Military

Reducing The Power Projection Gap:  The Army Fast Sealift Maritime Prepositioning Ships (AFSMPS) Program

 

CSC 1991

 

SUBJECT AREA - National Military Strategy

 

 

              REDUCING THE POWER PROJECTION GAP:

                THE ARMY FAST SEALIFT MARITIME

            PREPOSITIONING SHIPS (AFSMPS) PROGRAM

 

                      Steven M. Anderson

                      Major, US Army

                      

                      

                      EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 

                                             

 

       The recent experiences of the US military in the Persian Gulf

identified a serious flaw in our ability to globally project heavy

forces. While success was achieved moving light infantry forces to

Saudi Arabia rapidly, armored and mechanized units from the US

Army were late arriving in the theater due to a number of problems

in our strategic sealift fleet. Exploitation of the mobile storage

capacity of the Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)

program and sailing speed of the Navy Fast Sealift Ships (FSS)

program leads to a new concept in heavy forces power projection,

the Army Fast Sealift Maritime Prepositioning Ships program

(AFSMPS).

       In order to fully understand the dynamics involved in reducing

the gap in our heavy force power projection capability, an

evaluation of the present and future threat is required  This

examination reveals seven threat-driven defense challenges.  In

order to deter and combat the threat during the next decade, our

military must posses the following capabilities: (1) sufficient global

strategic mobility; (2) rapid force closure ability; (3) the flexibility to

respond to a wide range of confrontation intensities; (4) the ability

to fight two wars simultaneously; and the capability to project

forces that have (5) combat power and mobility, (6) are maintained

in a high state of readiness, and (7) are self-sustaining.

       The AFSMPS concept envisions using three fast sealift ships

to preposition equipment and 30 days of supplies. In the event of a

crisis, this equipment links up with fly-in personnel from the

standby brigade of the 24th Infantry Division in the contingency

area. There exists ample evidence that this concept reduces the

power projection gap by 70%, provides the decision maker more

flexible response options, and considerably increases our ability to

fight two wars at the same time. The AFSMPS Mechanized Infantry

Brigade is not only a ready and self-sustaining force, but it is a

heavy unit powerful enough to defeat a Soviet Tank Division.

       By relying on proven technology to negate R&D demands and

advocating the use of a force credible without excessive

transportation requirements, the cost of the AFSMPS program is

relatively low.  Procurement expenses for the high tech ships are

estimated to be $1.125 billion with operating costs in the $60

million range. Taking advantage of the upcoming drawdown from

Europe will enable the AFSMPS ships to use surplus equipment

that will reduce procurement costs further still.

       Considering the many capabilities and advantages of the

program, the AFSMPS concept is worthy of immediate and serious

consideration by military planners interested in improving our

heavy force power projection capability.

 

              REDUCING THE POWER PROJECTION GAP: THE ARMY FAST

           SEALIFT MARITIME PREPOSlTlONlNG SHIPS (AFSMPS) PROGRAM

 

                                OUTLINE

 

Thesis Statement:  The AFSMPS concept is an efficient and cost-

effective means of greatly improving US heavy force combat power

projection capability

 

I.      DESERT STORM RESULTS

       A.      The Good News - MPS and FSS

       B.      The Bad News - Gap in Power Prolection Capability

 

II.     MOTIVATION TO REDUCE THE GAP - THE THREAT

       A.      Global locations

       B.      Short Warning Time

       C.      Wide Spectrum of Conflict

       D.      Simultaneous Conflicts

       E.      Conventional Lethality

       F.      Home Field Advantage

       G.      Extended Duration

 

III.    REDUCING THE GAP AND MEETING THE THREAT - AFSMPS

       A.      Global Strategic Mobility

       B.      Rapid Force Closure

       C.      Flexible Response

       D.      Fight Two Wars at Same Time

       E.      Combat Power and Mobility

       F.      Readiness

       G.      Self-sustainability

 

IV.     THE UNEXPECTED SURPRISE - AFSMPS IS AFFORDABLE

       A.      Proven Technology and Efficiency

       B.      R&D Costs and Equipment Procurement Costs

       C.      Ship Procurement Costs

       D.      Ships Operating Expenses

 

V.      AFSMPS - THE TIME IS RIPE TO REDUCE THE GAP

 

              REDUCING THE POWER PROJECTION GAP: THE ARMY FAST

           SEALIFT MARITIME PREPOSITIONING SHIPS (AFSMPS) PROGRAM

 

       The Leader glared intently at the military map on the wall before him and tried to imagine

the impact of the proposed massive armored thrust his neighbor's country. Newly discovered oil

reserves less than 50 miles from his own eastern border offered a tempting reward, but he knew

the world would react with hostility to this bold invasion plan.

       "Are you sure the Americans can't stop us?," the Leader demanded of his Chief of Staff.

       "I am certain, Sir," stated the General resolutely. "They are still arrogant and overconfident

after their great victory in the Persian Gulf. No nation in the world can get here with armored forces

fast enough to stop the advance of our tanks or drive us out from our consolidated defensive

positions around the oil fields."

       The Leader pressed his inquiry. "I'm sure we can handle any airborne forces, but what

about the Marines? Don't they have a maritime prepositioned force nearby?"

      "You are correct, Sir," replied the general, "but that marine force has only 30 tanks! Even

with their tremendous air power, there is no way they can stop our armored division. The

Americans cannot quickly project anything but light infantry and airplanes. The advantages the

coalition enjoyed in the gulf war are not present here and we will not make the same mistakes as

Saddam Hussein.  In only three weeks we should have positions so well fortified that they will not

be able to force us out without paying a high price in American blood; with such little oil and

political advantage at stake, the Americans will not be willing to pay that price."

      "General, you have convinced me," the Leader said smiling. "Launch your attack."

 

       At first glance, the scenario above seems ludicrous. Surely there is no

leader in the world irrational enough to test the military capability or resolve of

the United States after the recent events in the Persian Gulf.  Is there really

such a gap in American combat power projection capability that a nation with a

substantial military force might dare to challenge us?

       Unfortunately, events in operation Desert Shield revealed an affirmative

answer to this question. The slow of the movement of troops and equipment to

the Persian Gulf demonstrated a discouraging lack of ability to quickly project

heavy forces in order to counter global threats.  However, the recent war

validated two extremely important programs, the Marine corps Maritime

Prepositioning Ships (MPS) concept and the Navy's Fast Sealift Ships (FSS)

program, and a completely new concept combining the mobile storage capability

of MPS with the sailing speed of FSS can be used to breech this power

projection gap. This concept is called the Army Fast Sealift Maritime

Prepositioning Ship (AFSMPS) program.  By scrutinizing the lessons learned

from the recent war and evaluating the proficiency of the AFSMPS to address

the nature of our worldwide threat, the AFSMPS concept will be demonstrated

as an efficient and cost-effective means of greatly improving our heavy force

combat power projection capability.

 

GOOD NEWS FROM THE GULF - MPS AND FSS

 

       The overwhelming majority of news from the gulf war was good and the

performance of the Marine's MPS concept was no exception.  Less than ten

years old, the program was designed to enhance US combat power projection

by allowing the Marines to establish a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)

ashore almost anywhere in the world.  Three squadrons of special MPS ships

are positioned in key worldwide locations, and each squadron consists of four

or five ships that contain a MEB's equipment and thirty days of supplies. The

MPS cargo can be offloaded in stream over a beach, if no port is available, and

the MEB will be combat-ready ten days after the first ship arrival.(1)

       Called up on 7 August, the MPS squadron from Diego Garcia arrived

within eight days in Saudi Arabia and it's associated MEB was combat capable

on 25 August.(2)  LTG Walter Boomer, commander of the Marines during Desert

Shield and Desert Storm, declared the concept was "validated"(3)  by the war

experience, as did an observer for the Marine Gazette,(4) and L.E. Prina, a noted

military analyst and reporter, called MPS one of the "stars of the Desert Shield

buildup."(5)   VADM Francis Donovan, commander of the Military Sealift

command, referred to the operation as "a classic application of MPS doctrine."(6)

Marines were able to provide support to not only their own MEB, but  numerous

Army and Air Force units in the Saudi theater with food, water, fuel and medical

sustenance for over sixty days.(7)  Not surprisingly, the Marine Corps Lessons

Learned After Action Report stated that the "MPF capability has proven itself to

be an invaluable national capability that can respond rapidly to a crisis with a

credible force capable of significant self-sustainment."(8)

       Another success story from the gulf war involved the FSS program.  Eight

SL-7 technologically advanced roll-on, roll-off (RO/RO) FSS ships were built by

the Navy during the defense buildup of the last decade.  These ships were

unique because they possessed the ability to travel at 33-knots, contrary to

standard sealift ships which only have a 20-knot capability, and are always

manned and maintained so that they can get under way within 96 hours of

being called up.(9)

       On 7 August the group of eight high-tech SL-7s was ordered to deploy

from their various locations on the East Coast to the port of Savannah and

transport the 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) to Dharan, and all the FSS

ships saw extensive action during the crisis.  One of the ships experienced a

fire while crossing the Atlantic, but the lead ship was able to return to Spain and

pick up the load from the damaged ship and return to Dharan, minimizing the

lost time to only four days.(10)  At times reaching speeds of 35 knots, the FSS

fleet made numerous round trips to the Saudi theater from the US and,

according to VADM Donovan, totally validated the FSS concept, demonstrated

the redundancy in the program, and proved that the previously untested FSS

designs were capable of delivering their cargo in a strategic mobility crisis as

quickly as advertised.(11)  General Louis C. Wagner wrote that the superb

performance of these ships was "a major lesson learned in this deployment."(12)

L.E. Prina wrote recently that in Operation Desert Shield, the FSS "proved their

worth."(13)

 

THE WAR - THE COMBAT POWER PROJECTION GAP IDENTIFIED

 

       The most significant strategic lesson learned during the gulf war was the

existence of a heavy force projection shortfall.  Two factors contribute account

for this gap: (1) the MPS MEB lacks the land combat power to defeat a modern

armored division and (2) Army armored and mechanized forces were moved

slowly to the Saudi theater.

       Shortly after the MPF MEB landed in Saudi Arabia, Marine commanders

sought to augment their land combat power with armored forces from other

nations and the US Army.(14) Authorized only 53 tanks (a figure that has since

been reduced to 30), 30 Light Armored Vehicles, and 72 TOW anti-tank

weapons,(15) it was obvious that a well-trained and modern armored Iraqi division

attacking in the flat, open terrain of the Saudi desert would have severely

tested the Marine force.  As effective as the MPF MEB's considerable air assets

(20 AV-8Bs, 24 F1A-18s, and 12 Cobra helicopters(16)) proved to be, the time-

honored requirement that ground units are armed with enough firepower to

seize or hold physical terrain was once again validated.  While the Marine and

Army light infantry forces waited for the heavy units to arrive in the gulf, ground

troops referred to their role in the wake of a massive multi-division Iraqi armored

attack as nothing more than "speed bumps."(17)

       "If the lraqis had attacked us anytime in August or September," said one

Marine officer in a position to know, "they could have cleaned our clocks."(18)

       Fortunately, political and logistical considerations prevented the lraqis

from attacking the armor-light MPF MEB when the Marines were the most

vulnerable.   Marine LTC Charles Armstrong wrote that "light infantry is not the

answer to deterring Iraqi aggression or defending Saudi Arabia,"(19) and L.E.

Prina concluded the following:

           Desert Shield ... showed a need for main battle tanks, armored

personnel carriers and heavy artillery to be deployed near likely trouble areas.

While the marines have tanks, they do not have nearly as many (nor are they as

modern) as those in an Army armored division and certainly not enough to take

on a veteran Iraqi tank division or divisions in the desert.(20)

 

       The impotency of the MPF MEB against an armored opposition served to

exacerbate the slow arrival of Army heavy forces.  One defense analyst objected

that armored and mechanized divisions took 45-60 days to deploy to the

Persian Gulf once shipping became available.(21)  Retired General Glenn K. Otis,

noting the 7 August call-up date for the 24th ID (M), complained that "as of 4

September, only part of the division had closed onto Saudi Arabia,"(22) and it was

reported that the Army "took longer than its senior leaders desired to get heavy

divisions to Saudi Arabia."(23)   According to a movements staff officer on the

Army Staff, the first heavy division to arrive in theater was not completely

combat ready as a entire unit until 23 September, over six weeks after it was

ordered to depart the US.(24)

       The reasons for this slow transit are well documented.  "The inability of

national sealift assets to meet the deployment challenge springs from the

erosion of the US' commercial assets and the declining readiness of the Ready

Reserve Fleet (RRF)," wrote John G. Roos in the November 1990 Armed Forces

Journal.(25) The US maritime industry  now possesses only the 14th largest fleet

in the world,(26) there is a serious shortage of qualified  US merchant marine

personnel,(27) and the US ship building industry is essentially nonexistent.(28)

Admiral Paul Butcher of the US Transportation Command testified before

Congress that the "maritime fleet and its supporting industrial base is

eroding,"(29) and the President's Commission on the Merchant Marine and

Defense made the finding that "there is insufficient strategic sealift, in both

ships and trained personnel, for the US, using only its resources as required by

defense planning assumptions, to execute a major deployment."(30) Of the 46

RRF ships that were called up for Desert Shield, only 11 of them were available

to deploy within the five-day readiness target, a fact which stimulated General

Otis to decried that "a fundamental issue is that there is not a match between

the readiness of Army divisions to deploy and the readiness of the right ships to

transport them."(31)

 

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       As seen during Desert Storm, the paucity of MPS MEB land combat

power and the late arrival of heavy Army units in the Saudi contingency area

serve to highlight the glaring gap of 47 days in American combat power

projection that is depicted in Figure 1.  Heavy forces require more preparation,

support, and strategic lift than lighter forces and would be expected arrive last

in a distant regional conflict.  However, the time that it took during Desert

Shield was unquestionably too long.  The potential threat that this nation and

the US military is faces is too potent for the gap in power projection to be

acceptable.

 

MOTIVATION TO REDUCE THE GAP - THE THREAT

                    

       Conflicts of the future will probably bear little resemblance to the recent

gulf war.   US forces were afforded many advantages by the host nation, and we

must assume our next enemy will fight with more tenacity than Iraq. An

understanding of the future threat characteristics will yield military imperatives

that can guide our efforts to project combat power more rapidly.

       During the next decade, no single region will likely dominate our

defensive planning like Europe has done in the past.  In the recent Annual

Report to the President and Congress (ARPC), Secretary of Defense Dick

Cheney stated the following:

              In response to the dramatic changes of the past two years,

the President devised and implemented last summer a new strategy that shifted

the focus of defense planning from countering the global challenge posed by

the Soviet Union to responding to threats in major regions -particularly Europe,

Southwest Asia, and East Asia.(32)

 

      The propensity for the American people to support major military

commitments in any areas other than those shown in Figure 2 is doubtful.  US

economic and cultural ties will unquestionably keep our commitment to Europe

and the East Asia strong.  Concern over most of the world's oil reserves and the

tremendous potential for volatility will similarly demand unwavering US attention

on Southwest Asia and North Africa.

       Such worldly commitments portend that the US military forces have global

reach.  Previously, this has been achieved through forward stationing of troops

and equipment.  A recent National War College study concluded that forward

bases are controversial in both the US and abroad, and that it "would be virtually

impossible to base units in all the likely contingency areas of the world in which

the US has a vital interest."(33)  Forward outposts in Europe, Korea, the

Philippines, and Japan will unquestionably be reduced or eliminated in the next

few years.  Therefore, the burden of demonstrating US commitment and resolve

must shift from forward presence to global strategic mobility and power

projection.

       Despite an increase the advance warning time prior to an attack by the

Soviets in Europe,(34) short fuze contingency missions will still be the norm, as

Saddam Hussein demonstrated this past August.  The warning time in places

like Korea and the Middle East, in fact, is measured in hours, not days.(35) The

1991 ARPC states that "the potential for regional threats to the US is growing.

Such threats can arise with very little warning."(36)

 

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       In light of the increased mobility and lethality of most worldwide

belligerents, the importance of arriving early in a conflict with a credible force

cannot be overstated. General Carl Vuono, Chief of Staff of the Army,  paid

homage to this concern when he said that moving forces rapidly throughout the

world "must be the center of a major national defense effort."(37) Failing to

properly anticipate the Iraqi attack, the US and the world watched helplessly last

August as the 6200 square miles of Kuwait was completely overrun in little more

than a day; the world coalition would spend the next seven months regretting

that short warning time.  It is imperative that the US has credible forces that can

be rapidly projected to a trouble spot in order to counteract the impact of the

expected short warning time.

       The present and future threat confronts the US with a broad range of

possible battle intensities.  At one end of the confrontation spectrum is

terrorism and low intensity conflict.  Many of our present and future rivals lack

the conventional means to challenge us, so terrorism and low-intensity conflicts

will persist.(38)   At the opposite end of the spectrum is the continuing possibility

of nuclear war, as the strategic arsenal of the Soviet Union remains intact.(39)  In

the middle of these extremes is the specter of conventional warfare.  With the

reduction in Soviet and US forward basing and the proliferation of powerful and

mobile conventional arms, the likelihood that some nations may wish to take

matters into their own hands has increased and "the nature of warfare in the

Third World today will likely reach incredible intensity."(40) The obvious

implication here is that we must have the flexibility to respond adequately to the

entire range of possible threat intensities.

       The possibility of two of our global adversaries mounting simultaneous

military challenges to the US also warrants attention.  Recently LTC Charles

Armstrong acknowledged this dilemma when he wrote, "What would have

happened if we'd had two similar crises break out when we were midway through

the deployment to the Persian Gulf?  We could not have responded adequately

to both."(41)  With world attention focused elsewhere, border units in Korea were

recently put on alert in anticipation of an attack by the North Koreans.(42)  It is

extremely unlikely that any foe would do the US the great favor of waiting to

make a aggressive move until after we had regrouped following another regional

conflict.

       The response to the threat of simultaneous conflicts is, as stated in the

1991 ARPC, is having the force structure and the strategic lift required to "deal

with more than one concurrent major regional contingency," and handle a "major

shift in Soviet strategy or a major new threat."(43)  General Colin Powell recently

said the "the superpower shingle now hangs only in one place."(44)  If the CJCS

is correct and we really are entering an era where the US is the "Policeman of

the World," our power projection aptitude must have sufficient depth to fight

two concurrent wars.

 

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       Perhaps even more alarming than the proliferation of nuclear weapons is

the tremendous growth of conventional arms in the world.  Between 1976 and

1983, lesser developed countries purchased over $233 billion worth of

assorted armaments, including 17,310 tanks and self-propelled guns, 19,210

artillery pieces, and 32,816 armored personnel carriers.(45)  As Chart

demonstrates, there are 42 countries in the world that possess at least a

division of tanks. The Armor 2000  white paper states the following:

              Since sales of the full range of modern weapons to Third World

nations continue unabated, the US Army must be ready to fight an intense and

destructive battle anywhere in the world.  Central and South America, Africa,

Southwest Asia, Southeast  Asia, Korea, as well as the traditional battlefields of

Europe, are all possible areas for employment of Armor forces.(46)

 

       Obviously, if we have to fight such battles we will want to win them, but

our first objective is to deter the conflict from occurring at all. The limitations of

light forces fighting an enemies heavy forces were articulated  recently by

General Otis:

              When a military operator knows that in a troubled hot spot to which

he is committed the potential enemies have mobile armored forces, he must

have armored and mechanized forces on his side.  The so-called light US forces

can give good early defensive account of themselves in a fight against heavy

armored enemy forces, but they would not be able to sustain it for long, nor

would they be able to launch offensive actions without our own heavy forces

available.(47)

 

       The military imperative dictated by the worldwide armor threat is that we

must be able to match, and thereby deter,  the combat power and tactical

mobility of an enemy force with a similarly destructive armored force of our own.

       In addition to the lethality that our future enemies will probably possess,

they will also have the advantage of fighting us in the vicinity of their own

homeland.  This probable "home field advantage" affords our adversary such

advantages as interior lines of communication, shorter supply lines, and greater

familiarity with the terrain and weather. We will not have the luxury of time to

acclimatize our soldiers and conduct extensive training after arriving in a crisis

area, contrary to the example of the Persian Gulf war.  Future adversaries will

recognize that a US military commitment is weakest during the early stages of a

conflict, so they will seek to achieve their military objectives before a massive

buildup of American troops and supplies can occur.  This implies that soldiers

and their equipment arrive in the crisis area in a high state of readiness.

       Another probable characteristic of the threat is that the enemy will try to

extend the duration of the conflict.  During the recent gulf clash, a primary

strategy of Saddam Hussein's was to prolong the conflict and maximize the cost

in lives and resources required to expel his forces from Kuwait.  While his forces

were crushed by a month of aerial bombardment and a 100-hour ground war,

Hussein succeeded in making the coalition's campaign against him very

expensive and lengthy; Saudi Arabia alone has incurred a $64 billion war debt,

and the US has had hundreds of thousands of soldiers in the gulf for many

months.(48)

       Despite the extended duration of the war, the gulf clash was clearly an

optimistic test.  VADM Paul Butcher of TRANSCOM has pointed out that the

host country provided outstanding  support that we cannot count on in the

future.(49)  Massive quantities of water, food, construction materials, and fuel

were provided by the Saudi's, and logisticians enjoyed excellent air facilities

and modern ports that could dock six ships simultaneously.(50)  Despite the

attention that Pentagon planners have long given to the severing of our supply

lines by  potential enemies, our resupply assets enjoyed safe passage to the

Saudi theater.(51)   Our next conflict may not provide us with an ally like Saudi

Arabia, or an adversary as limited in sea power, air power, and strategic

positioning as Iraq.  We must plan for an extended and isolated war and ensure

sustainability is built into any projected force.

 

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military must respond. The US must possess: (1) the global strateciic mobility

sufficient to move forces anywhere in the world; (2) rapid force closure ability;

(3) the flexibility to respond to the entire spectrum of confrontation intensities;

(4) the ability to fight two wars at the same time; and the possession of forces

the can be projected with (5) combat power and mobility, that are in (6) a high

state of readiness, and (7) are self-sustaining.

 

REDUCING THE GAP AND MEETING THE THREAT - AFSMPS

               

       Operation Desert Shield identify the extent of the present combat power

projection gap, and the nature of the threat provides military imperatives that

attest to the urgency of reducing this gap as soon as possible.  A new concept

in strategic mobility and power projection, the AFSMPS program, will help this

nation meet the seven challenges posed by the threat and substantially reduce

the time required to project a credible heavy force.

       AFSMPS relies on two recent success stories, the MPS and FSS

programs, to provide a valuable new weapon to our strategic mobility arsenal.

The proposed AFSMPS consists equipment and 30 days of supplies for a

Mechanized Infantry Brigade (MIB) equipment prepositioned on three large 33-

knot FSS ships based in Diego Garcia.  In the event of crisis, the ships would be

sent to the desired port or beach area and the preloaded equipment would be

offloaded at either a secure port or beach in the crisis area. A fly-in echelon

(FIE) from a rotating standby MIB from the 24th ID(M) (the heavy division from

the XVIII Airborne Corps) would land in the contingency area and link up with

the offloaded equipment.  Ten days after arrival, this AFSMPS MIB would be

combat ready and prepared to take on a Soviet Tank Division.

       Any program that advocates the construction of ships will improve our

global strategic mobility.  Since AFSMPS envisions building three new ships,

this cannot help but improve our ability to move military assets to a distant

contingency.  However, the primary advantage provided by AFSMPS is not

merely getting to a crisis area, but getting there faster. The military imperative

of rapid force closure is benefitted by this new proposal by improving our

proximity to a crisis and reducing both the transit time and load-up time

required.

       The AFSMPS proposal envisions stationing prepositioning ships and

equipment as close as possible to likely areas of employment. Chart II shows

the distance from four principle US staging areas to the three regional "hot

      

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spots" discussed earlier.  Using the cost-cutting assumption that the US can

only afford one such AFSMPS MIB, Diego Garcia is the optimal location for the

AFSMPS home base.  The Diego Garcia facility is, on average, 38% or 2889

miles closer to the major port within each region than any of the other staging

locations.(52)  This close proximity represents an average reduction of four days

sailing time required for an FSS ship, and six less transit days for a standard

RRF vessel.  One of the great advantages maritime prepositioning affords is that

the force could be sailed even closer than Diego Garcia if the intelligence

community can provide some advance warning, so the AFSMPS option

represents even more potential time savings from proximity to a crisis.

       The tremendous capability of the new FSS ships is its sailing speed.

Steam-driven SL-7 ships averaged 27 knots making 8600 mile trips from

Savannah to Dharan during Desert Shield, reducing the transit time from 30

days for many slower RRF ships to less than 12 days.(53) General Wagner

recently wrote that "the US cannot afford to depend on old, slow, poorly

maintained ships from the RRF to project forces in our national interests to

contingency areas worldwide."(54) It is impossible to measure the value of

reducing even a few days from the transit time; we hope to have the luxury of

methodically moving our assets to the desired theater, but the nature of the

threat is such that a few days saved will probably be crucial to the successful

resolution of the conflict.  Armor 2000 points out that "a tank platoon landed on

Day 1 may be more critical than an armored division landed on Day 30."(55) The

importance on using the new FSS technology to reduce transit time cannot be

over-emphasized.

       According to the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank Kelso, "the

biggest problem with sealift is loading time."(56)  During the recent deployment of

the 24th lD(M), many problems were associated with this phase of the

deployment.  One can easily imagine the complexities associated with a no-

notice deployment; the FSS was able to deploy to Savannah and the 24th

succeeded in receiving, loading, and discharging the first of ten ships carrying

their equipment in only nine days.  However, this relatively fast load-up time was

achieved loading an FSS RO/RO ship, a faster-loading vessel than conventional

RRF ships.  Load-up of the other divisions deployed during Desert Shield took

longer.(57)  Since AFSMPS, like the Marine Corps MPS, involves prepositioned

ships with preloaded equipment, the rapid force closure requirement is greatly

enhanced by avoiding the challenging load-up requirement.

 

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Chart III shows the reduced closure time achieved by AFSMPS over two

other possible alternatives.  The "FSS" column represents our present best-

case strategic mobility assets, and "AMPS" identifies the Army Maritime

Prepositioned Ships alternative, a duplication the Marine MPS concept with 20-

knot prepositioned ships in Diego Garcia.  This chart clearly depicts the benefit

accrued by proximity, transit speed, and preloading, as the Brigade Ready Date

in the three critical regions for a MIB is improved an average of 43%. This large

reduction occurs despite the assumption that the AFSMPS ships are no closer

to the deployment area than Diego Garcia.  General Otis clearly recognized the

potential for rapid force closure when he wrote that the SL-7 ships with "their

33-knot speed and RO/RO configuration make them ideally suited for moving

heavy forces."(58)  The 46-day heavy force combat power projection gap

identified during Desert Storm is reduced a remarkable 70% to only 13.6 days.

Even in the worst-case theater, Europe, the time savings are considerable.

       The proposed AFSMPS program will improve the US capacity to meet the

military imperative of flexible response in several ways.  From a security

viewpoint, floating AFSMPS ships offer a less exposed target to terrorists than

forward based units or equipment.(59)  Prepositioned ships aid the low end of the

confrontation spectrum by giving the commander the opportunity to move his

equipment assets to a less dangerous area, an option not available if the

equipment is stored in a warehouse or motor pool.  At the opposite end of the

range of possible conventional threats the US may face, AFSMPS MIB allows us

quickly mount a serious challenge to a well-armed opponent.

       AFSMPS serves the vague middle ground of confrontation, too.  The

Marine Corps has recently  investigated the flexibility provided by selective

offload of assets from the MPS squadron, and constructed modules that are

able to respond across the "broad range of contingencies from disaster relief to

combat situations below the threshold of total MEB commitment."(60)  For

example, one of MPS support packages is a humanitarian assistance module;

under this scenario, selective engineering and logistics assets are offloaded

from the MPF in order to help construct roads, rebuild schools and medical

facilities, and supply food and water to local inhabitants.(61)   Similar support

modules could be constructed for AFSMPS.

      The political benefit of AFSMPS flexibility is considerable.  Between

1946 and 1975 there were 215 instances in which military forces were used as a

political threat,(62) and AFSMPS would provide the US with an valuable means of

wielding political and military power. The relatively easy act of staging a potent

armored threat offshore could "perform an important diplomatic/political

function by reinforcing an ally...or deter adventurism by a hostile power."(63)

Such a exhibition tells would-be belligerents, "If you don't stop rattling your

swords, you're going to have 275 mechanized vehicles and 3500 American

soldiers fall in on you."(64)  In an interesting corollary to this advantage,

discussed in the Brooke and McCorkle study at NDU, is that such a presence "is

less threatening than a force capable of making a forcible entry; an amphibious

task force runs the risk of lowering the threshold of confrontation."(65)  The

bottom line, as articulated by General P.X. Kelley, former Commandant of the

Marine Corps, is that prepositioning affords the user great flexibility by

responding to a wide range of threats in a crisis area and in doing so serves as a

"ready-made prescription to prevent the crisis from escalating."(66)

       AFSMPS provides strategic capability that will help the nation achieve

the military imperative of fighting two wars simultaneously.  As our forward

bases are reduced, the demands on our strategic lift assets will make

responding to a single crisis difficult; response time to a second confrontation

will be significantly slower.  What would have happened if the North Koreans

had invaded South Korea on the same day Iraq invaded Kuwait?  Our strategic

lift assets would have been hard pressed to adequately meet both crises,

requiring some very hard choices by our military leadership.  However, the

AFSMPS MIB, in conjunction with the Marine MPS and the Army's airborne and

air assault divisions, could have easily provided the combat power  needed to

deter any further Iraqi advances in the gulf, thus freeing other sealift assets to

simultaneously reinforce our forward-based forces and Korean allies.

       Some advocates of the Marine MPS program, like Marine LTG Ernest

Cook, have argued that the Army doesn't need MPS because "we don't need

two Marine Corps."(67) Among the fallacies in this reasoning is the failure to

account for the dual- conflict possibility in which both the Marine MPS and

AFSMPS would fight two distinct engagements at the same time.  There is also

exceptional utility in using the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps and the MPS MEB to

meet global low-intensity challenges and augmenting the light infantry with

heavy forces from the AFSMPS MIB.  General Otis has stressed the importance

of the "early introduction of light forces followed closely by the tanks that

provide the needed punch."(68)  The AFSMPS proposal would allow military

planners to follow a light contingency force with a heavy one in a matter of days,

rather than weeks.

       The conventional lethality of the modern battlefield demands that

projected forces possess a great amount of combat power and mobility.  These

capabilities are critical not only because the many potential adversaries possess

a sizeable tank formations, but the Army's Airland Battle Doctrine considers

firepower and mobility vital components of any tactical operation.(69)   Armor 2000

states, "The bottom line is a force [must] be tailored to provide the firepower

and mobility necessary and inserted into the conflict at the right time."(70) The

AFSMPS program benefits our power projection capability by providing a

combat power and mobility with low transportation requirements.

       As demonstrated in gulf war and discussed earlier, the MPF MEB does

not have enough tanks to meet the modern threat.  At a minimum, our projected

force needs to be able to counter a Soviet Tank Division, and 30 M1A1 tanks

(under the new Table of Equipment) of the MPF MEB would not appear to match

favorably with 328 modern Russian tanks.  However, a MPF MEB possesses the

tank-killing Harrier jump-jet and F1A-18, so the issue is more complex than

merely counting tanks. Chart IV on the following page represents a straight-

forward and non-robust attempt to determine the lethality needed to equal a

Soviet tank division, and provide a means to compare the combat capabilities

and transportation requirements of live US notional units.(71) The weapon

weights shown in the left column are approximate representations of the combat

power and mobility of each weapon system against the standard of the M1A2

Main Battle Tank (with a weight coefficient of 1.0). The weapon weight is

multiplied by the number of weapon systems found in each particular unit to

obtain a weapon system score, and these system scores are total led.  Assuming

that 30 days of supplies equals 80% of each units transportation space

requirement, a composite efficiency ratio can be obtained from the unit weapon

score and the transportation requirement.  This simple methodology fails to

account for the myriad of other pertinent factors (such as weather, tactics,

leadership, weapon synergism, etc.), but is nevertheless somewhat illustrative

of several points.

       The MPF MEB, with the lowest total score, is inferior to all other units

shown in terms of combat power and mobility, and its large transportation

requirement makes it the least efficient unit evaluated.  The Armored Cavalry

Regiment (ACR) has the highest efficiency rating, but economic, training, and

doctrinal issues make it a poor choice for employment in the AFSMPS. The

Separate Armored Brigade (SAB) and the Mechanized Infantry Division (ID) both

require too much space and, therefore, too expensive to employ in the

AFSMPS program.  An AFSMPS MIB has just enough firepower and mobility to

compare favorably with the Soviet Tank Division and is very close to providing

the best ratio of combat power per thousand square feet of transportation space

required.  This analysis demonstrates that in yet another key criterion, the

AFSMPS concept improves US power projection capability.

       The AFSMPS concept ensures that the ships, the equipment the ships

carry, and the units the ships support are maintained in the highest possible

 

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state of readiness. Robert Moore, Director of Transportation Policy in the

Pentagon, testified before the House last fall and emphasized that "we need

more RO/RO ships and we need them in a high state of readiness."(72) AFSMPS

would copy the successful formula used by the Marine MPS program by using

Navy personnel of command and civilian merchant seaman to operate the three

AFSMPS ships year round.  According to the Brooke and McCorkle study,

"readiness has been build into the MPS ships themselves....Each ship is an

intermodal combination breakbulk, container, and RO/RO ship."(73)  The

movement of a potent armor force would not be hampered by a last-minute

scramble for operational ships and crews.

       A rotating brigade from the 24th ID(M) would be ideal for maximizing

AFSMPS unit readiness.  At any given time, one of the three brigades would be

on standby (although one of these brigades is presently a round out reserve

unit), its fly-in echelon personnel mentally and physically peaked for

deployment.  As shown in Figure 4, when a brigade leaves the standby phase, it

 

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would enter an administrative recovery period in which personnel issues and

post details would have priority.  The brigade would then cycle into the very

important training phase and the unit would participate in large-scale exercises

like REFORGER or conduct collective brigade training at the National Training

Center.  At all times civilian maintenance personnel on the AFSMPS ships would

conduct a rigorous maintenance and exercise program to maintain the

equipment stored on board, ensuring that if the standby unit is deployed, it will

link up with operational equipment.  Additionally, the deployed brigade will have

the tremendous luxury of having another complete set of equipment in Ft.

Stewart; any shortcomings could be augmented by using this backup set.   Such

a cyclic plan reduces the wear and tear on both the equipment and the soldiers

in the AFSMPS MlB, thus promoting unit readiness.

       The seventh military imperative, self-sustainability, will be well-served by

the AFSMPS concept.  Despite its penchant for lethality, maritime

prepositioning operations are highly logistical in nature and based on the

assumption that extensIve host nation support will not be available.(74) The

AFSMPS MIB would be accompanied by the same Forward Support Battalion

(FSB) that provides support during routine training and garrison operations.

The FSB would have support equipment loaded on the AFSMPS ships that

would enable it to direct the logistical operation and provide critical medical,

maintenance, supply, and transportation assistance.  The AFSMPS ships, built

with the same capabilities as Marine MPS ships, would have bulk storage for fuel

and water, containers with food and ammunition, and sufficient lighterage and

cargo-handling equipment to "discharge its own cargo quickly and efficiently"

either in port or in stream over a beach.(75)

       A less obvious component of the AFSMPS program's self-sustainability

prowess concerns the ability of the AFSMPS ships to discharge its cargo and

return to the strategic sealift fleet for other transportation missions.  Chart V on

the next page demonstrates how the US can exploit the tremendous transit

speed of the on AFSMPS squadron. These ships can deliver a second load of

equipment and supplies to a crisis in Southwest Asia, Europe, or Far East Asia,

on average, 13.3 days faster than either the FSS or AMPS alternative.  The

AFSMPS unit is capable of sustaining itself indefinitely in almost any part of the

world with no additional augmentation, since the ships can offload its

equipment almost anywhere and return with additional supplies within 30 days.

Furthermore, if the crisis was of such magnitude that the movement of a heavy

 

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corps was required, the AFSMPS ships could augment the FSS fleet

significantly.  According to the results displayed in Chart VI, the time required

to move the Corps to a contingency in Southwest Asia would be reduced by

20% (16.9 days) with the additional fast sealift provided by the AFSMPS fleet.

 

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       There are, of course, limitations to the use of AFSMPS.  The AFSMPS

MIB must be deployed in a benign environment, as it is incapable of conducting

a forced amphibious entry into a hostile area. The AFSMPS relies on the Navy

to provide protection from air and naval threats during transit.(76) Similarly, the

AFSMPS requires a airfield capable of landing Air Force C-5A or C-141 aircraft,

although the Air Force's new C-17, when fielded,  will considerably reduce the

runway requirements for this airfield.  Finally, the AFSMPS unit, in order to

marry up with its sealifted equipment, will require Air Force strategic airlift

support.  However, these very limitations also apply to the Marine MPS concept

and they have not proven to be overly restrictive.  In fact, regarding the airlift

support requirement, the AFSMPS is considerably less constrained.  With

16,500 personnel to lift, he MPF MEB requires 249 C5A sorties;(77) with less a

fifth of the troops in the MPF MEB, the AFSMPS MIB only needs 53 sorties.

Clearly, the AFSMPS program offers many capabilities without any significant

limitations.

 

THE UNEXPECTED SURPRISE - AFSMPS IS AFFORDABLE

 

       Despite making vital contributions to each of the threat-driven military

imperatives of the future, the AFSMPS concept is of little utility if it is not

affordable.  Contrary to what many might anticipate following the a discussion of

the capabilities and advantages of the program, AFSMPS is not prohibitively

expensive.  In fact, when compared to many defense programs, AFSMPS

appears quite economical.

       Two factors point to the inherent economy of the AFSMPS concept: (1) it

involves proven technology -- the program capitalizes on the best of recently

validated MPS and FSS concepts; and (2) it is efficient -- the deployed brigade

is large enough to pose a credible threat, yet small enough to transport its

equipment on only three ships. As with any program in its infancy, it is difficult

to predict with great precision the costs associated with the program.  However,

it is possible for examine the expected life cycle costs of AFSMPS in order to

provide more compelling evidence regarding the program's low cost.

       There are essentially three constituents of life cycle costs: research and

development costs, procurement costs, and operating costs.(78)  In the case at

hand, research and development costs are negligible, since the technology

required for AFSMPS has already been tested and validated in both the MPS

and FSS programs.

       A key aspect regarding procurement expenses is the issue of equipment

costs.   Admiral Kelso recently stated that the major expenditure in the MPF

program has been the cost of the MPF MEB's equipment.(79) Any plan that

advocates the use of an alternate set of equipment to completely outfit a

brigade-sized contingency force initially appears to be an ill-advised and

wasteful.  However, a great deal of equipment will be brought back to the US in

the next fiscal year. A recent NDU study stated that the "drawdown of units

from Europe will make available more equipment than is needed to fill the six

division sets of equipment In Prepositioned Material Configured in Unit Sets

(POMCUS) for reinforcing Europe."(80)  This surplus equipment that could be

used to outfit the AFSMPS mechanized brigade.  Once again, the costs in a

important component of the total program expenditures are almost nil.

       Another means by which AFSMPS promotes low cost concerns the

number of ships required to move the AFSMPS mechanized infantry brigade's

536,000 square feet of equipment and supplies.  An ACR would require four

ships, as would a SAB, and a mechanized ID would need 12 such ships. As

discussed and shown earlier (Chart IV), the AFSMPS brigade provides almost as

much combat power as an ACR or an AB and manages to do so using one less

ship, a attribute that obviously lowers procurement and operating costs.(81)

 

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       Chart VII above highlights the reasonable procurement and operating

costs identified with AFSMPS by comparing it to the less capable AMPS

alternative.  AMPS would involve using slower (20 knots vs. 33 knots) and

smaller (140,000 square feet of usable cargo space vs. 191,000 square feet)

ships similar to Marine MPS ships. Four AMPS ships would be needed to move

the AFSMPS brigade, but the ships are $115M less expensive.(82)   Despite the

advanced technology involved with the AFSMPS program, procurement costs

for a squadron of fast sealift prepositioning ships is only 8% higher than the

AMPS option.  Spending lust a little more money in this instance would ensure

that strategic planners get the very best.

       Equally encouraging are the operating costs expected to be incurred by

the AFSMPS program as displayed on Chart VII.  Annual operating costs of the

fast sealift ships are estimated to be almost 50% percent higher than the more

conventional MPS ships, but since only three ships need to be maintained, total

annual operating costs are only 12% higher for the advanced AFSMPS

alternative than the low-tech AMPS option.(83)   Additionally, the operating costs

per square foot of available cargo space is just a few dollars more with the

former alternative than the latter.  Operating costs for the Marine MPS are

$312M annually for its fleet of 13 ships in three locations,(84) and the POMCUS

annual operating budget is over $240M;(85) at less than $60M, the yearly

operating expenditures for the proposed AFSMPS program is a bargain.  So

reasonable, in fact, is the cost of this option that the Defense Department could

build the three high-tech AFSMPS ships, load them with all the required

equipment, and operate these ships for ten years for less money that it will take

to purchase two B-2 stealth bombers.(86)

 

AFSMPS - THE TIME IS RIPE TO REDUCE THE GAP

 

       The next several years promise to be very challenging for the US military

establishment.  Despite the tremendous success achieved during the recent

war, there exists tremendous political impetus to withdraw from forward bases

and reduce the size of the military services considerably.  Recent base

closures, force structure cuts, and program cancellations are indicative that

future financial constraints will be great, and competition for dollars in a smaller

pool of defense money will be keen.  Programs that are implemented during the

next decade will have to "get the most bang for the buck."

       The AFSMPS is such a program.  It capitalizes on two outstanding

strategic programs recently validated during the gulf war, the Marine MPS and

the Navy FSS programs.  By making tremendous contributions towards meeting

our crucial military imperatives, the AFSMPS proposal addresses the challenges

posed by the present and future threat.  AFSMPS provides much-needed focus

on the projection of heavy forces, a capability that was forgotten during the 80's

when light forces had priority.  Additionally, the program would provide a shot in

the arm to our declining maritime industry.  By capitalizing on proven

technology and promoting the use of a small and potent force, force, the

AFSMPS program is cost-effective and efficient.  The proposed concept will

reduce our present heavy force combat power projection gap by approximately

70% and allow this nation to put an credible heavy force almost anywhere in the

world in less than three weeks.

              Despite today's fiscally restrictive environment, the time is right to

promote and implement the AFSMPS Program.  Jeffrey Record wrote seven

years ago that "in no other area is the gap between US military power and

obligations greater than in the area of strategic mobility;"(87) unlike 1984, the US

military now has the proven technology to diminish this disturbing gap.  The

slow movement of US heavy forces to Saudi Arabia has provided a excellent

opportunity to resurface this issue, and L.E. Prina wrote recently that "there

appears to be growing support at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill for maritime

prepositioning ships dedicated to the Army."(88)  Political support may be on our

side, but time is clearly not, as each day the threat grows more potent. and our

heavy force power projection gap becomes wider.

       "Imagine the capability and options," a recent NDU study contemplated,

"the new FSS loaded with equipment either in US ports or on station around the

world would give the US during a crisis."(89)  Clearly, now is the time to do more

than imagine, but give careful consideration to the ambitious and cost-effective

AFSMPS concept.

 

                      FOOTNOTES

 

1       David B. Brown, LTC, USMC (Ret), "MPS: An Evolving Entity," Marine Corps

Gazette, 69 (January 1985), pp. 34-35.

 

2       David Reist, MAJ, USMC, Maritime Prepositioning Ships Office, Headquarters,

US Marine Corps, Department of the Navy.  Telephonic interview about deployment

times.  Washington D.C., 3 April 1990.

 

3       Robert Gerlaugh, MAJ, USMC, Maritime Prepositioning Ships Office,

Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Department of the Navy.  Class lecture to

Command and Staff College, Quantlco, 28 March 1990.

 

4       Charles L. Armstrong, LTC, USMC, "Early Observations on DESERT SHIELD,"

Marine Corps Gazette (January 1991), pp. 35-36.

 

5       L. Edgar Prina, "Two If By Sea, Are We Ready?" Army (December 1990), p. 14.

 

6       Francis Donovan, VADM, US Navy, Commander, Military Sealift Command,

Lecture to Command and Staff College, Quantico, March 1991.

 

7       Gerlaugh.

 

8       Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Operation Desert Shield MPS First

Impressions Report, Observation 51, p. 22.

 

9       David Steigman, "Navy Charters Foreign Flag Ships to Help in Supplying

Desert Storm," Navy Times (12 December 1990), p. 16.

 

10      Donovan.

 

11      Donovan.

 

12      Louis C. Wagner, GEN, US Army (Ret), "Our Deployment to the Persian Gulf

- Three Views," Army (November 1990), p. 18.

 

13      Prina, p. 14.

 

14      George Crist, GEN, USMC (Ret), television interview on deployment of

Marines in desert and need for tanks, CBS Evening News with Dan Rather,

Channel 9, Washington D.C., 7 December 1990.

 

15      US Marine Corps.  Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Department of the Navy. 

Marine Air-Ground Task Force Pocket Guide, FSFRP 2-5A, Washington D.C.

(16 August 1989), p. 21.

 

16      US Marine Corps, FSFRP 2-5A, p. 21.

 

17      Clay Huddleston, MAJ, USMC, television interview on deployment of

Marines in Saudi Arabia and the initial dangers, CBS Evening News with Dan

Rather, Channel 9, Washington D.C., 12 September 1990.

 

18      David Segal, "What Ever Happened to Rapid Deployment?" Armed Forces

Journal International (March 1991), pp. 39.

 

19      Armstrong, p. 36.

 

20      Prina, p. 15.

 

21      Segal, p. 39.

 

22      Glenn K. Otis, GEN, US Army (Ret), "Our Deployment to the Persian

Gulf - Three Views," Army (November 1990), pp. 11.

 

23      George C. Wilson, "Operation Highlights Weaknesses of US Forces,"

Washington Post (10 February 1991), p. A23.

 

24      Raymond Driscoll, LTC, US Army, Movements Officer, DALO-TSM, Deputy

Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department of the Army, Telephonic interview

regarding the date the 24th Infantry Division was combat ready, Washington

D.C., 6 April 1991.

 

25      John G. Roos, "While DOD Sorts Out Sealift Shortfall, Army Planners

Packaging the Force," Armed Forces Journal International (November 1990) p.18.

 

26      John J. Pomfret, CPT, USMC, "MPS: Can One Get It All?" Marine Corps

Gazette (August 1986), p. 29.

 

27      Prina, p. 14.

 

28      Donovan.

 

29      Prina,  p. 14.

 

30      Prina, p. 14.

 

31      Otis, p. 12.

 

32      Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the

Congress, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., p. v.

 

 

33      Kenneth M. Jenkins, COL, US Army, Enhancing Strategic Mobility: 

Applying Lessons From the Past, US Army War College Study, Carlisle Barracks, 1

0 May 1989.

 

34      Robert W. Kesteloot, "Fast Sealift Ships Program: All Ahead Slow," Sea

Power (May 1990), p. 18.

 

35      Douglas Amman, Defense Intelligence Analyst, Pacific Branch, Defense

Intelligence Agency, Lecture to Command and Staff on Korea, Quantico,14 March 1990.

 

36      Cheney, p. vi.

 

37      Prina, p. 14.

 

38      George M. Brooke, LTC, USMC, and Frederick McCorkle, LTC, USMC, The

Strategic Implications of Maritime Prepositioning Ships as a Rapid Force

Option, National War College, National Defense University, Ft. McNair,

Washington D.C., March, 1985, p. 9.

 

39      Amman.

 

40      U5 Army Armor Center, Armor 2000: A Balanced Force for the Army of

the Future, White Paper, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 10 July 1990, p. 14.

 

41      Armstrong, p. 35.

 

42      Amman.

 

43      Cheney, p. 5.

 

44      Frank Kelso, ADM, US Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Department of

the Navy, Lecture delivered to Command and Staff College, Ouantico, January

1991.

 

45      Michael E. Dick, MAJ, USMC, Major Weapons and Minor Wars, Expository

Paper written for Command and Staff College writing requirement,

September 1990.

 

46      Armor 2000, p. 9.

 

47      Otis, p. 12.

 

48      David B. Ottaway, "Saudis, Said to Owe $64 Billion, Scrape to Meet

Obligations," Washington Post (3 April 1991), p. A25.

 

49      Prina, p. 14.

 

50      Gerlaugh.

 

51      Wilson, p. A23.

 

52      Pomfret, p. 30.

 

53      Prina, p. 16.

 

54      Wagner, p. 18.

 

55      Armor 2000, p.17.

 

56      Kelso.

 

57      Prina, p. 16.

 

58      Otis, p. 12.

 

59      Brooke and McCorkle, pp. 9-10.

 

60      Charles M. Lohman, COL, USMC, "Refining the MPF," Marine Corps

Gazette (April 1990), pp. 23-24.

 

61      Lohman, p. 24.

 

62      Brooke and McCorkle, p. 26.

 

63      Brown, p. 35.

 

64      Brown, p. 36.

 

65      Brooke and McCorkle, p. 21.

 

66      Arthur Mullins, "Maritime Prepositioning Operations," The Military

Engineer (March-April 1988), 520, p. 113.

 

67      Rick Atkinson, "Bush Plan to Cut Forces Scrutinized Amid Crisis,"

Washington Post (23 Dec 1990), p. Al.

 

68      Otis, p. 12.

 

69      US Army.  Headquarters, Department of the Army.  Operations, 

FM 100-5, Washington D.C. (5 May 1986), pp. 12-13.

 

70      Armor 2000, p. 16.

 

71      Francis Devoraux, LCDR, Strategic Mobility Staff Officer, US Navy,

OP-42, Department of the Navy, Telephonic interview regarding ship costs and

unit transportation requirements, Washington D.C., 28 December 1990.

 

72      Prina, p. 18.

 

73      Brooke and McCorkle, p. 9.

 

74      Brown, p. 37.

 

75      Brown, p. 38.

 

76      Pomfret, p. 29.

 

77      Pomfret, p. 28.

 

78      US Army War College, Army Command  and Management, 1988-1989, US Army

War College, Carlisle Barracks (26 August 1988), pp. 17-18

 

79      Kelso.

 

80      Jenkins, p. 18.

 

81      Devoraux.

 

82      Devoraux.

 

83      Devoraux.

 

84      Atkinson, p. A18.

 

85      Michael Bossi, MAJ, US Army, DAMO-ODO, Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations, Department of the Army, Telephone conversation about POMCUS

costs, Washington D.C., 28 December 1990.

 

86      Prina, p. 21.

 

87      Jeffrey Record.  Revising US Military Strategy.  Washington: Pergamon-

Brassey's, 1984, p.12.

 

88      Prina, p. 21.

 

89 J    enkins, p. 19.

 

 

                             BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

1.      Amman, Douglas. Korea Defense Briefing and Lecture.  Command and

Staff College. 14 March 1990.

 

2.      Armor 2000: A Balanced Force for the Army of the Future, White Paper,

US Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky, 10 July 1990, p. 14.

 

3.      Army Command and Management. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks

(26 August 1988), 17-18.

 

4.      Armstrong, LTC Charles L. "Early Observations on DESERT SHIELD,"

Marine Corps Gazette, 75 (January 1991), pp. 35-38.

 

5.      Atkinson, Rick.  "Bush Plan to Cut Forces Scrutinized Amid Crisis,"

Washington Post (23 Dec 1990), Al.

 

6.      Bossi, MAJ Michael.  Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Department of

the Army, Telephone conversation about POMCUS costs, Washington D.C., 28

December 1990.

 

7.      Brooke, LTC George, and LTC Frederick Mccorkle.  The Strategic

Implications of Maritime Prepositioning Ships as a Rapid Force Option, National

War College, National Defense University, Ft. McNair, Washington D.C., March,

1985.

 

8.      Brown, LTC David B., "MPS: An Evolving Entity," Marine Corps Gazette,

69 (January 1985), pp. 34-35.

 

9.      Cheney, Dick.  Annual Report to the President and the Congress - 1991.

February 1991.

 

10.     Crist, GEN (Ret) George. Television interview on deployment of Marines

in desert and need for tanks, CBS Evening News with Dan Rather, 7 December

1990.

 

11.     Devoraux, LCDR Francis, OP-42, Department of the Navy. Telephonic

and personal interviews regarding ship costs and unit transportation

requirements, Washington D.C., 2-29 December 1990.

 

12.     Dick, MAJ Michael E.  Major Weapons and Minor Wars, Expository Paper

written for Command and Staff College writing requirement.  September 1990.

 

13.     Donovan, VADM Francis. Commander, Military Sealift Command, Lecture

On Desert Storm Deployment.  Command and Staff College.  March 1991.

 

14.     Driscoll, LTC Raymond.  Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Department

of the Army.  Telephonic interview regarding the date the 24th Infantry Division

was combat ready, Washington D.C., 6 April 1991.

 

15.     FM 100-5, Operations, S Army.  Headquarters, Department of the Army.

(5 May 1986).12-13.

 

16.     FSFRP 2-5A, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Pocket Guide.  US Marine

Corps.  Headquarters, US Marine Corps (16 August 1989), 21.

 

17.     Gerlaugh, MAJ Robert.  Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Department of

the Navy.  Class lecture to Command and Staff College on MPS. 28 March 1990.

 

18.     Huddleston, MAJ Clay. television interview on deployment of Marines in

Saudi Arabia and the initial dangers, CBS Evenino News with Dan Rather, 12

September  1990.

 

19.     Jenkins, COL Kenneth M.  Enhancing Strategic Mobility: Applying Lessons

From the Past, US Army War College Study, Carlisle Barracks.  May 1989.

 

20.     KeIso, ADM Frank, US Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, Department of

the Navy. Lecture delivered on Roles and Missions of Navy in Pacific.  Command

and Staff College. January 1991.

 

21.     Kesteloot, Robert W.  "Fast Sealift Ships Program: All Ahead Slow," Sea

Power (May 1990), p. 18.

 

22.     Lohman, COL Charles L. "Refining the MPF," Marine Corps Gazette 74

(April 1990), 23-24.

 

23.     Mullins, Arthur.  "Maritime Prepositioning Operations." The Military

Engineer 520 (March-April 1988), 13.

 

24.     Operation Desert Shield MPS First Impressions Report.  Report

published by Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Observation 51, 22.

 

25.     Otis, GEN (Ret) Glenn K. "Our Deployment to the Persian Gulf - Three

Views," Army, 67 (November 1990), 11-13.

 

26.     Ottaway, David B.  "Saudis, Said to Owe $64 Billion, Scrape to Meet

Obligations," Washington Post (3 April 1991), A25.

 

27.     Pomfret, CPT John J. "MPS: Can One Get It All?" Marine Corps Gazette

August 1986), 29.

 

28.     Prina, L. Edgar."Two If By Sea, Are We Ready?" Army, 67 (December

1990),  12-21.

 

29.     Reist, MAJ David.  Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Department of the

Navy.  TeIephonic interviews about deployment times for MPF MEB.

Washington D.C., March - April 1990.

 

30.     Record, Jeffrey.  Revising US Military Strategy.  Washington: Pergamon-

Brassey's, 1984.

 

31.     Roos, John G. "While DOD Sorts Out Sealift Shortfall, Army Planners

Packaging the Force," Armed Forces Journal International, 121 (November

1990)17-19.

 

32.     Segal, David.  "What Ever Happened to Rapid Deployment?" Armed

Forces Journal International, 121 (March 1991), 39.

 

33.     Steigman, David.  "Navy Charters Foreign Flag Ships to Help in Supplying

Desert Storm," Navy Times (12 December 1990), 16-17.

 

34.     Wagner, GEN Louis C., US Army (Ret), "Our Deployment to the Persian

Gulf - Three Views," Army. 67 (November 1990), 16-18.

 

35.     Whitener, Carr.  OP-42, Department of the Navy, Telephonic and

personal interviews regarding ship costs and unit transportation requirements,

Washington D.C. December 1990 - March1990.

 

36.     Wilson, George C. "Operation Highlights Weaknesses of US Forces,"

Washington Post (10 February 1991), A23.