Military Force Restructure For The Future
AUTHOR Major Wayne E. Briggs, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
MILITARY FORCE RESTRUCTURE FOR THE FUTURE
As the final page is turned on the 20th century, America
must guard against falling into the historical cycle of
demobilizing its military forces after conflict termination that
it has followed since the Revolutionary War. With the crumbling
of the Warsaw Pact, many Americans consider the Cold War with the
Soviet Union of the past 40 years has come to an end. They
mistakenly believe, as our predecessors did, that America can
dismantle its military structure and divert that portion of the
Gross National Product (GNP) to other governmental projects,
reaping the peace dividend. This would be a grave mistake. A
strong America provides a stabilizing influence in the inter-
national community.
The socioeconomic pressures, coupled with a spiralling
national debt, have caused defense planners to cut manpower in
the military as a means of relieving fiscal burdens. Current
plans will reduce the military by 25% with a total Department of
Defense funding of less than 4% of the GNP by 1995.
Restructuring the Department of Defense will provide a
comparable budgetary bonus while retaining a credible manpower
structure. This structure would consist of a dual military
service arrangement, an expanded Marine Corps and the Navy
administered directly under the Department of Defense.
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: America can maintain her military strength
while reducing the Defense Budget simply by restructuring the
Department of Defense.
I. Past National Security Policies
A. Isolationist
B. Nuclear Retaliation
1. Atomic Monopoly
2. Korean Invasion
II. Present Peacetime Defense Policy
A. Cost
B. Threat
1. Bipolar
2. Multi-polar
III. The National Security Act of 1947
IV. Future Defense Strategy
A. End of the Cold War
B. Budget Deficit
C. Manpower Reductions
1. Forward Deployment
2. Multi-polar Threat
V. An Alternate Defense Strategy
A. Departmental Reorganization
B. Dual Military Service Concept
MAJ Wayne E. Briggs
C. G. #4
MILITARY FORCE RESTRUCTURE FOR THE FUTURE
As the Cold War essentially draws to a close, America must
responsibly plan for the future organization of its military. A
military capable of handling contingencies in a multi-lateral
international threat environment must be provided. Manpower cuts
designed to relieve fiscal pressure must be done with common
sense or we will doom ourselves to repeating the costly errors of
the past. The past pitfalls can be avoided by restructuring the
Defense Department into a two service organization (a combined
arms service and the Navy) and eliminating the current service
secretary administrative level. America can maintain her
military strength while reducing the Defense budget simply by
restructuring the Department of Defense.
Throughout America's history the Armed Forces have been
allowed to deteriorate to impotence after the termination of major
conflicts. "After the end of the Revolution in 1783, both the
Continental Navy and Marines waned into temporary nonentity under
the Confederation's unified "Department of War"." (9/114) As we
move through history toward more modern times, we see military
forces reduced to postwar lows after the war with Mexico, the
Civil War and most dramatically after World War II. Because of
public euphoria, politics and parochial in-fighting between the
services, together with competition for a limited share of the
Federal Budget, we have witnessed this cyclic military
degeneration phenomena with almost pinpoint predictability.
In our recent past, we have seen America's military power
reduced "under a skeletonized system that omitted up to one-third
of a division's maneuver elements and much of its firepower." (6/3)
Because National Security Policy was oriented toward the concept
of global war originating in Europe, "the United States
government was totally unprepared for the disaster befalling the
Republic of Korea." (6/5) This policy orientation based on the
single global war contingency together with "the complacent
national mood, budget restrictions, and low enlistment rates had
combined to lower Army strength ... to ... barely one-tenth of the
World War II total." (6/3)
"It is somewhat ironic that for the first 170 years of its
existance the United States had no real military policy or
strategy." (7/14) Although America had national interests, they
rarely translated into a defense policy. Because of its
isolationist policy, the government did not recognize the need for
a peacetime defense policy, therefore large standing armies were
not maintained. If the U. S. was required to fight a war, it
would build a military force capable of achieving victory. The
need for a large peacetime army along with a peacetime defense
strategy became clear as the United States was thrust into,
"the age of the superpowers," (5/83) at he end of the Second World
War displacing the British empire as the dominant global power.
"The production of the atomic bomb - which appeared to
render both sea power and land power irrelevant," (5/82) lead the
U. S. to depend on nuclear retaliation as the key to national
defense strategy. "As a result of this defense policy, the
American Navy and Army were not revitalized even during the
darkest days of the Cold War in the late 1940s."(7/21) It was
recognized to some extent that conventional forces would be
needed to defend Western Europe with the establishment of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.
The flaw in the massive retaliation strategy of the Truman
era became evident when it was discovered that the Soviets
detonated an atomic weapon of their own, thereby breaking
America's atomic monopoly. Additionally, the invasion of South
Korea, for which the United States government was completely
unprepared, demonstrated a clear need for a strong standing
conventional force. The lesson that should be taken away from the
Korean experience is "the need for a balanced defense policy with
strong nuclear and strong conventional forces." (7/24) These
forces will be necessary to insure American interests and national
policy are achieved. American defense policy has evolved from
George Washington's policy of avoiding foreign entanglements to a
present day bilateral/coalition regional defense policy designed
to protect American national interests worldwide.
Can America continue to afford the cost of its current
peacetime defensive strategy? As the cost of peacetime defense,
become more prohibitive, Americans are questioning whether the
expense has become too high especially in light of the many
internal social programs competing with the defense budget for
fewer and fewer tax dollars. In the future the costs will likely
go up as the U. S. updates its arsenal with new and more
technically sophisticated hardware. Americans must decide what
national interests and foreign commitments are vital to the
country's survival. A sound investment in a continued peacetime
defensive strategy and a restructured, streamlined defense
establishment will insure America will not have to pay greater
costs in blood and treasure in the future.
With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union
turning inward to solve its growing social and economic problems,
the threat of a global conflict starting on the plains of Europe
have greatly diminished. As the international environment
fragments from a bipolar into a multi-polar arena, America must
maintain its military strength and enhance its capability to
defend national interests and allies throughout the world. Some
cost savings for this new strategic focus can be realized by
finding suitable alternatives for some of the high technology
aircraft and weapons systems or by combining multiple missions
into a single piece of hardware. "Substantial savings could,
however, be made by reducing manpower costs." (7/220)
Congress' desire to streamline the military establishment by
transferring and consolidating functions of the executive
department and unifying the military departments under a single
cabinet level secretary was achieved after WW II when the National
Security Act of 1947 was passed. "The National Security Act (NSA)
of 1947 was the first definitive legislative statement "to provide
for the effective strategic direction of the armed forces. . ."."
(4/2-14) The integration of the armed forces under unified
control would allow for greater efficiency in the use of the
nations military resources,
"The National Security Act of 1947, which unified the Armed
Services, is the controlling legislation of this country's
(military)." (9/73) As such the NSA as ammended by public laws
432 (80th Congress) and 416 (82nd Congress, 2nd Session) and "The
Function Papers" (originally known as "the Key West Agreement")
clearly established the Marine Corps as the only truely combined
arms force within the Department of Defense. The National
Security Act as ammended requires the Marine Corps to organize
based on a tri-division, tri-wing concept. Additionally, the
Corps will train as a combined arms force with the supporting air
components. This concept was successfully tested and proven to
be sound during the Korean Conflict.
"It is not possible to predict the future shape and
direction of Soviet policy, there are changes that can be
identified, some with positive benefits and some with unknown
consequinces."(12/101) The Soviet Union is the only nation on
earth that has the capability to destroy the United States and
its allies. The continued modernization of the Soviet nuclear
arsenal combined with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and
the social turmoil within the USSR poses a profound challenge to
maintaining international security in the future. We must
maintain a modern, flexible military force capable of responding
to unexpected crises throughout the world. "Unilateral . . .
disarmament, would remove our flexibility, weaken global
deterrence and heighten global instability." (12/102)
"Key prerequisites to our (future) success are the
maintenance of our economic vitality and the sustainment of our
strong ... military forces,"(3/A-6) Soviet/Warsaw Pact
instability and our future economic interests demand we continue
our strategy of forward deployment. We must maintain a strong
security posture to insure attainment of national goals,
especially inlight of current efforts to cut the national budget
and control the national deficit.
The lessons of the past must remain clear or we will repeat
the costly mistakes of the past. Forty-three years ago Secretary
of Defense James Forrestal discussed America's sudden
demobilization after World War II and the requirement of a strong
defense in maintaining peace.
"We scrapped our war machine, mightiest in the history
of the world, in a manifestation of confidence that we
should not need it any longer. Our quick and complete
demobilization was a testimonial to our good will
rather than to our common sense. International
fractions which constitute a threat to our national
security and to the peace of the world have since
compelled us to strengthen our armed forces for
self-protection." (11/x)
America must not allow this cycle to repeat itself as it has in
the past.
With the approach of the 21st century and the end of the
Cold War brought about by the failure of communism, "the
challenges we face are fiscal, as well as military." (1)
Considering the budget constraints of the future, the defense
department's strategic planners calculate that America's security
needs can be met with a force structure 25% smaller than today's
funded with less than 4% of the gross national product (GNP) by
1995. These calculations are based on the assumption that a
massive attack on Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact is unlikely
and a "new strategy (that) focuses . . . on major regional threats
that could harm U. S. interests." (1)
When completed in 1995, the force reduction will leave
"American Armed Forces . . . at their lowest level since 1950," (1)
the year the Korean War started. The new defense strategy plans
for the likelyhood of a greater number of contingencies in regions
outside the European theater; therefore, "we will need forces that
give us global reach." (1) These forces must be ready to rapidly
respond to crises throughout the world because of the reduction
of forward deployed troops.
The reorganization and restructure of America's armed forces
based on a multi-polar international threat and internal socio-
economic considerations must avoid reducing the military to a
mere garrison force. Clausewitz warns, "The more restricted the
strength, the more restricted its goals must be; further, the
more restricted the strength, the more limited the duration."
(2/283) A strong America will insure a stable world.
Conversely, a weak America may send a signal starting a chain of
events leading to another Korean style conflict.
A strong military with the capability to secure American
national policy objectives over the entire spectrum of war, from
low intensity conflict to total war, must be maintained. If it
becomes necessary to obtain a political, economic goal with force
in the future, the military must have the capability to respond
with the proper amount of force necessary to secure the
objective. This response will require a combined effort using
air, land and sea assets.
The military force structure for America's future must be
mobile and flexible. It must be appropriately balanced, trained
and equipped to provide a strategic as well as a conventional
deterrance posture. Keeping in mind the fiscal challenges of the
remainder of this decade, defense planners would be able to
attain a substantial budgetary reduction, without sacrificing
military power through extensive manpower cutbacks, simply by
restructuring the current military establishment. The new
organization would be based on a dual service system made up of
an expanded Marine Corps and the Navy. The Navy will continue
in its traditional roles of protecting American shores, global
power projection and nuclear deterrence. The Marine Corps, being
the only true combined armes service, would absorb the Army's
ground and aviation components as well as the Air Force's
aviation assets. The basic administrative divison/wing structure
would remain in place; however, it would be greatly expanded.
The dual service organization retains a greater number of
warfighters while reducing the overall administrative structure
by desolving the offices of the Secretarys of the Army, the Navy
and the Air Force. With this administrative layer removed, the
combined arms force and the Navy would be administered directly by
the Secretary of Defense. The Department of Defense would
function similar to the present Department of the Navy.
Not only would this reorganization streamline command and
control of deployed military forces, but it would also provide
America with substantial financial benefits. These benefits
would be realized through the consolidation of logistics and
supply into a single centrally controlled combat service support
organization.
In summary, the skeletionization of America's military
strength must be avoided to prevent a repeating of the errors of
past peacetime defense strategies, best exemplified by the Korean
conflict. The global community, particularly our allies, see a
strong America as a stabilizing influence within the many
regional global subdivisions. With a shift of international
politics, from a bipolar to a multi-polar environment, caused by
the failure of communism, U. S. forces will be called upon to
exercise contingencies outside the European theater. These
forces must be flexible, and capable of rapid deployment to
anywhere in the world. The volume of our international
commitments will not change substantially. Therefore, a military
manpower reduction to ease fiscal pressures would not be prudent.
America can maintain its military capability as well as reduce
budgetary pressure by reorganizing the Department of Defense
under the dual service concept, a combined arms force (the Marine
Corps) and the Navy.
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