Two Paths For MLR
AUTHOR Major Louis J. Cipriani, Jr., USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Logistics
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: TWO PATHS FOR MLR
I. Theme: Current Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) issues remain
unresolved due largely to political maneuvering and funding
disputes. Shortages in Marine Corps helicopter assets are
likely if serious decisions are not made soon.
II. Thesis: In resolving MLR issues, it is extremely
important that DOD focus on the capabilities of the Marine
Corps on the future battlefield of the 21st century vice
nearsighted budget debates.
III. Discussion: Key decisions during the struggle from
infancy to Secretary of Defense Cheney's decision to cancel
the V-22 program have always centered around budget disputes.
Congress's response to cancellation was to appropriate
APN/RDT&E and FSD funding for six aircraft. The Bell-Boeing
team initiated numerous survivability studies to counter
Secretary Cheney's preferred option of more CH-53Es/H-60s.
In 1989, the Marine Corps started its search for a suitable
helicopter replacement for MLR. This search has lead to the
CH-46X program developed to fulfill medium lift shortfall of
the Marine Corps.
IV. Summary: Unresolved differences between Congress and
DOD over the V-22/MLR program prevents the Marine Corps from
executing either, and only serves to delay and increase costs
associated with each program.
V. Conclusion: There are no guarantees for any military
procurement program that is so deeply dependent on political
maneuvering and funding during today's budget crisis. It is
hoped that the V-22 testing will provide positive results to
convince the key members of DOD and Congress of the worth and
desirability of the Osprey.
TWO PATHS FOR MLR
OUTLINE
THESIS STATEMENT: In resolving MLR issues, it is extremely
important that DOD focus on the capabilities of the Marine
Corps on the future battlefield of the 21st century vice
nearsighted budget debates.
I. MLR DEVELOPMENT
A. Key Decisions
B. Joint Service Operational Requirement
C. Funding
II. V-22 PROGRAM
A. Capabilities
B. Mission Potential
C. Cancellation
III. NEW SEARCH FOR AN MLR
A. Marine Corps SLEP Alternative
B. New Funding Issue
C. Current Program Status
TWO PATHS FOR MLR
Medium Lift Replacement (MLR) is the aviation program
which will provide the replacement for the Marine Corps CH-46
helicopter scheduled later this decade. The final decision to
procure a tiltrotor aircraft or an improved version of a
reliable helicopter still needs to be made by the Department
of Defense with funding being provided by the United States
Congress. This decision, influenced by budgetary concerns and
capability requirements, will be critical in shaping the
doctrine of the United States Marine Corps in the early
decades of the next century. The MLR program is a controver-
sial and politically sensitive issue within the Congress, the
Department of Defense (DOD), the Marine Corps, and the Office
of Management and Budget. This three letter acronym means
very little to the average Marine. However, to the Marine
Corps doctrine writers and more importantly to future Marine
Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), it is extremely important that
the Department of Defense focuses on the capabilities of the
Marine Corps for the future battlefield of the 21st century,
and not on nearsighted budget debates.
Early in 1980, the Marine Corps in cooperation with the
other military services began searching for an aircraft that
would update an aging fleet of helicopters and enhance modern
battlefield survivability. Lieutenant Colonel R. M. Flanagan
noted:
Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman Jr. was
instrumental in arguing for the tiltrotor concept. Dr.
DeLauer in a memorandum from the office of the Under-
secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
reinforced Lehman's case by saying, "It would appear
that . . .requirements could best be met with a single,
advanced but mature technology, rotary wing aircraft
such as an operational derivative of the XV-15 tilt-
rotor." But, because initial individual service
development costs were exorbitant, Deputy Secretary
of Defense Frank Carlucci, in December 1981, formally
established a joint rotorcraft project for all services
--known as JVX. By December 1982, Deputy Secretary
Carlucci stated, "I am pleased to note that... the ser-
vices have agreed to a joint development strategy for
the Joint Services Advance Vertical Lift Aircraft...
By April 1983 the V-22 program was born! (9:9-11)
This joint procurement strategy was to make the program more
affordable, and as stated by Frank Gaffney, "The V-22 has
been developed to serve as the principle support aviation
workhorse for the future." (12:28)
A Joint Services Operational Requirement (JSOR) for the
Advanced Vertical Lift Aircraft stated ten service specific
missions, and a joint mission requirement for self deployment.
The Marine Corps' mission would concentrate on the capability
to lift Marines or cargo from ship to shore and to rapidly
build combat power ashore as its primary focus. The Navy's
mission would concentrate on strike rescue, fleet logistic
support, and special warfare. The United States Army's focus
would be on Air/Land Battle doctrine, special operations,
cargo support, and aeromedical evacuation. The United States
Air Force wanted to satisfy a long range special operational
requirement.
Based on the JSOR, the Department of Defense initiated
development of the V-22 program, a multibillion dollar program
designed to provide a hybrid aircraft designed with tremendous
military applications. The V-22 is a tiltrotor aircraft which
utilizes the flight envelope of a helicopter and converts to
fixed wing at cruise altitude with a range of approximately
2100 nautical miles. The program incorporates advanced
technologies being developed by the prime contractors at Bell
Helicopter Textron Inc. and Boeing Helicopters.
For the United States Marine Corps, the V-22 aircraft
would provide the helicopter lift sorely needed and replace
the CH-46 Sea Knight and the CH-53D Sea Stallion currently
slated for retirement in 1997-2004. Tactically, the V-22 can
revolutionize Marine Corps' amphibious assault timing for
building combat power ashore in all worldwide environments
through surprise, speed, lift capabilities, and stealth.
Also, the delivery of the V-22 would augment the NECK-DOWN
strategy for Marine Aviation over the next few decades. (See
enclosure 1)
Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney cancelled the V-22
program in April 1989, on the advice of his Director of Pro-
gram, Analysis, and Evaluation Dr. David Chu. Dr. Chu
recommended:
the Marines substitute a 950 aircraft mix of
CH53Es/UH-60s instead of the V-22s. The Marine
Corps quickly and accurately countered that such
a strategy would be more expensive than the
original V-22 program. Dr. Chu revised his
estimate to approximately 650 CH-53Es/UH-60s.
It is not surprising that this adjustment brought
the cost below the V-22 package. But more
importantly, this new adjustment does not meet
the original CH-46 lift and survivability require-
ments on the modern battlef ield for the United States
Marine Corps. Based on his final assessment of the
program, Dr. Chu recommended a one year slip in the
V-22 program at the Defense Review Board deliberations
on the FY-90 budget, but Secretary Cheney eventually
made the final decision to cancel the program, and
directed that an alternative aircraft be procured in
lieu of the V-22. (9:12-13)
Even though Secretary Cheney killed the V-22 in April
1989, Congress provided $300 million in FY-89 APN (Advance
Procurement Navy) funding for the V-22, $200 million of which
DOD subsequently deferred. Congress also provided $355 million
in FY-89 RDT&E (Research, Development, Testing, and Evalua-
tion) funding which was reportedly spent. In FY-90, Congress
provided an additional $255 million for six full scale
development (FSD) aircraft, even though the V-22 had been
cancelled by DOD. A total of 2.6 billion dollars has already
been spent on this program to date. (12)
General Gray has repeatedly said, "that acquiring the
V-22 to replace Marine Corps helicopters is his top
priority." (12) Also, General Gray said, "No Marine Corps
requirement is more pressing than the need to identify a
solution for the replacement for our medium lift capability.
(14:65) Senator John Glenn has stated, "the V-22 is more
important than the Air Force's B-2 stealth bomber, the stealth
fighter or railbased mobile ballistic missiles." (18:15)
The problem with cancelling the V-22 program is the
Marines have planned their long-term mobilization strategy
around the arrival of the Osprey and have included it in
their assault ship and troop ferrying plans since early 1980.
Finding and cultivating helicopter replacements will cost
additional research and development money plus time needed to
produce the prototypes and develop them into a mission
capability. (17:11)
In testimony before Congress, Secretary Cheney explained
the cancellation of the V-22 by saying "I didn't see how I
could afford it relative to the priorities of the declining
budget." (20:36) Also, Secretary Cheney in Armed Forces Jour-
nal International said, "The Pentagon will continue to push for
termination of the Marine Corps/Bell-Boeing V-22 tiltrotor--We
love the V-22, but it's an expensive system." (26:20)
After the cancellation of the V-22 program because of
affordability, the Marine Corps embarked on a crash, revised
MLR program in April 1989. Back to square one in the process,
planners started a frantic search for a purely helicopter MLR.
Critical to this search is the Marine Corps desire to retain
the MLR funding for the 92 POM (Program Objective Memorandum).
The proposed funding for FY-92 is $51.5 million. Each delay
or missed POM cycle of the PPBS (Planning, Programing, and
Budgeting System) pushes the delivery date of an approved MLR
later and later into the next century. The Marine Corps will
suffer particularly because progressively fewer CH-46s/CH-53Ds
will be operationally available in the out years due to attri-
tion, the 10,000 flight hour restriction, or 30 year service
life of these assets. (See enclosure 2)
I have seen a photocopy of a letter sent to Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) signed by General Gray requesting the
current JS0R be used as the Operational Requirement for the
alternative medium lift aircraft replacement. (12) Confir-
mation of a CN0 response could not be obtained.
A CH-53E/H-60 combination was proposed when the V-22 was
cancelled. Initially, the Marine Corps challenged the surviv-
ability, capability, cost, lift signature (amphibious ships)
and associated increases in Marine force structure of this
proposal compared to the V-22 program. The Marine Corps, who
was a vocal supporter of the V-22 after cancellation of the
program, suddenly became silent on V-22 issues. Marine Corps
planners have been instructed to work on alternate plans for a
helicopter option MLR. But, Congressman Curt Weldon (R-Pa)
and the Bell-Boeing contractors continued their vocal support
for V-22 funding.
General Gray endorsed Secretary Cheney's tough decision
to cut the V-22 program in the following statement in Navy
Times:
Clearly there will be some tough choices, and we will
not be able to get some of the systems that we defi-
nitely need. So we will have to look to alternatives,
and when you look to alternatives to equipment, this
means that you're looking at your doctrine, your con-
cepts, and alternative methods of mission accomplish-
ment and the like...What should be our strategy for
the near and long term? The United States Marine Corps
should stick to the facts. One, the Marine Corps will
have a MLR requirement in the year 2000. The Corps
must hang our hat on improving the... capability that
defines the Marine expeditionary role in the future:
Capability to conduct amphibious raids on short notice
at night, in adverse weather conditions under emissions
control from over the horizon via air or surface means
against distant inland targets. (7:14)
Again, General Gray made a point of stressing the Marine
Corps backing of Secretary Cheney's cancellation of the V-22
in the following statement:
I say this because the media and others persist in the
rumor about Marines 1obbying in Congress for the pro-
gram. Let me tell you that's a lie. I'm very serious,
because we have a issue of integrity. We have an issue
of loyalty. I want to make crystal clear that we have
stated our operational requirements. We have done that
in the most honest and best way we can, and if there are
Marines here lobbying, in or out of uniform, than I sug-
gest you owe it to me to tel1 me who the hell they are
so I can take appropriate action. (13)
The Bell-Boeing team has been conducting an aggressive
lobbying campaign on Capital Hill to win support for
reinstating the V-22 program in the Defense budget. These
prime contractors unveiled a new V-22 mission analysis con-
ducted by the Energy Department's Lawrence Livermore Labora-
tory (LLL) , which reported V-22 capabilities very favorably.
According to this analysis, the V-22 sustained less attrition,
generated more sorties and delivered more reinforcements as
compared to the CH-53E/H-60 mix. This study refuted Secretary
Cheney's reliance on other helicopter substitutes mentioned
when he cancel1ed the V-22. Richard F. Spivey acknowledged,
analyses like LLL's pit estimated cost of the V-22 acquisi-
tion and operations, which may turn out to be too optimistic,
against the better understood costs of a derivative helicop-
ter." (2:119) Other survivabi1ity studies stated, "During six
months of combat, Marines would lose three times as many
aircrews using the CH-53/H-60 rather than the V-22." (16:28)
General Gray in Warfighting describes the Marine Corps
doctrine on warfighting which provides the authoritative basis
for how Marines fight and how Marines prepare to fight. This
document provides definitive guidance for equipping our force
in the following paragraph:
In order to minimize research and development costs
and fielding time, the Marine Corps will exploit
existing capabilities of off-the-shelf technology to
the greatest extent possible....We should base these
requirements on an analysis of critical enemy vulner-
abilities and develop equipment specifically to exploit
those vulnerabilities....As much as possible, employ-
ment techniques and procedures should be developed
concurrently with equipment to minimize delays between
the fielding of the equipment and its usefulness to the
operating forces. (31:52-53)
The V-22 is specifically designed to enhance the over-the-
horizon threat of amphibious assaults on a foreign shore
embedded in Marine Corps doctrine.
History has demonstrated that the JSOR, which was
intended to enhance the affordability of the V-22 program,
has not worked because some services have been allowed to
back out of the V-22 program. Now is not the time for
Marines to be frustrated with the political gamesmanship in
budget issues. The Commandant has made it clear--Marines
concentrate on your jobs and let me worry about manpower and
procurement issues.
If the V-22 is in fact never to be resurrected, what are
the options left to the United States Marine Corps? The Marine
Corps will not demand a new helicopter built from the ground
up, but will settle for a helicopter which is in production
with some modifications. The H-60 is in production, but does
not match the capability goals sought by the Marine Corps.
The H-60 cannot carry the required number of Marines per
sortie, nor the heavier external loads during an amphibious
assault. It will increase the required strategic lift
requirements for the United Stated Transportation Command to
get Marine forces into any theater of operations. Buying more
CH-53Es, although plausible and in production, is not the
smart way to get combat-ready Marines into landing zones.
The CH-53E is built primarily for heavy cargo lift support,
and then for passenger support. The Anglo-Italian EH-1O1 has
the obvious problem of being a sole source foreign purchase.
This criteria alone is enough to fail selection. (22:14) The
CH-47 showed some early merit, but fails because it is too
large to operate from smaller air capable ships, would need
extensive modifications for shipboard service, and require
more deck space than the proposed V-22. Even Boeing's Model
360 technological demonstrator was mentioned, but disregarded
because it is not in production. The leading helicopter
candidate for the MLR is a redesigned CH-46X, basically,
the same airframe Marines have today with 80's technology
incorporated.
Even though CH-46 production tooling is no longer avail-
able and would have to be bought from Kawasaki Heavy Indus-
tries Ltd., the Marine Corps has proposed a four phased pro-
gram to extend and upgrade the fleet of CH-46s. (Kawasaki
Heavy Industries, LTD. will stop manufacturing the KV-107
under license from Boeing within the next few months.)
Phase I is a service life extension program; Phase II is
procurement of CH-46s; Phase III is the development and
production of the CH-46X line; and Phase IV is a conversion
of remaining CH-46s into CH-46Xs. Total cost for this four
phased program is $10.21 billion. (12)
The service life extension program (SLEP) for most of
the current fleet would emphasize dynamic components including
the rotor system, transmission, and hydraulics. This dynamic
component replacement program (DCR) must be done for all Navy
and Marine H-46s regardless of what aircraft is selected as
the MLR. The SLEP kits wil1 be funded in FY93/FY-94 timeframe.
The Phase II procurement of seventy-five new CH-46s built
to current configuration standards would be an interim stopgap
measure to provide sufficient lift to the current fleet and
time to develop an MLR helicopter option. However, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has cancelled procurement of
these new CH-46s during budget reviews due to end strength
reductions and decreased numbers of amphibious deck spots.
Therefore, if this decision is not reversed, the Marine Corps
will begin to experience a shortage of medium lift helicopters
in 1998.
Phase III development and production of a CH-46X, would
include modern equipment developed from other programs, inclu-
ding integrated controls and the V-22 derived glass cockpit.
The proposed number of new CH-46Xs would be 108 airframes.
(See enclosure 3)
Phase IV is the upgrade of all CH-46Es remaining in the
fleet to a CH-46X configuration. A thorough remanufacturing
program would start the new X models off with a service life
lasting well into the 2020s. In the current proposal, all
four phases would be complete by the year 2004.
In spite of congressionally approved V-22 funding, the
Secretary of Defense and his staff have successfully cancelled
the V-22 and delayed overal1 resolution of the Marine Corps
medium lift problem. Although the Marine Corps has publicly
supported these actions, Congress and the prime contractors
continue to keep the V-22 program barely alive and funded.
Four of six V-22 aircraft have been constructed and are now
undergoing f1ight testing. The other 2 aircraft are over 60%
completed. Last month the Senate Appropriations Committee
approved an amendment offered by Senator Arlen Specter that
requires the Pentagon to release the 1991 funding for the
V-22. If the Senate approves the measure and it becomes law,
the Defense Department is obligated to release the money
within 30 days. Release of the disputed funding is critical
for the program to begin operational testing by Marine Corps
pilots in August 1991. If the program successfully passes
this rigorous testing, the V-22 could receive Defense
Acquisition Board approval to initiate limited production in
December 1991. (15:8) Unfortunately, funding rather than
mission accomplishment or capability is the key issue.
The Marine Corps has rightly put the onus on the Depart-
ment of Defense to decide this MLR political "hot potato." A
joint approach did not guarantee procurement of the V-22.
Documented operational need and survivability data did not
guarantee the V-22. Continuing unresolved differences between
Congress and DOD over the V-22/MLR prevent the Marine Corps
from executing either program as planned and only serves to
delay and Increase costs associated with each program. (12)
Obviously there is no guarantee for a program that is so
deeply dependent on political maneuvering and funding, or so
vulnerable to current military reductions. But the fact is
that the Marine Corps will begin to suffer unplanned and
unwarranted aviation losses in the very near future if some
MLR resolution isn't decided soon. It is to be hoped that
Marine testing of the V-22 this summer at HMX-1 will provide
sufficiently positive results that will finally convince the key
people in DOD and Congress of the worth and desirability of
this aircraft. Until then, the future of the Marine Corps
helicopter capability remains an unanswered question.
Click here to view image
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