A Wake-Up Call For Air Refueling
AUTHOR Major Andrew H. Cox, USAF
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: A WAKE-UP CALL FOR AIR REFUELING
Thesis: Airpower's future responsiveness and the US ability
to project its forces worldwide depends on air refueling. To
insure insure responsiveness and global projection, the Air
Force must expand its air refueling assets.
Background: Recent events in Southwest Asia have reaffirmed
the military's dependence on air refueling. Southwest Asia
also showed that there is a shortfall in this critical area.
The tanker shortfall is nothing new -- it has been with us
for years. Yet, the Air Force has not corrected the
problem. The tanker's historic relationship to the
strategic bomber and the Air Force's procurement philosophy
have hindered attempts to correct the problem. Furthermore,
congressional policies have also hampered efforts to improve
in this critical area.
Recommendations: To correct the tanker deficiency the
nation must first reevaluate bomber commitments to the SIOP.
With the reduced threat posed by our chief adversary, the
Soviet Union, improvements in other weapons systems, and
better intelligence capability, we can reduce bomber
commitments. As the number of bombers decreases, so will
the number of tankers. The tankers can then be used for
conventional operations. Secondly, we must accelerate the
KC-135R modernization program. If we are unable to draw
down our strategic forces, we must still have more tankers
to support an ever-increasing conventional commitment.
Conclusions: The Air Force has identified the need for more
air refueling capability. However, if the Air Force does not
act soon, we may be faced with no other alternative than to
buy a new tanker. In a time when fiscal restraint is the
watchword in Washington, buying a new tanker would be
difficult. We have viable options to address the shortfall
now, but we must act quickly.
A WAKE-UP CALL FOR AIR REFUELING
Thesis Statement. To insure airpower's future responsiveness and the
US ability to project its forces worldwide, the Air Force must expand
its air refueling assets.
I. Historical Background
A. Primary mission - support the bomber
B. Tankers in Vietnam
C. The Arab-Israeli Conflict of 1973
D. GAO's 1984 study
II. Procurement Policies
A. Air Force
B. Congress
III. Solutions
A. Reevaluate bomber commitments to the SIOP
B. Accelerate the KC-135R modernization program
C. Other solutions
A WAKE-UP CALL FOR AIR REFUELING
Duffy surveyed the desert ahead of him. There, in the
distance, waited no less than one brigade of tanks. Scores
of well armed, combat-hardened infantry units lingered
nearby. What was behind these units was anybody's guess,
but if one believed intelligence estimates, there was much
more of the same. Duffy had been in some tight spots
before, but he had never felt so exposed to the enemy. Not
even the dark days of Khe Sanh could match this moment. The
only thing that stood between him and half the Iraqi Army
were some TOWs, a few tanks, six Cobra gunships, a few
Harriers, and not nearly enough miles of sand. How could
they stop thatarmor if the Iraqis decided to cross the
border? Maybe the boys were right--they were just a "speed
bump" in the desert. Airpower could slow these guys down
just like at Khe Sanh. But was there enough ?
Sound like a short account out of a Tom Clancy novel?
Or was it the same thoughts that American ground units
pondered during the early moments of Operation Desert
Shield. Like the fictitious Duffy, American units faced the
same challenges over the first few months of Operation
Desert Shield. And, like Duffy, they probably wondered "is
there enough air?"
Airpower will certainly play an important role in our
next conflict. In the 1991 Annual Report to the President
and the Congress, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney noted
that the defense establishment must emphasize the qualities
of versatility, global deployability, and rapid
responsiveness.1 Forces such as the Marine expeditionary
brigades and the Army airborne divisions are tailored to
meet these requirements. These highly trained, elite units
make up our force-in-readiness. They depend on strategic
airlift to get them to the battlefield rapidly and they are,
by necessity, light. They quickly deploy with enough
firepower to sustain themselves, but depend on heavier
forces to reinforce them. As the saying goes, "they are
light enough to get there, but heavy enough to win."
Light forces trade offensive capability for responsiveness.
Artillery, tanks, and logistics support among other
equipment must remain behind. Therefore, our forces depend
on airpower to counter an enemy that in all probability
outguns and outnumbers them. Getting strategic airlift and
tactical units to the theater of operations is not easy;
they also need support.
To insure airpower's future responsiveness and the US
ability to project its forces worldwide, the Air Force must
expand its air refueling assets. In Desert Shield, we
needed more air refueling assets than were available. The
result was that for some time ground units did not have
enough air support. The Iraqis did not attack, but will a
future enemy remain in fixed positions or will he take
advantage of our weakness during the early stages of our
build-up? The loss of elite units and the rapid escalation
of the conflict is at stake. Desert Shield reiterated the
importance of air refueling and showed that we are lacking
in this critical area. It was a wake-up call.
The roots of the current tanker deficiency start many
years ago. In 1946, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was
established. SAC's primary mission was to conduct
long-range offensive operations anywhere in the world. Of
course, the primary threat was the Soviet Union. One of the
major problems that SAC faced was how to penetrate Soviet
defenses and, once penetrated, attack heavily defended
targets. In September 1947, General Carl Spaatz formed the
Heavy Bombardment Committee to study methods of air
delivery. The committee concluded that current and
projected bombers had the same problem-limited range. They
recommended that air-to-air refueling be developed as a
matter of first priority. 2
In the fall of 1947, even as the Heavy Bombardment
Committee was meeting, the Air force examined the
possibilities of using modified B-29s or B-50s to air refuel
jet fighters. Extensive testing was conducted for the next
year. By the end of 1949, six operational squadrons had
been established. SAC became the focal point for all air
refueling, and it was SAC bombers that were the primary
beneficiary of the early refueling efforts. The first
fighter refueling occurred in 1951 with SAC-controlled
fighters attaining refueling capability in early 1952.
Tactical Air Command fighters started operational air
refueling in the fall of 1952. Until the end of the Korean
War, air refueling aircraft supported tactical aviation in
the war zone; however, the bulk of SAC's air refueling
assets remained dedicated to bomber refueling.
In 1955, the B-52 Stratofortress became the Air Force's
primary strategic bomber. To increase the B-52's range and
payload, the Air Force realized that this new bomber would
require air refueling. The air refueling aircraft of the
day, the KC-97 and the KC-29, could support the B-52, but
they had limitations. Both the KC-97 and the KB-29 were
incapable of matching the B-52's speed and altitude. To
receive its gas, the B-52 had to slow down and descend. As
a result, the B-52s was unable to maintain the strict timing
required for weapons delivery. To correct the problem, the
Air Force decided to produce the KC-135 Stratotanker.
The KC-135 was a far superior aircraft to the KB-29 and
KC-97. Unlike its predecessors, the KC-135 was specifically
designed for air refueling. The -135's inherent
capabilities allowed it to fly as fast and as high as the
B-52. The Stratotanker was a perfect complement to SAC's
primary bomber. The KC-135 became exclusively tied to the
B-52, and by inference, the strategic mission. Air Force
planners clearly recognized the importance of air refueling
in the strategic arena, but would the planners recognize the
tankers's potential effectiveness in the conventional arena?
The answer to the question was forthcoming. The
Vietnam War forced the Air Force to focus on the KC-135's
conventional capability. Tankers were invaluable in
increasing the range, time-on-station, and payload of
tactical fighters. They also provided intertheater
refueling across the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, air
refueling procedures were perfected and refueling equipment
advanced. More air refuelable aircraft were produced. By
the end of the war, most of the Air Force's aircraft were
refuelable. New Marine and Navy aircraft also included an
air refueling capability. Air refueling became commonplace.
Air refueling had come a long way since the 1940s.
Despite the realization during Vienam that the tanker was
conventionally important, there was no attempt to increase
the tanker force structure to meet both conventional and
strategic refueling needs. As long as the likelihood of
either a large scale conventional or nuclear war against the
Soviet Union remained low, then there were enough tankers to
meet our conventional requirements.
The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 finally convinced the Air
Force to increase the number of tankers. During this
conflict, the US provided Israel with essential military
supplies and equipment. Strategic airlift was critical.
All of the equipment delivered to Israel before the
cease-fire was delivered by air. From October 13 through
October 24, Military Airlift Command (MAC) delivered 22,395
short-tons of cargo to Israel.3 Though the primary
airlifter, the C-5, was air refuelable, few crews were
proficient in air refueling procedures. Those that were,
were able to refuel enroute to Israel thus cutting the
delivery times and lessening airport congestion at
intermediate refueling stops. However, the vast majority of
C-5s and C-141 were forced make a refueling stop enroute.
Additionally, the US provided the Israelis with
replacement aircraft throughout the war. The KC-135 was
invaluable in supporting this process. The tankers provided
inflight refueling for F-4 and A-4 aircraft who flew
non-stop from the US to Israel in 15 hours. These same
aircraft were accepted by the Israelis and in some cases
flew combat sorties on the same day.4
Valuable lessons were learned from the conflict. MAC
immediately required all C-5 crews to receive training in
air refueling. Additionally, the Air Force decided to
modify the C-141 to make it air refuelable. The
Arab-Israeli War highlighted the need for additional air
refueling assets capable of refueling wide-bodied aircraft
like the C-5. The KC-135, though capable of refueling the
C-5 and the C-141, required multiple aircraft to pass the
large amount of fuel these wide-bodied aircraft required.
Thus, the Air Force identified a mission need for a bigger,
more capable refueler. Eventually, the Air Force purchased
60 KC-10 Extenders to meet the need.
The KC-10 increased the number of refueling assets and
improved the refueling capability with respect to strategic
airlift. However, even with the KC-10, the Air Force lacked
the number of tankers required to satisfy all of the
refueling demands of the 1990's. A 1984 General Accounting
Office (GAO) study concluded that the minimum number of
tankers needed through 1990 would equal 1000 tanker
equivalents. Using the GAO's system, each KC-135A counted
as one tanker equivalent. Tankers modified with more
fuel-efficient commercial engines counted as 1.2 or 1.5
equivalents depending on which engine was used. A KC-10
counted as three A-model equivalents. The GAO reasoned that
if the Air Force could field 1000 tanker equivalents through
the early 1990s, the air refueling demand would decline and
the shortfall would gradually correct itself. The Air Force
agreed with the 1000 tanker equivalent figure and used it
for subsequent calculations.
One year later, a Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
report used the same 1000 A-model equivalent figure to study
procurement options for the tanker shortfall. Again, the
Air Force agreed with using 1000 A-model equivalents as a
baseline, but added that in times of increased world tension
and with future weapons system needs, the figure would be
low. The CBO report provided the basis of the Air Force's
procurement plan of modifying enough tankers to meet the
1000 tanker equivalent level. With the commitment to expand
to 1000 tanker equivalents, the Air Force implicitly
acknowledged the tanker's utility in conventional
operations. Unfortunately, when the Air Force finally
recognized the tanker's conventional value it was unable to
make needed changes. The problem now was in procurement
policies of both the Air Force and the congress.
Recent Air Force procurement policies have been
characterized by the purchase of high-tech, high-cost weapon
systems. The less glamourous systems like the tanker have
suffered. For example, the B-2 bomber cost well over $550
million per copy. Critics charge that spending so much
money on one aircraft effects the entire nation by taking
money away from needy social programs. What people fail to
realize is that the B-2 program also takes money away from
other weapon systems like the KC-135. If, therefore, the
Air Force fails to emphasize the reengining program, the
congress will follow suit. Furthermore, the KC-135
reengining program is not a major program-it has few private
firms benefitting from the program. Why should anyone in
congress push for a program that has little economic impact
on their constituency when there are other more lucrative
programs to be awarded?
So, both the congress and the Air Force are at fault.
On the one hand, the Air Force understands the need for
additional tanker capability, yet it does not give the
program high priority in the budget wars. On the other
hand, the congress continues to slip the program resulting
in an ever-widening gap between the number of tankers needed
and the number of tankers available. Continued slips in the
reengining program increases the cost in the long run. And
soon, modifying the tanker will not be cost effective-it is
getting too old.
The congress is also using old information. The 1985
CBO air refueling study continues to be a guide for the
congress. The problem is that the CBO based its study on
incorrect assumptions. At the time of the study, these
assumptions were logical, but in six years factors have
changed. The most important assumption made by the CBO was
that by the early 1990's the number of aircraft requiring
air refueling would start to decrease. Purchasing more
fuel-efficient aircraft, retiring less fuel-efficient
aircraft, and reducing the number of fuel-intensive bomber
mission, would decrease the tanker requirement.
Unfortunately, air refueling requirements have increased.
The projected increase in more fuel-efficient aircraft and
the changes in bomber missions have not materialized due to
procurement slowdowns. Because the Air Force gets fewer
aircraft at a slower pace, it must keep some older, less
fuel-efficient aircraft to maintain their unique mission
capabilities. Consequently, air refueling assets are needed
more than ever.
The world today is a lot different from the world of
1985. Nations have become more independent, more willing to
exercise their sovereign rights. In the past, the US could
make a request for landing or overflight rights and feel
confident that its request would be granted. This is no
longer the case. For a myriad of reasons, countries are
unwilling to let the US forces transit their territory. A
recent example was the 1987 airstrike on Libya. France
refused to allow United Kingdom based F-111s to overfly her
territory. Air refueling made the mission possible. With
more and more countries denying access to their airspace and
facilities, the US may find itself in a similar situation in
the future. Air refueling will provide both military
planners and political leaders flexibility.
Finally, the CBO assumed a stronger economy and budget
than what exist now. In all fairness, few could have
predicted the size of the current budget deficit in 1985.
This deficit has dampened government spending. The
congress, in its attempt to arrest the deficit, is reluctant
to spend money. They prefer to cancel or change new
programs, or slowdown existing programs. The KC-135
reengining program has continually been slowed and it is
likely that this policy will continue.
The lack of air refueling aircraft is a serious problem
with military's readiness. Correcting the problem is
becoming more difficult with shrinking budgets, yet
expanding military commitments. The solutions are
available, but they require some hard decisions that must be
made soon if we are to avoid a serious deficiency in our
strategic mobility and responsiveness.
The first solution involves decreasing the number of
bombers required for strategic offensive operations.
Doctrinally, the tanker's primary mission is to support
strategic bombers committed to the Single Integrated
Operational Plan (SIOP), the nation's general nuclear war
plan. Daily, one-third of all bombers support the SIOP.
Concurrently, each bomber on alert status has at least one
mated tanker, but more probably, two or even three. In
actuality, well over one-third of the tanker force is on
alert. The higher number of tankers on alert is due to
bomber requirements for multiple refueling and the need to
maintain a strategic reserve of tankers.
The number of bombers on nuclear alert can be reduced
for several reasons. Advances in US intelligence gathering
capabilities have given military and civilian leaders
confidence in our ability to provide sufficient warning of
an impending attack. Since 1957, we have maintained a large
alert force to protect against surprise attack. Leaders now
believe that such an attack is improbable. Our newly-
acquired intelligence capability alleviates the need for a
large standing alert force.
Furthermore, our primary threat, the Soviet Union, has
changed. Over the last several years, the Soviet Union has
shown the desire to focus its' attention inward, and to
improve relations with the US. The recent events in
Eastern Europe support this observation.
Finally, advances in weapons technology give the US
alternatives to maintaining large bomber alert forces. The
recent use of the Tomahawk cruise missile in Southwest Asia
proved the accuracy and the penetration capability of the
cruise missile system. More air-launched and sea-launched
cruise missiles could be used to attack targets formerly
targeted by manned bombers. Individual bombers carrying
cruise missiles will actually require more tankers, but the
number of tankers required to support the entire SIOP will
decrease.
For these reasons the number of bombers on strategic
alert can be decreased. If the number of bombers needed to
meet strategic commitments decreases, the number of tankers
supporting them will decrease. The additional tankers can
be used to support conventional operations.
The second solution to the Air Force's refueling
shortfall is accelerating the KC-135 modernization program.
One modification kit improves twenty-seven aircraft
components and increases the offload capability of each
aircraft by fifty percent. This modification will extend
the KC-135's service life by approximately 50 years. By
modifying the entire active duty KC-135 fleet, the Air Force
will in effect increase its refueling capability from 636 to
954 A-model tankers.
Current Air Force plans are to modify the entire KC-135
fleet with the CFM56 engine. This modification, known as
the KC-135R, includes all of the previously modified
National Guard tankers in addition to the remaining
unmodified A-models. At the current pace, the 1000 tanker
equivalent total will be reached in 1992. However, the 1000
tanker equivalent total includes the KC-10. At least 20 of
the KC-10s are dedicated to the airlift mission.5 In times
of crisis these aircraft may not be available for air
refueling missions. The loss of 20 KC-10s, would require
the purchase of 40 KC-135R kits to compensate. This
translates to an additional 2 years before the Air Force
would reach the 1000 A-model equivalent total at the current
procurement rate of 24 modification kits per year.
With continual slowdowns in the modification kit
procurement schedule, soon the utility of this program will
be questionable. The fact is that the KC-135A is an aging
aircraft and despite continual modification it will
eventually reach the point where its useful service life is
limited. Why would congress continue support a system that
has a limited lifetime? We have not yet reached this point
with the KC-135; however, with the continuous program
slowdown we may soon reach the point where the congress
refuses to appropriate any further funds for new engines.
Accelerating the re-engining program would require real
growth in funding. The need to increase real growth would
actually accentuate the slowdown, however. If the entire
defense department is experiencing negative growth in its
budget, real growth for this one program is unlikely. The
overriding question is how important is air refueling to our
nation's readiness. All indications from both the Air Force
and the other services is that the need for more tankers is
a critical.
Several other solutions could relieve the air refueling
shortfall. These solutions are not as effective as the
previous solutions, but they do provide viable alternatives.
Re-engining the reserve tanker fleet can also provide
additional tankers in the near term. Purchasing additional
CFM56 engines will increase the refueling capacity of each
reserve tanker by thirty percent. If reserve tankers are
re-engined, the Air Force will in effect add 39 tankers to
the refueling force. As mentioned earlier, the current Air
Force plan calls for reengining the KC-135E after all the
A-models conversions are completed.
Another solution allows the Marine Corps to use its own
KC-130 tankers for intertheater refueling. Current DoD
policy assigns the Air Force the responsibility of
intertheater refueling. Even if the Air Force does not wish
to relinquish this responsibility, provisions could be made
within DoD allowing the Marines to conduct emergency
intertheater refueling. This solution would add three
active duty and two reserve Marine refueling squadrons for
intertheater service. The appeal of this solution is that
it requires no additional cost to the nation. However, it
offers limited improvement in air refueling capability.
The solution that we may soon be faced with is to build
a new aircraft. This of course would be difficult during
these fiscally constrained times. However, we must ask
ourselves what is important. Certainly, we must start to
consider replacing the KC-135-it can not live forever
despite all of the modifications. The Air Force reported in
its most recent report to congress. "..even when these
enhancements are complete, we will remain unable to meet
conventional force requirements while simultaneously
supporting the SIOP. Meeting this shortfall will require the
eventual procurement of a new KC-X tanker."6 By presenting
this to congress, the Air Force has acknowledged that the
1000 tanker figure is no longer valid. Furthermore, the Air
Force is emphasizing air refueling and showing that it is
willing to spend the required funds to correct the
deficiency.
No one predicted the events of Southwest Asia (SWA),
nor can we accurately predict what will happen in the
future. What SWA should tell us is that we must be
responsive to a wide range of worldwide contingencies. We
must also be able to project our forces quickly and over
great distances. In order fulfill these requirements, we
must have more tankers. By reducing the number of tankers
committed to strategic refueling and by accelerating the
procurement of the KC-135R modernization kits, we will be
better prepared in the near term to cope with an uncertain
world.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President and the
Congress, 1991. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1991.
2. Department of the Air Force. The Air Force Issues Book, 1990.
Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, 1990.
3. Department of the Air Force. The United States Air Force Report
to the 101st Congress of the United States of America, 1991.
Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, 1991.
4. Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in
the United States Air Force, Vol I. Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama: Air University Press, 1971.
5. Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in
the United States Air Force, Vol II. Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama: Air University Press, 1989.
6. Littauer, Raphael, and Norman Uphoff, eds. The Air War in
Indochina. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
7. Morger,Randal E., Maj, USAF. "Tankers for a Thirsty Fleet." Air
Force Magazine, 69 (June 1986).
8. Office of the Historian, Headquarters Strategic Air Command.
Seventy Years of Strategic Air Refueling, 1918-1988, A
Chronology. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1990.
9. Polmar, Norman ed. Strategic Air Command: People, Aircraft, and
Missiles. Annapolis, Maryland: The Nautical and Aviation
Publishing Company of America, 1979.
10. The Congress of the United States. " Modernizing the Aerial
Tanker Fleet: Prospects for Capacity, Timing, and Cost.
Washington D.C.: The Congressional Budget Office, 1985.
11. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Armed Services.
Investigations of National Defense Phase II. Hearing Before a
Special Subcommittee on Armed Services. 85th Congress,2nd
sess. ,1958
12. U.S. Congress. Senate. Subcommittee on the Air Force. Study of
Air Power: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Air Force,
84th Congress., 2nd sess., 1956.
13. Wolf, Richard. The United States Air Force: Basic Documents on
Roles and Missions. Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force
History, 1987.
FOOTNOTES
1 Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President and the
Congress, 1991.( Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1991), p.4.
2 Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the
United States Air Force, Vol I. (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama:
Air University Press, 1971), p.233.
3 Futrell, Robert F. Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the
United States Air Force, Vol II. (Maxwell Air Force Base,
Alabama: Air University Press, 1989), p.642.
4 Ibid. p.644.
5 The Congress of the United States. " Modernizing the Aerial Tanker
Fleet: Prospects for Capacity, Timing, and Cost. (Washington
D.C.: The Congressional Budget Office, 1985), p.xiii.
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