Columbia: A Search For An Integrated U.S. Policy For Counternarcotics (CN) And Counterinsurgency (COIN)
AUTHOR Major Arnaldo Claudio, USA
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: COLOMBIA: A SEARCH FOR AN INTEGRATED U.S. POLICY FOR
COUNTERNARCOTICS (CN) AND COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN)
I. PURPOSE: To design an integrated U.S. policy requiring full
coordination and cooperation of all U.S. CN and COIN programs in
countries threatened by both phenomena (CN/COIN).
II. PROBLEM: There is a remarkable similarity in requirements
for CN and COIN, yet the U.S. Government operates its CN programs
in near isolation from ongoing Host Nation COIN efforts. The
failure to fully coordinate CN and COIN programs in countries such
as Colombia has resulted in very limited successes in both
efforts.
III. DATA: In the past decade, the U.S. has logged numerous
para-military operations in the Andean Ridge countries (Peru,
Bolivia, and Colombia), to combat the influx of drugs to the
United States. Unfortunately, U.S. policy for counternarcotics
(CN) does not reflect the needs of countries, such as Colombia,
where insurgency is seen as the main threat. Colombian President,
Cesar Gaviria, has expressed the opinion that U.S. CN efforts
should be focused counterinsurgency (COIN) which would stabilize
the government and halt economic downturn. U.S. CN efforts
presently do not allow the Colombian civil and military
establishment to exercise their authority and develop their own
expertise in CN matters. Data is presented from the Colombian
perspective regarding how to integrate both CN and COIN programs
to better serve U.S. and Colombian national interest.
IV. CONCLUSIONS: The U.S. should link its counternarcotics (CN)
and counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts. It has been proven that
both programs need to be unified to properly address Host Nation
(HN) national interest. By unifying CN/COIN efforts the U.S. will
ensure HN support and U.S. policy success.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS: To properly counter problems the U.S.
faces in the international arena, the U.S. CN policy must have the
following enabling characteristics: establish overall national
objectives for both CN/COIN; establish reliable resource links to
the U.S. budget process and should result in development of
fiscally-constrained, realistic plans and programs for policy
implementation; identify changes to U.S. laws and agency
guidelines, i.e. DEA, FBI, DIA, CIA, etc., essential to effective
lawful implementation.
COLOMBIA: A SEARCH FOR AN INTEGRATED U.S. POLICY FOR
COUNTERNARCOTICS AND COUNTERINSURGENCY
Thesis Statement: There is a remarkable similarity in require-
ments for counterinsurgency (COIN) and counternarcotics (CN)
operations in the Andean Ridge countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and
Peru). Yet the U.S. government operates its CN programs in near
isolation from host nation COIN efforts. The failure to
coordinate fully CN and COIN in countries such as Colombia has
resulted in very limited successes in both efforts. Clearly it is
time for the design and implementation of an integrated national
policy requiring coordination and cooperation of all U.S. CN and
COIN programs in those countries threatened by both phenomena.
I. Historical Perspective--Colombia
A. History
B. Government
C. Political Conditions
II. Present General Situation
A. The Threat of Subversion
B. The Threat of Narcotrafficing
C. The Main Threat
III. United States COIN and CN Programs
A. Budget
B. U.S. Narcotics Control Efforts and Achievements
IV. Elements of U.S Policy
A. Characteristics
B. National CN/COIN Policy
C. Objectives
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Colombia's contemporary record of political violence has been
the most cruel, the most bloody and the longest lasting of all
Latin American countries. Indeed it seems to have had neither a
real beginning nor any prospect for ending in the foreseeable
future. This is a country marked by contrasts which extend across
the entire spectrum of socio-political development within the
nation. The country boasts the oldest tradition of democracy in
all of South America, with only one four-year period of military
intervention in national politics during this century (1953-1957).
It also bears the onus of a tradition of violence which has led to
several periods of internal struggle, including eight civil wars
and over fifty insurrections during the nineteenth century alone.
Most notable during this century are the War of a Thousand Days,
which claimed over 100,000 lives at the turn of the century
(1899-1902), and the period known as "La Violencia" (The Violence)
which cost almost 400,000 lives from 1948 to 1960.1 Since 1965
the International Communist Party has been organizing and
supporting several insurgent movements and terrorist groups in
order to take over the country because of its strategic position
in the Caribbean basin.2
In 1549 the area was established as a Spanish colony with the
capital at Bogota. In 1717, Bogota became the capital of the
Viceroyalty of New Grenada, which included what is now Venezuela,
Ecuador, and Panama. Along with Lima and Mexico City, Bogota
became one of the principal administrative centers of the Spanish
possessions in the New World. On July 20, 1810, the citizens of
Bogota created the first representative council to defy Spanish
authority. Total independence was proclaimed in 1813, and in 1819
the Republic of Greater Colombia was formed.
From the time of its independence from Spain until the first
civil war (1838-1842), several factors combined to fuel the
tradition of violence for this country. The most important of
these factors were the "caudillismo" (a system of war lords), the
"personalismo" (a concept of individualism), and a sense of
regionalism that was greatly exacerbated by Colombia's geography.
To some extent these systems still influence Colombian society
today.3
Two political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives,
have dominated Colombian politics. The Conservative Party,
comprised of Simon Bolivar's supporters, advocated a strong
centralized government, close alliance between the government and
the Roman Catholic Church, and a limited franchise.
The followers of Francisco de Paula Santander, forerunners of
the Liberals, wanted a decentralized government rather than church
control over education and other civil matters. They also wanted
broadened suffrage.
Although today these are no longer active issues, these
differences were the principal topics of political debate
throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The
Conservatives established a highly centralized government; the
Liberals eventually won universal adult suffrage and a large
measure of separation of church and state, although the Catholic
Church retains some important powers such as the right to give
religious instruction in all public schools.
The 1886 constitution has been amended frequently and
substantially. The most recent major revisions were approved in
January 1991. Freedom of religion, speech, and assembly, along
with other basic rights, are guaranteed by the constitution. The
national government has separate executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. Elected for a four-year term, the president
may not serve consecutive terms and his extensive powers include
appointing cabinet ministers as well as departmental and
territorial governors without congressional confirmation.
No vice president, as such, exists. Every two years,
Congress elects a "designate" from the president's party to become
acting president in the event of the president's ill health,
death, or resignation. If the president's inability to serve is
permanent, the acting president must call new elections within
three months. The designate has no duties, receives no salary,
and may hold other public or private positions while serving as
designate.
Colombia's bicameral Congress consists of the Senate and the
Chamber of Representatives, all elected on the basis of
proportional representation. Members and alternates are elected
at the same time.
Judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice
and subordinate courts. The justices serve five-year terms and
may be reelected.
The country is divided into twenty-three departments, the
Federal District of Bogota, three intendencias, and five
comisarias (territories or lesser rank not having local
legislatures). The presidentially appointed governors and mayors
are considered agents of national government, although their
powers are somewhat limited by the elected departmental
legislatures and municipal councils.
The April 1974 elections marked a return to normal
competition for the presidency; candidates from all parties were
permitted to run. The Liberal Party candidate won with 55% of the
vote.4 The 1978 election illustrated the continuing dominance
of Conservative and Liberal Parties. Several radical leftist
parties and coalitions participated in the election and won six
seats in Congress. During this election the most striking feature
was the high rate of voter absention, particularly among city
dwellers and the poor. The 1980 midterm elections confirmed this
trend. This elected government focused on countering a limited
but persistent Cuban-backed insurgency that sought to undermine
Colombia's democratic system. The success of this government
enabled it to lift the state of siege that had been in effect for
most of the previous thirty years.
In the latest Colombian election held in 1990, almost 8.5
million eligible voters participated. Turnout reached 68% despite
repeated threats from subversive groups designed to keep voters
home. Now the government continues promoting social justice,
growth with equity, and amnesty for insurgents willing to return
to the established political system. The armed element of
Colombia's Communist party called the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia has signed a joint communique with the castroide Army
of National Liberation in which they ask that the guerrillas have
representation in the constituent assembly and call for immediate
peace negotiations.5
Colombia presently faces three threats against internal
order: subversion, drug-trafficking, and general delinquency.
The principal threat against the institutions and internal
order of Colombia comes from the violent actions of armed groups,
supported by the Communist Party and national and international
organizations of the extreme left. These groups intend to take
power by force of arms in order to change the present democratic
system to one of Marxist-Lenist persuasion. Every subversive
group has a political movement which acts openly and takes
advantage of the freedoms of this democratic country. They take
part in political events and elections. The most active of them
are "The Patriotic Union" (UP) for the Armed Revolutionary Forces
of Colombia (FARC), the "Popular Front" for the Popular Army of
Liberation (EPL), and the movement called "To Fight", which
represents the Army of National Liberation (ELN).
The subversives agree that there are four stages in the fight
to gain power:
Stage I. Destabilization of the State
Stage II. Weakening of the Armed Forces
Stage III. Generalized violence, insurrections, and popular
uprisings
Stage IV. Downfall of the government and the success of
the Revolution
Colombia presently finds itself in Stage I of this
framework. Firm steps have been taken by subversives in order to
reach the objectives of Stages II and III. They are currently
trying to weaken the military and foment violence, insurrection,
and uprisings in society.
In addition to the actions of armed subversive groups,
another undesirable development affecting public order at the
national level is narcotrafficking. The production of raw
materials, the processing and commercialization of drugs, and the
worldwide demand for marijuana and cocaine, particularly in the
United States, has made Colombia one of the leading countries in
illegal drug business.6 Marijuana has been relegated to second
place in demand. Cocaine production occupies 80% of the drug
market, bringing traffickers huge profits.7 Few incentives
exist to disaude people from this lucrative business.
General delinquency constitutes a very important threat to
internal security considering that its actions, day-by-day, are
becoming more serious to the country. Delinquency gravely attacks
security in both the countryside and the cities, is the result of
the high 23% unemployment rate. It is influenced as well by
groups of guerrillas, narcotraffickers, organized gangs of
murderers (sicarios), and anti-socials in general.
Colombians consider communist subversion the main threat for
the country because of communist long-range plans for the Latin
American region. At present, subversive groups with their
supplies of weapons total over 9,000 people. Additionally the
auto defenses militias, comprising of 9,000 more men, can be
mobilized at any moment for a total of approximately 18,000 men.
This was confirmed in October 1990.8
Sufficient evidence exists to establish a link between
narcotrafficking and subversion, as a result of operations against
narcotraffickers where laboratories with FARC security were
found. The narco-guerrilla link comprises moral, financial, and
operative aspects. The area of illegal activities of
narcotraffic-subversives compels the two to maintain united
interests. The narcotraffic-guerrilla alliance is a major cause
of worry for political authority and for other representative
sectors of the society as the two enemies unite to destabilize the
system. Political authorities are disturbed by this link.
Representatives and political leaders have fully identified
narcotrafficking and subversion as the real threat to the
Colombian democratic system.
Melvyn Levitsky, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics Matters (INM), recently stated before a
Congressional committee: "I want to be very frank in saying that
where the insurgency and drug traffickers are inextricably bound
together, we have to deal with them together....We have an
interest in helping them (Andean Ridge nations) fight that
insurgency."9 Reassuring words from a top U.S. official,
however the question remains whether or not such statements
reflect an intended approach to the problem as an integrated
counternarcotics (CN) and counterinsurgency (COIN) policy by the
U.S. government that will address the specific counteraction
requirements of Andean Ridge nations among others.
The following is a preliminary examination of how U.S. and
Colombian counterinsurgency and counternarcotics activities are
coordinated and executed. It reveals some dismaying inconsist-
encies. It further indicates that the U.S. government does not,
in fact, have a clearly defined and integrated CN/COIN policy.
The total budget in FY-90 for U.S. counternarcotics programs
exceeded $3.5 billion. In FY-91, the DOD budget alone for
surveillance, interdiction, and counterdrug support activities is
over $1 billion dollars. Worldwide security assistance programs
aimed at counterinsurgency and internal defense and development in
1991 add almost another $750 million. Such an impressive
allocation of assets would seem to suggest that U.S. foreign
policy objectives are being vigorously and effectively pursued in
coordination with friendly governments. Nothing could be further
from the truth.10
In the Andean Ridge nations of Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia,
for example, a recent Congressional study revealed that U.S.
narcotics control efforts have achieved minimal results over the
past year (1989).11 Eradication efforts have failed even to
reduce the overall increase in coca leaf production that was
expected. Corruption at all levels of the Colombian, Peruvian,
and Bolivian governments was effectively gutting counternarcotics
efforts. A myopic focus by U.S. officials on counternarcotics to
the near exclusion of counterinsurgency and internal development
programs in the Andean Ridge resulted in policy and procedural
schisms between U.S. governmental officials and host regimes.
Open disagreement between the Bush administration and newly
elected Colombian President, Cesar Gaviria, reflects Colombia's
general dissatisfaction with U.S. sensitivity to host nation
perceptions and priorities.
Not only is there disagreement on what priorities should be
jointly pursued by U.S. and host governments in CN and COIN
campaigns, but there is bickering, lack of coordination, and
political infighting among U.S. agencies. In Colombia, for
example, there is tension between the Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) and the Department of State over who will have access to
limited helicopters DEA wants priority for coca eradication
operations and U.S. military liaisons want priority for training
of Colombian police and military personnel. Fundamental
disagreements on whether to employ certain chemical sprays on coca
leaf growing areas have continued to hamper crop eradication
operations. Failure to agree on priorities with several narcotic
producing countries has been reflected in a general lack of host
government will to pursue CN activities, particularly in Peru and
Bolivia. U.S. efforts to enforce import control and limit
internal distribution of precursor chemicals necessary for cocaine
production have also been largely ineffective. One of the reasons
is lack of strategic analysis concerning chemical distribution
control. Many chemicals used in drug manufacturing such as
kerosene, ammonia, and sulfuric acid are also widely utilized in
various industrial applications. Strict control would cripple
some significant host country industries.
While efforts to reduce coca leaf cultivation and cocaine
production have been almost uniformly ineffective, inadequate
response to shifting patterns of cocaine shipment into the United
States offers still another picture of a poorly coordinated group
of U.S. agencies and departments. In this instance, a heavy
emphasis on Caribbean infiltration routes, both airborne and
maritime, has resulted in concentration of detection and
intelligence assets to the areas from Texas through the Bahamas.
Over 90 percent of E-3A AWACS missions, for example, are flown
east of Brownsville, Texas, with only an occasional mission over
the Mexican-U.S. border.12 This pattern of asset distribution
has continued, despite intelligence information for over a year
that narcotics traffickers have been steadily shifting their
infiltration operations from the Caribbean to the Pacific and
southwestern U.S. routes, largely through Mexico. The failure to
effectively manage our intelligence detection and interdiction
efforts is at least partially due to the large number of U.S.
agencies involved. In the California, Arizona, New Mexico, and
Texas areas, there are some 61 state and local law enforcement
agencies under the Project Alliance coordination umbrella. This
does not include the major federal players in the counternarcotics
interdiction campaign such as DEA, FBI, CIA, DIA, USCG, NSA, U.S.
Border Patrol, Customs, NORAD, the military services, and Joint
Task Forces.
While the array of U.S. agencies is impressive, their record
of cooperation and coordination is not. As early as 1981, a study
of Caribbean counternarcotics efforts involving U.S. and Caribbean
government agencies revealed there was a frequent failure to share
intelligence information with cognizant U.S. organizations. Much
of this was attributed at the time to bureaucratic competition.
For example, an agency might conveniently avoid passing
intelligence to another in order to give its own personnel a
chance of "making the bust," even though another agency might have
a much higher probability of intercepting the narcotics shipment.
This past summer, a senior official of Project Alliance admitted
that this practice is alive and well throughout U.S. counter-
narcotics agencies. His candid assessment was, "We are doing a
little better than we did in the past to coordinate our activities
and share information. Unfortunately, we are doing a whole lot
better at concealing our lack of coordination. I believe this is
due to increased competition for the counternarcotics pie."13
At the national level, the U.S. State Department has been
given the lead in both counternarcotics and counterinsurgency
efforts overseas. Despite this, scrutiny of almost any in-country
CN/COIN group of programs reveals continuing struggles within the
U.S. Ambassador's "Country Team." Personnel who have recently
been a part of in-country CN/COIN program management continue to
report that day-to-day operations resemble our dilemmas of the
early Vietnam era. Sadly, with no clearly defined policy
mandating our strategy and management, we continue to operate on a
case-by-case basis, with the strongest personalities driving
"preferred" U.S. programs over host government programs. In the
Andean Ridge area, this lack of U.S. national policy guidance has
resulted in a deaf ear to the priorities of host governments we
are attempting to assist.
Elements of a U.S. National Policy for Counternarcotics and
Counterinsurgency
To properly counter the problem I suggest that U.S. policy
must have the following enabling characteristics:
- It must be at the highest national level. Any
governmental level below the National Security Council (NSC) will
be unable to compel major U.S. agency players to get their houses
in order. Elements of the Department of Defense civilian staff,
for example, continue to compete for pieces of the Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict missions, which supply a
significant amount of the total DOD support to CN and COIN. An
NSC level policy would make it possible for the Secretary of
Defense to unambiguously direct integration of the programs of DOD
agencies, the military services, and the regional CINCS.
- The policy must establish overall national objectives
for both counterinsurgency and counternarcotics. These objectives
would then guide development of very specific regional and country
objectives, and enable the State Department to manage in-country
programs within a defined national policy framework.
- An effective national policy for COIN and CN must
establish reliable resource links to the U.S. budget process, and
should result in development of fiscally-constrained, realistic
plans and programs for policy implementation by U.S. agencies.
Within DOD, for example, Security Assistance Programs should
directly support the national CN/COIN policy and should implement
national strategy. Within the Department of State, economic
development programs and AID should provide a coordinated CN/COIN
influenced input to the annual budget request.
- An effective national CN/COIN policy must identify
changes to U.S. law and agency guidelines essential to effective,
lawful, policy implementation. Issues such as posse comitatus,
and preferential forgiveness of developmental and security
assistance loans must all be reviewed at the NSC level.
Legislative and policy change proposals should be assigned to
specific agencies for development and submission to the White
House and Congress.
It is the security policy of the U.S. government to attack
these problems concurrently overseas where they coexist, in full
cooperation with the governments of insurgent afflicted and drug
producing countries. A defined spectrum of tailored, mutually
agreed upon, bilateral, and multilateral programs will be
implemented and sustained that include developmental, security,
economic, and law enforcement assistance.
Goals:
During the period 1991-2010, implement and sustain a fully
integrated, National Security Council (NSC) monitored program of
assistance to cooperating governments that will neutralize or at
least measurably reduce the threats and effects of subversive
insurgencies and the illicit narcotics industry.
Objectives
1. The NSC should develop and implement an integrated,
interagency strategy for control and constant evaluation of U.S.
government CN and COIN programs to take effect immediately.
2. Regional focus, for planning purposes, will be
prioritized as follows:
a. South America
b. Caribbean Sea
c. Northern Southeast Asia (Golden Triangle)
d. Africa (selected countries)
e. Southwest Asia
3. Initial countries for strategy implementation program
assessment, and adaptation (assuming host government concurrence)
are:
a. Colombia
b. Peru
c. Burma
d. Nigeria
e. Pakistan
4. Initiate Foreign Internal Defense (FID) programs tailored
to host government and U.S. Country Team stated objectives and
requirements. These programs will act as the country level
umbrella for U.S. government department and agency efforts to
assist the host nation, under the guidance and control of the
respective Ambassadors, in close cooperation with the regional
U.S. military CINC. The measure of effectiveness, on a yearly
basis, will be the increased ability of the host government,
military and/or police to conduct sustained internal defense and
development activities.
5. Maintain the absolute minimum levels of U.S. military
presence necessary to train, advise and assist host nation
military and law enforcement counterparts in the sub-areas of
counterinsurgency. All supporting psychological operations and
civil affairs aspects will be fully coordinated and approved by
responsible host nation and U.S. Country Team officials, with U.S.
Information Service (USIS) guidance.
To be effective, a U.S. national policy must be seen by the
Administration, Congress, and the public as necessary. Its
objectives must be seen as achievable. This implies that the
problem must be perceived by policymakers and resource providers
as significant, important to resolve, and within the ability of
the U.S. government in cooperation with other international actors
to reduce or resolve. For CN, the evidence is compelling and the
public is sympathetic. For COIN, there is little U.S. public
constituency. Thus, the interconnectedness of the challenge, or
the exacerbation of the narcotics problems by insurgent involve-
ment, must be convincingly demonstrated. To date there has been
little progress in this regard.
Galvanizing U.S. national will, political resolve, and
pro-active attitudes requires that means and ends are defined,
related, and seen as lawful and rational. This is particularly
difficult if policy is stated too broadly and if resources are
unspecified. In the case of CN and COIN, there is some good news:
a lot can be done at low cost if activities are well focused at
the operating level in each host country. Let's start with
Colombia.
FOOTNOTES
1. Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz, Colombia A
Country Study (Washington, DC, 1988), pp. 37-39.
2. Richard L. Maullin, Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics
In Colombia (California, 1971), pp. 15-16.
3. Jesus Maria Henad and Geraldo Arrubla, History of
Colombia (Chapel Hill, 1938), p. 333.
4. Journal of Internamerican Studies and World Affairs, A
Publication for Advanced International Studies, The University of
Miami, Vol. 23, No. 2, May 1981, p. 132.
5. Colombia's Elections Lead to Deaths, Insight Magazine
(November 26, 1990), p. 37.
6. Bruce M. Bagley, "Colombia and the War on Drugs."
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Fall 1988), p. 84.
7. National Drug Control Strategy (Washington, DC, September
1989), pp. 1-6.
8. Brian Michael Jenkins, Colombia's Bold Gamble For Peace,
(February 1985), p. 6.
9. U.S. Aid to Fight Rebels, a New York Times Report,
reprinted in the Tampa Tribune (June 21, 1990), p. 3.
10. Conference Report 101-938, 101st Congress, 2d Session to
accompany H.R. 5803 (October 24, 2990), p. 123.
11. Stopping the Flood of Cocaine with Operation Snowcap: Is
It Working? H.R. 101-673, 101st Congress, 2d Session, August 14,
1990, pp. 1-5, pp. 12-13, p. 17.
12. Richard MacKenzie, "Borderline Victories on Drug War's
Front Line." Insight Magazine (14 January 1991), pp. 8-17.
13. Millan, Guillermo, LTC, Colombian Army, Personal
Interview, Ibague, Colombia, October 17, 1989.
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