an altitude capability over 10,000
feet. Stinger was selected because of its lethality and it is
currently in the Marine Corps inventory. Necessary maintenance and
training facilities are presently in place. Four Stingers are to
be mounted on the LAV-AD in an armored launch pod. This pod is
identical to the air launched Stinger pod used on the AH-1W
SuperCobra. This commonality reduces developmental costs, while
providing the tactical flexibility of being able to interchange
parts and pods with other units.
While Stinger is an effective weapon system, it is not the
total answer. Presently, MI-24 Hind or MI-28 Havoc helicopters
(armed with AT-6 or AT-10 missiles) have the capability to standoff
at ranges of 6,000 to 8,000 meters. This distance is outside
Stinger's maximum effective range. The LAV-AD needs an additional
capability to counter this sophisticated standoff threat. The
solution was to add 70mm Hydra-70 hypervelocity rockets to the
system's weapon suite. The Hydra-70's, mounted in a seven rocket
pod, would provide a credible capability against a standoff threat.
To date, there remains considerable controversy regarding the
utility of the Hydra-70 rockets. Most of this controversy is
focused on the Hydra-70's questionable ability to hit moving
targets. Notwithstanding, the Hydra-70 was originally viewed as a
near-term fix with long-term growth potential. Accordingly, the
mounting point for the Hydra-70 pod is actually a-universal mount.
This universal mount can be used to mount an additional Stinger pod
or, in the future, mount other weapon systems such as Hellfire,
TOW, U.K. StarStreak, and the Bofors RBS-70. The additional
universal weapons mount offers a long-term tactical flexibility.
System Interfaces: As a minimum, voice communications with the
Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS), the LAV battalion,
and the LAV-AD platoon are required for command and control (C-2).
The LAV-AD must be able to integrate with the MACCS for early
warning and cueing without degrading the LAV unit mission.
Communications: LAV-AD crew must be able to communicate among
themselves, with other LAV-AD fire units, and with the MACCS (see
Figure 4). All radios should be capable of functioning in the
secure mode.
Organization and Employment of LAV-AD
At present, the LAV-AD is to be placed in the air defense
battery within the LAI battalion. The battery will rate 24 LAV-
ADs. A LAV-AD battery will have a headquarters element (one LAV-
25, one LAV command and control variant, and one recovery variant)
and two LAV-AD platoons. Each platoon will have three sections,
while each section will have four (4) LAV-ADs. The platoon
headquarters element will have one LAV-25 and one logistics
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variant. Battery officers will have the 7204 MOS (Surface to Air
Weapons Officer) and LAV-AD crewmen will have the 7212 MOS (Low
Altitude Air Defense Gunner). In essence, LAV-AD will be manned by
Marine air defense personnel, but located within the LAI battal-
ion. This will facilitate training in conjunction with LAV-AD
employment in defense of LAI units.
The LAV-AD battery will be employed during all phases of MAGTF
operations and at all levels of conflict. The doctrinal concept of
employment envisions LAV-AD operating in defense of LAI units as
much as 200 km in front of the forward edge of the battle area
(FEBA). In this scenario, tactical employment considerations
center on three primary factors: the existing threat, the terrain,
and the relative size of the force to be protected. For example,
when providing air defense for rapidly maneuvering units in terrain
where line of sight is unrestricted, the LAV-AD section would form
a rectangle (two fire units up front and two in the rear). The
rectangle would be centered on the middle of the formation or upon
high value targets such as C-2 vehicles. Each LAV-AD would
maintain approximately 2 to 2.5 km separation to sustain mutual
supporting and overlapping fires capability. Normally, each LAV-AD
would be assigned a search sector (in this case, 90 degree sector
minimum) centered on a primary target line. If the threat is
predominately in one direction, the LAV-AD section modifies its
search techniques to concentrate in that direction.
In terrain where LOS is restricted, individual LAV-AD vehicles
move in bounds (bounding overwatch) to key terrain features to
increase LOS. Search sector techniques within the LAV-AD section
are coordinated to maintain observation in the threat's direction.
If there is no particular threat direction, search sector tech-
niques can be coordinated to establish a balanced coverage.
Air defense protection for larger, maneuvering forces would
entail multiple LAV-AD sections. Each section would be separated
from the next by approximately 4 to 4.5 km, which is measured from
the center of each section (see Figure 5 ). In larger formations,
LAV-AD sections are either placed on or along the periphery to
provide 360 degree protection, or oriented on one side of the
formation when the threat is from a single direction. Search
sectors in larger formations would be tailored to existing threat
and terrain considerations.
Command and Control of LAV-AD
To optimize the LAV-AD's capability to perform its mission,
its command and control system must provide for an efficient
exchange of target cueing and assignment information with other air
defense organizations within the MACCS. The LAV-AD can best inter-
face with the MACCS through the LAAD battalion's C-2 system. The
weapons and control procedures used in the LAAD battalion are
similar to those of the LAV-AD battery and, as a result, the C-2
requirements are similar. Since elements of both organizations
will be intermingled on the battlefield, it would be beneficial for
them to share air track information. Therefore, the most logical
method for providing cueing data to the LAV-AD is through the same
C-2 system that supports the LAAD battalion.
Presently, the plan for command and control of LAV-AD is very
similar to that of a highly mobile Stinger team. LAV-AD fire units
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will be provided early warning and cueing from available sources
through digital and voice communications. The LAV-AD will be
equipped with a digital communications terminal (DCT) and, UHF/VHF/
HF voice communications.
The DCT can be used to relay early warning/cueing informa-
tion from the MACCS, receive movement orders, pass engagement re-
ports, and exchange weapons control conditions. An advantage
gained by using the DCT is a higher probability of getting infor-
mation through a jamming environment. This is attributed to the
burst transmission technique, which permits a formatted message to
be passed in much less time than would be possible via voice. The
main disadvantage is the amount of time required to prepare the
formatted message for transmission. The data input process may be
unacceptably slow.
To achieve a more real-time data exchange, voice communica-
tions would be the most expeditious method for exchanging informa-
tion between the LAV-AD, LAAD battalion units, and other MACCS
agencies. Exchanging information by voice permits a free format to
be used. The operator is not constrained to using specific message
formats. Based on the need for real-time information, a voice net
will probably be the primary communication means for cueing and
target assignment for LAV-AD units.
Using the LAAD Bn operational procedures as a guide, the LAV-
AD battery would send a liaison officer(s) to those MACCS agencies
that can best provide cueing data. The agencies that display air
track data, derived either from organic sensors or via data link,
are TACC (Tactical Air Command Center), TAOC (Tactical Air Oper-
ations Center), and Hawk BCP (Battery Command Post). At a MACCS
agency, the liaison officer can monitor the air defense situation
and pass cueing data to the LAV-AD battery and platoon commanders
via a LAV-AD battery tactical net (refer to Figure 6).
If LAV-AD units are operating well forward of the FEBA, the
early warning and cueing information of the MACCS will be of inter-
mittent value. Conventional surveillance radar limitations, due to
earth curvature and terrain masking, will degrade the low-level
acquisition capabilities of the MACCS. This can be off-set to some
degree by the use of an airborne radar platform (EA-3) data linked
down to the MACCS Nevertheless, the LAV-AD unit will often find
itself reporting threat aircraft to the MACCS rather than the other
way around. This is especially true regarding threat rotary air-
craft. The primary means or target detection for LAV-AD will be
its own visual and electronic passive acquisition capabilities.
Normally, each LAV-AD will be assigned a search sector centered on
a primary target line. In-this case, the LAV-ADs will have to
alert each other to the location of hostiles. LAV-AD sections must
fight in much a manner as to provide mutual protection and
overlapping fires.
Final Development of LAV-AD
At present, the final design/configuration of the LAV-AD has
yet to be determined. A competition between two candidate systems
(General Motors and FMC Corporation) will be held over the next
year. Both prototype systems are required to meet the same uniform
operational requirements and performance criteria. As a result,
the two air defense systems are similar with the only substantive
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differences being the type of 25mm gun (the GAU-12 Gatling versus
the M-242 Chain gun) and the capabilities of their respective fire
control systems (refer to Figures 7 and 8).
The development of the LAV-AD concept to include its refine-
ment into a mission requirement and the articulation of system
design features/performance standards was part of a methodical and
intricate process. From the beginning, LAV-AD has been designed to
provide the Marine Corps with the most effective, mobile air
defense system in the world. The LAV-AD will provide the MAGTF
commander with a tactically flexible air defense system that can be
employed well forward with the LAI battalion or as rear area
security to protect established air defense vital areas.
Air defense for rapidly maneuvering, independent mechanized
forces remains a critical issue. Nothing in the current Marine
Corps inventory can adequately fulfill the mission requirements.
The HMMWV mounted stinger teams and Pedestal Mounted Stinger (PMS)
are inadequate in both mobility and firepower. The Marine Corps
needs the LAV-AD, and needs it now. Only with the LAV-AD can
the tremendous potential of the LAI battalion be realized and
exploited. Without it our mechanized forces are unbalanced and
vulnerable.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Boden, Capt. William C. "LAV Logistical Support Forward
of the FEBA." Marine Corps Gazette. February 88.
2. "Key Air Defense System Requirements." Research Paper by
Contractor. General Electric.
3. LAV-AD. Technical Information Questionnaire. Prepared by
FMC, Ordnance Division. November 87.
4. "Light Armored Vehicle-Air Defense". Purchase Description.
5. "LAV (AD) Command and Control Interface Study." Contracted
Study. Mulkerin Associates. December 88.
6. "LAV-AD Program Moving Ahead." Editorial. Marine Corps
Gazette. November 87.
7. "LAV (AD) Prototypes Contracted." Editorial. Marines Corps
Gazette. February 88.
8. Murphy, Cpl. John R. "Landing Zone Defense." Marine Corps
Gazette. February 88.
9. Ryan, Maj. John E. "Air Defense of the Light Armored
Infantry Battalion." Marine Corps Gazette.
December 88
10. Test and Evaluation Master Plan for Light Armored Vehicle-
Air Defense. U.S. Army Tank - Automotive Command.
November 88.
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