The Marine Corps Reserve And Its Future
AUTHOR Major David R. Chevallier, USMCR
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Manpower
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE AND ITS FUTURE
I. Purpose: To review the status of the Marine
Corps Reserve prior to its activation for use in Desert
Shield/Storm and make recommendations for its future shape for
the remainder of the 90's and into the 21st Century.
II. Problem: To determine if substantial flaws
exist in the mission assigned the Marine Corps Reserve to
include its organization, readiness and command relationships.
III. Data: The Marine Corps Reserve was assigned
the primary mission of providing the Marine Corps with
pre-trained units and individuals with which to expand the FMF
in time of national crisis. To meet this requirement the
Reserve's focus was primarily directed towards the training and
readiness of the Ready Reserve. The primary components of the
Ready Reserve are the Selected Marine Corps Reserve and the
Individual Ready Reserve are used to make up the units of the
4th Division and Wing Team (DWT), a mirror image organization of
the Marine Corps' active MEF's. The Individual Ready Reserve is
a large pool of pre-trained individual manpower that is used to
flesh out active and reserve units in times of crisis. To
enhance readiness and ensure compatibility reserve units and
individuals routinely integrate and train with regular units and
receive testing and evaluation under the same criteria regulars
are exposed to. Almost all of the units of the 4th DWT and a
significant portion of the individual Ready Reserve were
activated for service in Desert Shield/Storm. Based on
preliminary indications their service exceeded most expectations.
IV. Conclusions: The Marine Corps Reserve's
mission, organization, training and command relationships
provided a sound basis for the preparation of the Marine Corps
Reserve's participation in a major crisis. The Reserve
provided the Marine Corps with the strategic capability
necessary to meet the challenges of Desert Storm/Shield and
maintain operational flexibility throughout other regions of the
world.
V. Recommendations: That the Marine Corps Reserve
should be sustained at its current level of readiness with
particular emphasis placed on maintenance of equipment
compatibility and unit inter-operability with regular Marine
Forces.
THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE and ITS FUTURE
THESIS STATEMENT: To conduct a critical review of
the Reserve that supported the Marine Corps in Desert Shield in
order to determine the kind of reserve the Nation and the
Marine Corps needs for the 90's and into the 21st Century.
I. RESERVE IMPORTANCE
A. Upper strategic level
1. Policy Support
2. Grass Roots Support
B. Lower Strategic level
1. Marine Corps Capability
II. STATUS: MARINE CORPS RESERVE
A. Missions
B. Organization
C. Readiness
D. Training
III. MISSIONS
A. Expand the FMF in Time of Emergency
IV. ORGANIZATION
A. Ready Reserve
1. Selected Marine Corps Reserve
2. Individual Mobilization Augmentees
3. Full Time Support Program
4. Individual Ready Reserve
B. Standby Reserve
1. Retired Reserve
2. Fleet Marine Corps Reserve
V. READINESS
A. Exercises and Operations
B. Evaluation and Tests
VI. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
A. Dual Command
B. Autonomous
VII. REVIEW
A. Mirror Image
B. Commonality
C. Integration
VIII. CONCLUSION
A. Strategic Importance will grow
B. Vital Importance of Reserve
The Marine Corps Reserve and Its Future
Desert Storm has drawn to a close, but that conflict
will have an impact on he Marine Corps for the foreseeable
future. At the strategic level, the decision to use the Reserve
and National Guard proved to be a vital element of the
President's source of power for implementing his policies in the
Persian Gulf. From the moment he made the decision to use the
reserve, he had irrevocably committed the American people to the
support of his policies.
The activation of the National Guard and Reserve
units had overwhelming strategic implications. Unlike an
individual going off to join or being drafted into the military
where his departure only touches a fragment of a community, the
activation of the guard and reserve introduced whole communities
to the reality of potential cost of our policies in the Gulf.
The make-up of today's reserve reflects a much broader spectrum
of American society than the active duty military. Doctors,
prominent businessman, professionals, nurses, college students,
mechanics, .i.e. the people that make up the fabric of a
community were directly involved. Consequently, the community
instantly had a vital stake in the successful outcome of this
conflict. Their desire to see the honorable return of friends,
husbands, sisters, brothers and acquaintances insured strong
support of the President's policies--so long as the people
perceived those policies focusing on a rapid and decisive
conclusion to the conflict. As the war continued with
measurable success being achieved at a minimal cost in
casualties, the people's support of the President's policies not
only remained steadfast, but actually increased.
On a lower strategic level, it has become an
accepted fact that the Marine Corps could
not have maintained its worldwide presence during the
course of desert Shield/Desert Storm without the activation of
its reserve. General Gray states that although our reserves
usually are not used for crisis response, they provide a
critical sustainment and reinforcement base for extended
operations beyond 60 days. (6:14) This is the Corps' strategic
ace in the hole. Without the reserve there is no depth. Desert
Storm proved this categorically.
With these thoughts in mind, a review of the current
status of the Marine Corps Reserve with particular emphasis on
the missions, organization, readiness and training, and command
relationships is in order. Comparisons and critical review will
be made to ensure that the reserve that supported the Marine
Corps in Desert Shield is the kind of reserve that the Nation
and the Marine Corps needs for the remainder of the 90's and
into the 21st Century.
At the onset of Desert Storm/Desert Shield the
Marine Corps Reserve was organized, manned, and commanded
according to the mandated of its mission. the basic mission of
the Marine Corps Reserve is to provide the Regular Marine Corps
with pre-trained individuals and units with which to expand the
FMF in time of national emergency. (2:68) Beneath this umbrella
of employment the reserve mission was broken down into four
major areas:
1. Augementation/reinforcement of active forces to
field three Marine Expeditionary forces (MEFS) at full wartime
strength.
2. Field a MEB with reduced aviation and CSS
capability (Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Combat Service
Support).
3. Provide a nucleus for reconstitution of the
Division, Wing, FSSG. (FSSG)
4. Provide a complete division, Wing, FSSG. (7:38)
Manpower to perform these missions was divided into
four categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, The
Retired Reserve, and the Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (FMCR).
The Ready Reserve is made up of individuals either
assigned to the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) or the
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The SMCR is comprised of
individuals organized into the units of the 4th Division, 4th
MAW and 4th FSSG (4th DWT); the Individual Mobilization
Augmentee program; and the Full-Time Support Program FTS). The
IRR is composed of pre-trained individuals not organized into
specific units. The Ready Reserve has the largest amount of
manpower assigned to it. As of 1 February 1991, the strength of
the Ready Reserve was approximately 80,000.
Within the Selected Marine Corps Reserve, the 4th
Division-Wing Team accounts for the bulk of the manpower. This
is the operational power of the Reserve. It occupies 166 ground
or combat service support centers and 27 aviation centers
dispersed geographically over 46 states, the District of
Colombia and Puerto Rico. The 4th DWT is organized specifically
to mirror active force combat organizations as much as possible
and to be prepared to perform a variety of mobilization roles.
When fully mobilized the 4th DWT represents 25% of the combat
power available to Fleet Marine Force Commanders.
The Individual Mobilization Augmentees are drilling
reservists who are members of the SMCR but not members of the
4th DWT. They are assigned to mobilization billets at major
bases and installations that require them to report within 24
hours of notification. They are to be used to augment commands
during a crisis or mobilization.
The personnel of the Full-Time Support program serve
on full-time active duty in direct support of the Reserve
forces. They are instrumental in augmenting our regular forces
in the development of policy, administration, recruitment,
training and logistical support of the reserve forces.
The Marines of the Individual Ready Reserve are a
pre-trained manpower pool who are not required to perform
regular drills. The IRR consists of individuals who have served
in the regular component or the SMCR and have some period of
military service obligation remaining or individuals who have
completed their military service and stay in the IRR by choice.
They are and experienced and valuable manpower pool. Their
primary importance is as source of manpower for augmenting the
active forces in times of crisis, as was demonstrated in Desert
Storm.
The Standby reserve is a pool of reservists who may
be ordered to active duty only in time of war or national
emergency. They are only called when there are not enough
qualified members in the Ready Reserve in a specific skill
category to fill requirements. There are only about 1400
Marines in this category. The retired reserve is composed of
those reservists who have completed 20 years of qualifying or
federal service for retirement pay. About 4200 Marines are
found in this category. The FMCR is made up of those Marines
either regular or reserve who have retired for reasons other
than physical disability after completion of 20 or more years
but less than 30 years active service in the armed Forces.
For our purposes, the SMCR and the IRR are the
components of the Reserve that will address my remarks too. The
operations and training of the reserve primarily revolve around
the preparation of individuals and units of the 4th DWT for
battery/company level up to regiment/group level for
participation in joint and combined operations as designated by
FMF commander's requirements. IRR members participate on an
individual basis in major exercises and MOS training throughout
the Marine Corps. However the major emphasis in reserve
training is on the 4th DWT.
To evaluate the competence and preparation of the
reserve, the units of the 4th DWT are subjected to the following
tests and evaluation:
1. Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation System (MCCRES)
2. Mobilization Operational Readiness Deployment Test (MORDT)
3. Field Supply Maintenance Analysis Office (FASMAO)
4. Marine Corps Disbursing On-Site Evaluation Team (MMCDOSET)
Results of MCCRES and MORDT for those units tested
in Fiscal Year 90 were 100% for the MCCRES and 95% for the
MORDT. This is substantial proof of the current state of
readiness of the Reserve. (7:12)
Command relationships within the Reserve are exactly
like those of the active forces with two exceptions: the dual
chain-of-command system used for reserve unit Commanding
Officers and the Inspector-Instructors (I&I) below the
battalion/squardon level, and the autonomous command exercised
by the 4th Division and Wing Commanding Generals.
The dual chain-of-command arrangement is unique to
the Marine Corps Reserve. It is a long-standing practice and
appears to be one that will remain, regardless of its obvious
flaws. However, the autonomous command relationships enjoyed by
the 4th Division and Wing commander appears to be sound one.
These Commanders enjoy a direct line to the Commandant and
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC),. which serves to ensure that
reserves are not run-over or ignored in day-to-day operations
with the active forces and FMF Commanders.
That's the way the current missions, organization,
organization, operations and readiness and command relationships
of the Marine Corps Reserve were at the time Desert Shield
began. We will now evaluate the reserves performance in order
to determine the soundness of the policies that prepared the
reserve for this crisis. It is the first time since the Korean
war that there has been a large scale Mobilization of the Marine
reserve. While it might be a bit premature to draw universal
conclusions, there is none the less enough evidence available to
be able to form a fairly sound evaluation of the Reserve's
ability to meet the mandates of its missions.
This following is drawn directly from the testimony
of the Marine Corps' Deputy Assistant for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs, Major General Davison, before the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
As of 26 February 91, 24,084, members of the 4th DWT, 7171
IRR's and 871 IMA's had been activated in operations
supporting Desert Shield and other Marine Coprs Commitment.
In is augmentation role, many reserve units were called
to deploy with active forces not operating at full
strength. In its reinforcing role, SMCR units deployed to provide
additional combat capability to Fleet Marine Force Commanders.
Many individual reservists with critical military occupational
specialty skills were also called to fill specific billet vacancies
or as combat replacements. Regardless of the specific
mobilization role or assignment, the integration of highly
motivated and dedicated reservists with the Active
Component has give impetus and momentum to our Marine
Air-Ground Task Forces. The infusion of state-of-the-art
equipment within the 4th DWT has also provided additional
capability and firepower. the entire process has validated
long-standing principles in areas of manpower management,
training, and procurement of equipment which have guide our management of the
Marine Corps Reserve." (7:38)
From these remarks, we can make the case that the
Reserve has met all its mandates and has more than justified its
existence. But what are the major lessons to be gleaned from
the success of the Marine Corps Reserve up to this time? Three
major points come to mind:
1. The SMCR organized to mirror image an active MEF
is a sound one. Because of this flexibility and depth the Corps
was able to draw the units it needed to meet the specific
mission requirements of Desert Shield and also meet the needs
for the constitution of sufficient forces for other world-wide
commitments. Lessons one then would indicate that the 4th DWT
should remain a mirror image of an Active MEF.
2. The success of the integration of reserve forces
and active forces can also be credited to the commonality of
equipment and weapon systems found in both forces. The 4th MAW
still lags in certain aircraft, but steps are being taken to
close this gap. This is a critical factor in any attempt to
integrate reserve and active forces. All efforts in procurement
in the future must be focused on ensuring the reserve's
equipment and weapons remain on an equal par with the active
forces. Waiting until the next crisis to make up shortfalls
will be too late.
3. The third and final point of the Reserves success
can be attributed to the level of readiness and training
expected of the reserve and the integration of the reserve in
active duty exercises in and out of CONUS. Familiarity, mutual
respect, and appreciation for the other's strengths and
abilities in these exercises laid the ground work for the
successful integration of the Reserve in the
augmentation/reinforcement role requirement of it in this recent
crisis.
These then were the cornerstones of the Reserve
success in Desert Shield. They are simple and straightforward.
Nurturing and maintaining them should spell success the next
time the Reserve is needed. The primary focus in the Reserve
buildup has been the SMCR. It is imperative that it remain so.
In the days of looming budget cuts and shrinking resources many
attempts will be made to take shortcuts. Shortchanging the 4th
DWT cannot be one of them.
To many regular Marines, the Marine Corps success in
Desert Shield will be laid totally at the feet of the active
forces, because their claimed success overshadows the reserves
importance. But what would have happened if the Iraqi's had
put up token resistance? Increased casualties would have
occurred, surely. The primary source for these replacements
would have been reserve Marines. Likewise, an extended
emergency in another area of the world would have called for
large scale usage of the Reserve in direct operations.
Although, the likelihood of such concurrent contingencies on the
future may seem remote, remember that the post Cold War world is
a volatile one. A characteristic of this volatility is that the
U.S. will usually find itself reacting--as happened in Desert
Shield/Storm.
Because of the proven success of the reserve
activation, the rapid transition from peace to war that exists
in the modern world, and the natural aversion to a draft by the
American people, the Reserve will remain the major source of
manpower augmentation for regular forces in a future crisis of
any duration short of a worldwide conflict. Therefore, the
strategic importance of the reserve for the Regular Marine Corps
will grow, not lessen.
In the future, with reductions of the active forces
looming, the only source of trained units and individuals for
the regular Corps will be the Marine Corps Reserve, so the
Marine Corps cannot afford to let the Reserve languish. And on
an even larger strategic scale the reserve makes a unique
contribution, because it embodies the very fabric of American
society. It is not an exaggeration to say "Call-up the Reserve
and you call up America!" As Vietnam proved so tragically war
is too serious not to involve all America. So, all these
considerations together point to the requirement for a strong
Guard and Reserve.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Cancian, Mark F, LtCol USMCR, "Why Not the
Best?." Marine Corps Gazette,(January 88), 63-70.
2. Davison H. E., Major General USMC,"Active/Reserve
Relationship Acts to Enhance Corps." The Officer,
(February 91), 68-74.
3. Howell J. D. Col USMCR and LtCol G. I. Wilson,
USMCR, "In the Event of War, Its the USMC". Marine Corps
Gazette, (December 85), 71-76.
4. Jacobs, Jeffrey A. "Integrating the Total Army:
The Road to Reserve Readiness", Parameters, XX 4 (December
1990), 73-84.
5. Kufeldt, E. Col USMCR. "The Reserve Wing." Marine
Corps Gazette (May 1983), 81-85.
6. U.S. Congress, House. Annual Report to the
Congress Before The Senate Armed Services Committee. Gray, A.
M., Commandant of the Marine Corps, (21 February 91). 1-27.
7. U.S. Congress, Senate. Annual Report to the
Congress Before The Senate Armed Services Committee. Davison H.
M., USMC, (22 February 91) 1-36.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
