The Keys To Successful Coalition Warfare: 1990 And Beyond
AUTHOR Major Willie J. Brown, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Security
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Keys To Successful Coalition Warfare:
1990 and Beyond
I. Theme: Coalition warfare has been practiced for
thousands of years. Sometimes the results were a complete
debacle, and other times the results were unequivocally
successful. Germane to both case was a coalesced force
acting in concert with all members to accomplish both their
individual and collective goals.
II. Thesis: Although coalition warfare was once looked upon
as the perfect recipe for sure failure by Napoleon, an
increasing world interdependence and collective abhorrence
for unprovoked aggression has made it the modern recipe for
success. But as with any recipe, a successful outcome
depends on the careful measure and mixture of key
ingredients. In coalition warfare, those tried and true
ingredients include command relationships, training and
tactics, combined operations, high technology weapons,
personnel and equipment strength, and cultural relationships.
III. Discussion: Coalition warfare has been a part of
American history since its inception. From the American
Revolution to our most recent involvement in Operation Desert
Storm, coalition warfare has made significant contributions
to the defense of America and her allies. The prerequisites
for successful coalition warfare, command relationships and
personnel and equipment strength and others, proved their
worth during numerous conflicts. However, history also shed
light on what happened when these key factors were not
followed.
IV. Summary: Although there were occasional setbacks during
America's involvement in coalition warfare, the concept stood
the test of time in proving its viability, resilience, and
flexibility. Coalition warfare is no longer just a mutual
arrangement of nations with common interests and values, it
is a coalescenceof nations that of necessity transcend
national core values and beliefs.
V. Conclusion: As nations continue to rely upon one another
more often for trade, technological research, and mutual
defense, the importance of establishing coalitions becomes
more critical with each passing day. Coalition member bodies
like the United Nations, as proven during Operation Desert
Storm, have the international respect, political clout, and
the experience to continue to forge ahead in shaping and
ensuring peace throughout the world.
THE KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL COALITION WARFARE:
1990 AND BEYOND
Thesis: Although coalition warfare was once looked upon as
the perfect recipe for sure failure by Napoleon, an increasing
world interdependence and collective abhorrence for unprovoked
aggression has made it the modern recipe for success. But as
with any recipe, a successful outcome depends on the careful
measure and mixture of key ingredients. In coalition warfare,
those tried and true ingredients include command relationships,
training and tactics, doctrine, combined operations, high technology
weapons, personnel and equipment strength, and cultural relationships.
I. Coalition Warfare Experience
A. World War I
B. World War II
C. Korean War
D. Vietnam
E. Operation Desert Storm
II. Military Keys to Victory
A. Command Relationships
B. Training and Tactics
C. Doctrine
D. Combined Operations
E. High Technology Weapons
F. Personnel and Equipment Strength
G. Cultural Relationships
III. Current Coalition Experience
A. Command and Control
B. Conflict Termination
C. Lessons Learned
D. Impact of the Future
THE KEYS TO SUCCESSFUL COALITION WARFARE:
1990 AND BEYOND
by W.J. Brown
Major CG #11
On 27 February 1991, President George Bush in a
nationally televised report to Congress and the nation made
the following statement: ". . .Ambassador Al Sabbah, I am happy
to announce that Iraqi aggression has been stopped, and
Kuwait is once again a free nation. . . ." To the joy of
Ambassador Al Sabbah and to the relief of America and the
other coalition members, this statement represented more than
a military victory. It represented the combined resolve of
several culturally diversified nations. This amalgamation of
nations came together to answer the call to thwart aggression
in Kuwait. In doing so, the viability of coalition forces
had been successful once again.
Coalition warfare has come a long way since the days of
Frederick the Great. Although coalition warfare was once
looked upon as the perfect recipe for sure failure by
Napoleon, an increasing world interdependence and collective
abhorrence for unprovoked aggression has made it the modern
recipe for success. But as with any recipe, a successful
outcome depends on careful measure and mixture of key
ingredients. In coalition warfare, those tried and true
ingredients include command relationships, training and
tactics, doctrine, combined operations, high technology
weapons, personnel and equipment strength, and cultural
relationships.
From World War I to Operation Desert Storm, America has
witnessed firsthand both the benefits and shortcomings of
coalition warfare. History tells us not only of the key
factors that contributed to success in the past, but it
suggests how and why coalition warfare is so vital to the
future defense of America and her allies.
America's involvement in World War I was viewed with
skepticism by some -- most notably Great Britain. America
reluctantly entered World War I after many years of
isolationism. Her military did not reflect the muscle needed
to challenge the might of Germany and her allies. Yet, she
found herself in the trenches fighting alongside Great
Britain, France, and Russia.
Despite her courage and valor, America was not
remembered as a mighty nation during World War I. General
George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in World
War II, said that running through all his thinking was a
burning desire, retained from World War I, to prove something
to the European commanders. He wanted to prove that the
American soldier was equal to any in the field. Generals
Marshall and Pershing and their World War I colleagues were
never quite sure that their British and French
comrades-in-arms sufficiently respected the American ability
to command. (14: 191) It was with this military backdrop
that America entered the early days of World War II.
Colonel Robert J. Berens, USA (retired), echoed similar
sentiments as a former member of the 34th Infantry Division,
a National Guard unit from Iowa, Minnesota, and the Dakotas
in World War II. He wrote:
While on a recent reading binge, I discovered that
several World War II books, both British and American,
were quite critical of American units that fought in the
Tunisian
campaign. (2: 24)
Despite repeated pleas from Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, President Roosevelt was very cautious about
America's involvement in World War II. Fortunately for Prime
Minister Churchill and perhaps the world, Japan's bombing of
Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and Germany's subsequent
declaration of war on the United States forced America into
the Allies' camp. Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, during
the bombing of Pearl Harbor said, "I fear we have awakened a
sleeping giant." It's debatable whether or not a sleeping
giant was awakened, but there is no doubt that herculean
commanders arose to meet the challenge of the Axis and Japan.
A group of deer led by a lion will always defeat a group
of lions led by a deer. There is much to be said of this wit
and even more of the Allied commanders in World War II.
General Eisenhower was but one of the titans of World War II;
however, in many ways he was perhaps the greatest asset the
Allies possessed.
As with most coalitions, each party has its own agenda
on how to fight the war, when to fight the war, and what
conflict termination will look like. World War II was no
exception. Despite unanimous agreement on a strategy which
called for beating Germany first, containing Japan until
Germany was defeated, and finally forcing Japan into
unconditional surrender, there was much heated debate on when
and how. (7: 27)
Notwithstanding the differences in opinion on how the war
should be run between Field Marshall Sir Bernard L.
Montgomery and General George S. Patton, General Eisenhower's
tact and diplomacy held the Allies together. There were
times when even the patience of General Eisenhower was
stretched, as evidenced by this quote appearing in David
Irving's, The War Between the Generals:
I am tired of dealing with a lot of prima donnas. By
God, you tell that bunch that if they can't get together
and stop quarreling like children, I will tell the Prime
Minister to get someone else to run this damn war. (9:
iii)
General Eisenhower's generalship and diplomacy not only
held the Allies' command structure together, but provided the
impetus necessary to take advantage of the personnel strength
and high technology that were available through this
alliance.
It became painfully clear that the Allies had their
hands full after Germany's blitzkrieg through the Ardennes
and into France in the spring of 1940. Germany's invasion of
Prussia followed a year later, and by December 1941 Britain
and Russia were fighting with their backs to the wall. They
were joined by the United States, but its only ready arm
--the Navy--had been reduced to smoking wreckage at Pearl
Harbor. However, Britain and the United States immediately
formed an interlocking directorate, pooled their resources,
and placed all that they could spare at the disposal of the
embattled Russians. At once they began to concert plans for
a worldwide offensive on the assumption that they could
utterly defeat both the Axis and Japan. (7: 10) The
foresight and thoroughness with which the Allies planned,
developed and applied their resources, economic and military,
was fundamental to the accomplishment later achieved by the
Allies.
In April 1942 a proposal -- at the urging of a desperate
Soviet Union -- was made to immediately begin an Allied
build-up of strength in England to launch a cross-Channel
attack in the spring of 1943 (ROUNDUP). This attack did not
occur as envisioned by the Allies in 1943 because of tactical
considerations and a lack of the required men and landing
craft. While attacking up the Italian peninsula as a sop to
Stalin, Allies continued to amass personnel and shipping in
England. The now famous Normandy landing occurred on 6 June
1944, a testimony to the resolve of the Allies to combine
their forces in an all-out effort to achieve a decisive
victory at Normandy.
The victory at Normandy was the result of brilliant
planning and execution. All the while preparations were
being made, Allied air power had been shaping the
battlefield. Strategic bombing and the Allied success
against the Luftwaffe were taking a heavy toll. Although air
campaigns did not win the war, the advent of improved
aircraft, munitions, and tactics were instrumental in wearing
away both the Luftwaffe and the enemy's will to resist.
Nevertheless, the Axis power continued to resist the ever
pressing Allied combined operations.
There were many factors that significantly contributed
to the Allies victory over the Axis powers, but in the final
analysis it was the men and women, the resources, the
technology, and the combined efforts of the Allies that
exacted victory out of armed conflict. General Walter B.
Smith encapsulated this idea as follows:
It is tribute to the bravery of our fighting men and
the skill of their tactical leaders that the Allied
forces never suffered a real military defeat during the
entire course of the European campaign. But it is also
a monument to the efficiency of our services of supply
and particularly to the superiority of our Air Force in
destroying its opposition and disrupting the supply
system of the enemy. (6: 29)
As befitting the man, General Eisenhower at the close of
the war in Europe wrote, in massive understatement, "The
mission of this Allied force was fulfilled at 0241 local
time, May 7, 1945." (6: 229)
World War II finally ended when the "sleeping giant"
awakened the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with
the world's first use of the atomic bomb. Victory came at a
very high price, but the dividends gained through coalition
warfare were an investment for the future of alliances.
The future was not long in coming. The very same Allied
forces that worked side-by-side to defeat the Axis and Japan
also were called upon in 1950 to liberate Korea. The seeds
of the Korean war had been planted in the aftermath of World
War II.
On 15 August 1945 the Japanese surrendered to the
Allies. The Cairo Declaration of December 1943, issued by
the British and U.S. leaders and Chiang Kai-shek of China,
had stated that "in due course Korea shall become free and
independent." The Russians accepted the Cairo agreement,
but proposals made by the United States in 1945 led to the
division of Korea into two military zones: the area south of
the 38th parallel to be under U.S. occupation and the northern
area to be under Soviet control.
U.S. Forces were withdrawn from South Korea in June
1949, leaving only a small military mission. South Korea's
forces were far weaker than the North's forces at the time.
After tension and rivalry between the North and the South
grew more menacing, a North Korean force of over 60,000
troops, supported by Soviet-built tanks, crossed the 38th
parallel and invaded the South on 25 June 1950. U.S. Forces
arrived on 30 June after a United Nations request. Once
again the call for help coalesced under one body.
The United Nations (UN) mounted a collective defensive
action in support of South Korea. Armed forces from 16 UN
member states, attached to a unified commander under the U.S.
Army, were sent to help repel the invasion. As with World
War II, it was unity of command, tenacity, air power, and
aggregate manpower that eventually turned the tide of battle
against the North Korean invaders. Recognizing the
importance of coalition warfare and the significance of sheer
numbers of fighting men, the People's Republic of China sent
200,000 troops to assist North Korea. The Chinese advanced
into South Korea but were
driven back by a UN counterattack in April 1951.
Thanks to strong UN Forces committed to keeping South
Korea free, peace negotiations began in July 1951. However,
hostilities continued until an armistice agreement finally
was made on 27 July 1953. The narrow demilitarized zone
(DMZ) that separates the two frontiers still is protected by
the resolve of a wide coalition of forces dedicated to one
another and the cause of peace. (12: 532)
Somewhat like Korea, the State of Vietnam had been
divided after the French left in the 1950's. The State of
Vietnam, originally within the French Union, made an
agreement with France in June 1954, after which French forces
withdrew. South Vietnam's jurisdiction was limited to the
zone south of 17 degrees N. Complete sovereignty was
transferred by France in December 1954.
For approximately 20 years after the Geneva agreements,
the area south of the 17th parallel remained a separate state
with an anti-communist administration supported by the U.S..
Gradually, South Vietnam moved out of the French ambit and
into the U.S. sphere of influence. South Vietnam also
developed much closer relations with other U.S. -aligned
states: the Philippines, Thailand and the Republic of Korea.
Although a coalition force, as in wars past, was
committed to defend South Vietnam, it lacked some of the key
military traits necessary for victory. The most glaring
element mishandled in the Vietnam War was personnel
strength. It alone did not cast the die for military defeat,
but its lack of proper application was quite costly. The
number of U.S. forces in Vietnam increased from 23,000 at the
beginning of 1965 to more than 500,000 by March 1968. In
addition, contingents were sent from the Republic of Korea,
Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. Although the number
of personnel were substantially high at the end of the war,
the U.S. and its Allies had sent in forces piecemeal;
therefore, the awesome power of this coalition was never
realized. Its dynamic lethality was never unleashed, and so
the war continued to take a predictable course.
The war took a turn for the worse in January-February
1968, when the communists launched an offensive to coincide
with the lunar New Year (known as Tet). The Tet offensive,
although only a partial success, forced the U.S. to
reconsider her policy of "defending South Vietnam at all
costs." President Johnson decided against a further
expansion of the war and rejected the request of General
William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. Military
Assistance Command, for an additional 200,000 men.
A gradual U.S. withdrawal ensued under the guise of a
new U.S. policy, `Vietnamization'. The end of the Vietnam
War was the predictable outcome of the erosion of coalition
forces that had started with the enemy's TET offensive.
Although air power and high technology weapons did not
turn the tide of battle in Vietnam, the combined use of
strategic bombing with conventional and guided munitions was
quite effective when the principle of concentration of power
was repeatedly and systematically applied. However, victory
was not lost because one principle of war was violated;
rather, it was lost because many principles of war were
violated.
In the end, the Paris Agreement provided for the
complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam, together
with the return of U.S. prisoners of war, by the end of March
1973. For the U.S. the war was over. We had suffered 45,941
combat deaths and over 10,000 deaths from other causes in
Vietnam, as well as 150,000 wounded. The statistics,
unfortunately, did not show the toll on the pride of a great,
powerful nation who boasted not only her own strength but the
strength of her allies. (15: 1088-89) What was to become of
this world power and her ideas of coalition warfare in the
face of such a humiliating defeat?
It is said that time heals all things, but the bitter
wounds plagued the U.S. military like a Ieper. Confidence in
the military eroded. The U.S. no longer stood as the symbol
for deterrence and retribution. Although there were a few
successful campaigns/operations -- Urgent Fury, Just Cause
-- confidence in America's military was at low ebb.
Thus, when America agreed to help her ally and friend
Saudi Arabia when threatened by Iraq following an unprovoked
Iraqi blitzkrieg into Kuwait, many doubted her ability to
accomplish the mission. Unbeknownst to the public at large
was a U.S. military reborn.
A somewhat unusual advertisement in a March 18, 1991
edition of U.S. News and World Report read as follows:
Thanks America and the Global Family of Nations. The
people of Kuwait are appreciative for the swift response
from the United States Forces and the United Nations
Coalition to reinstate the independence of the country
and sovereignty of Kuwait. . . Our unwavering gratitude
to the people of America who were willing to make the
ultimate sacrifice in the defense of the peaceful people
of Kuwait. From Desert Storm. . .to Desert Peace. Thank
you. (10: 71)
The transition from the debacle in Vietnam to the devastation
of Iraq's army resulted from many lessons learned and
relearned. Among those relearned was the importance of
coalition warfare, the gathering of all nations with similar
interests and values to subdue an aggressive dictator.
As in World War II, the importance of a good commander
and command relationship was paramount to the United Nations'
forces arrayed on the battlefield against a well fortified
Iraqi army on the desert floor of Kuwait. This time the
general was General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief
of the U.S. Central Command. General Schwarzkopf, and
everyone around him, accepted that this would be a combined
operation in every sense of the word.
On August 2, 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait,
Schwarzkopf's command existed largely on paper and in the
minds of several hundred staff people. That paper force
turned into the command of more than 500,000 American troops
and co-command of an additional 200,000 allied forces poised
on the Saudi-Kuwati border awaiting the order to attack.
Schwarzkopf and his staff brought this force together in the
desert, and planned and coordinated the mission of a polyglot
multinational force.
This was the largest American led military coalition
since Vietnam. Perhaps this was the first time America had a
larger- than-life general to lead troops since General
Eisenhower. In an interview with U.S. News and World Report,
General Schwarzkopf revealed himself as follows:
I really think of myself as a soldier who tries to do
his duty with honor, serving his country. Contrary to
what has been said about me, I have never had any illusions
of grandeur, of leading huge armies into battle, and I will
confess that sometimes the awesome responsibility that is
placed on my shoulders flat scares me to death...I love my
country, I love my troops, and I dearly love my family. ...
(6: 32-34)
The significance of good generalship is a key to
success. Sun Tzu wrote:
The expert commander strikes only when the situation
assures victory. To create such a situation is the
ultimate responsibility of generalship. Before he gives
battle the superior general causes the enemy to disperse.
When the enemy disperses and attempts to defend everywhere
he is weak everywhere, and at the selected points many
will be able to strike a few. (8: 39-42)
General Schwarzkopf's orchestration of Operation Desert Storm
demonstrated the results of painstaking preparation and
accommodation. He built up his forces, applied the
principles of war, made use of air power, employed high
technology weapons judicially, and combined the capabilities
of each coalition partner efficiently and effectively. He
also respected core values of the varied cultures involved.
The efficiency and effectiveness of Operation Desert
Storm yielded some new "lessons learned." Although the air
war lasted just 1000 hours and the ground war a paltry 100,
it will be weeks before all the after-action reports,
bomb-damage assessments and prisoner-of-war debriefings can
be examined in a systematic, objective fashion.
Nevertheless, some lessons have surfaced in what must be
regarded as a rapid, total and remarkably low-cost allied
victory.
Critical ingredients to this allied victory were addressed
by General Michael Dugan, retired former Chief of
Staff, U.S. Air Force, in a recent article in U.S. News and
World Report. He stated that the first lesson of the gulf
was about personnel and leadership. General Dugan further
commented:
The quality of the people involved - their performance
under fire, their self-discipline and their victory -
reveal the payoff and the value of America's all-volunteer
force. From the dustiest marine to the commander in chief,
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the Americans in the
gulf been impressive. (5: 32-36)
General Dugan also applauded the training, technology, and
doctrine of the coalition forces. Although all the factors
mentioned contributed significantly to the success of
Operation Desert Storm, much of the success resulted from the
unity and resolve of the coalition.
The forces that united against Iraqi aggression had one
thing in common -- the expulsion of Iraqi forces from
Kuwait. They had several things that were diametrical
opposites: religion, dietary habits, cultural beliefs, etc.
Yet in the face of a common antagonist, they set aside their
differences and united their resources and energies toward
liberating Kuwait and thwarting aggression.
Realizing the fragile nature of our coalition, Saddam
Hussein attempted to bring Israel into the war in order to
fracture the united front. He introduced the Palestine
Liberation Organization issue of a homeland into the equation
in hopes of creating a rift. He declared the war with the
"infidels" a holy war. He did everything possible to strain
the relationship of the coalition forces amassed against
him. However, fellow Arabs preferred fratricide to
unprovoked homicide. (11: 44-46)
In the final analysis, cultural differences yielded to
common good. Sun Tzu believed that moral strength and
intellectual faculty of man were decisive in war, and that if
these were properly applied war could be waged with certain
success. He also believed the master conqueror frustrated
his enemy's plans and broke up his alliances. (8: 39-42) The
coalition forces of Operation Desert Storm proved that the
master conqueror can be an alliance.
The American Revolution, the Civil War, World Wars I and
II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Operation Desert
Storm all have a common thread among them - coalition
warfare. America is facing and will continue to face
budgetary constraints that will force reductions in military
spending, personnel strength, and technological research and
development. Nevertheless, the requirements to maintain a
viable force in readiness will continue to grow as America
approaches the year 2000.
Growing international interdependency, third world
developments, arms proliferation, and numerous other
variables will require America to be vigilant and
responsive. Can we respond in the face of so many
challenges? We can. However, we can only do this in concert
with our allies.
National unity was deemed by Sun Tzu to be an essential
requirement for victory. That is still true today. Notwith-
standing, coalition unity will of necessity be deemed
a requirement for victory in the future. A verse from Isiah
2:41 is inscribed on the United Nations building which reads
as follows:
And he shall judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many
people; and they shall beat their swords into plowshares,
and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift
up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any
more.
Perhaps the ultimate coalition will be the United Nations.
Although it has sputtered and faltered since it inception in
1945, it has shown a resilience and stamina that enabled it
to survive. The UN played a major role in Desert Storm and
will assume an even larger role in the post-war period.
Although the U.S. is riding high after its Desert Storm
success, a formidable challenge awaits her as she adjusts to
the ultimate coalition -- the UN.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Auster, Bruce B., and Richard Z. Chesnoff. "Thunder Over
Hussein's Head." U.S. News and World Report, 14 January 1991,
pp. 24-28.
2. Berens, Robert J., Col, USA (Ret). "34TH Infantry Division
During World War II." National Guard, September 1988, 24-28.
3. Budiansky, Stephen, and Bruce Auster. "A Force Reborn."
U.S. News and World Report, 18 March 1991, pp. 30-32.
4. Budiansky, Stephen, and Bruce Auster. "Air Power's Ultimate
Test." U.S. News and World Report, 28 January 1991, p. 32.
5. Dugan, Michael, Gen, USAF (Ret). "First Lessons of Victory."
U.S. News and World Report, 18 March 1991, pp. 32-36.
6. Galloway, Joseph, and Bruce Auster. "The Bear." U.S. News
and World Report, 11 February 1991, pp. 32-34.
7. Greenfield, Kent Roberts. American Strategy in WW II.
Florida: Robert E. Krieger, 1982.
8. Griffith, Samuel B. Sun Tzu The Art of War. Tr. Samuel B.
Griffith. London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.
9. Irving, David. The War Between the Generals. New York:
Congdon & Latte's, Inc., 1981.
10. Kuwait. "Thanks from Kuwait." U.S. News and World Report,
18 March 1991, p. 71.
11. Lief, Louise. "A Challenge to Unity." U.S. News and World
Report, 22 October 1990, pp. 44-46.
12. "The Korean War, 1950-53," The Far East and Australasia
(1991, 532.
13. Pasternak, Douglas. "Technology's Other Payoff." U.S. News
and World Report, 11 February 1991, p. 27.
14. Pogue, Forrest C. George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory.
New York: The Viking Press, 1973.
15. "South Vietnam and the War," The Far East and Australasia
(1991), 1088-1089.
16. Smith, Walter Bedell, Gen, USA (Ret). Eisenhower's Six Great
Decisions. Toronto, London, New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.,
1956.
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