Too Many General Officers?
AUTHOR Major Stephen W. Baird, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TITLE: TOO MANY GENREAL OFFICERS?
I. Thesis: In light of the future reduction of G/FOs, the
Marine Corps will have to continue to operate with a deficit
of general officers when compared to overall requirements.
The challenge for the Commandant of the Marine Corps will be
to balance his internal general officer requirements with
the requirement to adequately represent the Marine Corps in
the joint arena so as to ensure that the Marine Corps
remains the force of choice.
II. Problem: The present reduction of generals/flag
officers (G/FOs) imposed by Congress will negatively impact
on the Commandant's ability to adequately staff both his
internal and external general officer requirements. A
shortage of Marine general officers in the joint arena could
result in less operational exposure for the Marine Corps
with the combatant commanders. This could have a direct
effect on the future of the Marine Corps.
III. Supporting Points: Competing with the Commandant's
flexibility in the assignment of his general officers is the
fact that general officers are becoming a scarce resource.
As a result of the the 1991 Defense Authorization Act, the
Marine Corps will lose nine general officers.
If we do not have general officer representation across the
joint arena to advise the combatant commanders of the
utility of Marine forces, then the Marine Corps will not be
included in the CINC's force list. If we are not included in
the combatant commanders' force list then we will not
participate in future operations.
An indication of how the shortage of general officers
impacts on Marine Corps operational capabilities can be
drawn from our experience in Desert Shield/Storm. In order
to effectively conduct operations in the joint and combined
operation in Southwest Asia, the Marine Corps temporarily
assigned ten general officers to support both internal and
external requirements.
IV. Conclusion: The Commandant of the Marine Corps will
have to carefully balance his internal general officer
requirements with the requirement to adequately represent
the Marine Corps in the joint arena.
TOO MANY GENERAL OFFICERS?
OUTLINE
Thesis Statement: In light of the future reduction
of G/FOs, the Marine Corps will have to continue to
operate with a deficit of general officers when
compared to overall requirements. The challenge for
the Commandant of the Marine Corps will be to balance
his internal general officer requirements with the
requirement to adequately represent the Marine Corps
in the joint arena so as to ensure that the Marine
Corps remains the force of choice.
I. General officer (G.O.) reduction issues
A. Impact on the Marine Corps
B. Qualifications to address G.O. issues
C. G.O. assignment options
D. Present USMC G.O. authorizations
II. How G.O. authorizations are determined
A. Title 10, United States Code Annotated
B. Historical perspective on authorizations
III. DoD response to reduction of G.O.
A. Hay Group Study
B. Testimony by ASD for FM&P
IV. Present reduction plan for general/flag officers
A. Secretary of Defense plan
B. Senate Armed Service Committee response
C. 1991 Defense Authorization Act
V. Future challenges for the Commandant
A. General officers in joint billets
B. G.O.s and Desert Shield/Storm
C. General officer assignment challenge
TOO MANY GENERAL OFFICERS?
by Major S. W. Baird CG#11
One of the many challenges the Commandant of the
Marine Corps will face in the future will be the
assignment of his general officers. This challenge may
seem minor when compared to the one he faces in
structuring the Marine Corps to meet our security needs
for the next century. However, his decisions regarding
the assignment of his general officers will have a direct
impact on the future of the Marine Corps. If you accept
the premise that future military operations will be a
joint effort; similar to Grenada, Panama, and Southwest
Asia, then you would also agree that the Marine Corps must
have general officer representation in the joint arena.
Presently, the Marine Corps has a shortage of general
officers when compared against total requirements. This
shortage negatively impacts on the Commandant's ability to
adequately represent the Marine Corps in the joint arena.
A congressionally imposed reduction of generals/flag
officers (G/FOs) will further limit the Commandant's
ability to staff both internal and joint general officer
billets.
I want to highlight this problem of a shortage of
general officers by addressing how general officer
authorizations are made, how recent legislation has
affected general officer authorizations, how the
Department of Defense has reacted to general officer
reductions, how the shortage of general officers was
addressed with respect to staffing for Desert
Shield/Storm, and how this problem of poses a future
challenge for the Commandant.
In light of the future reduction of G/FOs, the Marine
Corps will have to continue to operate with a deficit of
general officers when compared to overall requirements.
The challenge for the Commandant of the Marine Corps will
be to balance his internal general officer requirements
with the requirement to adequately represent the Marine
Corps in the joint arena so as to ensure that the Marine
Corps remains the force of choice.
You may be asking yourself what qualifies a Marine
major to write about general officers issues. During my
last tour I served for one year as the General Officer
Matters Officer at Headquarters, United States Marine
Corps (HQMC). In this position I worked directly for the
general officer who heads the Personnel Management
Division at HQMC. My duties involved the administrative
processing of all requirements pertaining to general
officer assignments to include: slating, orders,
nominations for joint positions, etc.. Having served in
this position certainly does not make me the expert on all
general officer matters; however, the tour did provide me
with an insight into issues which few officers have had
the opportunity to be exposed to.
There is one thing I would like to emphasis, I held
the position of the General Officers Matters Officer, but
the true General Officers Matters Officer is the
Commandant of the Marine Corps. He, contingent upon
approval by the Secretary of the Navy, made all assignment
decisions concerning his general officers.
The Commandant has two options of assignment for his
general officers, he can either assign them to internal
positions or external (joint) positions. Competing with
the Commandant's flexibility in the assignment of his
general officers is the fact that general officers are
becoming a scarce resource. Congressional committees are
challenging the Department of Defense (DoD) to demonstrate
why the services require so many G/FOs. As a result of
the the 1991 Defense Authorization Act, G/FOs will be
reduced from the current ceiling of 1,073 to 858.(3) As
part of this reduction the Marine Corps will lose nine
general officers.(1)
Today the Marine Corps is authorized 70 promoted.
general officers and nine frocked brigadier generals to
meet both internal and joint requirements. Per Title 10,
United States Code Annotated,(USCA), Section 525, the
grade breakdown of the 70 general officers is as follows:
Grade # Authorized
general 2
lieutenant general 8
major general 25
brigadier general 35
The Marine Corps presently has 82 internal general
officer positions and presently staffs 15 billets in
the Joint arena for a total requirement of 97 general
officers.(1) This leaves the Marine Corps with a
shortage of 18 general officers when compared to
internal requirements.
In order to understand how the reduction of
general officers impacts on the Marine Corps I feel it
is necessary to provide you with an appreciation for
the complex issue of general officer authorizations.
In doing so I will present a historical perspective of
the Marine Corps' general officer authorizations
focusing on recent events which have led to the current
reduction in general officer authorizations.
We must first examine the process of how general
officer authorizations are determined for Marine Corps.
The number of general officers the Marine Corps is
authorized is promulgated by Title 10, United States
Code Annotated, Section 5443. (Our sister services also
receive their G/FO authorizations from Section 5443)
The authorization for general officers is based on the
number of officers serving in the grade of second
lieutenant and above. At our present officer strength,
in accordance with Title 10, USCA, the Marine Corps is
authorized 73 general officers. However, the 73
general officers authorized by Title 10, USCA, is
superceded by a ceiling imposed on G/FO authorizations
by Congress and the DoD. This ceiling on G/FO
authorizations takes precedence over the G/FO
authorizations granted in Title 10, USCA.(7)
The number of generals or flag officers (flag
officer is the Navy term for an admiral) each military
service is authorized is not an arbitrary number that
the service singly determines. There is a method to the
process and that method involves the Congress. At this
point let's take a historical snapshot of how the
Marine Corps arrived at its current authorization of 70
general officers.
The Officer Personnel Act (OPA) of 1947 established
limits on the authorized number of general/flag officers
(G/FOs) for each service. At that time, the Marine Corps
was in the process of scaling down its general officer
strength from a World War II high of 79 general officers.
Upon the enactment of the 1947 OPA the Marine Corps had 47
general officers with a projected strength of 44 general
officers in 1950.
Following the Korean War, the Officer Grade Level Act
(OGLA) of 1954 fixed ceilings that codified in law the
dramatic growth of G/FO numbers between 1950 - 1954.
During this period the Marine Corps increased from 44 to
60 general officers. In the years following the 1954
OGLA, 1955 - 1965, Congressional ceilings on G/FOs held
the Navy and Marine Corps authorizations relatively stable
while the Army experienced modest growth and the Air Force
expanded dramatically.
In order to support the conflict in Vietnam, the
Senate in 1965 authorized an increase in G/FO
authorizations for all the services. The Marine Corps
gained 15 general officers in the Senate ceiling.
Subsequent to the Vietnam conflict, the Marine Corps
general officer authorization was reduced from the post
Vietnam high of 79 to 69 general officers in 1975.
The Fiscal Year(FY)78 Defense Authorization Act
directed a reduction of 6% in the total number of G/FOs
throughout the Department of Defense (DoD). This
legislation reduced the number of G/FOs from 1141 to 1073,
a total reduction of 68 G/FOs. The reason for the 6%
reduction was the belief in Congress that there were too
many generals and admirals in the DoD. The reduction was
phased over several years with the final reduction to 1073
G/FOs directed in the FY82 Defense Authorization Act. The
Marine Corps' share of the G/FOs was determined by the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as 65.
The authorization of 65 general officers changed in
June of 1986 when the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed
a reallocation of G/FO authorizations within the DoD. As
a result of the reallocation, the Marine Corps general
officer authorization increased from 65 to 70 as our
general officer participation in the joint arena increased
from 10 to 15.
In FY87, in an effort to obtain relief from the 1,073
G/FO ceiling, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked each
military service to conduct a billet review of all G/FO
positions. OSD coordinated the review and contracted the
Hay Group of Washington, D.C., to conduct the study. The
Hay Group was chosen because it is a recognized pioneer
and leader in the field of job measurement and job
analysis. The purpose of the study was to develop a
reliable, valid, and defensible methodology for
establishing service requirements for G/FO positions. The
study used the zero-based method of analysis in an effort
to establish each G/FO requirement on its own merit and
without regard to previous rationale or justification. The
total number of G/FO positions validated by the Hay Group
for the DoD was 1,436. (4) When compared to the present
ceiling of 1,073 G/FOs for the DoD, there are 363
positions that require a G/FO that are either filled with
an officer of a lower grade, or the responsibilities of
that position are covered by dual-hatting (one officer
filling two positions) a G/FO. Of the 1,436 validated G/FO
positions, the Marine Corps had 82 internal positions
validated.
On August 10th, 1988, the Honorable Grant Green Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and
Personnel, appeared before the Senate Subcommittee on
Manpower and Personnel for the Armed Services. His intent
was to use the Hay Group findings as a basis for a request
that Congress raise the G/FO authorization ceiling. An
excerpt of his testimony is as follows:
After years of being accused of lacking a coherent method of
identifying flag and general officer requirements and
constantly robbing Peter to pay Paul in order to stay within
the current ceiling, the Department of Defense has developed
a valid, credible, requirements determination process for
its general and flag officers. We have provided the
evidence that we have substantially more requirements than
are currently authorized... As I indicated, I am sure there
are individuals who still believe that there are too many
officers wearing stars in the military today. No amount of
data--no proof--to the contrary will be accepted....it is
the Department's intent ion to submit a legislative proposal
that accurately portrays the DoD's senior command and
leadership needs. I believe we have demonstrated those
needs, . . . . . I trust that you are confident as well, and that
you will endorse this long overdue adjustment to the number
of general and admirals needed to improve our ability to
defend this nation.(2)
The subcommittee was not receptive to the testimony
provided by Mr. Green with respect to the recommendations
made by the Hay Group. Senator Nunn indicated that any
study that does not address military requirements carries
little weight. Senator Nunn is one of the lawmakers who has
been most responsible for the current limit on G/FO
authorizations. Another senator who echoed the same
sentiment concerning G/FO authorizations, but is more
critical, is Senator Glenn. Senator Glenn has been an
active force in the Congress to reduce the size of the
officer corps. He observed that generals do not work alone
and any increase in G/FO authorizations would also lead to
an increase in staff personnel to assist the G/FOs. Senator
Glenn also noted that if the Hay Study recommendations were
approved, the military would have 84 more G/FOs than it had
at the height of Vietnam. Senator Glenn further stated "I
am not sure it takes more generals to wage peace than to
wage war."(4) Mr. Green was successful in one area, his
testimony and the Hay Group Study temporarily forestalled
any further congressional reduction of the 1,073 G/FO
ceiling.
The easing of tensions between the United States and
the Soviet Union has resulted in plans for drastic personnel
cuts for our armed forces. With these force reductions we
can expect G/FO reductions. On June 28, 1990, Secretary
Cheney announced a seven percent cut in G/FO billets over
the four years. This reduction represents the loss of 78
G/FOs. The DoD G/FO ceiling would be reduced from 1,073 to
995 G/FOs by the end of FY 94. Under this plan the Marine
Corps loses 3 of its 70 general officers. General Powell,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a statement
released by the Pentagon regarding the seven percent
reduction said "The Joint Chiefs and I believe this plan
reflects an appropriate balance between the continuing
requirements and the changing force structure."(5)
Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee did not
feel that Secretary Cheney went far enough with the
reduction of G/FOs. The committee recommended for the 1991
Defense Authorization Bill a 20% reduction of G/FOs over a
five year period. This would reduce the total number of
G/FOs from 1,073 to 778 by the end of FY 95.
The present reduction plan as set forth in the 1991
Defense Authorization Act is for the DoD to reduce the
number of G/FOs from 1,073 to 1,030 by the end of FY91.
Under this plan the Marine Corps will lose 2 general officer
authorizations. The long range plan is for the DoD to reduce
the number of G/FOs to 858 by the end of FY95.(3) Under
this plan the Marine Corps will lose nine general officers.
By the end of FY 95 the Marine Corps will have a total of 61
general officers. The grade breakdown of the 61 general
officers is as follows:(1)
Grade # Authorized
general 2
lieutenant general 7
major general 21
brigadier general 31
As the Marine Corps reduces its general officer
corps, it will also reduce general officer billets.
However, I do not foresee the reduction in general
officer billets coming into balance with the total of
number of general officer authorizations we will have.
Thus the Marine Corps will still be faced with the same
old problem of too many general officer requirements
and too few general officers.
If we do not have general officer representation
across the joint arena to advise the combatant
commanders of the utility of Marine forces, then the
Marine Corps will not be included in the CINC's force
list. If we are not included in the combatant
commanders' force list then we will not participate in
future operations. This could have a negative
influence on the future of the Marine Corps. At
present the Marine Corps has representation on every
CINC's staff who is a combatant commander with the
exception of the U.S. Southern Command.(1) This serves
as a testament to the Commandant's resolve to ensure
Marine Corps general officer representation throughout
the joint arena. However; as our general officer
strength is reduced, these reductions could severely
impact on the Commandant's ability to staff the joint
arena with general officers.
An indication of how the shortage of general
officers impacts on Marine Corps operational
capabilities can be drawn from our experience in Desert
Shield/Storm. Both the 1st Marine Division and the 2d
Marine Division deployed to Southwest Asia without
general officers filling the billets of Assistant
Division Commander. The fact that no general officer
was serving in these positions prior to Desert
Shield/Storm is due in part to the current general
officer shortage.
In order to effectively support the joint and
combined operation in Southwest Asia, the Marine Corps
temporarily assigned ten general officers to support
both internal and external requirements. Eight of the
ten general officer's were assigned to internal billets,
some of which were: two Assistant Division Commander
billets, one Assistant Wing Commander billet, and four
general officers to support billet requirements for the
MarCent staff.(I)
I have tried to highlight the problem of general
officer shortages by addressing how general officer
authorizations are made, how recent legislation has
affected general officer authorizations, how the
Department of Defense has reacted to general officer
reductions, how the shortage of general officers was
addressed with respect to staffing for Desert
Shield/Storm and how this problem of poses a future
challenge for the Commandant.
In light of the upcoming force reductions and the
perception in Congress that we have too many general
officers, the Commandant of the Marine Corps will have
to balance his internal general officer requirements
with the requirement to adequately represent the Marine
Corps in the joint arena, so as to ensure that the
Marine Corps remains the force of choice.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Christie, Richard, General Officer Matters Officer,
Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. Personal interview
about general officer issues. Arlington, Virginia,
April 5, 1990.
2. Green, Jr., Grant, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Force Mangement and Personnel. Statement before
the Subcommitte on Manpower and Personnel, Committee
on Armed Services, United States Senate. Statement
concerning requirements of the military services for
general and flag officers. Washington, D.C., 10 August 1988.
3. Maze, Rick, "Senate panel favors 20% fewer top
officers," Air Force Times, July 30, 1990, p.3.
4. Maze, Rick, "Senate balks at proposal for 363 more
flag officers," Air Force Times, August 22, 1988, p.4.
5. Nelson, Soraya, "Cheney orders 7% cut in generals
by `94," Air Force Times, July 9,1990, p.6.
6. Title 10, United States Code Annotated, 1991 Addendum
7. U.S. Marine Corps, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps,
Manpower Plans and Policy Division, "Summary of General
and Flag Officer Authorizations, undated.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
