Maneuver Warfare Enhanced With Land Mine Warfare
AUTHOR Major Steven F. Barilich, USMC
CSC 1991
SUBJECT AREA - Warfighting
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: MANEUVER WARFARE ENHANCED WITH LAND MINE WARFARE
I. Purpose: Identify deficiencies with existing mine warfare
doctrine that do not support maneuver warfare outlined in FMFM-1
WARFIGHTING.
II. Problem: Mine fields are effective casualty producers, but
their primary use is always defensive. This defensive orientation
forces a commander to concentrate on the terrain. This runs counter
to maneuver warfare, which directs the commander to concentrate on
the enemy. Mines can be effective in offensive operations, but
there is no U.S. doctrine for this purpose. Therefore, combat
engineers do not receive training on the employment of mines in the
offense.
III. Data: All mine warfare doctrine supports defensive operations.
Deliberate protective and tactical mine fields receive most
attention because of their size and logistic effort to emplace. The
other types of mine fields have potential use in the offense.
However, the doctrine only views the mine fields as defensive
measures. History shows tactical mine fields were not decisive in
defeating a trained and determined attacker. Field Marshal Rommel
and General Montgomery were not immune from the shortcomings of
mine fields. The North African campaign is a perfect case study for
this lesson. A review of the logistical requirements to lay a
tactical mine field quickly identifies the Marine Corps'
deficiencies.
IV. Conclusions: The Marine Corps' adoption of maneuver warfare
requires the validation of supporting doctrine. Mine warfare has
the potential to enhance offensive operations. Maneuver warfare can
adapt several types of mine fields for the offense. Acceptance of
mine warfare for offensive operations will be a combat multiplier
for the Marine Corps.
V. Recommendations: The Marine Corps combat engineers must take
the lead and promote mine warfare in offensive operations. The
combat engineers must write new doctrine to support FMFM-1
WARFIGHTING. The Marine Corps Engineer School must change the
emphasis of mine fields from the defense to the offense.
ENHANCING MANEUVER WARFARE WITH LAND MINE WARFARE
OUTLINE
Thesis statement. The present mine warfare doctrine, accepted by
the U.S. Marine Corps, does not support FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING, because
of the fixation on defensive operations.
I. Doctrine
A. Requirement to review and validate supporting doctrine
B. FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING
1. Definition of maneuver warfare
2. Application of doctrine
C. Mine and countermine warfare
1. Types of mine fields and their application
II. Historical Background
A. North African campaign; Montgomery vs. Rommel
B. Failure of mine fields to be decisive
C. Effects of maneuver warfare
D. Historical lessons applied to Southwest Asia
III. Logistics
A. Feasibility of deliberate and tactical mine fields
B. Number of mines required for a tactical mine field
C. Man-hours required to lay a tactical mine field
D. Availability of mines
IV. Conclusion/Solution
A. Identify mine fields that can support FMFM-1
B. New doctrine for offensive mine warfare
C. Refocus of combat engineer training
ENHANCING MANEUVER WARFARE WITH LANDMINE WARFARE
Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that
seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a
series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions
which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating
situation with which he cannot cope.
FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING
The United States Marine Corps is vigorously embracing
maneuver warfare doctrine. The doctrine is ideal for the Marine
Corps, particularly with the pending force reductions. The
validation of supporting doctrine must occur when tactics and
equipment change. The present mine warfare doctrine accepted by the
Marine Corps does not support FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING, because of the
fixation on defensive operations.
The challenge to the Marine Corps becomes twofold. First,
develop new doctrine and techniques that "dove tails" with maneuver
warfare, as expounded upon in FMFM-1, WARFIGHTING. FMFM-1 states,
"Our doctrine does not consist of procedures to be applied in
specific situations so much as it establishes general guidance that
requires judgement in application. Therefore, while authoritative,
doctrine is not prescriptive."(11:44) Second, refocus the training
of the combat engineers, in mine warfare, from the defense, to
employing mines in the offense.
Existing mine and countermine warfare doctrine is a simple
concept with only the imagination limiting the application of the
idea. Very good doctrine exists for the employment of mines in the
defense and countermine warfare in the offense. Still, there is
almost no U.S. doctrine for the employment of mines in the offense.
The defensive "mind set" of mine warfare must be broken. FMFM-1
concludes " . . . that there exists no clear division between the
offense and the defense. Our theory of war should not attempt to
impose one artificially. The offense and the defense exist
simultaneously as necessary components of each other, and the
transition from one to the other is fluid and continuous." (11:26)
MINE WARFARE DOCTRINE
Current counter-mobility and mine warfare doctrine, FM 5-102
and FM 20-32, divides mine fields into five different types. A
short description and purpose of each of these is important in
understanding the focus of this subject.
The first type is the protective mine field. The protective
mine field has two sub-categories of fields; the deliberate
protective and the hasty protective mine field. The deliberate
protective mine field provides for the protection of static or
semi-permanent installations. The best example is the expansive
mine fields protecting the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The
mine field uses the standard pattern to emplace the mines. The
deliberate protective mine field usually incorporates the entire
spectrum of conventional anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. A
closer look at the logistics and manpower required to emplace such
a field will be presented later.
The hasty protective mine field provides for local, close-in
security protection of the small unit. This mine field uses no
standard pattern to lay the mines. The location of the mines
depends on the terrain, enemy, and situation. The hasty protective
mine field primarily uses anti-personnel mines, although anti-tank
mines may be employed depending on availability. An example of a
hasty protective mine field would be placing claymore mines to
cover an avenue of approach where the enemy could infiltrate.
The second type is the point mine field. The primary use of
this mine field is for reinforcing other obstacles such as road
craters, abatis, or wire obstacles not associated with hasty
protective mine fields. These mine fields also can stand alone as
obstacles in streams, the entrance and exit of fords, or deny a
landing zone. Point mine fields have no standard pattern and are
dependent on the threat and situation. The point mine field should
cause the enemy to deploy his forces and bring up his breaching
assets, exposing those critical assets to indirect or direct fires.
The point mine field takes advantage of limited resources and
existing obstacles to maximize the effect.
The third type is the tactical mine field. The primary use of
this mine field is to stop, delay, and disrupt the enemy attack.
The field can be used to strengthen defensive positions and protect
the flanks. These fields use the standard pattern when laying the
mines. The full spectrum of conventional mines may be used with a
variety of scatterable mines. Like the deliberate protective mine
field, the tactical mine field is logistically and manpower
intensive. The tactical and deliberate protective mine fields have
many deficiencies when employed under the premiss of maneuver
warfare.
The fourth type is the interdiction mine field. The primary
use of this type of field is to trap or harass the enemy deep in
their territory, assembly areas or defensive positions. The mine
field can effectively delay a road march or block a retreat. The
family of scatterable mines is ideal for this type of mine field.
The methods of long range delivery, such as air or artillery,
provide surprise and significantly add to the "fog of war."
Reconnaissance and special forces personnel also can lay
conventional mines to serve the same purpose.
The significant advantage of the scatterable mines is the
ability to self-destruct at predetermined times. This feature
prevents the enemy from recovering the mines and using the mines
against friendly units. The mines will not permanently restrict
access to terrain that friendly forces may need to occupy or pass
through in the future. Coordinated air strikes, artillery raids, or
an ambush by combined anti-armor teams will significantly enhance
the effect of an interdiction mine field.
The fifth type of mine field is the phony mine field. The
primary use of this type is to simulate the other mine fields,
supplement or extend live mine fields, and conceal gaps in existing
fields. All requirements for marking and recording mine fields
apply to phony fields, including the requirement to cover them by
fire and observation. The purpose of a phony mine field is to force
the enemy to delay his attack, commit breaching assets, or force
him to change the axis of his advance. Each of these actions will
force the enemy to remain within the range of defensive fires for
a longer period.
Reviewing mine warfare doctrine and the mine field breaching
results of Operation Desert Storm, several questions seem to stand
out. Are deliberate protective and tactical mine fields still
practical given the intensive logistic and manpower effort to lay
them? Are deliberate protective and tactical mine fields compatible
with FMFM-1, Warfighting?
The purpose of raising these questions is not to cast aside
mine warfare. History does show that mines are a very effective and
economical means to produce casualties. However, history does not
seem to prove that mines were the decisive factor in victory or
defeat.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A look at historical record can often place the development of
military doctrine into perspective. The present doctrine of mine
and countermine warfare originated from the battlefields of World
War II. Mines have been effective in inflicting casualties and
destroying equipment, since their inception. Still, the large
expansive mine fields were not decisive in defeating an attacker.
The historical results do not seem to justify the intense
logistical effort to lay the fields.
BRL Report No.1582, MINE AND COUNTERMINE WARFARE IN RECENT
HISTORY, 1914-1970, written by Dr. Russel H. Stolfi, of the U.S.
Naval Post Graduate School, April 1972, for the Ballistic Research
Laboratories, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, contains a
detailed account of the development of mine and countermine
warfare. Dr. Stolfi's report emphasizes the importance of mine
fields in several wars and battles during the period of 1914-1970.
The large mine fields, used by General Montgomery and Field Marshal
Rommel, in the North African theater of operations, are of
particular interest. Dr. Stolfi makes several observations,
unrelated to mine warfare, while discussing the effects of mine
fields during certain battles. These observations, highlighted in
the following paragraphs, may be more significant to the outcome of
a battle than the actual mine fields themselves.
In 1941, "geography" presented Germany and its allies with
formidable problems of attacking through the mountainous regions of
Yugoslavia and Greece. The defending Yugoslav army worked on
deficit time in preparing their defenses. The Greek army, engaged
in a ground conflict with Italy in Southern Albania and soon
supported by powerful British ground units, could offer stiff
resistance against the Germans. The terrain canalized the movement
of the motorized German formations along the few roads of a poorly
developed transportation network. The location favored the
employment of mines and demolition explosives as critical weapons
for the Greek defenders. Neither the Greeks nor British armies
involved in the defense in April 1941, used mines
effectively. (6:24-25)
The reader of this report might logically conclude that the
defenders lost this battle because they did not effectively use
mines fields. However, Dr. Stolfi continues with this side bar
observation. "The Germans, who had the psychological advantage of
one and one half years of successful ground attacks, showed
remarkable flexibility and elan on the offensive. Those factors
probably would rapidly overcome a defense in the mountains, which
included even ruthless and extensive use of mines and
demolitions. "(6:25)
Thus, the theory behind maneuver warfare, as outlined and
explained in FMFM-1, begins to appear as a decisive element in the
outcome of a campaign. Surprise, training, and boldness are just a
few of the characteristics that exemplify maneuver warfare. The
Germans demonstrated the same traits in their Balkan campaign.
These characteristics enabled the Marines in Southwest Asia to
breach and penetrate the vast defensive mine fields in Kuwait.
The Germans and the British continued to emphasize the use of
mines during the latter part of 1941. The British leaned heavily on
them in the defense of Tobruk and the Germans increased the numbers
in the defenses on the Egyptian frontier. The British launched a
powerful offensive in December of 1941. The offensive was an
expensive one in terms of casualties, equipment losses, and the
revelation of inferior operational techniques. Despite the losses,
the British Imperial Corps forced the Germans to retreat from the
battlefield in the critical El Adem area.(6:27)
The important feature of this encounter is not the British
overcoming the mine fields. The phrase, "revelation of inferior
operational techniques" jumps off the page. Applying the
operational art of war to the campaign is more crucial to success
than the physical defeat of the enemy. The British may have
defeated the Germans in this battle, but the losses they suffered
could have cost them the campaign. A commander must shape the
battlefield to attack the enemy on the ground of his choosing.
Mines continued to be used in an ever increasing amount on the
battlefield. Commanders viewed these artificial obstacles as purely
a defensive weapon. This viewpoint seemed to trap these commanders
into the same limitations and inflexibility whether they were in
the offense or in the defense. They simply did not develop an
offensive concept for the employment of mines. Even today, mine
warfare in the offense is a neglected technique that must be
further exploited. Mines can become a real combat multiplier when
combined with true maneuver warfare. The Marine Corps should take
the lead in perfecting the tactics as it has in perfecting the
tactics of an amphibious landing.(6:28)
Field Marshal Rommel penetrated the mine fields of Tobruk that
had a perimeter of mines thirty five miles long. The success was
partially due to the inner mine fields of the British defenses
having fallen into decay. The British were also unable to launch a
credible counter attack. The defeated British retreated, but the
Germans were unable to exploit the success due to the terrain. This
illustrates another example of a large deliberate protective mine
field defeated by a determined attacker. Later, the British
defenses stalemated Rommel at Alexandria, not because the mine
fields were impenetrable, but because he made the advance without
reinforcing or resting his Army.(6:30)
The British began an intensive training program during the
previously mentioned stalemate. Many participants felt the
emphasis on countermine measures and the techniques used to clear
enemy mine fields, were perhaps the most vital preparations before
the second battle of Alamein. The British engineers developed a
deliberate and well rehearsed method for breaching. The technique
incorporated direct and indirect fires and supporting armor. Rommel
began an intensive mine laying effort sowing over 500,000 mines. He
wanted to form a barrier that no British soldier could penetrate.
The mine fields did delay the British attack and inflicted many
casualties. Still, the training, the coordination and air supremacy
forced the Germans to disengage and flee west.(6:30-38)
The prelude and scenario of the second battle of Alamein is
strikingly similar to the training effort, fire support
coordination, and well rehearsed breaching operations of the U.S.
Marine Corps combat engineers during Operation Desert Storm. The
only difference is the extremely low number of casualties suffered
by the Marines, due to the unwillingness of the Iraqis to fight.
The Marine Corps must not forget these parallels. Again, the
example shows that a trained, determined, and disciplined force
will not allow a mine field, no matter how extensively laid, to
stop them.
Dr. Stolfi makes several positive points on how the Germans
used mine fields at Alamein. Most of the points are common
knowledge but two of them are worth noting. First, mines are
effective barriers to movement and are useful weapons for weak
defenders. Second, mines benefit the attacking forces. They block
the shoulders of penetrations against counter attacks and cover the
flanks of attacking motorized columns still engaged against units
defending in deep echelon. This second point is very interesting
since neither the British nor the Germans used mines offensively.
The negative points Dr. Stolfi identifies are equally important.
Mine fields, once emplaced, are static in nature and restrict the
mobility of friendly forces. They can be just as difficult to clear
by friendly forces as they are for the enemy.(6:39)
The preponderance of Dr. Stolfi's report seems to emphasize
the value of mine fields in the defense, but two observations stand
out. Mines failed in adding enough defensive strength to prevent
either Field Marshal Rommel or General Montgomery from achieving
victories. Again, the question rises: Were the effects of mine
fields really worth the effort to prepare and could another more
mobile and flexible weapons system have done the same job? The
second observation was the large-scale use of mines preceded the
defeat of the user. A conclusion may be drawn that a defending
force, that resorts to extensive mine laying, has already
acknowledged the superior strength of the adversary and its own
impending defeat. (6:40-41)
LOGISTICS
Logistics and manpower surface as reasons to diminish the
emphasis of deliberate protective and tactical mine fields on
Marine Corps combat engineer training. These two types of mine
fields exist in Cuba and Korea. The maintenance of these fields
requires extensive manpower and assets. The ordnance used to
replace deteriorated mines might have better use elsewhere. These
mine fields have a limited effect on a well trained, equipped, and
determined enemy. The logistics of defensive mine fields have the
potential of seriously limiting the offensive options of a
commander, if emplaced without any relation to the enemy's intent.
This assessment of mine fields raises other questions. Can a
commander afford the assets and manpower required to remove the
mine field if the enemy's intention changes or the mine field is no
longer required? Does a commander risk becoming permanently fixed
to a location because of the effort and assets required to lay the
mine fields?
A closer look at the requirements for a small, generic
tactical mine field, using the planning guidance from FM 20-32,
should clearly illustrate this point. The size of the mine field
will have a front of 200 meters and a depth of 300 meters. This
would barely cover the front of a platoon in the defense. The total
mines required would be as follows: 246 anti-tank; 931 anti-
personnel fragmenting; 1811 anti-personnel blast; for a total of
2988 mines.(9:29-31)
The time involved just to lay the mines would take 350 man-
hours and could exceed 450-500 man-hours during limited visibility
or NBC conditions. The man-hours do not reflect moving the mines
into position, breaking the mines out of their crates, or the
laying out and recording of the mine field. Additionally, an
engineer unit must be dedicated for continued maintenance on the
field and therefore, be unavailable for other vital engineer
tasks. (9:35)
Currently, there is a total of only 4500-5000 anti-tank and
anti-personnel mines aboard Maritime Prepositioning Ships.
Obviously, employing these mines in a tactical mine field, in
support of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade would be futile. The
mines would be best used in support of the offense, laid in point
or interdiction mine fields.
A commander also must question whether an area or asset he
considers vital requires an extensive mine field. If the answer is
yes, then perhaps the asset is in the wrong location in the first
place. The ability to displace and conceal a vital asset becomes
paramount in a tenuous situation. Protecting assets or an area with
mine fields forces the commander to focus on terrain and not the
enemy. This fixation runs counter to maneuver warfare. An area
surrounded by a large mine field can attract the enemy's attention
and become a lucrative target.
CONCLUSIONS
The Marine Corps must concentrate its training effort in the
employment of the point, the interdiction, the phony, and the hasty
protective mine fields. All four mine fields have application in
the defense, but their combined effect with offensive operations
has the most potential. The point and interdiction fields are ideal
for confusing and disrupting the enemy. They can be used to protect
exposed flanks or avenues the enemy can use to counterattack. These
mine fields can be placed behind the enemy blocking his retreat and
helping to fix him in place to be defeated. The phony mine field
can enhance the general deception plan. The hasty protective mine
field is ideal for our forces when they have reached their
culminating point in the attack. Mine warfare focused in this
direction now truly becomes a combat multiplier.
Operation Desert Storm proved the Marine Corps' ability to
adapt and find solutions for difficult situations. The operation
also showed the value and abilities of combat engineers to breach
extensive enemy mine fields. They wrote another chapter in the
history of mine and countermine warfare. Again, history shows that
large, deliberate mine fields will not be decisive in defending
against a determined, well trained attacker. Yet, do not forget
that mines still produce casualties, both psychological and
physical. Thus, mines are still a valuable weapon. The goal is to
maximize the effects of mines, as with any other weapon system.
Refocusing the employment of mines to the offense will multiply the
total effect of maneuver warfare.
If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the enemy's
cohesion, the immediate object toward that end is to create a
situation in which he cannot function. By our actions, we seek
to pose menacing dilemmas in which events happen unexpectedly
and faster than the enemy can keep up with them. The enemy
must be made to see his situation as deteriorating, but
deteriorating at an ever-increasing rate. The ultimate goal is
panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to
resist.
FMFM-1 WARFIGHTING
The Marine Corps' engineering community has the opportunity to
take the lead toward achieving that "ultimate goal." The combat
engineers must develop an aggressive doctrine for the employment of
mines in the offense. The new doctrine must take advantage of the
latitude provided by FMFM-1 and must not become strangled by a
static defense or terrain oriented mentality. The combat engineers
cannot sit on the laurels of the success they received from the
breaching operations in Kuwait. The engineers must use the momentum
of Operation Desert Storm to correct past deficiencies. A new
doctrine for using mines in the offense will provide a "full tool
box" to take to the next war. When mine warfare begins to support
the direction and guidance of FMFM-1, the Marine Corps will remain
the innovative force the world knows and respects.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Landmine and
Countermine Warfare, Italy 1943-1944, Washington D.C., 1972.
2. Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Landmine and
Countermine Warfare, Korea 1950-1954, Washington D.C., 1972.
3. Engineer Agency for Resources Inventories, Landmine and
Countermine Warfare, North Africa 1940-1943, Washington D.C.,
1972.
4. Lucas, James, War on the Eastern Front 1941-1945, New York:
Bonanza Books, 1982.
5. Manstein, Field Marshal Erich von, Lost Victories, California:
Presidio Press, 1982.
6. U.S. Army, Aberdeen Research and Development Center, BRL Report
No. 1582, Mine and Countermine Warfare in Recent History,
1914-1970, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, 1972.
7. U.S. Army, U.S. Army Engineer School, Engineers in the Tank and
Mechanized Infantry Task Force, FC 5-71-2, Virginia, 1986.
8. U.S. Army, HQTRADOC, Countermobility, FM5-102, Virginia, 1985.
9. U.S. Army, HQ TRADOC, Mine/Countermine Operations, FM 20-32,
Virginia, 1985.
10.U.S. Marine Corps, Campaigning, FNFN 1-1, Washington D.C.,
1989.
11. U.S. Marine Corps, Warfighting, FNFN 1, Washington D.C., 1989.
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